Judgment : 1. The present writ petition is filed assailing the proceedings dated 29.12.2008 issued by the respondent Corporation terminating the services of the petitioner from its rolls with immediate effect, without considering the explanations submitted by the petitioner on 17.04.2008 and 04.11.2008. 2. The facts in brief are that the petitioner initially joined the services of the respondent Corporation in the year 1983 as Junior Engineer, and later in the year 1990-1991, he was promoted as Deputy Executive Engineer. When he was discharging his duties as Deputy Executive Engineer, on 09.07.2007, he applied to the Corporation to permit him to avail himself of the earned leave from 01.08.2007 to 29.09.2007. Having had the leave sanctioned to him, the petitioner went on leave, but before the sanctioned leave could come to an end, he made another request on 26.09.2007 to extend the leave up to 29.12.2007. The said request is said to have been partially accepted by the authorities by extending the leave up to 28.11.2007, through proceedings dated 12.10.2007. 3. Later, in course of time, on 06.11.2007, the petitioner was served with an intimation by the respondent Corporation to the effect that the leave sanctioned to him from 30.09.2007 to 28.11.2007 was cancelled through proceedings dated 12.10.2007 and that he should report back to duty on or before 12.11.2007. This communication was followed by another reminder dated 14.11.2007. In response thereto, the petitioner submitted a representation, dated 08.11.2007, requesting the respondent authorities to consider sanctioning of Extra Ordinary Leave (EOL) for three (03) years from 29.11.2007. Such request is said to have been made in the light of G.O.Ms.No.64, Irrigation & CAD (IRRIGN.IX.A2) Department, dated 23.05.1996. 4. It has further come on record that the petitioner followed up his earlier request with another representation dated 27.12.2007. Despite the petitioner’s repeated requests, the respondent, it is alleged, issued Memo dated 04.01.2008 informing the petitioner that he overstayed the leave that had already been granted, and that it was in violation of the instructions issued by the respondent Corporation, thus, bringing the conduct of the petitioner under Rule 25 (a) of Chapter III of Staff Regulations. Accordingly, the petitioner was directed to submit his explanation for the misconduct of being absent without leave. Accordingly, the petitioner was directed to submit his explanation for the misconduct of being absent without leave. The petitioner, in turn, submitted his explanation on 09.01.2008, reiterating, even in the explanation, his request to permit him to avail the sanctioned leave in terms of G.O.Ms.No. 64, dated 23.05.1996. Having not been satisfied with the explanation submitted by the petitioner, the Corporation issued a charge sheet dated 04.04.2008, served on the petitioner on 09.04.2008, seeking to conduct a departmental enquiry, on the receipt of the explanation to be submitted by the petitioner on or before 19.04.2008. Though the petitioner submitted explanation on 17.04.2008, the respondent Corporation proceeded with an enquiry, the General Manager (Finance), Andhra Pradesh State Irrigation Development Corporation Limited, being the enquiry officer. After initial adjournments, the enquiry eventually was held on 25.07.2008. The petitioner attended the enquiry and reiterated, yet again, his request for sanction of leave for three (03) years to enable him to explore securing alternative employment. The enquiry officer submitted his report on 12.08.2008 to the respondent Corporation recommending that the petitioner’s case may be allowed for premature retirement. Disregarding the recommendation of the enquiry officer, the respondent Corporation issued a final show cause notice dated 22.10.2008 seeking the petitioner to show cause why his services should not be terminated. Having considered the explanation dated 04.11.2008, submitted by the petitioner, and having found it to be not satisfactory, finally, the disciplinary authority of the respondent Corporation issued the impugned proceedings dated 29.12.2008 terminating the petitioner’s services from the Rolls of the Corporation with immediate effect. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has come before this Court assailing the action of the respondent Corporation in terminating his services. 5. In the above factual back drop, Sri K. V. Subba Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioner, assailed the proceedings dated 29.12.2008, issued by the respondent, on technical parameters – to begin with. According to the learned counsel, before differing with the findings of the enquiry officer, the disciplinary authority ought to have put the petitioner on notice seeking his explanation when the disciplinary authority chose to differ with the enquiry officer, only later can the Corporation could take a decision, more pertinently supported by reasons as to on what grounds the disciplinary authority desired to differ with the findings of the enquiry officer. The learned counsel has contended that the show cause notice issued on receipt of the enquiry report is a fait accompli, that seeking the explanation from the petitioner to the final show cause notice was only a mere formality, and that the whole exercise was conducted in a ritualistic manner, eventually concluding to remove the petitioner from the service summarily, thus offending the basic tenets of the audi altrem partem doctrine. 6. Adverting to the merits of the matter, the learned counsel has laid very heavy stress on G.O.Ms.No.64, dated 23.05.1996. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, this G.O. was issued providing a window of opportunity to the employees of the respondent Corporation to avail themselves of leave to explore the ways and means of securing private employment and leaving the organization. Thus, specifically referring to Clauses (b) and (c) of the said G.O., the learned counsel has submitted that once the Government has given the leverage to the petitioner to go on leave in terms of the said G.O. and once the respondent Corporation has sanctioned the leave only in terms of the said G.O., there is no justification for the respondent to turn back in the middle and to cancel the leave without assigning any reasons whatsoever. The learned counsel has further strenuously contended that even the recommendations of the enquiry officer have been disregarded without assigning any valid reason. Thus, in spite of such categoric recommendation by the enquiry officer either to permit the petitioner to go on leave in terms of G.O.Ms.No. 64, dated 23.05.1996 or to retire him prematurely, the respondent Corporation in a predetermined manner took up the further disciplinary proceedings and terminated the services of the petitioner, which is highly unjust and arbitrary. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed his reliance on Punjab National Bank & Others v. Kunj Behari Misra (1998) 7 SCC 84 ), Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (1999) 7 SCC 739 ) and Ranjit Singh v. Union of India & Ors., ( (2006) 4 SCC 153 ) 7. Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Corporation has strenuously defended the order dated 29.12.2008, impugned in the writ petition. The learned Standing Counsel, to begin with, has stated that there are no procedural irregularities of whatever nature, including those that have offended the principles of natural justice. Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Corporation has strenuously defended the order dated 29.12.2008, impugned in the writ petition. The learned Standing Counsel, to begin with, has stated that there are no procedural irregularities of whatever nature, including those that have offended the principles of natural justice. Reiterating the well known principle of service jurisprudence that the findings of an enquiry officer are only recommendatory or at best advisory in nature and do not bind the authorities concerned, the learned Standing Counsel has contended that the disciplinary authority has acted well within its powers in differing with the findings of the enquiry officer. He has further submitted that the petitioner had been duly put on notice, seeking his explanation as to why his services should not be terminated on the ground of his continued unauthorized absence, before passing the final orders. The learned Standing Counsel has submitted that only on receipt of the explanation submitted by the petitioner and only on having found it to be not satisfactory, the disciplinary authority passed the final orders, which are impugned before this Court. According to the learned Standing Counsel, there is neither any instance of arbitrariness nor any illegality attached to the orders impugned. 8. Adverting to the merits of the matter, the learned counsel has stated that initially G.O.Ms.No. 64, dated 23.05.1996 was issued permitting the employees of the Corporation to avail themselves of EOL or to go on deputation for a maximum period of three (03) years. This facility has been put in place for the purpose of enabling the employees to take up consultancy services, etc., with prior approval of the Corporation, subject to the conditions stipulated therein. 9. It is further contended that, in view of subsequent restructuring of the Corporation and commissioning of new schemes with further budgetary allocations, the Corporation has felt the need of having more and more qualified personnel in the service of the Corporation. As a result, the Corporation has put an end to the practice of permitting employees to go on leave in the manner aforesaid. The learned Standing Counsel has reminded this Court that the petitioner was given ample opportunities to mend his ways and to resume his services without insisting on going on further leave. As a result, the Corporation has put an end to the practice of permitting employees to go on leave in the manner aforesaid. The learned Standing Counsel has reminded this Court that the petitioner was given ample opportunities to mend his ways and to resume his services without insisting on going on further leave. Despite numerous opportunities given to him, the petitioner has persisted with his request to have the leave sanctioned for three (03) years and at no stage has he shown any inclination to resume his duties. 10. Adverting to the statutory scheme in the form of Staff Regulations of the Corporation, the learned counsel has contended that over staying of the sanctioned leave, in other words remaining absent unauthorisedly, amounts to misconduct as defined under Rule 25(a) of Clauses 6 and 7, Chapter III of Staff Regulations of the Corporation. The whole disciplinary proceedings have been initiated and concluded in terms of the said Staff Regulations, and as such the petitioner cannot be heard saying that there is any infraction of procedural safeguards or any misdirection substantively. The learned Standing Counsel has also contended that there is effective alternative remedy available to the petitioner in the Staff Regulations to prefer an appeal to the Board against the orders of the disciplinary authority, but it has not been availed of by the petitioner. Thus, the learned Standing Counsel has urged this Court to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy. Eventually, the learned Standing Counsel has also stated that even in the face of G.O.Ms.No.64, the petitioner cannot demand a leave as of right and it should be based on the exigencies of the services as ought to be determined by the Corporation, the employer. As such, in the light of the persistent absence on the part of the petitioner, since his action lacks bona fides, even his request, as was recommended by the enquiry officer, for premature retirement was not considered by the respondent Corporation - justly so. Thus, summing up his submissions, the learned Standing Counsel has stated that the writ petition lacks merits and is required to be dismissed summarily. 11. Heard Sri S.V.Subba Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Harinath Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Corporation, apart from perusing the record. 12. Factually speaking, not much of a controversy could be seen from the record. 11. Heard Sri S.V.Subba Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Harinath Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Corporation, apart from perusing the record. 12. Factually speaking, not much of a controversy could be seen from the record. Indeed, initially, the petitioner was allowed to go on leave, which was further extended on one occasion. When the petitioner wanted to have it extended for a longer period of three (03) years, perhaps, in terms of G.O.Ms.No.64, dated 23.05.1996, the same was rejected. Despite numerous representations on the part of the petitioner, the Corporation stood its ground and insisted that the petitioner join the duty. Very evidently, the petitioner, having been disinclined to continue in service, has gone on making further representations despite initial rejection by the respondent Corporation. As is evident from the record, the prolonged absence of the petitioner has resulted in the respondent Corporation initiating disciplinary proceedings. In fact, the enquiry officer did recommend to retire the petitioner prematurely taking into account what is stated to be administrative exigency. The said recommendation of the enquiry officer has not been considered. 13. It is profitable to extract a portion of the enquiry report dated 22/23.04.2008 which contains the said recommendation: “I have gone through the records available and rules of the corporation etc., in this regard. In view of the above and as per my observation, it appears that Sri Ch.P.Subbaiah, Dy. Executive Engineer is not interested to continue in the corporation service. Therefore, his request for premature retirement may be considered favourably, thereby the arising vacancy may be filled up with other person to serve the purpose of the Corporation.” 14. It needs no reiteration that recommendations of the enquiry officer do not bind the disciplinary authority, inasmuch as those recommendations are at best advisory in nature. In the eye of law, it is the disciplinary authority who conducts the enquiry. The enquiry officer, as his deputy, performs certain assigned tasks, only to assist the disciplinary authority. If a proposition is to be laid that the findings of the enquiry officer bind the disciplinary authority, then it amounts to delegation of quasi-judicial functions to the enquiry officer by the disciplinary authority without the sanction of law. The enquiry officer, as his deputy, performs certain assigned tasks, only to assist the disciplinary authority. If a proposition is to be laid that the findings of the enquiry officer bind the disciplinary authority, then it amounts to delegation of quasi-judicial functions to the enquiry officer by the disciplinary authority without the sanction of law. In other words, since the disciplinary proceedings take into their fold the power of removal, etc., the disciplinary authority, usually being the appointing authority as well, cannot delegate its power of removal or dismissal to its subordinate officer. The power, however, could be conferred on an officer other than the appointing authority, provided he was not subordinate in rank to the appointing authority. 15. In any event, G.O.Ms.No.64, dated 23.05.1996, is still said to have been in force and has not been superseded by any other subsequent G.O. It can be seen from the record that the petitioner may have acted bona fide in taking recourse to the said G.O. He repeatedly requested the authorities concerned to sanction the leave for a period of three (03) years as has been stipulated in the said G.O., a portion of which is extracted herein below: “As the State-level Committee has recommended to hand over the commissioned scheme to the respective farmers/co-operative societies for maintenance, the staff willing to assist such beneficiary committee in the maintenance of the scheme or to take up any other item of work of their choice are permitted to proceed on E.O.L. for a maximum period of three (03) years. The modalities are as follows: (a) ELIGIBILITY: Staff who have put in a minimum period of two (02) years service are eligible to proceed on E.O.L. as per entitlement, subject to a maximum period of three (03) years. (b) They are permitted to take up private consultancy for maintenance of the scheme to be handed over to the beneficiaries/to take up any other item of work. During the period of absence, they are permitted to charge consultancy fees or receive any remuneration. (c) They are permitted to resign/retire voluntarily from the Corporation service at the end of three (3) years, if they so desire with the permission of VC & MD, APSIDC Limited. During the period of absence, they are permitted to charge consultancy fees or receive any remuneration. (c) They are permitted to resign/retire voluntarily from the Corporation service at the end of three (3) years, if they so desire with the permission of VC & MD, APSIDC Limited. The benefits of voluntary Retirement Scheme, as are laid down in Government memo No. 1038/PE-1/A2/94-5, Genl.Admn, dated 23-1-1996 and the instructions of Government on the subject issued from time to time will be extended to them, if they are otherwise eligible for the same as on the date of proceeding on the above leave. In case of other employees who have to resign from Corporation Service after three (3) years the eligible benefits available as on date of proceeding on leave will be released.” 16. I hasten to add, in the light of the above extract, that simply because G.O.Ms.No.64, dated 23.05.1996, permits the employer i.e., the respondent Corporation to allow its employees to go on leave for a certain period, it does not necessarily mean that the employees have a carte blanche to insist on going on leave for the maximum period permitted, for any such concession given to employee would always be subject to the conditions attached to it; especially, such scheme should be implemented as to the satisfaction of the employer. The employer is the ultimate authority to decide as to whether it should act on a particular request of the employee or negate it, supported, of course, by reasons. In this case, having stated that the disciplinary authority has got every power to differ with the findings or the recommendations of the enquiry officer; in the same breath, it may have to be added that while issuing the final show cause notice dated 22.10.2008, it could be seen that no discernable reason has emerged therein justifying the disregard for the opinion of the enquiry officer. 17. In this context it is apposite to examine the judicial precedents placed reliance on by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In fact, to the said discussion in context, it is further relevant to refer to Art.311, which, having suffered an amendment in 1977 (42nd Constitutional Amendment), stands as follows: “311. 17. In this context it is apposite to examine the judicial precedents placed reliance on by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In fact, to the said discussion in context, it is further relevant to refer to Art.311, which, having suffered an amendment in 1977 (42nd Constitutional Amendment), stands as follows: “311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State.—(1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. [(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges: [Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed: *** (omitted) 18. In fact, in Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra(1) it is held that whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings, so that the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. 19. The facts in Yoginath D. Bagde (2), as they well accord with the facts of the present case, need some elaboration. In the said case, the delinquent being a judicial officer, after the completion of enquiry, the enquiry officer submitted his report to the disciplinary authority, holding that the charges against the delinquent were not established, and, further accordingly recommending the delinquent’s reinstatement. The Disciplinary Committee of the High Court considered the report of the enquiry officer and disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer held that the charges against the appellant were proved. The Disciplinary Committee of the High Court considered the report of the enquiry officer and disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer held that the charges against the appellant were proved. The Disciplinary Committee, therefore, tentatively decided to impose the penalty of dismissal from service upon the delinquent. Accordingly, the delinquent was called upon by a notice to show cause why the proposed penalty be not imposed upon him. A copy of the reasons recorded by the Disciplinary Committee for not agreeing with the findings submitted by the enquiry officer as also a copy of the enquiry officer's report was sent to the appellant who filed his reply to the show-cause notice. This reply was considered by the disciplinary authority, namely, the High Court which decided to impose the major penalty of dismissal from service and accordingly recommended to the Government of Maharashtra that the appellant be dismissed from service. Acting upon this recommendation, the Government of Maharashtra, dismissed the delinquent from service. 20. Under those factual circumstances, placing reliance on Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra (1) State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit( AIR 1963 SC 1612 ), Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna (1986) 4 SCC 537 ), as also the Constitution Bench decision in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar ( (1993) 4 SCC 727 ), and the decision in Ram Kishan v. Union of India( (1995) 6 SCC 157 ), has held that: “31.In view of the above, a delinquent employee has the right of hearing not only during the enquiry proceedings conducted by the enquiry officer into the charges levelled against him but also at the stage at which those findings are considered by the disciplinary authority and the latter, namely, the disciplinary authority forms a tentative opinion that it does not agree with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer. If the findings recorded by the enquiry officer are in favour of the delinquent and it has been held that the charges are not proved, it is all the more necessary to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee before reversing those findings. The formation of opinion should be tentative and not final. If the findings recorded by the enquiry officer are in favour of the delinquent and it has been held that the charges are not proved, it is all the more necessary to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee before reversing those findings. The formation of opinion should be tentative and not final. It is at this stage that the delinquent employee should be given an opportunity of hearing after he is informed of the reasons on the basis of which the disciplinary authority has proposed to disagree with the findings of the enquiry officer. This is in consonance with the requirement of Article 311(2) of the Constitution as it provides that a person shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. So long as a final decision is not taken in the matter, the enquiry shall be deemed to be pending. Mere submission of findings to the disciplinary authority does not bring about the closure of the enquiry proceedings. The enquiry proceedings would come to an end only when the findings have been considered by the disciplinary authority and the charges are either held to be not proved or found to be proved and in that event punishment is inflicted upon the delinquent. That being so, the “right to be heard” would be available to the delinquent up to the final stage. This right being a constitutional right of the employee cannot be taken away by any legislative enactment or service rule including rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution.” 21. Their Lordships, having noted that the delinquent was served with a show cause notice along with the report of the enquiry officer, have gone further to observe: “34. Along with the show-cause notice, a copy of the findings recorded by the enquiry officer as also the reasons recorded by the Disciplinary Committee for disagreeing with those findings were communicated to the appellant but it was immaterial as he was required to show cause only against the punishment proposed by the Disciplinary Committee which had already taken a final decision that the charges against the appellant were proved. It was not indicated to him that the Disciplinary Committee had come only to a “tentative” decision and that he could show cause against that too. It was for this reason that the reply submitted by the appellant failed to find favour with the Disciplinary Committee. 35. Since the Disciplinary Committee did not give any opportunity of hearing to the appellant before taking a final decision in the matter relating to the findings on the two charges framed against him, the principles of natural justice, as laid down by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra [ (1998) 7 SCC 84 ] referred to above, were violated.” (emphasis added) 22. In the present instance too, the show cause notice was given only to show cause to explain why the petitioner should not be removed from service but with not with regard as to why the findings of the enquiry officer should not be differed with. Since Ranjit Singh (3) too stands on the same footing, it does not require further elaboration. 23. Thus, in the impugned proceedings of the authorities, dt.29-12-2008, the respondent Corporation has not backed up its decision to terminate the services of the petitioner, or, for that matter, to differ with the findings of the enquiry officer, with no cause or material or reasoning to the said effect. As such, it will serve the interest of justice if the order impugned is set aside and the matter is remanded to the disciplinary authority of the respondent Corporation to issue a notice to the petitioner afresh, setting out the reasons why the said authority has decided to differ with the findings of the enquiry officer and, on submission of the explanation of the petitioner, to take a fresh decision, inter alia, considering the request of the petitioner, to the extent feasible, to retire him prematurely in terms of the Staff Regulations, and pass appropriate orders. 24. 24. For the foregoing reasons, proceedings dated 29.12.2008 are hereby set aside and the matter is remanded to the respondent Corporation with a direction to consider the case of the petitioner afresh, taking into account the submissions he has submitted earlier, and if necessary, by giving him further opportunity to make his fresh submissions in the light of the subsequent developments, if any, and pass appropriate orders, especially with regard to the petitioner’s request to consider his case for premature retirement, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate not beyond four (04) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this orders. 25. Thus the writ petition stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. 26. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this writ petition, shall stand closed.