Judgment: Sujoy Paul, J.;— 1. By filing this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the transfer order dated 12.08.2013 (Annexure P/1), whereby she is transferred from Gwalior to Bhopal and in lieu thereof, respondent No. 4 is transferred from Bhopal to Gwalior. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the transfer order is against the transfer policy and it is not issued in any administrative exigency. In fact transfer order is malafide in nature. To elaborate, Shri D.K. Katare, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner was transferred from Bhopal to Gwalior by order dated 29.06.2012 (Annexure P/2). In obedience of this order, the petitioner joined at Gwalior. She worked at Gwalior with utmost sincerity and devotion. Her work at Gwalior was highly appreciated. By placing reliance on Annexure P/17 dated 11.04.2013, it is contended that the Managing Director appreciated the excellent performance of the petitioner. By drawing attention of this Court on clause 2 of the transfer policy dated 30.05.2013 (Annexure P/4), it is submitted that the petitioner could not have been transferred before completion of three years of period at Gwalior. Before completion of three years, transfer is permissible only when it is permitted by an officer superior than the competent authority to transfer her. 2. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was transferred to Gwalior by the order of General Manager (HR) and from Gwalior she was transferred by Chief General Manager (HR & A), whereas this could have been done only with the permission of Managing Director. It is further submitted that the word "permission" has a different meaning than "approval". In the present case, there exists no permission by the Managing Director. By placing reliance on clause 10 of the transfer policy, it is further contended that after transfer, the transferred officer cannot be posted to the same place from where he/she was transferred. This ban continues for three years. In the present case, there is a flagrant violation of policy because before completion of three years the petitioner is transferred from Gwalior and is posted to the same place from where she was transferred. It is further contended that the State Government issued circular dated 12.09.1997 in respect of reserved category employees and directed that those employees should not be victimized or harassed. It is further contended that the State Government issued circular dated 12.09.1997 in respect of reserved category employees and directed that those employees should not be victimized or harassed. It is further contended that the petitioner issued the order dated 12.08.2013, by this order petitioner instituted an enquiry to examine the irregularity in the matter of preparation of service book, personal record and files etc. The employer was aggrieved by this order and therefore, petitioner has been transferred. The transfer order is challenged on the ground of malice also by contending that one Sub-Engineer Subodh Kumar Ingle was transferred from Bhopal to Gwalior on 11.06.2009. He did not comply with the transfer order and remained absent for considerable long time. After holding an enquiry, the competent authority terminated his services on 19.10.2010. His departmental first appeal to Chief General Manager-CE was rejected on 23.11.2010 and then by the Managing Director on 28.07.2011. A review petition was rejected on 27.09.2011. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the 2nd review order was passed by the CE-Chief General Manager, Gwalior Region dated 03.03.2012. Thereafter, said Shri Ingle filed another review before Managing Director on 16.04.2012. The Managing Director sent that review through General Manager (HR) vide letter No. 98 dated 16.04.2012 to the then CE-Chief General Manager, Gwalior Region. The said authority by the order dated 24.04.2012 rejected it. Thereafter a letter dated 15.05.2012 was sent by the GM (HR) to the petitioner. But the petitioner informed that third review is not tenable. By drawing attention of this Court on Annexure P/14 dated 05.08.2013, it is argued that the petitioner after obtaining the legal opinion from the employer's counsel opined that after rejection of earlier review applications, another review is not maintainable and Managing Director has been informed about this by the petitioner. This information is given by the petitioner during the visit of Managing Director to Gwalior on 26.06.2013. 4. The bone of contention regarding malice is founded upon the document dated 5th February, 2013 (Annexure R/12), whereby the Energy Department of Government of M.P. directed the Managing Director to review the matter of said Shri Ingle. Reading this document along with document dated 04.06.2013 (Annexure P/13) it is contended that the petitioner was directed to decide the review in a particular manner, since petitioner declined to undertake review, the petitioner was transferred. Reading this document along with document dated 04.06.2013 (Annexure P/13) it is contended that the petitioner was directed to decide the review in a particular manner, since petitioner declined to undertake review, the petitioner was transferred. During the petitioner's tenure at Gwalior, output was increased and therefore, transfer of petitioner cannot be said to be in administrative exigency or in public interest. In respect of the said contention, the petitioner has relied on the following judgments 2009 (2) MPJR 71 (Subhash Roy Vs. Coal India Ltd. & Others), 2003 (11) SCC 740 (Sarvesh Kumar Awasthi Vs. U.P. Jal Nigam and others), 2003 (4) SCC 239 (High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan Vs. P.P. Singh) and 2009 (2) SCC 592 (Somesh Tiwari Vs. Union of India & Ors.). No other point is pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. Per Contra, Shri Vivek Jain, Advocate and Shri Pawan Dwivedi, Advocate for the respondents submit that no interference is warranted in this petition. The transfer order is passed in administrative exigency and in public interest. Employer is the best judge to decide as to which work is to be taken from which employee. Employee has no lien on a place. Transfer policy is directory in nature. Transfer order is passed by following "due process". Reliance is place on Annexure R/1, the relevant note sheet to demonstrate that it contains permission/approval of Managing Director. It is a common stand of the respondents that transfer order is not outcome of any malice. All the points raised by the petitioner are specifically denied by the respondents. 6. To elaborate, Shri Vivek Jain learned counsel for the employer submits that the transfer order is passed in administrative exigency only. The petitioner has no field experience. As a CGM (GR), Gwalior the officer has to control, monitor, regulate and supervise big number of subordinate employees. Because of lack of experience of petitioner in the field, it was thought proper to replace her by an experienced person. It is further contended that before the posting of the petitioner at Gwalior she remained posted in office only. Employer is the best judge to decide which officer needs to be posted at a particular place. It is strenuously contended by Shri Jain that the transfer order is passed only in pubic interest and in administrative exigency. It is further contended that before the posting of the petitioner at Gwalior she remained posted in office only. Employer is the best judge to decide which officer needs to be posted at a particular place. It is strenuously contended by Shri Jain that the transfer order is passed only in pubic interest and in administrative exigency. It is not for any other irrelevant consideration than the twin reasons assigned above. He further strenuously contended that after receiving the order of the State Government Energy Department dated 5th February, 2013 (Annexure R/12), it was open for the Chief General Manager (HR) of Corporate Office to review the order. Shri Jain submits that as per State Govt. order, the said authority could have reviewed the order of Shri Ingle. If he has not done the same, this itself shows that there is no malafide intention on the part of the employer. No other point is raised by the parties. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. This is trite that transfer is an incident and condition of service. Transfer order can be interfered with only if it is proved to be malafide, changes service condition of employee to his detriment, passed by incompetent authority, actuated by irrelevant consideration other than administrative exigency which may amount to malice in law. 9. Before dealing with the aforesaid ingredients, it is apt to quote relevant portion of transfer policy which reads as under;- 10. A bare reading of relevant clauses of transfer policy, reproduced above, makes it clear that ordinarily the officers are not required to be transferred within three years of their posting. However, the administration is equipped with the power to transfer the employees in administrative exigency. The Policy further provides that in the event an officer is transferred within three years, he/she should not be posted at the same place from where he/she was transferred. Admittedly, in the present case the petitioner is transferred within three years and posted to the same place (Bhopal) from where she was transferred. 11. This is trite in law that the transfer order cannot be interfered with because of violation of transfer policy. The transfer policy does not have any statutory force. Thus, for this reason no interference is warranted by this Court. 11. This is trite in law that the transfer order cannot be interfered with because of violation of transfer policy. The transfer policy does not have any statutory force. Thus, for this reason no interference is warranted by this Court. However, the transfer policy and the general principle governing the filed of transfer is that the officer can be transferred only in administrative exigency and in public interest. Thus, it needs to be seen whether impugned order of transfer of the petitioner is arising out of any administrative exigency, public interest or it is actuated by malafide or any other consideration which is not relevant for transferring an officer. This aspect will be dealt with later on. 12. Another ground on which transfer order is called in question is that it is not issued by Managing Director, a competent authority as per Annexure R/2. However, the note sheet Annexure R/1 shows that the proposal of petitioner's transfer was approved by the competent authority i.e. Managing Director, though the order is issued by an inferior authority. This point is squarely covered by the judgment of this Court delivered in WP No. 8092/2012 (K.K. Arya Vs. M.P. Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Co. Ltd. and others) decided on 19.12.2012 wherein it is opined that if the power to approve or disapprove is taken by the competent authority by maintaining the degree of control over the said decision, merely because the order is signed by some inferior authority will not make the order as illegal. This view was taken on the basis of judgment of Supreme court reported in AIR 1968 SC 850 (Union of India Vs. P.K. Roy). The Division Bench affirmed the said order of this Court in WA No. 802/2012. 13. On the basis of aforesaid, I am unable to hold that the transfer order suffers from lack of competency. The judgment cited by Shri Katare regarding distinction between approval and permission, is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the said case, the statutory recruitment rules were involved and the question of "approval" and "permission" arose as per the requirement of the rule. In the present case, since approval is taken from competent authority, it satisfies the test of competency and no interference on this aspect is warranted. 14. Now reverting back to the question whether the petitioner's transfer is based on relevant consideration or not. In the present case, since approval is taken from competent authority, it satisfies the test of competency and no interference on this aspect is warranted. 14. Now reverting back to the question whether the petitioner's transfer is based on relevant consideration or not. It is apt to quote the appreciation letter (Annexure P/17) which reads as under:- No. MD/MK/Com/102 Bhopal dated 11-04-13 Sub:-Performance of Central Distribution Company on parameters. Dear Mrs. Singh, Throughout the financial year 12-13 we maintained a steady growth in all the revenue related matters thereby the Central Discom could excel in annual performance compared to previous year. The Company has gone up by 30% in Revenue receipt and growth in Revenue per unit by 15% with growth in energy input by 13%. The Principle Secretary, Energy GoMP has conveyed his greetings on the achievement of the Company. All this has been possible due to focused hard work and sheer determination. I congratulate you and your team for valued contribution to the excellent performance of the Company and expect that the spirit will be maintained in the current year. I hope you will not spare any effort for turn around of the Company to a state of financial profitability. (Nitesh Vyas) Managing Director A bare perusal of appreciation letter of Managing Director, issued on 11.04.2013 makes it clear that the work and performance of the petitioner and her team was termed as "excellent". Her spirit of working was also appreciated. After issuing such appreciation letter certifying that company has gone up by 30% in Revenue receipt and growth in Revenue, with further finding that Revenue growth per unit is raised by 15% with growth in energy input by 13%, It cannot be said that petitioner's performance was not up to the mark. 15. It is difficult to agree with the contention of the employer that petitioner was either not suitable to perform field duty or to handle the work force. Transfer order can be passed only in administrative exigency and public interest. The basic question is whether in the present case the transfer order is passed on those considerations. To appreciate this, it is apt to consider the background facts. One employee Shri Ingle was terminated from service pursuant to a disciplinary action. His first appeal and review petitions were dismissed by the Reviewing Authority. The basic question is whether in the present case the transfer order is passed on those considerations. To appreciate this, it is apt to consider the background facts. One employee Shri Ingle was terminated from service pursuant to a disciplinary action. His first appeal and review petitions were dismissed by the Reviewing Authority. The State Government, Energy Department issued order dated 5th February, 2013 (Annexure R/12). By this letter the Managing Director was asked to get the matter of Shri Ingle reviewed by the Chief General Manager (HR) of Corporate Office and personal hearing be also given to Shri Ingle. It is further directed to inform the outcome of finding to the Department. In the said letter, the State Government requested the Managing Director that CGM, Gwalior (petitioner) be asked to submit an explanation as to why rules were not followed in such a serious matter related to major punishment of removal of employee from services and his review application was not heard and rejected, considering it as an appeal. In turn, the Managing Director considered this letter of State Government in its communication dated 04.06.2013 (Annexure P/13) para 5 to 8 reads as under:- 16. A microscopic reading of aforesaid portion of the order and more particularly, the under lined portion shows that it was desired that petitioner should review the matter again. A finding is already arrived at that the punishment is disproportionate. Pausing here for a moment, para 5 of the order makes it clear that power of review was not exercised by CGM or Managing Director because they were not the competent authority. Thus, contention of Shri Jain is devoid of any merits that if the intention was to get the matter reviewed any how, pursuant to State Government's letter dated 05.02.2013, Managing Director/CGM could have reviewed the same. 17. This is settled in law that statutory powers can be exercised by only such authority with whom power is vested as per statute. Even higher authorities cannot direct the inferior authorities to act in a particular manner. This is more important in cases where the statutory authority is exercising judicial or quasi judicial powers. The Apex Court in 2011 (5) SCC 435 (Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots' Association of India (Alpai) and others Vs. Even higher authorities cannot direct the inferior authorities to act in a particular manner. This is more important in cases where the statutory authority is exercising judicial or quasi judicial powers. The Apex Court in 2011 (5) SCC 435 (Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots' Association of India (Alpai) and others Vs. Director General of Civil Aviation and others) in para 26 opined as under:- It is settled legal proposition that the authority which has been conferred with the competence under the statue alone can pass the order. No other person, even a superior authority, can interfere with the functioning of the statutory authority. In a democratic set-up like ours, persons occupying key positions are not supposed to mortgage their discretion, volition and decision-making authority and be prepared to give way to carry out commands having no sanctity in law. Thus, if any decision is taken by a statutory authority at the behest or on suggestion of a person who has not statutory role to pay, the same would be patently illegal. (Vide Purtabpore Co. Ltd. v. Cane Commr. Of Bihar reported in (1969) 1 SCC 308 , Chandrika Jha Vs. State of Bihar reported in (1984) 2 SCC 41 , Tarlochan Dev Sharma Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2001) 6 SCC 260 and Manohar Lal Vs. Ugrasen reported in (2010) 11 SCC 557 . A perusal of para 5 and 6 of letter dated 04.06.2013, shows that contention of Shri Katare has substantial force. In obedience of State Government's letter, by Annexure P/13 dated 04.06.2013 The petitioner was directed to review the order and interfere in to the quantum of punishment. The petitioner, in turn, passed the order which reads as under:- 18. Immediately after passing of this order, whereby the petitioner declined to review the matter, she was transferred. The chain of events show that State Government by its letter dated 5th February, 2013 (Annexure R/12) directed the Managing Director to get the matter reviewed by the Chief General Manager (HR) of Corporate Office. In turn, the said authority opined that he is not competent and in fitness of things this needs to be done by the petitioner. For this purpose, order dated 04.06.2013, aforesaid, was issued. The petitioner passed the order Annexure P/8 and expressed her inability to review the matter for the reasons stated therein. Immediately thereafter she was transferred. 19. In turn, the said authority opined that he is not competent and in fitness of things this needs to be done by the petitioner. For this purpose, order dated 04.06.2013, aforesaid, was issued. The petitioner passed the order Annexure P/8 and expressed her inability to review the matter for the reasons stated therein. Immediately thereafter she was transferred. 19. In the aforesaid factual backdrop, it is clear that there existed pressure from the State Government to get the matter reviewed. In the order dated 5th February, 2013 the State Government directed to inform the outcome of finding by undertaking the review. The language of Annexure P/13 also shows the clear intention of higher authorities that review of Ingle be entertained on quantum of punishment. There is a specific finding in para 6 of the order Annexure P/13 that the punishment is disproportionate to the misconduct. Thus, it is clear that there was a dictate by the State Government and employer to the CGM to review the matter in a particular manner and fashion. Petitioner did not succumb to such pressure and, therefore, she was subjected to transfer immediately after writing the letter Annexure P/8 on 05.08.2013. 20. On the basis of aforesaid, circumstances a reasonable inference of malafide can be drawn. The Apex Court in 1993 (1) SCC 54 (M. Sankaranarayanan las Vs. State of Karnataka and ors) opined that it may not always be possible to demonstrate malice in fact with full and elaborate particulars and it may be permissible in an appropriate case to draw reasonable inference of malafide from the facts pleaded and established. In 1993 (1) SCC 148 (Rajendra Roy Vs. Union of India and another) the Apex Court opined that it may not be always possible to establish malice in fact in a straight cut manner. In an appropriate case, it is possible to draw reasonable inference of malafide action from the pleadings and antecedents facts and circumstances. 21. In the opinion of this court, there is a difference between malice in fact and malice in law. Malice in fact means express or actual malice, ill-will towards a particular person; an actual intention to injure. It implies desire or intent to injure while malice in law or implied malice means wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse (See: Black's Law Dictionary-Sixth Deluxe Edn.). Malice in fact means express or actual malice, ill-will towards a particular person; an actual intention to injure. It implies desire or intent to injure while malice in law or implied malice means wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse (See: Black's Law Dictionary-Sixth Deluxe Edn.). Malice in fact or actual malice relates to the actual state or condition of mind of the person who did the act. Malice in fact is where the malice is not established by legal presumption or proof of certain facts, but is to be found from the evidence in the case [See (2003) 8 SCC 567 (Chairman and MD, BPL Ltd. Vs. S.P. Gururaja)]. Malice in its legal sense means malice such as may be assumed for a wrongful act done intentionally, but without just cause or excuse or one of reasonable or probable cause. The term "malice in fact" would come within the purview of the said definition. [see AIR 2006 SC 2912 (R.S. Garg Vs. State of U.P.) and AIR 1991 SC 1260 (State of Bihar Vs. P.P. Sharma). 22. This is settled in law that exercise of power for an extraneous or ulterior purpose amount to "malice in law". These are cases where, though the authority has no corrupt motive or personal malice against the party affected, yet the law will impute a fraud on the statute, if he has exercised the power for a purpose other than that for which the enabling provision conferred the power or discretion. Legal malice or malice in law means something done without lawful excuse. In other words, it is an act done wrongfully and willfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill-feeling and spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard of the rights of the other (See: State of A.P. Vs. Goverdhanlal Pitti (2003) 4 SCC 739 ). Where government action is unreasonable or lacking in quality of public interest, though different from that of mala fides, it may in a given case furnish evidence of mala fides (See: Kasturi Lal Vs. State of J & K (1980) 4 SCC 10). Goverdhanlal Pitti (2003) 4 SCC 739 ). Where government action is unreasonable or lacking in quality of public interest, though different from that of mala fides, it may in a given case furnish evidence of mala fides (See: Kasturi Lal Vs. State of J & K (1980) 4 SCC 10). Even if an order is found to be not vitiated by malice in fact, but still can be held to be invalid, if the same is passed for unauthorized purpose as it would amount to malafide in law [see: (2005) 6 SCC 776 (Punjab State Electricity Board Vs. Zora Singh)]. Interference of mala fides can be drawn by reading in between the lines and taking into consideration the attendant circumstances [see (1994) 6 SCC 98 (N.K. Singh Vs. Union of India)]. In (2009) 2 SCC 592 (Somesh Tiwari Vs. Union of India) it is opined that transfer order will be bad in law, if it is issued not based on any factors germane to the passing of an order of transfer and based on irrelevant grounds. 23. At the cost of repetition, in my opinion the transfer order can be passed only in administrative exigency and in public interest. On the basis of aforesaid judgments, it is clear that transfer order can be passed only on the said relevant consideration and purpose. The appreciation letter Annexure P/17 leaves no room for any doubt that the petitioner's continuance at Gwalior was neither against administrative exigency nor public interest. The word "administrative Exigency" and "public interest" are not magic words nor these are 'mantras' which can serve the purpose in any circumstances. These words have definite meaning and in a given case the employer must show the reason for transferring the employee. Reasons must be discernable.Putting it differently, the said words are not like a carpet under which anything can be swept. On the basis of pleadings, material and antecedents facts of this case, in the opinion of this Court, transfer order is passed for extraneous and irrelevant considerations other than the reasons for which valid transfer order can be passed. Such exercise of power amounts to colourable exercise of powers. In (1991) 1 SCC 212 (Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and others Vs. On the basis of pleadings, material and antecedents facts of this case, in the opinion of this Court, transfer order is passed for extraneous and irrelevant considerations other than the reasons for which valid transfer order can be passed. Such exercise of power amounts to colourable exercise of powers. In (1991) 1 SCC 212 (Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and others Vs. State of U.P.) and others the Apex Court opined that it is in consonance with the Court's commitment to openness which implies scrutiny of every State action to provide an effective check against the arbitrariness and abuse of power. The Court would much rather be wrong in saying so rather than be wrong in not saying so. Non-arbitrariness, being a necessary concomitant of the rule of law, it is imperative that all actions of every public functionary, in whatever sphere, must be guided by reason for not humour, whim, caprice or personal predilections of the persons entrusted with the task on behalf of the State and exercise of all power must be for public good instead of being an abuse of the power. 24. Colourable exercise of power also means exercising power for a purpose not authorized by law (See: (1994) 4 SCC 675 (Srinivasa Co-op. House Building Society Ltd. Madam Gurumurthy Sastry). In Collector Allahabad Vs. Raja Ram (1985) 3 SCC 1 the Apex Court opined that where power is exercised for extraneous or irrelevant consideration or reasons, it is also colourable exercise of power. In (1999) 1 SCC 529 (State of Gujrat Vs. Suryakant Chunilal Shah) the Apex Court opined that when an opinion is not based on material on record, the same would be arbitrary and colourable exercise of power. In (Girias Investments (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Karnataka) reported in (2008) 7 SCC 53 the Apex Court opined that when impugned action with specific object of damaging interest of aggrieved party and such action is aimed at helping another party which results in damage to the party aggrieved, the same amounts to colourable exercise of power. In (Sukhbans Singh Vs. State of Punjab) reported in AIR 1962 SC 174 it was held that use of power for a purpose other than that of which the power is conferred upon the authority is called mala fide use of power. 25. In (Sukhbans Singh Vs. State of Punjab) reported in AIR 1962 SC 174 it was held that use of power for a purpose other than that of which the power is conferred upon the authority is called mala fide use of power. 25. On the basis of aforesaid legal position, in the considered opinion of this Court, the transfer order is not arising out of administrative exigency or public interest. It is passed on irrelevant considerations and amounts to malice in law. On the basis of aforesaid analysis, the transfer order cannot be permitted to stand. The order Annexure P/1 dated 12.08.2013 is, accordingly, set aside. The petitioner shall be entitled to get all the consequential benefits. No costs.