Mansoor, J.:-- (1) Questioning the judgment dated 4th February, 2012, hereinafter for short as impugned judgment, by virtue of which the respondents have been acquitted of the charges levelled against them in case titled State v. Pushpinder Singh and another, bearing FIR No. 52/2002, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 8/21 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, for short as NDPS Act and 4/25 of Arms Act, this criminal acquittal appeal seeks conviction of the accused after setting the impugned judgment aside. BRIEF FACTS (2) On 6th September, 2002 at about 6.30 pm, police party of police Station Lakhanpur, stopped a motorcycle bearing registration No. JK02G 7095. One Pushpinder was the driver while as respondent Vishal Sharma was its pillion rider. Both of them were put to search and upon which a dagger which has a six inches long blade than a normal knife, known in local dialect as 'khokhari' was recovered from the driver/pushpinder and 5000 capsules of Parvanspas and a butcher knife Toka' in local dialect, were recovered from respondent. Seizure was affected. Accused were taken into custody and FIR was lodged against them being FIR No. 52/2002 for the commission of offences punishable under sections 5/ 6/13 of Drug Control Act, Section 27 of Drugs & Cosmetic Act and 4/25 of Arms Act. (3) Upon registering the case, police investigated the matter, which resulted in filing of a final report in terms of Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for short as Cr.P.C., before the court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, (Munsiff) Kathua, who after charging the accused committed the case, being a sessions trial case, to the trial court viz. Court of Sessions Judge, Kathua. The case was committed to the trial court in presence of respondent only as Pushpinder had died on 11th October, 2004. After committal, respondent was formally charged for the commission of offences punishable under section 8/21 of NDPS Act read with section 4/25 of Arms Act. Accused/respondent denied the charge and instead sought a trial. (4) Prosecution, in support of its case, produced and examined PW Shamsher Singh, PW Karan Singh, and PW Rajesh Kumar. (5) Statement of the accused was recorded in terms of Section 342 of Cr.P.C and he did not choose to produce evidence in defence when asked to exercise option in this behalf. (4) Prosecution, in support of its case, produced and examined PW Shamsher Singh, PW Karan Singh, and PW Rajesh Kumar. (5) Statement of the accused was recorded in terms of Section 342 of Cr.P.C and he did not choose to produce evidence in defence when asked to exercise option in this behalf. Brief Resume: (6) PW Shamsher Singh has stated that Pushpinder was driving motor cycle and respondent was a pillion rider. During checking 5000 Capsules of Parvanspas, a Toka' and a "khokhari" were recovered from their possession. Seizure was affected. During cross-examination the witness has stated that Constable Tarlochan Singh and Karan Singh were also present there and accused did not make any effort to escape. He has specifically stated that accused were not informed of the right to exercise an option of having their search conducted in presence of a Magistrate and no civilian was associated with the proceedings of recovery. (7) PW Karan Singh has deposed that he along with Constable Tarlochan Singh and Constable Shamsher Singh were conducting search of vehicles at Transport Yard Lakhanpur and during check Pushpinder Singh was found on a motorcycle coming from Pathankot while as respondent Vishal was a pillion rider. On search 5000 capsules and a 'khokhari' was recovered from respondent and a toka' was recovered from beneath the seat of motorcycle. FIR was lodged in police station lakhanpur, seizure memo was prepared; 2/3 civilians were also associated with the recovery proceedings. (8) PW Rajesh Kumar has deposed that recovery was made in his presence while conducting search of accused. During cross-examination he denies to have any knowledge about the seizure having been made in his presence and has added even that his signatures were taken in the police station on seizure memo. (9) Prosecution has failed to examine Assistant Sub Inspector Mir Wazir and other material witnesses, thus, adverse inference is to be drawn against it. (10) Prosecution has failed to prove that the mandate of Sections 42, 50 & 59 of the NDPS Act was complied with. It has also failed to prove that Police Officer has recorded the occurrence in writing and its subsequent intimation to an immediate superior police officer within a prescribed time of 72 hours. Failure of the prosecution is attributed for denying accused their right to have their physical search conducted in presence of a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer. It has also failed to prove that Police Officer has recorded the occurrence in writing and its subsequent intimation to an immediate superior police officer within a prescribed time of 72 hours. Failure of the prosecution is attributed for denying accused their right to have their physical search conducted in presence of a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer. There is no evidence in support of seizure alleged to nave been affected in the matter as the witness to the seizure, Rajesh Kumar, denied, in cross-examination, his signatures having been taken on spot. Not only that the witness has deposed that nothing was recovered from the accused in his presence. (11) The story that had been projected in terms of the report submitted under Section 173 of Cr.P.C., that SHO and ASI of Police Station Lakhanpur reached the spot and conducted proceedings has not been corroborated by the witnesses who too are the police officials. Prosecution did not examine the SHO also. One more and important lacuna in the case is that the seized articles have not been sent for expert opinion, as such, the expert opinion, in the matter, too is missing making again the seizure doubtful. (12) Though the prosecution case is doubtful from the word go, however, the non-compliance of mandate of Sections 42, 50 & 59 of NDPS Act strikes all that remains. It would be profitable to have recourse to law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Kishan Chand v. State of Haryana reported as AIR SCW 2013, 210. Paragraphs 16 and 24 of the judgment are reproduced herein, thus: "16. We are unable to contribute to this interpretation and approach of the Trial Court and the High Court in relation to the provisions of sub- Section (1) and (2) of Section 42 of the Act. The language of Section 42 does not admit any ambiguity. These are penal provisions and prescribe very harsh punishments for the offender. The question of substantial compliance of these provisions would amount to misconstruction of these relevant provisions. It is a settled canon of interpretation that the penal provisions, particularly with harsher punishments and with clear intendment of the legislature for definite compliance, ought to be construed strictly. The doctrine of substantial compliance cannot be called in aid to answer such interpretations. The question of substantial compliance of these provisions would amount to misconstruction of these relevant provisions. It is a settled canon of interpretation that the penal provisions, particularly with harsher punishments and with clear intendment of the legislature for definite compliance, ought to be construed strictly. The doctrine of substantial compliance cannot be called in aid to answer such interpretations. The principle of substantial compliance would be applicable in the cases where the language of the provision strictly or by necessary implication admits of such compliance. 24. Reliance placed by the learned counsel appearing for the State on the case of Sajan Abraham (supra) is entirely misplaced, firstly in view of the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Karnail Singh (supra). Secondly, in that case the Court was also dealing with the application of the provisions of Section 57 of the Act which are worded differently and have different requirements, as opposed to Sections 42 and 50 of the Act. It is not a case where any reason has come in evidence as to why the secret information was not reduced to writing and sent to the higher officer, which is the requirement to be adhered to 'pre-search'. The question of sending it immediately thereafter does not arise in the present case, as it is an admitted position that there is total non-compliance of Section 42 of the Act. The sending of report as required under Section 57 of the Act on 20th July, 2000 will be no compliance, factually and/or in the eyes of law to the provisions of Section 42 of the Act. These are separate rights and protections available to an accused and their compliance has to be done in accordance with the provisions of Sections 42, 50 and 57 of the Act. They are neither inter-linked nor inter-dependent so as to dispense compliance of one with the compliance of another. In fact, they operate in different fields and at different stages. That distinction has to be kept in mind by the courts while deciding such cases." (13) Having regard to above narration, we are of considered view that trial court has passed quite reasoned judgment and needs no interference. Accordingly, upholding the verdict of trial court we dismiss the appeal. (14) Send down the record. ________-