Judgment : 1. This petition was earlier dismissed for non-prosecution on 09.12.2004. The application filed seeking recall of that order along with an application for condonation of delay were rejected on 04.02.2010. An appeal in W.A.No.3558/2010 was filed against the said order. The Hon'ble Division Bench by the order dated 21.10.2011 has allowed the appeal and restored this petition for consideration. Accordingly, the petition being restored is taken up for consideration. In the meanwhile, the first petitioner is reported to be dead and petitioners No. 2 to 4, the legal representatives who are already on record are treated to be so. 2. The brief facts are that the land bearing Sy.No.342 of Gowthamapura Village, Sagar Taluk, Shimoga District, was Inam lands which vested in the Government on coming into force of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954, with effect from 01.02.1959. Prior to the same, the predecessor of petitioners No. 1 to 4 viz., Gurumurthy Rao on negotiating with the Inamdars purchased the tree growth in the said forest land under a sale deed dated 12.09.1958 for Rs.10,000/-. The tree growth was agreed to be removed within a period of three years. However, before the completion of the said period, the Act came into force and the lands vested in the Government. Therefore, an application was made to the Government and also to the Divisional and Deputy Commissioner to permit him to remove the timber and fuel wood as contemplated under Section 14 of the Act. The permission granted was however for the value of Rs.10,000/-, less the extent of timber already removed. Since according to late Gurumurthy Rao, the right to timber was not in terms of the value, but it was to be removed over a period for which it was agreed with the Inamdar, he filed a writ petition before this Court in W.P.No.591/1978. The said petition was disposed of on 8/10.07.1986 directing the authorities to permit removal of timber and fuel wood for a period of 10 months which was considered to be the remaining period. The said order has attained finality. 3. The said petition was disposed of on 8/10.07.1986 directing the authorities to permit removal of timber and fuel wood for a period of 10 months which was considered to be the remaining period. The said order has attained finality. 3. When this was the position and the Deputy Conservator of Forests in obedience to the order passed in W.P.No.591/1978 had issued the official memorandum dated 04.06.1987 permitting the petitioners to cut and remove timber and fire wood for a period of 10 months, the same was questioned by one Sri Jayanna by filing a writ petition in public interest in W.P.No.17496/1989 so as to protect the environment by preventing denudation of forest. In the meanwhile, the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1996, inserting Section 14-A was notified on 19.04.1996. The third petitioner herein assailed the said amendment by filing W.P.No.26407/1996. The said petition was clubbed with W.P.No.17496/1989 filed in public interest. They were disposed of by the common order dated 13.03.1998. The petition filed by the third respondent herein in W.P.No.26407/1996 was dismissed as withdrawn leaving open the points that had been raised. The petition filed in public interest was allowed and the official memorandum dated 04.06.1987 which was issued in favour of the petitioners herein, in implementation of the order passed in W.P.No.591/1978 was set aside. However, the authorities of the State were directed to pass fresh orders in terms of the directions issued in W.P.No.591/1978 keeping in view the prevalent law, rules and the judgments of various High Courts and the Apex Court. Pursuant thereto, the third respondent herein has issued the official memorandum dated 03.08.1998 and ordered that the request of the petitioners for removing timber and fire wood cannot be considered. The petitioners in addition to assailing the said order have sought for declaration that Section 2 of Act No. 10 of 1996 is unconstitutional and void. 4. In the above background, I have heard Sri Ravikumar Gokakakar, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Jagadish Mundargi, learned Additional Government Advocate for the respondents and perused the petition papers. 5. The petitioners in addition to assailing the said order have sought for declaration that Section 2 of Act No. 10 of 1996 is unconstitutional and void. 4. In the above background, I have heard Sri Ravikumar Gokakakar, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Jagadish Mundargi, learned Additional Government Advocate for the respondents and perused the petition papers. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner while contending that the amendment by insertion of Section 14-A to the Act is unsustainable as it seeks to overreach the orders of the Court and that it cannot be retrospective, has relied on the following decisions: (i) The case of State of Tamil Nadu -vs-Sri Thirumagal Mills and Others ( AIR 1972 SC 1148 ) wherein the amendment made to Madras General Sales Tax Act was in issue. Section 9 therein with non- obstante clause was introduced so as to take away the effect of judgment, decree or order so as to make the collection of tax as valid. The question was as to whether the assessments were validly protected. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the amendment therein is only prospective. ii) The case of State of Haryana and Others -vs- The Karnal Co-op. Farmer's Society Ltd., ( AIR 1994 SC 1 ) wherein the amendment made to Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation) Act was in issue. The Court decrees had held that certain lands and immovable properties fell outside 'Shamilat deh'. Amendment was brought in where it provided for the Assistant Collector to decide claims ignoring the decree. It was held unconstitutional as it encroaches upon the judicial power. (iii) The case of State of Tamil Nadu -vs-Arooran Sugars Ltd., [ (1997) 1 SCC 326 ] wherein it was held that the power to amend, delete or obliterate a statute or provision with retrospective effect is available provided it does not violate Article 14. An earlier decision is referred therein in which it is held that the law must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution today taking into account the accrued or acquired rights of the parties today. The law cannot say twenty years ago the parties had no rights, therefore the requirements of the Constitution will be satisfied, if the law is dated back by twenty years. The concern should be today's rights and not yesterdays. The law cannot say twenty years ago the parties had no rights, therefore the requirements of the Constitution will be satisfied, if the law is dated back by twenty years. The concern should be today's rights and not yesterdays. (iv) The case of Peddiniti Venkata Murali Ranganatha Desika Iyengar and Others -vs-Government of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1996 SC 966 ) wherein the provision without removing the foundation of the judgments rendered by the High Court, the legislature sought to destroy the effect of the law in Inams Abolition Act on erroneous belief or assumption that it did not bind the religious or charitable institutions or endowment or that the holder of land did not acquire title or no patta land was granted to him and the land was still with the institution and the provision which treated the occupant as encroacher was disapproved. (v) The case of A.V. Nachane and Another -vs-Union of India ( AIR 1982 SC 1126 ) wherein the attempt made to supersede the settlements insofar as they related to the payment of bonus by enacting the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act, was held not to be retrospective. It was held that any such supersession could only have future effect, but not retrospective effect so as to disentitle Class III and IV Employees of LIC from receiving cash bonus which had been earned by them. (vi) The case of B. Krishna Bhat -vs-State of Karnataka (2001 AIR SCW 1485) wherein the exercise of judicial power by the legislature was disapproved and it was held that the legislature cannot reverse the finding of the Court. Legislatures overruling or ignoring finding of fact by High Court is not proper. 6. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has relied on the decision in the case of Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd., -vs-Broach Borough Municipality and Others ( AIR 1970 SC 192 ) wherein the Gujarat Imposition of Taxes by Municipalities (Validation) Act, 1963, was in issue whereby the validation of collection was made, since the collection had been held by the Court as illegal. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that validation of a tax so declared illegal may be done only if the grounds of illegality or invalidity are capable of being removed and are in fact removed and the tax thus made legal. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that validation of a tax so declared illegal may be done only if the grounds of illegality or invalidity are capable of being removed and are in fact removed and the tax thus made legal. It is further held that if the legislature has the power over the subject matter and competence to make a valid law, it can at any time make such a valid law and make it retrospectively so as to bind even past transactions. Reliance is also placed on the case of M/s. Hindustan Gum and Chemicals Ltd. -vs-State of Haryana and Others ( AIR 1985 SC 1683 ) wherein it is held that it is now well settled that it is permissible for a competent legislature to overcome the effect of a decision of a Court setting aside the imposition of tax by passing a suitable legislation amending the relevant provisions of the statute concerned with retrospective effect, thus taking away the basis on which the decision of the Court had been rendered and by enacting an appropriate provision validating the levy and collection of tax made before the decision in question was rendered. 7. From the decisions noticed above, the validation as indicated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is permissible if the legislature has the competence to enact such law. Further, with regard to the amendment made to the existing law, it has been held that it cannot be made retrospective without the basis of the judgment being removed but the power to enact law retrospectively is also recognized in the circumstances stated. In that background, it is necessary to notice the nature of the amendment made in the instant case by insertion of Section 14-A to the Act. In that background, it is necessary to notice the nature of the amendment made in the instant case by insertion of Section 14-A to the Act. The provision reads as hereunder: "14-A. BAR TO ENFORCE RIGHT CREATED IN FOREST.-Notwithstanding anything contained in section 14 or in any judgment, decree or order of any court or in any contract, agreement or instrument having force by virtue of any law or in any permission, approval or sanction given or order made by Government or any officer or authority.- (a) any right in any forest created by a transaction which is deemed to be valid under sub-section (1) of section 14, and any obligation arising thereunder, on and after the date of commencement of the Mysore Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1996 shall not be enforceable against the Government; (b) no suit or other proceeding shall be instituted maintained or continued against the Government in any Court or before any authority for enforcement of such right or obligation or recovery of any amount by way of reimbursement, damages or indemnification; (c) all suits or proceedings pending on the said date against the Government for the enforcement of such rights or obligations or recovery of any such amount shall abate." 8. By the said amendment, what has been taken away is the enforceability of the right in respect of any forest created by a transaction under Sub-Section (1) of Section 14, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court or in any contract. Such enforceability is taken away on and after the date of the commencement of the amendment. Therefore, in effect it is prospective inasmuch as it does not seek to nullify all acts that have been granted by judgment, decree or order and has already been enforced. It is only the enforceability from and after the date of the amendment i.e., from 18.04.1996 that it has prevented with the intention of preserving the forest and environment. 9. Despite the above conclusion, this Court while considering the claim of the petitioners herein at this juncture cannot loose sight of the earlier proceedings relating to the very same subject matter based on the claim of the petitioner, though presently what is challenged is the order dated 03.08.1998 and also the provision contained in the amended Section 14-A of the Act. By filing the petition in W.P.No.591/1978, the petitioners had sought to enforce the right that was available under Section 14 (1) of the Act and the learned Judge by the order dated 8/10.07.1986 had not directed merely the consideration of the case of the petitioners, but what was directed is to permit the legal representatives of the petitioner (i.e., the petitioners herein) to cut and remove timber and fuel wood for the period of 10 months from the date to be specified by the authorities. If the said direction alone is kept in view, the Deputy Conservator of Forests had no other option, but to pass the order dated 04.06.1987 in the manner it was done by permitting the petitioners to cut and remove timber and firewood for 10 months. What is to be kept in perspective is also that the order in W.P.No.591/1978 dated 8/10.07.1986 and the order of the Authority implementing the same is dated 04.06.1987 i.e., both are before the date of the amendment on 18.04.1996. Nevertheless, though the order in W.P.No.591/1978 has remained undisturbed, the said order dated 04.06.1987 passed by the Deputy Conservator of Forests implementing the order made in the writ petition was set aside by the Hon'ble Division Bench in W.P.No.17496/1989. Hence, that aspect would become highly relevant to be kept in view in the instant facts while considering the correctness or otherwise of the impugned order dated 03.08.1998 and not merely the order passed in W.P.No.591/1978 since much water has flown under the bridge changing its course. Unlike any other right, what is sought to be enforced herein is the right to tree growth which was purchased about 55 years prior to this day and in normal course the period of three years would have been over 52 years ago. Even the order in the writ petition was about 25 years ago. The position would be totally altered when the tree growth in a natural habitat is to be considered and the entire issue relating to preservation of forests has undergone change as a matter of policy. 10. Even the order in the writ petition was about 25 years ago. The position would be totally altered when the tree growth in a natural habitat is to be considered and the entire issue relating to preservation of forests has undergone change as a matter of policy. 10. In that regard, it is to be noticed that the contention on behalf of the petitioner in W.P.No.17496/1989 that the order in W.P.No.591/1978 was procured by way of misrepresentation or fraud was not adjudicated and to that extent, the Hon'ble Division Bench presumed that the said order in W.P.No.591/1978 was valid and legal having a binding force upon the respondent-State. Though that is the position and I have also noticed and indicated above that there was specific direction issued by the order in W.P.No.591/1978, the Hon'ble Division Bench on the other hand has observed that the direction issued therein was to pass appropriate orders regarding felling, cutting and removal of trees in accordance with Rules which would presumably imply the law as well. The further observation therein is also that both the parties have contended that the order dated 04.06.1987 which was impugned therein at Annexure-H has been passed completely ignoring the directions of the Court, the provisions of law applicable in the case and various pronouncements of the Apex Court and the High Courts. Thereafter the Hon'ble Division Bench has noticed the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1997 SC 1228 and emphasized the position that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has the mandate of law in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution. With the said observations, the order dated 04.06.1987 i.e., Annexure-H to that petition was quashed and the respondent authorities were directed in the following manner: "8. Under the circumstances, Writ Petition No. 17496/89 is allowed by setting aside the impugned order Annexure-H. Rule issued is made absolute. The authorities of the respondent-State are directed to pass fresh orders in terms of the directions issued in Writ Petition No.591/78 keeping in view the prevalent law, rules and the Judgments of various High Courts and Apex Court within a period of three months. Both parties shall be at liberty to appear before the competent authority in support of their rival contentions regarding the implementation of directions issued in Writ Petition No.591/78." 11. Both parties shall be at liberty to appear before the competent authority in support of their rival contentions regarding the implementation of directions issued in Writ Petition No.591/78." 11. While taking note of the direction extracted above, what is also to be kept in perspective is that the order was passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench on 13.03.1998 and the amendment to the Act vide Section 14-A already having come into force much prior to that date was also challenged by the third petitioner herein in W.P.No.26407/1996 which had been clubbed with W.P.No.17496/1989. Despite the same, the petitioners herein apart from conceding to a position of the order dated 04.06.1987, Annexure-H being quashed and the matter being reconsidered as per the law prevalent, rules and the judgment of the various High Courts and the Apex Court, did not choose to press for consideration of the third petitioner's claim in W.P.No.26407/1996 though an observation was made that the points raised are kept open. When the amendment dated 18.04.1996 had been assailed and when adjudication of the same was not sought despite the same being relevant and the matter was to be reconsidered in the manner as directed by the Hon'ble Division Bench by keeping in view the prevalent law as well, the respondent-authorities were required to keep all aspects including the amended provision which was the prevalent law in view while passing the order. 12. In that light, a perusal of the impugned order dated 03.08.1998 would disclose that the second respondent has kept in view the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the prevailing statutory provision in perspective and made detailed consideration. Firstly, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of T.N.Godavarman Thirmulkpad -vs- Union of India ( AIR 1997 SC 1233 ) and the various directions issued therein would not permit felling of trees in any thickly wooded area. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the area concerned is a 'forest' and felling of trees cannot be permitted in such forest. Further, though the order passed in W.P.No.591/1978 was held as legal and valid by the Hon'ble Division Bench, the nature of consideration directed by the learned Single Judge in the order dated 8/10.07.1986 is eclipsed by a different nature of consideration as ordered by the Hon'ble Division Bench. Further, though the order passed in W.P.No.591/1978 was held as legal and valid by the Hon'ble Division Bench, the nature of consideration directed by the learned Single Judge in the order dated 8/10.07.1986 is eclipsed by a different nature of consideration as ordered by the Hon'ble Division Bench. A proper understanding of the order will disclose that the Hon'ble Division Bench intended that the law prevalent at the time of reconsideration as ordered by the Hon'ble Division Bench is to be kept in view. This conclusion is inevitable since if that was not the intention, there was no reason for the Hon'ble Division Bench to quash the order dated 04.06.1987 which was impugned before it. The second respondent has accordingly kept in view these aspects and taken note of Section 14-A of the Amendment Act also and arrived at his conclusion. Hence, in such circumstance, when there can be no dispute that the contract for felling of trees regarding which the petitioners had entered into transaction with the Inamdar is frustrated due to change in the status of land and the legal position and the judicial pronouncements, the question of the State Government becoming liable to undertake valuation of the tree growth and pay money in lieu thereof as sought in I.A.No.1/2012 also does not arise. 13. Therefore, in a circumstance where the order passed in favour of the petitioners in W.P.No.591/1978 was eclipsed by the order passed by a Hon'ble Division Bench in W.P.No.17496/1989 and the relief granted had been watered down and the nature of reconsideration by the competent authority was qualified, I see no error in the manner of consideration made by the second respondent in passing the impugned order. Hence, the order dated 03.08.1998 does not call for interference. In the result, the petition and I.A.No.1/2012 are dismissed with no order as to costs.