ORDER Gangele, J. -- 1. The petitioner challenged in this writ petition findings recorded in an enquiry conducted by the District and Sessions Judge, Bhind against the petitioner in pursuance to the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.3129/2005 (PIL). 2. A Public Interest Litigation was filed by one Mr. Vijay Kumar Singh, respondent No.6 before this Court. The petitioner prayed in the petition that a CBI enquiry be ordered for investigation of a police encounter, which had taken place on 13.1.2002 at village Bohara, Police Station Raun, District Bhind. In the aforesaid encounter, two persons namely Komal @ Karan Singh and Neeraj @ Arjun Singh had died. As per the police version, these persons were notified dacoits and they were killed in anencounter. The petitioner in the PIL pleaded that two innocent persons were killed by the police in cold blood. The Division Bench of this Court passed observations against the petitioner and also imposed a costs of Rs.50,000/- on the petitioner. Division Bench further directed that Shri N.K. Gupta, the then District and Sessions Judge, Gwalior shall hold an enquiry in regard to police encounter and the incident, in which two persons were killed at Police Station Raun, District Bhind in an incident occurred on 13.1.2002. Division Bench further observed that District and Sessions Judge shall also enquire that whether the encounter, in which two persons had been killed, was a fake encounter and what was the role of respondent No.5, the present petitioner in this petition, in the aforesaid incident. 3. Against the order of the Division Bench, respondent No.6 filed a SLP, in which he had challenged imposition of costs and the observations made by the Court against him. The aforesaid SLP was registered as SLP (Civil) No.20769-20770/2008. 4. Hon’ble Supreme Court stayed the directions issued by the Division Bench in para 34(i), (ii) and (iii) of the order and passed the following order : “Delay condoned. Leave granted. List the matters for final disposal on a non-miscellaneous day in the week commencing from July 25, 2011. The Government to produce relevant record with reference to incidents in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No.6. Leave granted. List the matters for final disposal on a non-miscellaneous day in the week commencing from July 25, 2011. The Government to produce relevant record with reference to incidents in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No.6. It is clarified that the stay which was granted by this Court vide order dated 11.8.2008 relates to the inquiry which was ordered against the appellant in respect of the directions contained in paragraph 34(i), (ii) and (iii) of the impugned order. Order IAs to be heard along with the main matters.” 5. Shri N.K. Gupta, the then Sessions Judge was transferred during pendency of the enquiry. Thereafter, High Court issued direction that the District and Sessions Judge, Bhind shall conduct the enquiry. Thereafter, the enquiry was conducted by then District and Sessions Judge, Bhind Shri D.K. Paliwal. Learned Sessions Judge in his report held that the version of the police that there was an encounter is not true. Two persons were killed in cold blood and for the aforesaid Act Mr. K.K. Singh, the then Station House Officer in-Charge, Phooph and Mr. Suresh Pal Singh, the then Station House Officer in-Charge, Raun were responsible because they had taken the deceased persons from Delhi. In regard to present petitioner, it is observed by the learned Judge that there was active role played by the petitioner because the petitioner wanted to get out of turn promotion and some gallantry award. Learned Judge recorded his findings in this regard on the basis of a fact that recommendation was made by the police for grant of President Medal to the petitioner, hence, the petitioner was a consented party in the encounter. 6. It is also a fact that police filed a charge-sheet against one Ramsagar in regard to same incident because an offence was registered by the police at Police Station Raun, District Bhind vide Crime No.4/2002 under sections 148, 307, 307/34 and sections 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act. Trial was conducted by the Special Judge Bhind vide Sessions Trial No.9/2004 (Dacoity). Special Judge found the incident of dacoity true and convicted accused Ramsagar for an offence under sections 307, 148, 149 of IPC and awarded sentence of 4 years RI vide judgment dated 6th October, 2009. Against the aforesaid judgment, a criminal appeal is pending before this Court. 7. Special Judge found the incident of dacoity true and convicted accused Ramsagar for an offence under sections 307, 148, 149 of IPC and awarded sentence of 4 years RI vide judgment dated 6th October, 2009. Against the aforesaid judgment, a criminal appeal is pending before this Court. 7. During the trial Kailash Singh and Deshraj Singh filed an application under section 173A of CrPC that the District and Sessions Judge conducted a judicial enquiry and in the aforesaid enquiry, it was held that S.P. Singh, the then Station House Officer Raun and K.K. Sharma, the then Station House Officer Phooph and the petitioner G.R. Meena were involved in the ncident and it was a fake encounter, hence, further enquiry be ordered in exercise of power under section 173A of CrPC. TrialJudge vide order dated 17.3.2009 rejected the application. Another application was filed on 27.8.2009 by the aforesaid two persons; Kailash Sharma and Deshraj Singh for adding the present petitioner G.R. Meena and S.P. Singh, the then Station House Officer Raun and K.K. Sharma, the then Station House Officer Phooph as accused on the basis of the judicial enquiry conducted by the District and Sessions Judge, Bhind, that application was also dismissed. 8. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that during judicial enquiry learned District and Sessions Judge has drawn inferences against the petitioner and on the basis of the aforesaid presumptions, it has been held by the learned Judge that the involvement of the petitioner could not be ruled out, however, on the basis of presumptions, findings could not be recorded in a judicial enquiry. Learned senior counsel further contended that no reasons have been assigned by the learned Judge in arriving out of the findings recorded against the petitioner. He further contended that a regular trial has been conducted in regard to same incident and the trial Judge has found the incident true and also awarded sentence to the co-accused persons contrary to the findings recorded in regular sessions trial, hence findings recorded by the Sessions Judge in regard to involvement of the petitioner is against the provisions of section 40 of Evidence Act. In support of his contentions learned senior counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kranti Associates Pvt.Ltd. and another v. Masoon Ahmed Khan and others, reported in (2010)9 SCC 496. 9. In support of his contentions learned senior counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kranti Associates Pvt.Ltd. and another v. Masoon Ahmed Khan and others, reported in (2010)9 SCC 496. 9. Contrary to this, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.6 has contended that the findings recorded by the learned Sessions Judge are in accordance with law. There is enough evidence that two Station House Officer in-Charge of police stations had gone to Delhi and they had taken the deceased persons to Bhind and thereafter those persons were killed. The incident could not had taken place without involvement of the petitioner. It is further submitted that nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased persons demonstrate that the encounter was false. In support of his contentions, learned senior counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana and others, reported in 2012(III) MPWN 23 =2013 Cr.LJ 1518. 10. Learned Deputy Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State has supported the arguments advanced by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. He submitted that in regular trial it has been held that the incident was true and the punishment has also been awarded to one of the co-accused. 11. Learned District Judge in the impugned report has observed that both the Station House Officer Mr. S.P. Singh and K.K. Singh were in-Charge of Police Stations Phooph and Raun. They had gone to Delhi on 10.1.2002. It could not be ruled out that they had gone Delhi without consent of the petitioner who was posted at the relevant time as S.P. Bhind. It is further recorded in the enquiry that both the Station House Officers came to Bhind on 11.1.2002 and thereafter they had reached at Police Station Raun on 13.1.2002, hence, it could not be ruled out that both the deceased persons were killed after taking consent and discussion with the petitioner, hence, the petitioner was actively involved in the incident. It is further observed that the petitioner wanted out of turn promotion and the police medal from the President and a recommendation was also made to this effect, hence, the petitioner had consented for the killing of two persons. 12. The petitioner in his affidavit submitted during the enquiry pleaded that he was posted as S.P. Bhind from 30.12.2000 to 10.6.2002. 12. The petitioner in his affidavit submitted during the enquiry pleaded that he was posted as S.P. Bhind from 30.12.2000 to 10.6.2002. He further deposed in his evidence before the commission that in the year 2002 number of dacoits gangs were in operation in District Bhind. Number of persons were abducted and some of political leaders applied their political influence over the police and one of them was Dr. Govind Singh. The petitioner refused to obey instructions of Dr. Govind Singh, who was the then MLA from Lahar Constituency and was also Minister of Cooperative Department. The petitioner made complaints against Mr. Singh to Inspector General of Police and Director General of Police and Chief Minister. One notified dacoit Sobran Singh Baghel was killed in an encounter on 3.10.2001 due to which Dr. Govind Singh got annoyed with him. He further deposed that during his tenure number of encounters had taken place and in the encounters dacoits were killed. On 13.1.2002 he received an information that certain dacoits were hiding in the forest area. Thereafter, he sent STF for searching. During searching there was an encounter in the field of Vijay Bahadur Singh between dacoits and police. In the aforesaid encounter both the persons who were dacoits and had been carrying rewards had been killed. He further deposed that earlier Sub-Divisional Officer conducted an enquiry and he submitted his report in which the encounter was found true. Thereafter, another SDO Mr. B.L. Mishra was posted as SDO Lahar. He was posted on the request of Dr. Govind Singh and he submitted his report against the petitioner. 13. It is also a fact that one Ajgar Singh filed a private complaint in regard to killing of two persons before the Judicial Magistrate First Class. The complaint had been withdrawn subsequently. 14. The findings recorded by the learned District Judge that there was consent of the petitioner in the incident of killing of two persons is based on the basis of presumption that two inspectors had gone to Delhi, thereafter they returned back and they stayed at Bhind, hence, there was a consent of the petitioner and the petitioner wanted his out of turn promotion and police medal, hence, he was a consenting party of the encounter. 15. 15. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kailash Gour v. State of Assam, reported in (2012)2 SCC 34 , has held as under in regard to presumption of innocence : “39. It is one the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent till he is proved to be guilty. It is equally well settled that suspicion howsoever strong can never take the place of proof. There is indeed a long distance between the accused “may have committed the offence” and “must have committed the offence” which must be traversed by the prosecution by adducing reliable and cogent evidence. Presumption of innocence has been recognised as a human right which cannot be wished away. See Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. and Ranjitsingh Brahmajeetsingh Sharma v. State of Maharashtra. 40. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in S. Ganesan v. Rama Raghuraman, where this Court observed : 39. Every accused is presumed to be innocent unless his guilt is proved. The presumption of innocence is a human right. Subject to the statutory exceptions, the said principle forms the basis of criminal jurisprudence in India.” 16. From the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is clear that presumption of innocence has been recognised as a human right which could not be snatched away. 17. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashish Batham v. State of M.P., reported in 2002(2) JLJ 373 = (2002)7 SCC 317 , has held as under in regard to presumption : “8. Realities or truth apart, the fundamental and basic presumption in the administration of criminal law and justice delivery system is the innocence of the alleged accused and till the charges are proved beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of clear, cogent, credible or unimpeachable evidence, the question of indicting or punishing an accused does not arise, merely carried away by the heinous nature of the crime or the gruesome manner in which it was found to have been committed. Mere suspicion, however strong or probable it may be is no effective substitute for the legal proof required to substantiate the charge of commission of a crime and graver the charge is, greater should be the standard of proof required. Mere suspicion, however strong or probable it may be is no effective substitute for the legal proof required to substantiate the charge of commission of a crime and graver the charge is, greater should be the standard of proof required. Courts dealing with criminal cases at least should constantly remember that there is a long mental distance between “may be true” and “must be true” and this basic and golden rule only helps to maintain the vital distinction between “conjectures” and “sure conclusions” to be arrived at on the touchstone of a dispassionate judicial scrutiny based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case as well as as quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record.” 18. Aforesaid judgments have been delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in regard to presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal trial. The present case is of judicial enquiry in which the petitioner has been held guilty. After recording a finding of guilty in judicial inquiry, it would be difficult for the petitioner to escape from the criminal prosecution. The petitioner was posted as Superintendent of Police. He was responsible for maintaining law and order in the district. In our opinion, he could not be held guilty for the incident merely drawing inferences and on the basis of presumptions. Learned District Judge has not assigned cogent reasons except on the basis of presumptions in arriving out on the findings that the petitioner was also responsible and involved in the incident. 19. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kranti Associates Private Limited v. Masoon Ahmed Khan and others, reported in (2010)9 SCC 496, has held in regard to recording reasons and passing speaking order. 19. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kranti Associates Private Limited v. Masoon Ahmed Khan and others, reported in (2010)9 SCC 496, has held in regard to recording reasons and passing speaking order. In the aforesaid judgment Hon’ble Supreme Court considered number of previous judgments of the apex Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [ (1969)2 SCC 262 ], Keshav Mills Co.Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1973)1 SCC 380 ], R. v. Gaming Board for Great Britain, ex p Benaim [(1970)2 QB 417], Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 AC 40], Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala [AIR 1961 SC 1669], Bhagat Raja v. Union of India [ AIR 1967 SC 1606 ], Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P. [ (1970)1 SCC 764 ], Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1969)3 SCC 868 ], Woolcombers of India Ltd. v. Workers Union [ (1974)3 SCC 318 ], Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor [ (1973)2 SCC 836 ], Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1976)2 SCC 981 ], Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [ (1978)1 SCC 248 ], Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuram v. State of Kerala [ (1979)4 SCC 782 ], Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab [ (1979)2 SCC 368 ], H.H. Shri Swamiji of Shri Amar Mutt v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department [ (1979)4 SCC 642 ], Bombay Oil Industries (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1984)1 SCC 141 ], Ram Chander v. Union of India [ (1986)3 SCC 103 ], Star Enterprises v. City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. [ (1990)3 SCC 280 ], Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi [ (1991)2 SCC 716 ], M.L. Jaggi v. MTNL [ (1996)3 SCC 119 ], Charan Singh v. Healing Touch Hospital [ (2000)7 SCC 668 ]. 20. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the following propositions of law in regard to recording reasons when the matter is quasi judicial : “47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds : (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds : (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons in meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-marker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate of process of judicial review by superior Courts. (h) The on going judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the Judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Resons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber stamp resons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the Judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See Davis Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor). (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the Judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See Davis Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor). (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions.” (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”.” 21. From the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is clear that a quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of his conclusion. 22. Learned District Judge conducted a judicial enquiry. He had taken evidence of witnesses, hence, it was obligatory on his part to record reasons in arriving on the conclusion in regard to involvement of the petitioner in the incident, but learned Judge has drawn inferences and thereafter on the basis of the presumptions, recorded his findings. In our opinion, it is contrary to law. 23. Another aspect is that on the basis of same evidence, the police registered an offence vide Crime No.4/2002 and thereafter a charge-sheet was filed. The Special Court in Sessions Case No.9/04 (Dacoity) vide judgment dated 6th October, 2009 held the accused Ramsagar guilty for an offence under sections 144, 307/149 of the IPC. As per the prosecution story of the case, on 13.1.2002, the then S.P. present petitioner informed the Station House Officer Mr. Suresh Pal Singh that 6-7 persons had been preparing to commit dacoity at the field of Vijay Bahadur Singh and thereafter with the help of Special Police and the local police persons near about 22 policemen reached on the spot and thereafter encounter had taken place, and in the aforesaid encounter two persons were killed. Suresh Pal Singh that 6-7 persons had been preparing to commit dacoity at the field of Vijay Bahadur Singh and thereafter with the help of Special Police and the local police persons near about 22 policemen reached on the spot and thereafter encounter had taken place, and in the aforesaid encounter two persons were killed. The allegation against the accused Ramsagar @ Sagar, Raghuveer Singh and Keshram is that they along with two deceased persons had fired at police persons. Learned Special Judge found the offence proved beyond reasonable doubt and awarded sentence of RI of 4 years against accused Samsagar. During trial of the aforesaid case, an application under section 173(8) of CrPC was filed for the relief that further investigation be ordered in regard to involvement of the present petitioner on the basis of the report of the judicial enquiry, that application was rejected. Thereafter another application was filed making the present petitioner as an accused, that was also dismissed. It means that the learned Sessions Court rejected the application and refuted the contentions in regard to involvement of the petitioner in the incident. 24. Section 40 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 prescribes relevancy of previous judgments to bar a second suit or trial. The relevant section is as under : “40. Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial. -- The existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any Courts from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial is a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of such suit, or to hold such trial.” 25. It is clear from the aforesaid section that the judgment of the trial is relevant fact, which has to be considered in subsequent proceedings and the Court ought to take cognizance of the judgment. 26. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, reported in 2009(2) JLJ 126= (2009)11 SCC 545 , has held as under in regard to section 40 of the Evidence Act. “15. A civil proceeding as also a criminal proceeding may go on simultaneously. No statute puts an embargo in relation thereto. A decision in a criminal case is not binding on a civil Court. “15. A civil proceeding as also a criminal proceeding may go on simultaneously. No statute puts an embargo in relation thereto. A decision in a criminal case is not binding on a civil Court. In M.S. Sheriff v. State of the Madras, a Constitution Bench of this Court was seized with a question as to whether a civil suit or a criminal case should be stayed in the event both are pending. It was opined that the criminal matter should be given precedence. In regard to the possibility of conflict in decisions, it was held that the law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one Court, binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. It was held that the only relevant consideration was the likelihood of embarrassment.” 27. In our opinion, this Court is bound to take cognizance of the judgment passed by the Special Court in Sessions Case No.9/04 (Dacoity), in which the incident was held to be true for the purpose of deciding this petition. 28. Looking to the aforesaid facts and legal position of law that the findings against the petitioner are based on inferences and no cogent reasons have been assigned by the learned District Judge in arriving on the aforesaid findings and the fact that in criminal trial, one co-accused has been convicted by the Court on the basis of same incident, the findingts recorded in the judicial enquiry in regard to involvement of the petitioner in the incident is contrary to law. 29. We hereby clarify that this judgment would not affect the findings recorded by the learned District Judge in the judicial enquiry against two persons namely Mr. Suresh Pal Singh and Mr. K.K. Mishra, posted at the relevant time as Station House Officers, Police Station Phooph and Raun because the findings are based on the appreciation of evidence that those persons had gone to Delhi and they had brought the deceased persons. The case of these police persons are on different footing. 30. Consequently, petition of the petitioner is allowed. The findings recorded against the petitioner in the judicial enquiry dated 17.1.2008 in regard to involvement of the petitioner in the incident, is hereby quashed. No order as to costs.