JUDGMENT : Navin Shah, J. We have heard Learned AAG 8 for the Appellant and Sri Dhirendra Kumar Jha, Advocate, on behalf of the respondent. The present Appeal arises from order dated 27.01.2009 dismissing C.W.J.C. No. 5766 of 2001, declining interference with the Award dated 29.04.1999 passed by the Labour Court in Reference Case No. 02 of 1993 directing reinstatement of the respondent as a permanent workman with regular pay scale. 2. Learned Senior counsel for the Appellant submitted that the respondent was appointed on daily wage. He raised an industrial dispute that his removal was in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') asserting that he had completed more than 240 days in service. In Reference Case No. 06 of 1987 the Labour Court held that the respondent was entitled to reinstatement. The respondent filed C.W.J.C. No. 12736 of 1992 for implementation of the Award. The Court referred the award to the Labour Court u/s 36A of the Act. Reference Case No. 02 of 1993 was instituted afresh and specific directions issued for a permanent appointment in a regular pay scale. Thus the writ petition leading to the order under appeal. 3. The appointment on daily wage being outright illegal the reinstatement ordered in Reference Case No. 6 of 1987 was unsustainable. The respondent in the facts was not even entitled to reinstatement on daily wage which also has to be subject to the requirement of the Management. The Labour Court did not have the jurisdiction u/s 36A of the Act to re-write the Award. The jurisdiction was confined only to clarification of ambiguity, if any, in the original Award. 4. Learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Award dated 05.12.1989 in Reference Case No. 06 of 1987 attained finality as the Appellant did not challenge the same. It must be given full effect. The Appellant cannot collaterally challenge that Award in the present appeal. The order u/s 36A of the Act was at the behest of the Appellant. The Tribunal has held that removal was unjustified and contrary to law. The ambiguity whether it was a reinstatement as daily wage or in permanent capacity has now been clarified by the Labour Court. The respondent is therefore entitled to reinstatement along with salary from 05.12.1989. 5. The Tribunal has held that removal was unjustified and contrary to law. The ambiguity whether it was a reinstatement as daily wage or in permanent capacity has now been clarified by the Labour Court. The respondent is therefore entitled to reinstatement along with salary from 05.12.1989. 5. We have considered the submissions of the parties on merits and are satisfied that the Appeal can be disposed on a very short question of law based on undisputed facts. But since we propose to allow the Appeal, we consider it our duty to pass a reasoned order so that the respondent may have no misgivings about our appreciation and understanding of his case and claims by us. 6. It is not considered necessary to decide the question whether the Forest Department is an Industry or not. Any appointment in the Government, even on daily wage, has to be made in accordance Article 14 of the Constitution since it constitutes a national wealth for which equal opportunity for consideration must be given to all eligible. It presupposes an open advertisement followed by a competitive merit selection. Government is run on written orders and not verbal directions for appointment. If oral appointments are permitted in Government service it will generate a completely illegal market of appointments based on favoritism and nepotism. The respondent indisputably was appointed on daily wage pursuant to oral orders. In Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union Vs. Delhi Administration, Delhi and others, (1992) 4 SCC 99 ) it was observed as follows:- 23....... The courts can take judicial notice of the fact that such employment is sought and given directly for various illegal considerations including money. The employment is given first for temporary periods with technical breaks to circumvent the relevant rules, and is continued for 240 or more days with a view to give the benefit of regularization knowing the judicial trend that those who have completed 240 or more days are directed to be automatically regularized........ 7. The undisputed facts with regard to the nature of the appointment of the respondent leads to the irresistible conclusion of his being a back door appointee. A person appointed in rank illegality cannot complain that the termination procedure was arbitrary. Those who came in through the back door must go out through the same door as observed in State of U.P. and others Vs. A person appointed in rank illegality cannot complain that the termination procedure was arbitrary. Those who came in through the back door must go out through the same door as observed in State of U.P. and others Vs. U.P. State Law Officers Association and others, (1994) 2 SCC 204 holding as follows:- 19...... That being so those who came to be appointed by such arbitrary procedure can hardly complain if the termination of their appointment is equally arbitrary. Those who came by the back door have to go by the same door...... A person appointed on daily wage holds no post, stands well established. The question for regularisation of such appointment simply does not arise. That regularisation cannot be a mode for conferring legality upon a basically illegal appointment was explained in B.N. Nagarajan and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, AIR 1979 SC 1676 No claim shall lie for regularization before the Labour Court on the ground of a daily wage having completed 240 days in service was considered in Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. Bhola Singh, (2005) 2 SCC 470 holding:- 18. When a workman is appointed in terms of a scheme on daily wages, he does not derive any legal right to be regularised in service. It is now well known that completion of 240 days of continuous service in a year may not by itself be a ground for directing regularisation particularly in a case when the workman had not been appointed in accordance with the extant rules. Likewise, setting aside an order for regularisation of a daily wage pursuant to a Labour Court verdict as modified by the High Court relying on Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others Vs. Umadevi and Others, AIR 2006 SC 1806 ] it was held in Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs. Workman, Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2007) 1 SCC 408 , 31. No doubt, there can be occasions when the State or its instrumentalities employ persons on temporary or daily-wage basis in a contingency as additional hands without following the required procedure, but this does not confer any right on such persons to continue in service or get regular pay. Unless the appointments are made by following the rules, such appointees do not have any right to claim permanent absorption in the establishment. Similarly it has been held in State of Himachal Pradesh and Another Vs. Unless the appointments are made by following the rules, such appointees do not have any right to claim permanent absorption in the establishment. Similarly it has been held in State of Himachal Pradesh and Another Vs. Ravinder Singh (2008) 12 SCC 286 , as follows:- 12. In addition it has to be noted that the Labour Court had observed that the name of the respondent claimant was not sponsored by the employment exchange; there was no appointment order; the requirements relating to procedure to be followed at the time of recruitment were also not fulfilled. There was a mere back door entry. It was further noted that they were not selected in the manner as applicable to regular employees who are liable to be transferred and are subject to disciplinary proceedings to which daily-rated workers are not subjected to. Section 36A of the Industrial Disputes Act reads as follows:- 36-A. Power to remove difficulties-(1) if, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, any difficulty or doubt arises as to the interpretation of any provision of an award or settlement, it may refer the question to such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal as it may think fit. (2) The Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal to which such question is referred shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide such question and its decision shall be final and binding on all such parties. The provision is not substantive but only procedural. It can be invoked by the Labour Court only when there is any ambiguity in the award hindering its implementation requiring clarification. If there is no ambiguity in the award and there exists no doubt or difficulty requiring interpretation the power under 36A cannot be exercised. Explaining the scope of the provision it was held in The Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd., Kirkee, Poona Vs. The Workmen and Others, AIR 1966 SC 1903 ] as follows:- 4....Besides, it is necessary to bear in mind the limitations of the enquiry permitted under the proceedings contemplated by Section 36A of the Act. The said section empowers the appropriate government to refer any question to the tribunal if the said Government is satisfied that any difficulty or doubt arises as to the interpretation of any provision of an award made by the said tribunal. The said section empowers the appropriate government to refer any question to the tribunal if the said Government is satisfied that any difficulty or doubt arises as to the interpretation of any provision of an award made by the said tribunal. It further provides that when such a question is referred to it the tribunal shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide such question and its decision shall be final and binding on all such parties. It is thus clear that the scope of the enquiry u/s 36A is limited to the decision of the difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation of any provision in the award. If the words used in any provision of an award are ambiguous or obscure and it is not reasonably possible to interpret them the difficulty arising from the use of such ambiguous or obscure words may be resolved by moving the appropriate Government to make a reference u/s 36A. It is obvious that any question about the propriety, correctness or validity of any provision of the award would be outside the purview of the enquiry contemplated by the section. If a party to the award is aggrieved by any of its provisions on the merits the only remedy available to it is by making an appeal, say for instance under Article 136 of the Constitution, to this Court. A grievance felt by a party against any provision of the award can be ventilated only in that way and not by adopting the procedure prescribed by Section 36A. Thus, the enquiry permissible u/s 36A is limited to the question of the interpretation of the provision of the award in question and no more...... 6......Such a claim cannot obviously be entertained in clarification proceedings u/s 36A. A proceeding contemplated by Section 36A is not a proceeding intended to enable the tribunal to review or modify its own order; it is intended to enable the tribunal only to clarify the provisions of its award where a difficulty or doubt arises about the interpretation of the provisions..... 8. In C.W.J.C. No. 12736 of 1992, the Court did not direct the passing of a fresh award or to exercise powers for revision or review. The Labour Court by reason of the order of the Court appears to have completely misconstrued its statutory powers. 8. In C.W.J.C. No. 12736 of 1992, the Court did not direct the passing of a fresh award or to exercise powers for revision or review. The Labour Court by reason of the order of the Court appears to have completely misconstrued its statutory powers. A fresh Reference case was registered without any order for Reference u/s 10 of the Act. We could understand the registration of a Miscellaneous case. There is no discussion in the fresh order with regard to the nature of ambiguity in the earlier order of the Labour Court and which part of it was not free from doubt or required interpretation/clarification. In that garb, the Labour Court proceeded to re-write the award itself. This was clearly impermissible. 9. In conclusion, the order in Reference Case No. 06 of 1987 having merged in Reference Case No. 02 of 1993 assailed in C.W.J.C. No. 5766 of 2001 giving rise to the present appeal, we set aside the award in Reference Case No. 06 of 1987 and Reference Case No. 02 of 1993 as also the order dated 27.1.2009 passed by the Learned Single Judge. The Appeal is allowed.