JUDGMENT A. M. Sapre, CJ.- This is an appeal filed by the writ petitioner/appellant herein under Rule 2 of Chapter V-A of the Gauhati High Court Rules against the order dated 10.09.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C)No. 561 of 2012. 2. By impugned order, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioner (appellant) and in consequence upheld the orders passed by the DRT and its appellate authority. 3. So the short question which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether DRT and writ court (Single Judge) were justified in overruling the objection raised by the petitioner as non -- applicant before the DRT while opposing the claim petition filed by applicant (respondent herein). 4. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and on perusal of the record of the case, we are of the considered opinion that this appeal has no merit and hence it is liable to be dismissed. In other words, the view taken by the DRT/appellate authority/writ court on the issue involved in this appeal is just and legal and hence it does not call for any interference. 5. The issue raised by the appellant is a short one. A claim petition/dispute is filed by the respondent (financial Institution) against the appellant (as their borrower) for the recovery of Rs 1,08,10,060 before the DRT being OA No 6 of 2003 under the DRT Act on the strength of 2 mortgage deeds and other documents executed by appellant in their favour. It is in reply to this claim petition, the appellant (as non applicant therein) raised an objection before the Tribunal that firstly applicant not being a financial institution as defined under the D.R.T. Act has no right to file claim petition before the Tribunal for such recovery and secondly the claim petition was barred by limitation having been filed beyond the period 12 years from the date of accrual of cause of action. These two objections were overruled by the DRT in the first instance and in an appeal filed by the appellant before the appellate authority constituted under the DRT Act, against this order of Tribunal, the appellate authority also dismissed the appeal and upheld the order passed by the DRT. These two objections were overruled by the DRT in the first instance and in an appeal filed by the appellant before the appellate authority constituted under the DRT Act, against this order of Tribunal, the appellate authority also dismissed the appeal and upheld the order passed by the DRT. It is against these two orders, the appellant felt aggrieved and filed writ petition out of which this appeal arises and the writ court (Single Judge) too found no merit in the petition and accordingly dismissed the petition by upholding the two orders passed by DRT/appellate authority. 6. Since we are in complete agreement with the view taken by the writ court while affirming the orders of the DRT/Appellate authority calling no interference, we consider it apposite to reproduce the findings of the writ court contained in para 10 and 11 of the impugned order:- “10. The two grounds on which the writ petition has been filed and for that matter the appeal was filed before the learned Tribunal have been noted above. As regards the plea that the respondent Corporation being not financial institution, it could not have approached the learned DRT, it has been held by the learned Tribunal that in view of the Exht. A/23 notification of the Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division) (referred to above), the Corporation is very much within the definition of the financial institution. As has been held, Industrial Development Bank of India Act, 1964 makes it clear that the financial institutions that are notified under Section 9 of the Act, are the financial institutions which come under the provision of Section 2(g) and 2(h) as public financial institutions within the meaning of Section 4/A of the Companies Act, 1956. Sub-Section 2(h) of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks & Financial Institutions Act, has recognized IDBI as financial institution for the purpose of recovery of debts. In such a situation, it was held by the DRT that the respondent Corporation is a financial institution and accordingly was entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the learned DRT. 11. As regards the question of limitation by applying the provision of Section 137 of the Limitation Act, it was found that Exbt. A/4 and Exbt. In such a situation, it was held by the DRT that the respondent Corporation is a financial institution and accordingly was entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the learned DRT. 11. As regards the question of limitation by applying the provision of Section 137 of the Limitation Act, it was found that Exbt. A/4 and Exbt. A/A registered mortgage deeds had been executed by late W. Basant Kumar Singh (defendant No. 2) who was the sole proprietor of the defendant No. 1 and the mortgage created by him in respect of immovable properties in favour of the respondent Corporation was as a collateral security. When there is valid mortgage as collateral security, the limitation is not confined to 3 years, but is 12 years. Calculating on that basis, it was found that OA was filed within the prescribed period of limitation.” 7. As noted above, two issues were raised-one was that claim petitioner (respondent herein) not being a financial institution cannot approach the DRT for recovery of their amount loaned to the appellant under the provision of the DRT Act and second even assuming that the petitioner has a right to file a claim petition, yet it was barred by limitation and hence liable to be dismissed. Both these objections were overruled and in our opinion rightly so. 8. Since the issue has rightly been dealt with by the writ court to which we entirely agree with their reasoning quoted above, we also hold that the petitioner (respondent) was entitled to file the claim petition for recovery of their amount under the provisions of DRT Act before the Tribunal they being financial Institutions and secondly on the facts which are in dispute, the claim petition was rightly held to be within limitation on the strength of two mortgage deed executed by the appellant in favour of the respondent, for obtaining the loan amount. Indeed, no fault can be noticed in the impugned findings of the writ court quoted above. 9. In the light of foregoing discussion, and without burdening our order with any more detail discussion, which we consider it as not really necessary we dismiss this appeal as being totally devoid of any merit in limine. ___________