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2013 DIGILAW 1201 (PNJ)

Om Parkash v. State of Haryana

2013-09-05

RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK

body2013
JUDGMENT Mr. Rameshwar Singh Malik, J.:- Feeling aggrieved against the order dated 4.12.2001 (Annexure P-5) passed by the Commissioner, Ambala Division respondent No.2, thereby dismissing the appeal of the petitioner and upholding the order dated 24.5.2001 (Annexure P-4) passed by the Collector, Yamuna Nagar, directing the petitioner to pay the requisite stamp duty amounting to Rs. 32,60,800/-, as per the provisions of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (‘the Act’ for short), petitioner has approached this Court by way of instant writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ in the nature of Certiorari, for quashing the impugned order. 2. Facts first. As pleaded by the petitioner, Sarv Sh. Yogender Parkash and Pawan Kumar Sharma son of the petitioner, purchased a piece of land measuring 3060 sq. yards in equal shares, i.e. 1530 sq. yards each, vide conveyance deed No. 2171/1 dated 4.8.1972. The above piece of land was purchased out of the land measuring 7780 sq. yards, which was in the name of Sarv Sh. Sehdev Rana, Hardev Sharma and Randev Tyagi, comprising khasra No. 9 and khatoni No. 2230. 3. Pursuant to the above said transaction, both the vendor and vendee constituted a partnership firm to do their business in Yamuna Nagar. Petitioner and above said Yogender Parkash were real brothers. After the death of Sh. Yogender Parkash, his wife Smt. Vijay Sharma allegedly inherited his share of land to the extent of 1530 sq.yards. Smt. Vijay Sharma suffered a release deed qua her above said share measuring 1530 sq. yards in favour of the petitioner. When this release deed was presented before the Sub Registrar, Jagadhri, i.e. respondent No.4, for registration, it was registered vide No. 5852 dated 23.11.2000 (Annexure P-3). 4. However, immediately after its registration, this document was impounded by respondent No.4 under Section 33 of the Act, vide letter No.50/RC dated 23.2.2001 and was referred to the Collectorrespondent No.3. Treating the above said release deed as a sale transaction, coupled with the commercial nature of land and its location, the Collector came to the conclusion that the petitioner was liable to make the deficiency good by paying an amount of Rs.32,60,800/- as stamp duty, vide his order dated 24.5.2011 (Annexure P-4). 5. Petitioner challenged the above said order passed by the Collector by way of appeal before the Commissioner, Ambala Division-respondent No.2. 5. Petitioner challenged the above said order passed by the Collector by way of appeal before the Commissioner, Ambala Division-respondent No.2. After hearing the parties, the Commissioner dismissed the appeal of the petitioner vide impugned order dated 4.12.2001 (Annexure P-5), thereby upholding the above said order passed by the Collector. Review application filed by the petitioner also came to be dismissed by the Commissioner, vide order dated 9.4.2002 (Annexure P-6). Thereafter, the petitioner challenged the above said order passed by the Collector as well as the Commissioner before this Court by way of Civil Revision No. 3397 of 2002. However, the revision was withdrawn by the petitioner with liberty to avail the alternative remedy, if any, vide order dated 18.7.2013 (Annexure P-7). Hence this writ petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously argued that the learned Collector as well the Commissioner failed to appreciate the factual as well as legal aspect of the matter, while passing their respective impugned orders. However, he did not press the issue of the above said piece of land, being a property of Hindu Undivided Family (‘HUF’ for short), so as to claim exemption from the stamp duty. He further submits that the Collector failed to take into consideration the relevant factors before arriving at the conclusion in the impugned order dated 24.5.2001 (Annexure P-4). Similarly, the Commissioner, Ambala Division, as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, also fell into serious error of law, while upholding the order passed by the Collector. To support his contentions, learned counsel relies upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in M/s Gilco Developers and Builders Pvt. Ltd Vs. State of Punjab and others, 2011 (5) RCR (civil) 668. Finally, he prays for setting aside the impugned order by allowing the present writ petition. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at considerable length, after careful perusal of the record of the case and giving thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present one is not a fit case warranting interference at the hands of this Court, while exercising its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. To say so, reasons are more than one, which are being recorded hereinafter. 8. To say so, reasons are more than one, which are being recorded hereinafter. 8. The size of the chunk of land involved in the transaction in question has not been disputed at any point of time. Nature of the land being commercial, was also not in dispute. Again, the material fact that the land was located within the municipal limits, has also not been a subject matter of dispute. Similarly, the Collector rate was also a matter of record. All these factors were relevant which have been rightly considered by the Collector before arriving at a judicious conclusion, so as to determine the true value of the land sold by way of the transaction in question. 9. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner could not dispute the above said material aspect of the matter, which has been found to be the basis of the impugned order passed by the Collector. Having said that, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that the Collector proceeded on a factually correct and legally justified approach, while passing the impugned order dated 24.5.2001 (Annexure P-4) and the same deserves to be upheld. 10. Similarly, while deciding the appeal of the petitioner, vide impugned order dated 4.12.2001 (Annexure P-5), the Commissioner, Ambala Division, also committed no error of law upholding the order passed by the Collector. Further, the Sub-Registrar, as he was duty bound, rightly registered the document first and then made a reference thereof to the Collector. This was the right course of action adopted by the Sub Registrar, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s Residents Welfare Association, Noida Vs. State of U.P. And others, [2009(3) Law Herald (SC) 1837] : 2009 (14) SSC 716. 11. It was so said, because the Registering Officer was duty bound to register the release deed presented before him. Consequently, if he was of the view that it was not a bonafide transaction and would amount to sale in view of the peculiar fact situation of the case, he was under legal obligation to impound the document and to refer the same immediately to the Collector for determining the true market value thereof, so as to make good the deficiency in the payment of stamp duty, as ruled by a Division Bench of Madras High Court in the case of District Collector, Erode Vs. M.Ponnusamy, 2002 (2) RCR (civil) 262. M.Ponnusamy, 2002 (2) RCR (civil) 262. That is what has been done by the respondent authorities in the present case. 12. After having received the reference from the Registering Officer, the Collector-respondent No.4 proceeded further, so as to determine the value of the property, taking into consideration the relevant factors including the commercial nature of the land, its location being within the municipal limits, size of the plot and the Collector rate. The Collector did not depend on one particular factor, but he rightly took into consideration the cumulative effect of all the above said relevant factors before arriving at a judicious conclusion, so as to determine the true value of the property in question. In this view of the matter, it is unhesitatingly held that the Collector as well as the Commissioner did not violate either any provision of the Act or judgmade law, while passing their respective impugned orders, which deserve to be upheld. 13. A careful reading of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in M/s Gilco Developers’ case (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, would show that the same goes against the petitioner. The relevant observations made by this Court in para Nos. 11, 12 and 13 of the judgment, which can gainfully be followed in the present case, read as under:- “Reference to the above provision will show that the Collector has to determine the true value of the transaction. For doing so, the Collector has to go by the relevant material on record and make assessment as per best of his judgment. The Collector has to determine the value taking into account the nature and location of land and other relevant factors including the Collector rate though the said rate may not be conclusive. 12. In the present case, the Collector has found that the land was in the municipal area and was purchased for colonization. Its value was not less than Collector rate fixed for residential area. In view of this finding, which is not shown in any manner to be perverse, mere fact that the land was described by the petitioner to be agricultural, could not be a ground to interfere with the rate fixed by the Collector. The petitioner was a colonizer and not an agriculturist. The transaction was in February 2006 for which the rate notified on 1.4.2006 could not be held to be irrelevant. The petitioner was a colonizer and not an agriculturist. The transaction was in February 2006 for which the rate notified on 1.4.2006 could not be held to be irrelevant. There is nothing to show that the rate determined by the Collector is for future and not on the date of the sale. The change of land use may affect the valuation but it cannot be said that in absence thereof value of the land should be treated at par with rate notified for agricultural land. Even according to the valuation given in the sale deed, the rate was almost double of notified rate for agricultural land. Thus, the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner at Sr.Nos. (i) to (iii) cannot be accepted. 13. Coming now to submission (iv), we find that order of the Collector does not take into faccount the size of the chunk of land involved in the transaction. In determining the value, though the Collector rate could be taken into account, the same could not be mechanically followed. The same could at best be treated as guideline. In applying the said rate, the size of the plot could not be ignored. It is well settled that price fetched for small plots cannot be the basis for determining value of each track of land. In Administrator General of West Bengal v. Collector, Varanasi, (AIR 1977 SCC 580), it was observed:- “6. It is trite proposition that prices fetched for small plots cannot form safe bases for valuation of large tracts of land as the two are not comparable properties. (See Collector of Lakhimpur v. B. C. Dutta, AIR 1971 SC 2015 ; Mirza Nausherwan Khan v. Collector (Land Acquisition), Hyderabad, (1975) 2 SCR 184 : ( AIR 1974 SC 2247 ); Padma Uppal v. State of Punjab, (1977) 1 SCR 329 : (AIR SC 580), Smt. Kaushalya Devi Bogra v. Land Acquisition Officer, Aurangabad, (1984) 2 SCR 900 : ( AIR 1984 SC 892 )). The principle that evidence of marketvalue of sales of small, developed plots is not a safe guide in valuing large extents of land has to be understood in its proper perspective. The principle requires that prices fetched for small developed plots cannot directly be adopted in valuing large extents. The principle that evidence of marketvalue of sales of small, developed plots is not a safe guide in valuing large extents of land has to be understood in its proper perspective. The principle requires that prices fetched for small developed plots cannot directly be adopted in valuing large extents. However, if it is shown that the large extent to be valued does admit of and is ripe for use for building purposes; that building lots that could be laid out on the land would be good selling propositions and that valuation on the basis of the method of a hypothetical lay-out could with justification be adopted, then in valuing such small, laid-out sites the valuation indicated by sale of comparable small sites in the area at or about the time of the notification would be relevant. In such a case, necessary deductions for the extent of land required for the formation of roads and other civic amenities; expenses of development of the sites by layingout roads, drains, sewers, water and electricity lines, and the interest on the outlays for the period of deferment of the realisation of the price; the profits on the venture etc. are to be made. In Brig. Sahib Singh Kalha v. Amritsar Improvement Trust, (See (1982) 1 SCC 419 : ( AIR 1982 SC 940 )) this Court indicated that deductions for land required for roads and other developmental expenses can, together, come up to as much as 53%. But the prices fetched for small plots cannot directly be applied in the case of large areas for the reason that the former reflects the ‘retail’ price of land and the latter the ‘wholesale’ price.” 14. Reverting back to the facts of the present case and respectfully following the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in M/s Gilco Developers’ case (supra), it is held that the Collector has rightly considered the relevant factors before passing the impugned order 24.5.2001 (Annexure P-4). Similarly, the Commissioner also rightly maintained the order passed by the Collector, while dismissing the appeal of the petitioner. Further, learned counsel for the petitioner failed to point out any jurisdictional error or patent illegality apparent on the record in either of the impugned orders passed by the Collector as well as by the Commissioner. Thus, the impugned orders deserve to be upheld for this reason, as well. 15. Further, learned counsel for the petitioner failed to point out any jurisdictional error or patent illegality apparent on the record in either of the impugned orders passed by the Collector as well as by the Commissioner. Thus, the impugned orders deserve to be upheld for this reason, as well. 15. It is also pertinent to note that the impugned order Annexure P-5, dismissing the appeal of the petitioner was passed by the Commissioner, Ambala Division way back on 4/12/2001. Review application filed by the petitioner had also been dismissed vide order dated 9.4.2002 (Annexure P-6) passed by the Commissioner, Ambala Division. Both the above said orders passed by the Collector as well as by the Commissioner were challenged by way of Civil Revision No. 3397 of 2002 before this court. After pursuing the Civil Revision No. 3397 of 2002 for more than long 10 years, petitioner got the same dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to avail the alternative remedy, if any, vide order dated 18.7.2013 (Annexure P-7). 16. It is not even pleaded on behalf of the petitioner that he was wrongly pursuing the above said remedy by way of civil revision before this Court under a bonafide wrong impression. Thus, in the absence of any such pleading taken and substantiated by the petitioner, the present writ petition would have been found to be suffering from delay and laches as well, had it been a case worth acceptance on merits. It is so said, because the petitioner sought the permission to withdraw the revision petition after ten long years which was not opposed and liberty was granted by this Court to avail alternative remedy, if any, by passing the following order:- “After arguing at some length, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he be allowed to withdraw the present petition with liberty to avail of alternative remedy, if any. This prayer has not been opposed by the learned State counsel. In view of the statement made by learned counsel for the petitioner, this petition is dismissed as withdrawn with the liberty as aforesaid.” 17. This prayer has not been opposed by the learned State counsel. In view of the statement made by learned counsel for the petitioner, this petition is dismissed as withdrawn with the liberty as aforesaid.” 17. In the conspicuous absence of any pleading that he was wrongly pursuing the civil revision for 10 years under a bonafide wrong impression or incorrect advice, as noticed hereinabove, petitioner would not have been entitled to avail the remedy by way of this writ petition, because of inordinate delay in approaching this Court against the impugned orders passed as far back as in the year 2001, i.e. after 12 years. However, since the case of the petitioner has been found to be misconceived and without any merit, this Court restrains itself from making any further observations on delay and laches. 18. No other argument was raised. 19. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstance of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered view that the present writ petition is misconceived, bereft of merit and without any substance. Thus, it must fail. No case for interference has been made out. 20. Resultantly, the instant writ petition stands dismissed, however, with no order as to costs. ——————— Ishwar Chand & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors.