ORAL ORDER NAVIN SINHA We have heard learned Counsel for the Appellant and the State. 2. The present Appeal arises from order dated 15.3.2013 dismissing CWJC No. 16012 of 2009. The Learned Single Judge concluded that a Vocational Intermediate qualification held to be equivalent to regular Intermediate by judicial interpretation had to be given prospective effect. The Appellant was not entitled to appointment as a Panchayat teacher under the 2006 selection process on basis of his vocational qualification. The direction of the District Teachers Employment Appellate Authority, Katihar, for his appointment “was uncalled for.” 3. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that he was selected for appointment as a Block Teacher on 6.2.2007. He had the highest marks and was at serial one of the panel. Appointment was denied to him on the ground that his vocational qualification was not acceptable. In CWJC No. 16069 of 2007 he was relegated to the alternative remedy before the District Teachers Employment Appellate Authority. The Authority on 9.5.2009, after hearing the parties, relying on orders of this Court in CWJC No.4878 of 2007 and L.P.A. No. 469 of 2006 held that his vocational qualification was equivalent to Intermediate as per the government decision. Directions were given for appointment. The District Superintendent of Education, Katihar, on 13.5.2009 and 13.6.2009 directed his appointment. Appointment still being denied the present writ application was preferred leading to the order under Appeal. 4. The Appellant had relied upon an order in CWJC No. 3974 of 2007 [Soni Kumari v. State of Bihar] and analogous cases, disposed on 16.5.2008 by a Learned Single Judge. A copy of the order was appended to I. A. No. 3361 of 2012 filed by him. In that order it was noticed that as far back as 1996, the Bihar Intermediate Education Council had clarified that the vocational qualification was equivalent to intermediate. Those who were sought to be terminated on the ground of vocational qualification were granted relief and those who had been terminated were directed to be reinstated. The Appellant had further relied on 2008 [4] PLJR 118 [Madan Paswan v. State of Bihar] and analogous cases, in support of the claim for appointment based on a vocational qualification as equivalent to Intermediate. The Learned Single Judge without appreciating the orders and discussing them declined to follow it holding that it shall apply prospectively. 5. The Appellant had further relied on 2008 [4] PLJR 118 [Madan Paswan v. State of Bihar] and analogous cases, in support of the claim for appointment based on a vocational qualification as equivalent to Intermediate. The Learned Single Judge without appreciating the orders and discussing them declined to follow it holding that it shall apply prospectively. 5. Learned Counsel for the State submitted that directions had been issued for complying the order of the District Teachers Employment Appellate Authority. There appeared to be a need for certain clarifications in view of CWJC No. 362 of 2010 preferred by the Mukhia questioning the order of the Appellate Authority. In the rules for appointment, 2006, there was no provision for treating Vocational as equivalent to Intermediate. 6. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. It is undisputed that the appellant with the highest marks was at serial one of the panel. The District Teachers Employment Appellate Authority having directed appointment of the Appellant relying upon orders of this Court in CWJC No. 4878 of 2007 and L. P. A. No. 469 of 2006, the respondents were bound to give effect to the order and any action contrary to the same on one pretext or the other was completely destructive of the rule of law. 7. In Soni Kumari [supra] and Madan Paswan [supra], two Single benches of this Court, had already held that persons with vocational qualification were eligible to be appointed. In Soni Kumari [supra] it had already been observed that the decision for equivalence of qualifications had been taken in 1996. In Madan Paswan [supra] it was noticed that the respondents themselves had taken decision on 30.4.2007 and the Bihar Intermediate Council on 4.9.2007 that Intermediate qualification in a vocational course was equivalent to that in the regular Intermediate course. Those who had been terminated on that ground were granted relief in C.W.J.C. No. 1631 of 2007 on 18. 4. 2007. Civil Review No. 146 of 2007 preferred by the State was dismissed on 19.8.2008. L P A No. 538 of 2008 arising from CWJC No. 1631 of 2007 was likewise dismissed. CWJC No. 4878 of 2007 followed the same on of 19.2.2008 and LPA No. 469 of 2008 against it was dismissed on 18.7.2008. 4. 2007. Civil Review No. 146 of 2007 preferred by the State was dismissed on 19.8.2008. L P A No. 538 of 2008 arising from CWJC No. 1631 of 2007 was likewise dismissed. CWJC No. 4878 of 2007 followed the same on of 19.2.2008 and LPA No. 469 of 2008 against it was dismissed on 18.7.2008. The Principal Secretary, Panchayati Raj, contrary to the orders of the Court, unfortunately passed an order on 11.3.2013 that vocational qualification shall be treated as equivalent to Intermediate from 25.2.2009 which was wrongly approved by the Learned Single Judge. This was clearly in derogation to more than one order of the Court referred to by us. The order of the Principal Secretary is therefore a nullity and has to be ignored. 8. The Learned Single Judge in the order under Appeal unfortunately dismissed the writ petition ignoring the decision in Soni Kumari [supra]. The very detailed discussion in Madan Paswan [supra] was ignored and cursorily referred to as a “judicial interpretation”which shall have prospective effect. The order of the District Teachers Employment Appellate Authority, had been questioned by none and was not under challenge before the Learned Single Judge. Yet it was held to be “uncalled for”. In Madan Paswan [supra] it was observed at paragraph 8 as follows : “8. Once the issue of a vocational intermediate qualification being in equivalent to an intermediate qualification has been decided and tested in appeal and the observations in the present order, this Court hopes and trusts that the State shall forthwith proceed to recall such orders of termination without requiring each individual terminated to bring individual orders in his writ application casting a wholly unnecessary burden on the Courts.” 9. In view of the aforesaid observation, and in the absence of any direction in the order for it to be treated as prospective, we are unable to understand and appreciate how the Learned Single Judge came to hold that the order in Madan Paswan [supra] shall have prospective effect only. This conclusion of the Learned Single Judge is contrary to well settled law that unlike a statute, a judgment shall have retrospective effect unless specifically made prospective. In (2007) 3 SCC 557 [P.V. George v. State of Kerala] it was observed :- “29….The law declared by a court will have a retrospective effect if not otherwise stated to be so specifically….” 10. In (2007) 3 SCC 557 [P.V. George v. State of Kerala] it was observed :- “29….The law declared by a court will have a retrospective effect if not otherwise stated to be so specifically….” 10. Similar view has been expressed in (2009) 7 SCC 205 [Uttaranchal Jal Sansthan v. Laxmi Devi] holding :- “29…..As to the first submission above, it is worth mentioning that judicial decisions unless otherwise specified are retrospective……” 11. The question of equivalence of the qualifications has been the subject of judicial consideration in more than one order of the Court. In [2007] 3 PLJR 746 (Ranjeet Kumar Vs. State Of Bihar) it was held :- “5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to the Press Communique No. 56/96 dated 4th September, 1996, issued under the signature of the Secretary, Bihar Intermediate Education Council, Patna, as contained in Annexure-3 to the writ application, whereby it was communicated that passing of Intermediate Examination and passing of Intermediate Examination in vocational course are equivalent. As such, the cancellation of the appointment of the petitioner on the post of Panchayat Sikshak is incorrect and the order cancelling the appointment of the petitioner deserves to be quashed. 6. The learned Government Advocate has fairly submitted that in light of the decision taken by the Bihar Intermediate Education Council, Patna, as contained in the aforesaid Press Communique No. 56/ 96 dated 4.9.1996, the order of cancellation of the appointment of the petitioner on the post of Panchayat Teacher could not be sustained in law.” 12. Yet again in [2008] 3 BLJR 2639 (State Of Bihar Vs. Ranjeet Kumar) it was held :- “10. It was further submitted that the matter regarding passing of Intermediate in vocational course is equivalent to Intermediate examination in Arts and Commerce, in similar circumstances, was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of the Vice-Chancellor, Jai Prakash University Chapra and Anr. V/s. Anmol Kumar Verma and Anr., reported in 2003 (1) PLJR, 334. The Division Bench also decided the matter noticing the decision of the Council that vocational course is treated to be equivalent to Intermediate Arts and Commerce. 13. In [2008] 3 PLJR 282 (Prakash Kumar Vs. State Of Bihar) it was held :- “5. There are no allegations of any illegality in their appointment process. The Division Bench also decided the matter noticing the decision of the Council that vocational course is treated to be equivalent to Intermediate Arts and Commerce. 13. In [2008] 3 PLJR 282 (Prakash Kumar Vs. State Of Bihar) it was held :- “5. There are no allegations of any illegality in their appointment process. They joined duties as Panchayat Sikshak and started to impart education. On 5.4.2007, after the selection process was complete and appointments made, a question was sought to be raised by the respondent authorities if a person holding an intermediate qualification in a vocational course was eligible for appointment. Guidance was sought in the matter. Even before the guidance was forthcoming on 11.4.2007, the appointment of the petitioners was terminated on the aforesaid ground. 6. Thereafter the respondents decided the matter by an order dated 30.4.2007 at Annexure-A to the counter affidavit. It acknowledges that an intermediate qualification in a vocational course was equivalent to an intermediate examination. The rest of the discussions is not necessary for the present purpose in view of what is to be discussed hereinafter. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed before this Court a Bench decision passed in C.W.J.C. No. 1631/07 disposed on 18.4.2007. It notices a Government decision dated 4.9.1996 issued under the signature of the Secretary, Bihar Intermediate Education Council, Patna, communicating that passing of intermediate examination and passing of intermediate examination in vocational course are equivalent. An order of termination in like terms was therefore set aside in the said writ application. 8. It is not the case of the respondents in the impugned order dated 30.4.2007 that the Government communication dated 4.9.1996 has been set aside. It still holds the field.” 14. In [2009] 4 PLJR 647 (Krishna Mohan Vs. State Of Bihar) it was held :- “2. By impugned order contained in Annexure-1 dated 30.4.2007 the representation of the petitioner has been rejected by the Director, Primary Education, Government of Bihar by holding that applicants for the post of Panchayat/Block/ Municipal Teachers who had secured intermediate in vocational courses could not be treated as equivalent to intermediate in general courses of studies and they would not be deemed eligible for appointment to the post of teachers. 3. 3. A perusal of Annexure-1 shows that although the Director accepted that intermediate in vocational courses is equivalent to intermediate in general courses but he held that such an intermediate degree in vocational courses would not make an applicant eligible for appointment to the post of teacher in the concerned schools. 4. It is not in dispute that pursuant to the orders passed by this Court in some cases, the State Government in the Department of Human Resources has already issued an order dated 9.9.2008 in favour of case of the petitioner accepting that intermediate degree in vocational courses would be deemed valid for the purposes of appointment as Panchayat/ Prakhand/Municipal Teachers. 5. In view of such decision by the State Government itself, the writ petition has become infructuous but in the facts of the case the impugned order contained in Annexure-1 dated 30.4.2007 is quashed and the concerned respondent is directed to act as per Government decision dated 9.9.2008 of the concerned authority. The concerned authority must act as per aforesaid decision of the Government contained in memo no. 3335 dated 9.9.2008 within four weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 15. In (Soni Kumari (supra) it was observed as follows:- “4. The petitioners submit that the Bihar Intermediate Education Council, way back in 1996 itself, clarified that Intermediate Vocational Course which was a 10+2 Course was equivalent to I Sc/I A/I Com which are also a 10+2 Course. This was already there when the Rules were framed and the Rules did not provide for any exceptions or exclusion of this Course. In support of the contention, the petitioners have relied on the judgment of this Court in Ranjeet Kumar V/s. The State of Bihar since reported in 2007 (3) PLJR 746 and the judgment in review application against the said judgment being judgment dated 30th April, 2008 passed in Civil Review No 146 of 2007 as also on the judgment dated 19.02.2008 in the case of Prakash Kumar and Ors. being CWJC No. 4878 of 2007 alongwith analogous cases.” 16. In [2012] 3 PLJR 749 (Pankaj Kumar Mukul Vs. State of Bihar) it was held :- “3. being CWJC No. 4878 of 2007 alongwith analogous cases.” 16. In [2012] 3 PLJR 749 (Pankaj Kumar Mukul Vs. State of Bihar) it was held :- “3. This is not in dispute that prior to petitioners’ appointment on their respective post of Panchayat Teachers, the private respondents had been appointed, but they were terminated on the ground that they have obtained their Intermediate degree in vocational course and as per Bihar Panchayat Primary Teachers (Employment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2008, the Intermediate degree in vocational course is not the requisite qualification for being appointed on the post. The vacancies created on account of their termination were re-advertised. Petitioners applied for the post and following all procedures, as provided under the Rules, they have been appointed. The Teachers, who were earlier appointed and terminated, challenged their termination Orders by filing Writ Applications before the High Court on the ground that the issue relating go Intermediate degree in vocational course is requisite qualification for appointment and equivalent to Intermediate degree in general subjects, already been settled and the ground……” 17. If for any reason the Learned Single Judge was not inclined to follow the earlier Bench decisions of the Court, including that of Division benches, the only course open for him was to refer the matter to a Division bench expressing his opinions with reasons for the same. Under no circumstances was it permissible for the Learned Single Judge to ignore the earlier decisions of the Court. The first principle in the hierarchy of Courts is consistency and predictability in its orders based on judicial discipline. The salutary importance of this has to be appreciated as otherwise the litigant, the lawyers and the State authorities shall all be left unsure of the correct legal position with different Benches taking different views. Judicial discipline required the Learned Single Judge to adhere to the same. 18. The salutary importance of this has to be appreciated as otherwise the litigant, the lawyers and the State authorities shall all be left unsure of the correct legal position with different Benches taking different views. Judicial discipline required the Learned Single Judge to adhere to the same. 18. The importance of judicial discipline and decorum to be maintained was noticed in (Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand, (1965) 3 SCR 218 :- “18…..It is hardly necessary to emphasise that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned Single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a Single Judge, needed to be reconsidered, he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a Single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is founded on healthy principles of judicial decorum and propriety. It is to be regretted that the learned Single Judge departed from this traditional way in the present case and chose to examine the question himself.” 19. The issue was yet again noticed in (Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija v. Collector, Thane), (1989) 3 SCC 396 , at page 407 : “22. In our system of judicial review which is a part of our constitutional scheme, we hold it to be the duty of judges of superior courts and tribunals to make the law more predictable. The question of law directly arising in the case should not be dealt with apologetic approaches. The law must be made more effective as a guide to behaviour. It must be determined with reasons which carry convictions within the courts, profession and public. Otherwise, the lawyers would be in a predicament and would not know how to advise their clients. Subordinate courts would find themselves in an embarrassing position to choose between the conflicting opinion. The general public would be in dilemma to obey or not to obey such law and it ultimately falls into disrepute.” 20. In (2001) 2 SCC 135 [Distt. Otherwise, the lawyers would be in a predicament and would not know how to advise their clients. Subordinate courts would find themselves in an embarrassing position to choose between the conflicting opinion. The general public would be in dilemma to obey or not to obey such law and it ultimately falls into disrepute.” 20. In (2001) 2 SCC 135 [Distt. Manager, A.P. SRTC v. K. Sivaji] on the aspect of judicial discipline it was observed :- “3……This decision was binding on the learned Judge hearing the writ petition. Judicial discipline required that he either followed it or referred the matter to a larger Bench. Sitting singly the learned Judge could not have taken a different view on the specious ground that the decision was based on facts…..” 21. Likewise in [2001] 2 SCC 247 [Dr. Vijay Laxmi Sadho v. Jagdish] it was observed :- “33. As the learned single judge was not in agreement with the view expressed in Devi Lal case it would have been proper, to maintain judicial discipline, to refer the matter to a larger Bench rather than to take a different view…..” 22. Similar view was expressed in [2009] 5 SCC 634 [Century Textiles Industries Ltd. v. Deepak Jain] holding :- “23…..Time and again it has been emphasised that judicial propriety and decorum requires that if a Single Judge, hearing a matter, feels that earlier decision of a Single Judge needs reconsideration, he should not embark upon that enquiry, sitting as a Single Judge, but should refer the matter to a larger Bench. Regrettably, in the present case, the learned Single Judge departed from the said healthy principle and chose to re-examine the same question himself.” 23. The Appellant, in our conclusion, was wrongly denied appointment despite being the first candidate. We are satisfied that he is entitled to orders for appointment. Even if another person has been appointed after wrong denial of appointment to the Appellant such person has to make way for him as held in (1960) 1 SCR 806 (Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. All India Punjab National Bank Employees' Federation) observing as follows :- “61…The mere fact that the Bank may have employed some other persons in the meanwhile would not necessarily defeat such a claim for reinstatement. As has been held by this Court in the National Transport and General Co. As has been held by this Court in the National Transport and General Co. Ltd. v. Workmen however much the court may sympathise with the employer's difficulty caused by the fact that after the wrongful dismissals in question he had engaged fresh hands, the court cannot “overlook the claims of the employees who, on the findings of the tribunals below, had been wrongly dismissed.” In the case of such wrongful dismissal the normal rule would be that the employees thus wrongfully dismissed must be reinstated. “The hardship in question”, observed this Court, “has been brought about by the precipitate action of the appellants themselves…..” 24. In conclusion we hold that the order under Appeal is destructive of judicial discipline and propriety. It is thus required to be set aside. We order accordingly. The Appellant is directed to be appointed forthwith giving him due protection on all aspects of service from 6.2.2007. He shall however not be entitled to any arrears of salary. 25. The Appeal is allowed with costs.