Judgment : The appellants herein are defendant Nos.2 and 3 in O.S.No.104 of 2003 on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Adoni, Kurnool District. The said suit was filed by respondent Nos.1 to 9 herein against respondent No.10 and the appellants for perpetual injunction initially and later converted to a suit for declaration of title and for perpetual injunction. The said suit was dismissed by the trial court, but reversed in appeal by the appellate court. Hence, this appeal by the appellants, who are purchasers from respondent No.10/defendant No.1 in the suit. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein will be referred to as they are arrayed in the suit. 3. Facts in brief are as follows: a) Plaintiffs claim to be absolute owners and possessors of suit schedule property having acquired the same by virtue of a registered Will, dated 19.11.1997, Ex.A2 executed by paternal grandmother of the plaintiffs. It is alleged that the schedule property originally belonged to paternal grandfather of the plaintiffs namely Gurukul Narsingappa, who had earlier purchased the property under registered sale deed, dated 20.01.1953, Ex.A1. It is stated that after the death of the grandfather of the plaintiffs, their grandmother came in to possession and she executed a Will in favour of plaintiffs. Ex.A2, A4 and A5 are the title deeds and pattadar passbooks issued in favour of the grandmother of the plaintiffs and Exs.A7 to A11 are cist receipts evidencing payment of land revenue. It is stated that the suit schedule land, which is situated in Jalimanchi village, where defendant No.1 is residing, was under continuous possession and enjoyment of the grandmother of the plaintiffs, which is reflected in Adangal entries Ex.A6. It is alleged that defendant No.1 had nothing to do with the property but had sought issuance of pattadar passbook on the basis of documents claimed by him. Plaintiffs state that they have received a Caveat-Ex.A12, alleging to have purchased the property and having transferred the title to defendant Nos.2 and 3/appellants herein. Hence, the plaintiffs filed the present suit for perpetual injunction initially. b) Defendant No.1 filed a written statement denying the claim of the plaintiffs and stated that the grandmother of the plaintiffs had neither right, title nor interest over the suit schedule property and consequently the Will set up by the plaintiffs has no value. The truth or genuineness of the Will was also denied. b) Defendant No.1 filed a written statement denying the claim of the plaintiffs and stated that the grandmother of the plaintiffs had neither right, title nor interest over the suit schedule property and consequently the Will set up by the plaintiffs has no value. The truth or genuineness of the Will was also denied. Defendant No.1 had further stated that the grandfather of the plaintiffs sold the property to one Dandu Pedda Lakshmaiah, father of defendant No.1 in 1958 by means of a revenue transfer and entries in the revenue record was accordingly made and after the demise of the father of defendant No.1, it was claimed that defendant No.1 was continued to be enjoyer and possessor. The suit schedule land, an extent of Ac.11-95 cents in Survey No.189, in Namlikal Village of Adhoni Mandal of Kurnool District, is said to have been sold by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 to the extent of Ac.2-50 cents and further to defendant No.3 to the extent of Ac.1-50 cents under registered sale deeds, dated 17.02.2003, Exs.B13 and B14 respectively. Defendant No.1, therefore, states that he continued to be in possession of the balance land and defendant Nos.2 and 3 with respect to their purchased land. He also places reliance on revenue record i.e., 10(1) Account and ROR Extract Exs.B8 and B9 and Xerox copy of pattadar passbook-Ex.B10. It was also clear that the grandfather of the plaintiffs left behind wife, three daughters and son. But none of those persons are made parties to the suit. Hence, the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. It was also claimed that defendant No.1 had filed a Caveat denying title of the plaintiffs and, as such, suit for bare injunction was not maintainable. Defendant No.1 also pleaded that in the land reforms proceedings, the grandfather of the plaintiffs admitted sale in favour of father of the defendants. c) Defendant Nos.2 and 3 filed separate written statements claiming that they have purchased the property from defendant No.1 under Exs.B13 and B14 respectively and denied the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs had sought relief of declaration of title by way of an amendment in I.A.No.629 of 2006, which was allowed on 18.04.2006, and the plaint was accordingly amended. Plaintiffs had sought relief of declaration of title by way of an amendment in I.A.No.629 of 2006, which was allowed on 18.04.2006, and the plaint was accordingly amended. It was stated that as per the amended plaint, the cause of action for seeking relief of declaration of title was the caveat filed by defendant No.1. 4. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues for trial: 1. Whether plaintiff was in lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit property as on the date of filing the suit? 2. Whether plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for? 3. To what relief? Additional issues:- 1. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs is barred by limitation? 2. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of heir title to the plaint schedule property as prayed for? 4. To what relief? 5. Plaintiffs examined P.W.1 and four other witnesses as P.Ws.2 to 5. Defendant No.1 examined himself as D.W.1 and defendant No.2 as D.W.6, apart from examining D.Ws.2, 3, 4 and 5. D.W.5 is the Mandal Revenue Officer, who deposed with reference to revenue record. 6. The trial court inter alia held on additional issue No.1 that the Caveat-Ex.A12 filed by defendant No.1 was served on the plaintiffs sometime in 2003, before filing of the suit for injunction. Whereas the suit with the amended relief of declaration was filed after the amendment was allowed on 18.04.2006. The trial court, therefore, held that in view of Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for brevity, “the Act”), the suit having been filed more than three years after receipt of Caveat Ex.A12, is barred by limitation. With regard to additional issue No.3, the trial court found and accepted the plea of defendant No.1 that the grandfather of the plaintiffs sold the property by way of a revenue sale in favour of father of defendant No.1 and the revenue record in support of the said claim including 10(1) account and the evidence of D.W.5 was accepted; that the father of defendant No.1 was pattadar of the suit land and consequently, the relief of declaration of title sought for was rejected; and based on the said main finding, the suit came to be dismissed. 7. 7. On appeal by the plaintiffs, the appellate court has reversed the decree of the trial court on finding that the suit had to be considered as one under Article 65 of the Act, for which limitation is 12 years and, as such, the suit is not barred by limitation. To the extent of title pleaded by defendant No.1, the court below found that the concept of revenue transfer pleaded by defendant No.1 cannot be accepted, as it is not recognised by the Transfer of Property Act. Consequently, it was held that defendant No.1 did not acquire any title merely on the basis of mutation records or entries in the revenue record. Consequently, therefore, the title claimed by defendant Nos.2 and 3 (appellants herein) on the basis of Exs.B13 and B14 also stood rejected. So far as the proof of Will is concerned, though the appellate court came to the conclusion that plaintiffs failed to prove the said Will, but in view of the admitted relationship of plaintiffs as being the grandsons of the original owner as successor, he is entitled to declaration of title. Thereby, the appeal was allowed by decreeing the suit. 8. This second appeal is, therefore, filed by the purchasers from defendant No.1 i.e., defendant Nos.2 and 3 and two substantial questions of law were framed for consideration in this second appeal as recorded in the proceedings in this appeal, dated 03.09.2013, which is extracted hereunder: “The lower appellate court has reversed the decree of the trial court and thereby, the suit of the respondents is now decreed by the lower appellate court. Apart from the other questions, on the aspect of limitation, the trial court held that article 58 of the Limitation Act applies and the suit is barred by limitation and the lower appellate court was of the opinion that Article 65 of the Limitation Act would apply and the suit is within limitation. The said question, being substantial question of law, is required to be considered: Both the learned counsel state that they will make submissions in the main second appeal itself so that it can be disposed of. Hence, list the appeal for ‘admission and final hearing’ on 27.09.2013. In the meanwhile, both the parties shall maintain status quo with regard to the suit schedule property so far as the appellants are concerned.” 9. Hence, list the appeal for ‘admission and final hearing’ on 27.09.2013. In the meanwhile, both the parties shall maintain status quo with regard to the suit schedule property so far as the appellants are concerned.” 9. ?Mr.Kowturu Vinay Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants, pointed out that the caveat Ex.A12, was also proved by the O.P. Register maintained by the trial court and marking relevant caveat as Ex.B16 as O.P.No.9 of 2003 presented on 06.03.2003 and registered on that date. Learned counsel also placed reliance upon the plaint allegations wherein cause of action is referred by the plaintiffs as that of the receipt of caveat. The relevant portion dealing with the cause of action may be extracted as the plea of limitation raised by the appellants revolves around the said contention. Paras 8 and 8(a) of the amended plaint are as follows: “8) The cause of action for the suit arose on 18.03.2003 when the defendant Nos.1 to 3 try to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit schedule property at Nemelikal village within the jurisdiction of this Hoon’ble Court. 8(a) Further the cause of action for the relief of declaration of plaintiffs title arose when the defendants No.1 to 3 filed Caveat just before filing of the suit by denying the title of the plaintiffs which is served at Nemelikal village within the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court (added as per the I.A.No.629/06 dated 18.04.2006). 10. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that when the plaintiffs were aware that their title is denied by defendant No.1, instead of filing a suit for declaration, they chose to file a suit for perpetual injunction. Further, even in the written statement though the plaintiffs’ title was denied, no steps were taken within three years for amendment of plaint. However, plaintiffs sought amendment of the plaint to seek relief of declaration much later by filing I.A.No.629 of 2006. He has further pointed out that the suit was filed on 20.03.2003 after receiving the caveat, whereas application for amendment I.A.No.629 of 2006 was filed on 21.03.2006. The cause of action shown in the plaint, as noticed above, is 18.03.2003 and the application for amendment was allowed on 18.04.2006. He has further pointed out that the suit was filed on 20.03.2003 after receiving the caveat, whereas application for amendment I.A.No.629 of 2006 was filed on 21.03.2006. The cause of action shown in the plaint, as noticed above, is 18.03.2003 and the application for amendment was allowed on 18.04.2006. Thus, though the exact date of service of Caveat on the plaintiffs is not available, evidently plaintiffs has sought relief of declaration more than three years after filing the suit for injunction, in spite of knowing that his title is denied by defendant No.1. By placing reliance on Article 58 of the Act, it is contended that the suit is clearly barred by time as rightly held by the trial court and the appellate court committed error in reversing the said finding. He also submitted that the appellate court went completely wrong in thinking that the suit would be covered by Article 65 of the Limitation Act and not by Article 58. He submits that the lower appellate court hereby committed grave error in thinking that the plaintiffs could have filed the suit within 12 years of Limitation as per Article 65. The said finding of the lower appellate court is, therefore, required to be set aside. 11. So far as the other findings of the lower appellate court are concerned, it is contended that the plaintiffs failed to prove the Will, under which they claimed the suit property and the trial court as well as the appellate court found the said Will as not proved in accordance with law. On the contrary, the defendants who had claimed transfer in favour of their father under revenue sale, were supporting their title and possession on the basis of mutation and entries in the revenue record, all of which, were exhibited before the courts below. While the trial court accepted the said documents and the title of defendant No.1, the appellate court rejected the same in spite of finding that plaintiffs have failed to prove the Will. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that in a suit for declaration, plaintiffs are required to succeed on the strength of his own case and having failed there, appellate court could not have allowed the appeal by finding weaknesses in the case of the defendants. In support of that contention, learned counsel places reliance on T.K.MOHAMMED ABUBUCKER V. P.S.M.AHAMED ABDUL KHADER ((20009) 14 SCC 224). In support of that contention, learned counsel places reliance on T.K.MOHAMMED ABUBUCKER V. P.S.M.AHAMED ABDUL KHADER ((20009) 14 SCC 224). Another decision in UNION OF INDIA V. IBRAHIM UDDIN ( (2012) 8 SCC 148 )is also relied upon to support the contention that the first appellate court wrongly placed the burden of proof on defendant No.1 though it was the plaintiffs, who was seeking declaration of title, was required to prove the same himself. 12. Mr. S. Lakshminarayana Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the trial court has wrongly appreciated the provisions of Article 58 of the Act and places strong reliance upon a series of decisions reported, which have taken a view, that suits for declaration relating to immovable properties are not covered by Articles 56 to 58 of the Act and in fact covered by Article 65 of the Act. Learned counsel also submits that preponderance of authorities hold the said views that in respect of immovable properties the period of limitation is governed by Articles 64 and 65 of the Act, but not by Article 58 of the Act. Reliance is placed upon judgment of this court reported in MECHINNEI CHOKKA RAO AND OTHERS V. SATTU SATTAMMA (2006 (1) ALD 116), which in turn had relied upon several decisions of this court and other High Courts. Learned counsel also placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in LAKHAN SAO V. DHARAMU CHAUDHARY ( 1991 (3) SCC 331 )in support of the contention that when both the parties have lead evidence, the burden of proof looses any significance and the court may consider the evidence in entirety to come to a conclusion. Reliance is also placed upon the latest judgment of this court in ASKARI BEGUM V. MOHD. AYAZ KHAN ( 2011 (4) ALT 479 ), wherein it was also held that suit not based after dispossession, suit for declaration of title can be filed within 12 years under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. Another decision of this court reported in KASARAPU SUJATHA AND ANOTHER V. VERA VELLI VEERA SOMAIAH ( 2008 (3) ALD 525 )is also relied upon for the same proposition. 13. On the above rival contentions, the following substantial questions of law need to be considered and answered. Another decision of this court reported in KASARAPU SUJATHA AND ANOTHER V. VERA VELLI VEERA SOMAIAH ( 2008 (3) ALD 525 )is also relied upon for the same proposition. 13. On the above rival contentions, the following substantial questions of law need to be considered and answered. 1) Whether the lower appellate court was justified in reversing the finding of the trial court that the suit is covered by Article 58 of the Act and hence barred? 2) Whether the lower appellate court was right in holding that the suit is governed by Article 65 of the Act and, as such, was perfectly maintainable? 14. In addition to the above two questions, it is also necessary to consider and decide as to whether the title claimed by defendant No.1 based on the revenue sale in favour of his father can be recognized? 15. So far as the first two questions are concerned, at the outset, it would be appropriate to notice Articles 58 and 65 of the Act. Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run PART III – SUITS RELATING TO DECLARATIONS 58. To obtain any other declaration Three years When the right to sue first accrues. … PART V – SUITS RELATING TO IMMOVABLE PROPERTY 65. For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on titleExplanation : - for the purposes of this article – (a) where the suit is by a remainderman, a reversioner (other than a landlord) or a devisee the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become b) where the suit is by a Hindu or Muslim entitled to the possession of immovable property on the death of a Hindu or Muslim female, the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the female dies; c) where the suit is by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree when the judgment-debtor was out of possession at the date of the sale, the purchaser shall be deemed to be a representative of the judgment-debtor who was out of possession. Twelve years When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. 16. Twelve years When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. 16. While it would be immediately noticed that Article 65 of the Act, deals with suit for possession or any interest based on title, whereas the cognate Article 64 deals with the suit for possession based on the previous possession but not on title. Further, Articles 56 to 58 of the Act, which form part III of the Schedule, deal with suits for declaration of different categories. While Articles 56 and 57 of the Act deal with specific nature of declaration, Article 58 is the residuary article. 17. While examining the questions 1 and 2 above, I will first proceed on the footing that the present suit being one for declaration and injunction, does not fall within Articles 64 or 65 of the Act and from that point of view it has to be seen whether the suit would be within time under any of the Articles under part III of the Schedule under the Act. As mentioned above, Article 58 of the Act is a residuary article, which deals with all residual declarations, other than those covered under Articles 56 and 57 of the Act and the limitation prescribed is when the right to sue first accrues. The significance of the words “right to sue first accrues” used in Article 58 has to be understood and distinguished from the limitation provided under residuary Article 137 where the words used are “when the right to apply accrues”. Thus in the legislative scheme under the Limitation Act, accrual of right to apply would cover every cause of action whereas under Article 58 of the Act the limitation of three years would begin when the ‘right to sue first accrues’. While interpreting the aforesaid ‘right to sue first accrues’, it has been held that it is not necessary for the plaintiffs to rush to the court seeking declaration, on any insignificant threat to his title. The cause of action, therefore, would arise only when the title or right of the plaintiffs is threatened or jeoparadised but not merely when any insignificant or imaginary threat arises. 18. The said aspect is further elaborated by a decision of the Supreme Court in Daya Singh v. Gurdev Singh (2010(2)SCC 194), which in turn had relied upon ratio of judgment of privy council in {Bolo v. Koklan [(1929-30) 57 IA 325]}. 18. The said aspect is further elaborated by a decision of the Supreme Court in Daya Singh v. Gurdev Singh (2010(2)SCC 194), which in turn had relied upon ratio of judgment of privy council in {Bolo v. Koklan [(1929-30) 57 IA 325]}. Relevant portions thereof are extracted hereunder: “13. Let us, therefore, consider whether the suit was barred by limitation in view of Article 58 of the Act in the background of the facts stated in the plaint its4elf. Part III of the Schedule which has prescribed the period of limitation relates to suits concerning declarations. Article 58 of the Act clearly says that to obtain any other declaration, the limitation would be three years from the date when the right to sue fir accrues. 14. … In support of this contention the learned Senior Counsel strongly relied on a decision of the Privy Council in Bolo v. Koklan {1929-30) 57 IA 325. in this decision Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows: (IA p.331) “… There can be no ‘right to sue’ until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement, or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right, by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted.” 15. A similar view was reiterated in C.Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa { AIR 1961 SC 808 }, in which this court observed: (AIR p.810, para 7) “7. … The period of six years prescribed by Article 120 has to be computed from the date when the right to sue accrues and there could be no right to sue until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right.” In C.Mohammad Yunus, this court held that the cause of action for the purposes of Article 58 of the Act accrues only when the right asserted in the suit is infringed or there is at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right. Therefore, the mere existence of an adverse entry in the revenue records cannot give rise to cause of action. 16. Keeping these principles in mind, let us consider the admitted facts of the case. Therefore, the mere existence of an adverse entry in the revenue records cannot give rise to cause of action. 16. Keeping these principles in mind, let us consider the admitted facts of the case. In para 16 of the plaint, it has been clearly averred that the right to sue accrued when such right was infringed by the defendants about a week back when the plaintiffs had for the first time come to know about the wrong entries in the record-of-rights and when the defendants had refused to admit the claim of the plaintiffs. Admittedly, the suit was filed on 21.08.1990. According to the averments made by the plaintiffs in their plaint, as noted hereinabove, if this statement is accepted, the question of holding that the suit was barred by limitation could not arise at all. Accordingly, we are of the view that the right to sue accrued when a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendants when they refused to admit the claim of the appellants i.e., only seven days before filing of the suit. Therefore, we are of the view that within three years from the date of infringement as noted in para 16 of the plaint, the suit was filed. Therefore, the suit which was filed for declaration, on 21.08.1990, in our view, cannot be held to be barred by limitation.” (emphasis supplied) 19. The crux of the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is on the caveat filed by defendant No.1 before the plaintiffs filed the suit for injunction. According to the learned counsel, the filing of the said caveat amounted to denial of title of the plaintiffs. In real sense, however, a caveat is merely an advance intimation by the defendant communicated to the prospective plaintiff and registered in the court, where the defendant expects the suit to be filed. A caveat is merely an anticipatory application to ensure that no ex parte interim order is granted to such prospective plaintiff. Any person may, therefore, file a caveat if he expects that such a prospective plaintiff is likely to file a legal proceeding against him. The filing of the caveat, therefore, serves only as an advance intimation to the prospective plaintiff to notify the caveator in advance before seeking any interim order. Any person may, therefore, file a caveat if he expects that such a prospective plaintiff is likely to file a legal proceeding against him. The filing of the caveat, therefore, serves only as an advance intimation to the prospective plaintiff to notify the caveator in advance before seeking any interim order. If the contention of learned counsel for the appellant is accepted that filing of caveat gives rise to a cause of cause of action for seeking relief of declaration of title; then, a caveat will have to be equated to an eminent threat to the tile of the prospective plaintiff and it will also have to be equated and elevated to the status of a pleading. In my view, both the assumptions would be far fetched and untenable. 20. The Caveat filed by defendant No.1 was marked in the suit as Ex.A12. Pending the appeal before the lower appellate court, the defendants filed certified copies of the caveat petitions and served acknowledgments as additional evidence, which were marked as Exs.B15 to B18. Ex.B16 extract of the caveat register is produced along with the additional material papers by the learned counsel for the appellant. The said extract merely shows that the Caveator i.e., 10th respondent herein (defendant No.1) lodged the caveat on 06.03.2003 before the court of Senior Civil Judge, Adoni by describing 1) G.Venu Gopal, S/o. D. Narsinappa and 2) G.Raghavendra, S/o. G. Venu Gopal (respondent Nos.1 and 2/plaintiff Nos.2 and 1), are likely to file a suit for which respondents’ counsel name as well as the description of the suit schedule property was mentioned. In Ex.B16 there is no averment of assertion of title. Even otherwise, the caveat would serve only as an intimation of a proceeding likely to be filed against the caveator for which he serves an advance intimation opposing any ex parte interim orders. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the said caveat by itself amounted to an unequivocal threat to the title of the respondents/plaintiffs. 21. It is true that in the amended plaint under para 8(a), which is extracted above, plaintiffs have shown the said caveat as a part of cause of action. However, the cause of action for the original suit is the threat of dispossession, as mentioned in para 8 of the plaint, also extracted above. 21. It is true that in the amended plaint under para 8(a), which is extracted above, plaintiffs have shown the said caveat as a part of cause of action. However, the cause of action for the original suit is the threat of dispossession, as mentioned in para 8 of the plaint, also extracted above. Thus, the right to sue cannot be said to have first accrued to the plaintiffs in 2003 when defendant lodged the said caveat Ex.A12. It is also well settled that the cause of action is bundle of facts and one among that is the filing of caveat by defendant No.1. Thus, the caveat alone by itself cannot be said to be the starting point of limitation of three years. Trial court, therefore, committed error in non-suiting the plaintiffs on the said ground and the appellate court was justified in setting aside that finding. 22. It is also necessary to consider the said aspect from another angle, which is covered by decision of this Court in MECHINENI CHOKKA RAO’s case (3 supra), wherein this court considered several earlier judgments and held in paras 9 to 13 as follows: “9. The Limitation Act bars the remedy but not the right, is the principle behind the Act. The two exceptions to the said principles being acquisition of right and extinguishment of right are dealt under Sections 25 and 27 of the Act respectively. Where a person enjoys an easementary right, uninterruptedly for a period of 20 years, as regards any access, use of light or air, way, watercourse, use of water or other easement, that person acquires an absolute and indefeasible easementary right. Where after the period of limitation prescribed under the Act for instituting a suit for possession of any property is expired, the right of the person to such property will be extinguished. In other words, a person who has a right over an immovable property fails to institute a suit for possession within the period prescribed therefor, his right over the property will be lost. Thus, while Section 25 of the Act confers right of acquisition, Section 27 thereof extinguishes the right. 10. A Schedule has been appended to the Act prescribing various periods of limitation. The, schedule has been suitably divided into three different divisions dealing with suits, appeals and applications respectively. Each division has been again divided into various parts dealing with specified matters. 10. A Schedule has been appended to the Act prescribing various periods of limitation. The, schedule has been suitably divided into three different divisions dealing with suits, appeals and applications respectively. Each division has been again divided into various parts dealing with specified matters. The first division thereof deals with various suits to be filed containing Articles 1 to 113; the second division deals with appeals containing Articles 114 to 117; and the third division deals with applications containing Articles 118 to 137. The first division of the schedule in turn has been divided into ten parts. Part-I thereof deals with suits relating to accounts; Part-II with suits relating to contracts; Part-Ill with suits relating to declarations; Part-IV with suits relating to decrees and instruments; Part-V with suits relating to immovable property; Part-VI with suits relating to movable property; Part-VII with suits relating to tort; Part-VIII with suits relating to trusts and trust property; Part-IX with suits relating to miscellaneous matters; and Part-X with suits for which there is no prescribed period. While part-Ill of first division deals with suits relating to declarations; Part-V thereof deals with suits relating to immovable property. In Part-Ill there are three Articles, namely, 56, 57 and 58. While Article 56 prescribes three years period of limitation to institute a suit for declaration that the instrument issued or registered is a forged one; Article 57 prescribes an equal period for declaring the alleged adoption as invalid and Article 58, however, prescribes albeit an equal period in respect of any other declaration. It is obvious that Article 58 is in the nature of residuary provision among the declaratory suits. Indubitably the relief of declaration can be sought for in respect of an immovable property or movable property, or in respect of an instrument, or in respect of a decree, or in respect of an adoption. Thus, various types of declaratory reliefs can be sought for pertaining to those categories. Therefore, the relief of declaration alone appears to be not the criterion for prescribing the period of limitation but the subject-matter of the suit in respect of which the declaration is sought for, appears to be germane for consideration. 11. One shall not be oblivious of the fact that part-V of first division specifically deals with category of suits relating to immovable property. 11. One shall not be oblivious of the fact that part-V of first division specifically deals with category of suits relating to immovable property. Coming in the domain of part-V, Articles 64 and 65 specifically deal with the period of limitation to institute a suit for possession of immovable property based on previous possession and to institute a suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title. Having regard to the categorisation sought to be made in the Schedule, although Part-Ill of the first division thereof apparently deals with suits relating to declarations, that part does not deal with suits relating to immovable property inasmuch as Part-V thereof exclusively deals with the suits pertaining to immovable property, prima facie it appears, therefore, that notwithstanding the fact that the suit is filed for the relief of declaration but the suit is in respect of an immovable property, Article 58 of the Act has no application, instead Articles 61 to 67, which specifically deal with the suits relating to immovable property, seem to be applicable. 12. A suit for the relief of declaration simpliciter is not maintainable as per the mandate contained in Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. If the suit is filed for declaration of title over an immovable property and for the consequential relief of either possession or injunctions, if it is said that still Article 58 governs, it does not stand to reason, nay appears to be somewhat odd. A suit for possession or a suit for perpetual injunction obviously is governed by the relevant Article in Part-V of the first division when that suit pertains to immovable property. Article 58, in my considered view, will not fall foul of Article 65 of the Act. In the event of any inconsistency in between the two Articles mentioned in the Schedule, the endeavour of the Court shall be to give a harmonious construction having due regard to the scheme and object of the Act. 13. The problem can be viewed in a different dimension. The right over an immovable property will get extinguished as can be seen from Section 27 of the Act only after the expiry of the period prescribed for filing the suit for possession as per Articles 64 and 65 of the Act. 13. The problem can be viewed in a different dimension. The right over an immovable property will get extinguished as can be seen from Section 27 of the Act only after the expiry of the period prescribed for filing the suit for possession as per Articles 64 and 65 of the Act. Therefore, if the period falls short of the requisite period of 12 years the right over an immovable property will not get extinguished. When the person has a right over an immovable property which right is not extinguished as yet, he can lay the suit in respect of an immovable property even praying for the relief of declaration at any time within the period of 12 years at the end of which, his right would get extinguished. When we consider this clear mandate contained in Section 27 of the Act, it becomes manifest that a declaratory relief in respect of an immovable property can be sought for at any time within the period of 12 years after which the right will get automatically extinguished, notwithstanding the fact that Article 58, the residuary Article for filing declaratory suits, prescribes a period of three years limitation. Thus, when we look, at the scheme of the Act, the above view seems to be plausible and reasonable qua the contrary view sought to be canvassed.” 23. Thus, preponderance of authority holds the view that in respect of declaratory suits pertaining to immovable property period of limitation is governed by Articles 64 and 65, but not under Article 58 of the Act. In view of the above, the questions 1 & 2 are answered against the appellants. 24. So far as the additional question is concerned, it is the case of defendant No.1 that the grandfather of the plaintiffs sold the property to his father under a revenue sale in 1953 and the said contention was accepted by the trial court. Appellate court, however, reversed the said finding by holding that there is nothing like revenue sale, which can be recognised in law. Appellate court, however, reversed the said finding by holding that there is nothing like revenue sale, which can be recognised in law. Though the learned counsel for the appellants, who have purchased part of the property from the said defendant No.1, placed strong reliance upon evidence of the Mandal Revenue Officer-P.W.5 and also on 10(1) account and R.O.R. Extract, Exs.B8 and B9 respectively, and the endorsements Exs.B11 and B2 given by the Revenue Divisional Officer and the Mandal Revenue Officer concerned and contended that the title of defendant No.1 is recognised in the revenue records for several years, I find it very difficult to accept the said contention as any transfer of immovable property of a value of more than Rs.100/- has to be in conformity with the Transfer of Property Act and must be registered. The revenue sale is equal to sale on white paper by which title cannot be said to have been transferred to the purchaser. Though there are some revenue entries showing the name of defendant No.1, it is also significant that D.W.1 has admittedly not obtained any pattadar passbook. The concept of revenue sale, therefore, was rightly not recognised by the lower appellate court and consequently in the absence of any pleading by the defendants, claiming any adverse possession, the suit filed by the respondents/plaintiffs was rightly decreed by the lower appellate court. The question No.3 is, therefore, answered in favour of respondent Nos.1 to 9/plaintiffs. Consequently, the second appeal is dismissed. However, in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand dismissed.