JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. This is an appeal, against the judgment and decree, dated 14-6-2007, passed, in Title Suit (Divorce) Case No. 11 of 2003, by the learned District Judge, Tinsukia, refusing to dissolve the marriage between the appellant and the respondent. The case of the appellant may, in brief, be described thus: The parties to the suit solemnized their marriage, on 3-3-1998, under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, at the office of the Registrar of Marriages, Tinsukia. About two months after marriage, i.e., on 24-5-1998, the respondent came to the house of the appellant without the consent of her mother and started leading her conjugal life with the appellant. However, on that very day, the respondent's mother came to the house of the appellant and she took away from the respondent her earrings and chain, which the respondent had brought from her matrimonial house. The mother of the respondent even rubbed the vermillion from the head of the respondent. At the time of her marriage with the appellant, the respondent was a student of Part-I degree course. The appellant allowed the respondent to continue with her studies and the appellant's mother got the respondent admitted in BA Part-II course in Women's College, Tinsukia, and provided facilities to the respondent to attend her classes regularly. A few months after her marriage, the respondent started behaving in an abnormal manner and she did not show even minimum respect and regard to the elder members of the appellant's family and that she used to move out the house of the appellant as and when she wanted. The respondent, eventually, left, on 16-2-1999, the appellant's house in the absence of the appellant and refused to come back to her matrimonial home despite many persuasive attempts made by the appellant and his well wishers. In order to subject the appellant and his family to mental cruelty and harassment, the respondent lodged a First Information Report (in short, 'FIR'), at Doom Dooma Police Station, alleging to the effect, inter alia, that on 16-2-1999, the respondent had become unconscious, but neither the appellant nor any of the members of his family took her to any doctor and the respondent had to be brought back to her matrimonial house by her parents and, then, the respondent underwent medical treatment. This apart, the respondent also alleged, in the FIR, that she had asked the appellant to return her certificates, but the appellant refused to do so and threatened her with dire consequences. Based on the said FIR, Doom Dooma Police Station Case No. 275 of 1999, under Section 498(A)/ 506 IPC, was registered against the appellant and his mother and both of them were tried by the criminal Court. While the mother of the appellant was acquitted by the learned trial Court, the appellant was convicted. As against his conviction, the appellant preferred an appeal, which gave rise to Criminal Appeal No. 26(2)/2002 and it was in the appeal that the appellant was acquitted. As a result of lodging of the said case, the appellant and his mother suffered financial loss and also mental torture and their reputation in the society was damaged. There is no scope of reunion between the parties concerned, because of the cruelty with which the respondent has treated the appellant and his family. This apart, the appellant is frightened to live with the respondent. 2. The respondent filed her written statement resisting the application for divorce, her case being, briefly stated, thus: Though their marriage was solemnized on 3-3-1998, the appellant did not take the respondent to his house due to some internal family problems and it was the respondent, who went to the house of the appellant and started leading conjugal life with him, but the respondent was subjected to mental torture by the appellant and his mother. As the respondent was unable to bear the cruelty heaped on her, she fainted on 16-2-1999. However, the appellant did not take care of the respondent and did not even call a doctor, whereupon the respondent's parents took the respondent for her medical treatment. The respondent was ever willing to live with the appellant. In fact, the appellant and the respondent had stayed, at Hotel Natraj, as husband and wife and at that time, the respondent was of the view that there would be reunion, but her hope came to be frustrated by institution of the divorce suit. 3. The learned trial Court framed the following issues: (i) Whether the petitioner was subjected to mental cruelty by the respondent? (ii) Whether the respondent deserted the petitioner since 16-2-1999? (iii) Whether the petitioner inflicted mental torture upon the respondent? 3. The learned trial Court framed the following issues: (i) Whether the petitioner was subjected to mental cruelty by the respondent? (ii) Whether the respondent deserted the petitioner since 16-2-1999? (iii) Whether the petitioner inflicted mental torture upon the respondent? (iv) Whether the respondent made endeavours to restore the marital relation? 4. Both sides adduced evidence, the appellant having examined 4 witnesses and the respondent 3 witnesses. The learned trial Court answered all the issues in favour of the respondent. The learned trial Court, thus, found the appellant not entitled to the reliefs, which he had sought for. By the judgment and order, dated 14-6-2007, the suit was, therefore, dismissed and impugned decree followed. 5. We have heard Ms. B. Sarma, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellant, and Mr. G.P. Bhowmik, learned counsel, for the respondent. 6. At the time of hearing, serious attempts have been made, on behalf of the appellant, to persuade us to hold that the appellant had been, in terms of the provisions of Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, treated with cruelty by the respondent. In this regard, it has been repeatedly pointed out to us, on behalf of the appellant, that the respondent had lodged falsely a criminal case and harassed the appellant for four years, but the appellant was acquitted as the criminal Court, eventually, found that the evidence, as regards the allegations of cruelty and harassment, were vague, inconsistent and unreliable and, hence, in the face of the conclusions, so reached, by the learned criminal Court, the learned civil Court, in the present case, ought to have held that the respondent had treated the appellant with cruelty and that their marriage ought to be dissolved. Reliance, in support of the appellant's case, has been placed on the case of Rishikesh Sharma v. Saroj Sharma, reported in (2007) 2 SCC 263 . 7. Reliance, in support of the appellant's case, has been placed on the case of Rishikesh Sharma v. Saroj Sharma, reported in (2007) 2 SCC 263 . 7. Repealing the above submissions made on behalf of the appellant, it is contended, on behalf of the respondent, that mere filing of the criminal case and the respondent's failure to prove her case would not ipso facto furnish a ground for dissolution of marriage in terms of the provisions of Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, and that in order to substantiate the ground of cruelty, the appellant could adduce no evidence except the fact that a case was lodged against him and his mother by the respondent and in the case, so lodged, the appellant and his mother had been acquitted. This apart, the respondent, as the submissions on behalf of the respondent proceed, had always been willing to live as husband and wife with the appellant and she made, in this regard, all endeavours, but failed and the learned trial Court has, on scanning the evidence on record, come to the correct conclusion that it was not the respondent, but the appellant, who had subjected the respondent to cruelty. 8. While considering the present appeal, it needs to be noted that the appellant instituted the suit seeking dissolution of marriage under Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, which provides for dissolution of marriage if the spouse, against whom the decree of dissolution is sought, has been undergoing sentence of imprisonment for seven years or more for an offence as defined in the Indian Penal Code. Admittedly, no case under Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, had been made out by the plaint. The appellant, then, filed an application seeking amendment to the effect that his plaint shall be considered to be a plaint, whereby he shall be treated to have sought for dissolution of marriage under Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The appellant, then, filed an application seeking amendment to the effect that his plaint shall be considered to be a plaint, whereby he shall be treated to have sought for dissolution of marriage under Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. We may pause to point out that Clause (e) of subsection (1) of Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, comes into play, when the spouse, against whom the divorce is applied, has been incurably of unsound mind or has been suffering continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. 9. As conceded, on behalf of the appellant before us, the provisions of Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, were not attracted to the facts of the case. As a matter of fact, the case of the appellant fell within the ambit of Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, and Clause (d) provides for dissolution of marriage if the person, who has applied for dissolution of marriage, has been treated with cruelty by the spouse against whom the application, seeking dissolution of marriage, has been made. 10. In the backdrop of what have been indicated above, the limited question, which arises in the present appeal, for decision is: Whether the appellant, according to the evidence on record, had been treated with cruelty by the respondent? 11. While answering the question posed above, it needs to be noted that the case of the appellant, seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, is based on the fact that a false criminal case had been lodged against him and his mother by the respondent and they were mentally and physically harassed and they were also made to suffer financial loss as well as loss of reputation in the society. In this regard, it is imperative to note that mere filing of a criminal case under Section 498A IPC and/or under Section 506 IPC and the failure to prove the case would not ipso facto satisfy the ground as contemplated by Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, unless the case is shown to have been lodged falsely and with a view to harass and torture the person concerned. 12. In the case at hand, though it is true that the appellant and his mother stand acquitted of the charges, which were brought against them, the fact remains that there is nothing in the judgment of acquittal indicating that the case, which had been lodged by the respondent, was false or that the respondent had made false allegations. It is trite that the standard of proof, in a civil case, is different from the standard of proof, which is required in a criminal case. While a civil case is decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence, the accusation or charge, in a criminal case, has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 13. Heavy burden, therefore, lies on a person to prove his case, when he lodges the criminal case. 14. In the case at hand, the learned appellate Court has recorded that the allegation of cruelty, which the respondent had made, were vague, inconsistent and unreasonable. The conclusions, so reached, cannot be stretched to hold that the allegations, which the respondent had made against the appellant and her mother, were false or vexatious. A criminal Court may find the evidence, which prosecution adduces, unreliable. The mere fact, however, that the evidence, adduced by the prosecution, is found to be unreliable, would not mean that the case lodged is false. Similarly, in the case at hand, merely because the case against the appellant was found to be not reliable, vague and inconsistent, it is not possible to hold, boldly and confidently, that the case against the appellant was false. The reference, which Ms. Similarly, in the case at hand, merely because the case against the appellant was found to be not reliable, vague and inconsistent, it is not possible to hold, boldly and confidently, that the case against the appellant was false. The reference, which Ms. Sarma, learned counsel, has made to the case of Rishikesh Sharma (supra), does not apply to the case at hand inasmuch as in the case of Rishikesh Sharma (supra), the wife had filed not merely one, but several criminal cases, one after the other and it was in such circumstances that the Supreme Court had observed that there was a history of litigation that the respondent wife had repeatedly been filing criminal cases against the appellant, which could not be substantiated by her. In the present case, there was only one criminal case, which was lodged by the respondent and the case failed. Hence, the observations, made in Rishikesh Sharma (supra), cannot be borrowed and applied to the facts of the present case. 15. It is also noteworthy that the respondent had lodged the FIR with the police and it was upon investigation that the charge sheet was filed. Prosecution was, admittedly, conducted not by the respondent, but by the State. In such a fact situation, merely because the case against the appellant could not be proved and, particularly, when there is no specific finding by the learned criminal Court that the case which had been lodged against the appellant and his mother, was false, we are firmly of the view that the acquittal of the appellant, in the criminal case, could not be taken to have furnished the ground for holding that the appellant had been treated with cruelty by the respondent. If the grievances of the appellant, with regard to the lodging of the case by the respondent are kept excluded from the purview of our consideration, there remains really no material to interfere, far less, conclude and hold, that the appellant had been treated with cruelty by the respondent. 16. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we are of the considered view that the learned trial Court's finding to the effect that the appellant had not been able to make out any case justifying granting of a decree of divorce does not suffer from any infirmity, legal or factual. 17. 16. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we are of the considered view that the learned trial Court's finding to the effect that the appellant had not been able to make out any case justifying granting of a decree of divorce does not suffer from any infirmity, legal or factual. 17. This appeal, therefore, fails and shall accordingly stand dismissed with cost. Send back the LCR with a copy of this order. Appeal dismissed