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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 1215 (MP)

Dilip Kumar Samadhiya v. State of M. P.

2013-10-07

SUJOY PAUL

body2013
Judgment: Sujoy Paul, J. 1. These petitions involve similar question of facts and law and therefore, on the joint request of parties, matters are analogously heard and decided by this common order. Facts are taken from WP No. 3875/2013. The petitioner is working on the post of Constable pursuant to his appointment 24.07.2010. Pursuant to advertisement for direct recruitment for the post of Sub-Inspector, the petitioner submitted his candidature after obtaining permission from the department. The petitioner appeared in the qualifying examination for the said post and was declared qualified. Petitioner also passed the physical test and in final result the petitioner was declared as selected for the post of Sub Inspector (District). The petitioner was directed to undergo training at Police Training Centre, Sagar, but he was not permitted to participate in the training. In this petition, an interim order was passed on 10.06.2013 on the basis of Indore Bench order directing the respondents to send the petitioner for training. Thereafter by order dated 11.07.2013, the petitioner was informed that his candidature/selection has been cancelled. The petitioner filed WP No. 5108/2013 to assail this order. In the impugned order dated 11.07.2013 it is stated that during verification of petitioner's antecedents it was found that crime No. 838/2007 was registered against the petitioner for the offences under sections 294, 323, 325, 341, 506 read with 34 IPC. The petitioner was exonerated by the Court on the basis of compromise (Rajinama) on 02.01.2009, the said offences amount to moral turpitude. It is further stated that on 23.01.2009 the petitioner was exonerated by the Court from the offences under sections 294, 323, 341, 427 and 506 IPC on the basis of compromise and exonerated from the offence under section 336 IPC on the basis that charges are not proved. It is stated in the order that the offence under section 427 is not a normal offence and it amounts to moral turpitude. In another crime No. 138/10 which involve the offences under sections 341, 294, 323, 506-B, 427and 34 IPC Petitioner is exonerated on the basis of compromise. It is the stand of the respondents that the police personnel performs sensitive nature of duty hence his conduct should be beyond suspicion and doubt. The police personnel who is obliged to protect the law and order must possess impeccable integrity. It is the stand of the respondents that the police personnel performs sensitive nature of duty hence his conduct should be beyond suspicion and doubt. The police personnel who is obliged to protect the law and order must possess impeccable integrity. On the basis of judgment of Supreme Court in the case of (Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and another Vs. Mehar Singh) reported in, (2013) 7 SCC 685 it was held that the petitioner's appointment in the police service will not be proper. This order is called in question in this petition. 2. Similarly in WP No. 5004/2013 the petitioner was acquitted on the basis of Rajinama from the offences under section 451, 294, 506 and 34 IPC. It is stated in the order that section 451 amounts to moral turpitude. The reason for rejection in all these matters is same. 3. In WP No. 3879/2013 the petitioner was subjected to criminal case arising out of crime No. 730/2006 (under sections 294, 323, 506 and 34 IPC) in crime No. 635/2007 (under sections 294, 323, 452, 506 and 34 IPC and in crime No. 746/07 (under section 394, 397 and 34 IPC). From crime No. 730/06 the petitioner is exonerated on the basis of Rajinama whereas from crime No. 365/07 the petitioner is exonerated on the basis of insufficiency/lack of evidence. Petitioner is exonerated from the crime No. 746/07 because charges are not found proved against the petitioner. 4. On the basis of aforesaid factual backdrop, it is clear that petitioners are acquitted for insufficiency of evidence and on the basis of compromise entered into between the parties. Shri Prashant Sharma, Advocate and Shri D.S. Raghuvanshi, Advocate for the petitioners contended that the offences mentioned against the petitioners do not constitute moral turpitude. It is further contended that petitioners were falsely implicated in the charges and are duly exonerated. As per IPC and Cr.P.C. there is no difference between acquittal on merits and acquittal on benefit of doubt. It is contended that acquittal is acquittal and once candidate is acquitted it cannot be said that his conduct was not proper. It is further contended that petitioners' candidature were rejected without proper application of mind. In support of said contentions, petitioners relied on following judgments: 1. 1980 Air (HP) 45(Prem Kumar Vs. State of H.P.) 2. AIR 1994 (P & H) 242 (Kuldeep Singh and others Vs. It is further contended that petitioners' candidature were rejected without proper application of mind. In support of said contentions, petitioners relied on following judgments: 1. 1980 Air (HP) 45(Prem Kumar Vs. State of H.P.) 2. AIR 1994 (P & H) 242 (Kuldeep Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and others) 3. AIR 1996 (SC) 3300 (Pawan Kumar Vs. State of Harayana) 4. 1995 MPLJ 870 (Brij Kishor Shukla Vs. M.P.S.R.T.C. and others) 5. Air 1963 (AID) 527(Mangilal Vs. Chhakki Lal and others) The petitioners also relied on division Bench Judgment in W.A. No. 262/2010 (Parvez Khan Vs. State of M.P. & Ors.) decided on 20.03.2012. On the strength of this judgment, it is canvassed that acquittal of the petitioner as per section 320(8) of Cr.P.C. will have an impact of clear acquittal. 5. Per Contra, Smt. Nidhi Patankar, learned Govt. Advocate supported the order and contended that recruitment in certain departments including police is to be seen from different angle. The police personnels are shouldered with responsibility to maintain law and order, detect and prevent the crime etc. Their conduct should be free from any doubt. It is prerogative of the employer to decide whether a person with criminal history should be appointed or not. Even if a person is acquitted on benefit of doubt or for lack of evidence, it cannot be said that his conduct is beyond suspicion. She relied on the Government circular dated 5th June, 2003 (Annexure R/2). On this basis of this circular, it is contended that clause 6(VIII) makes it clear that acquittal on merits alone makes the candidate eligible for appointment. By placing reliance on appendix to the said circular, it is contended that various offences registered against the petitioner amount to moral turpitude. The petitioner has not chosen to assail the relevant clauses of Annexure R/2 and therefore, no relief is due to them. Learned Govt. Advocate placed heavy reliance on Mehar Singh (supra). 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. As contended by the parties, it is not in dispute that all the petitioners have disclosed in verification form about the criminal cases registered against them. It is not the case of the respondents that the petitioners have suppressed anything in verification form about their criminal antecedents/criminal cases lodged against them. 7. As contended by the parties, it is not in dispute that all the petitioners have disclosed in verification form about the criminal cases registered against them. It is not the case of the respondents that the petitioners have suppressed anything in verification form about their criminal antecedents/criminal cases lodged against them. Thus, the only question needs to be decided is whether the action of the respondents in rejecting the candidature of the petitioners on the basis of their acquittal for insufficiency of evidence, benefit of doubt and Rajinama, is in accordance with law. 8. The respondents have contended that the present recruitment was made pursuant to M.P. Police: Executive (Non Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rules, 1997. The selecting authority also prepared (Conduct of Examination and Recruitment Rules) By filing Annexure P/1 it is contended that, which reads as under: In addition, the main stand of the respondents is that as per Annexure R/2 dated 5th June, 2003 only such candidates are eligible for Government service who are acquitted on merits. No doubt, on the question of moral turpitude various courts have given opinion in the judgments which are relied upon by the petitioners. Apart from this, the expressions "honourable acquittal", "acquittal on benefit of doubt", fully exonerated, and "honourably acquitted" are considered by the Supreme Court after taking note of earlier judgments in Mehar Singh (supra). The Apex Court considered this aspect and opined that quite often criminal cases end in acquittal because witnesses turn hostile. Such acquittals are not acquittal on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not stand on a par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full-fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over. The expressions "honourable acquittal", "acquitted of blame" and "fully exonerated" are unknown to the Cr.P.C. and I.P.C. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. The Supreme Court expressed that it is difficult to define exactly what is meant by the expression "honourably acquitted". It is opined that when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges against the accused, it can possibly be said that acquittal is honourable acquittal. Dealing with the question of eligibility of such candidate, who is either exonerated for insufficiency of evidence, benefit of doubt or on technical ground it is held that such acquittal is not honourable. Dealing with the question of eligibility of such candidate, who is either exonerated for insufficiency of evidence, benefit of doubt or on technical ground it is held that such acquittal is not honourable. The Screening Committee would be entitled to cancel his candidature. Supreme Court emphasized that stricter norms need to be applied while appointing persons in a disciplinary force because public interest is involved in it. A bare perusal of judgment of Mehar Singh (supra) makes it clear that Apex court has made it clear that acquittal on benefit of doubt cannot be equated with honourable acquittal. 9. On the basis of aforesaid legal position, I find force in the argument of leaned Govt. Advocate that appointment in police department has to be seen from a different angle and stricter norms need to be applied while appointing persons in a disciplinary/police force. In Mehar Singh (supra) the Apex Court was dealing with the matter which was arising out of the recruitment in Delhi Police. The Delhi Police framed "standing order No. 398/2010" for deciding about the eligibility of the candidates who were provisionally selected in Delhi Police and are involved in criminal cases (facing trial or acquitted). Delhi Police has constituted a Screening Committee to decide about the suitability of the candidates for the Government Job. This is clear from the standing order reproduced in the judgment of Mehar Singh. On a specific query from the Bench, learned Govt. Advocate was unable to show from their record that any such Committee is constituted by the Government in Madhya Pradesh. It is submitted that clause 8 of Annexure R/2 dated 5th June 2003 shows that the cases of character verification would be considered by the Additional DGP on the basis of recommendations of Superintendent of Police (SP). In cases regarding column 12 of verification form whether filed or blank, the DGP will take decision. However, in para 9 of this circular it is mentioned that the antecedents of the candidates can be examined by the SP. 10. Clause 6(VIII) on which reliance is placed by learned Govt. Advocate only shows that the candidates who are acquitted on merits shall be eligible, which reads as under: 11. In the considered opinion of this Court, a minute reading of this clause shows that the candidates who are acquitted on merits shall be eligible for Government employment. 10. Clause 6(VIII) on which reliance is placed by learned Govt. Advocate only shows that the candidates who are acquitted on merits shall be eligible, which reads as under: 11. In the considered opinion of this Court, a minute reading of this clause shows that the candidates who are acquitted on merits shall be eligible for Government employment. This clause, in my opinion, does not deal with the cases of acquittal on benefit of doubt or on compromise etc. In the said clause the department has not chosen to use the word "only or alone". Putting it differently, it cannot be said that on a plain reading of clause 6(VIII), aforesaid, that only such persons who are acquitted on merits are eligible for Government employment. Learned Govt. Advocate has not shown any other provision in Annexure R/2 which makes the candidate ineligible or not suitable if he is acquitted on benefit of doubt or on the basis of compromise. The Apex Court addressed this aspect in Mehar Singh in para 23 of the judgment. The Apex Court opined about the cases where the candidate is acquitted or discharged on technical grounds, it is held that authorities would be entitled to keep persons involved in grave cases of moral turpitude out of the police force even if they are acquitted or discharged if it feels that the acquittal or discharge is on technical ground or not honourable. It is further held that Screening Committee will be within its right to cancel the candidature of a candidate if it finds that the acquittal is based on some serious flaw in the conduct of the prosecution case or is the result of material witnesses turning hostile. Experienced officer of the Screening Committee must judge whether acquittal or discharge of candidate is likely to revert to similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if appointed, to the police force. The Screening committee needs to consider the nature and extent of such person's involvement in the crime and his propensity of becoming a cause for worsening the law and other situation rather than maintaining it. The policy of police was affirmed with the finding that the said policy is introduced to ensure that the persons with impeccable character enter the police force. 12. The policy of police was affirmed with the finding that the said policy is introduced to ensure that the persons with impeccable character enter the police force. 12. In Mehar Singh (supra) the Apex Court opined that even if candidates have disclosed about their criminal antecedents, it will not improve their case. The police force being a disciplinary force needs to shoulder the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. In para 33 to 35 the Apex Court opined as under: 33. So far as respondent Mehar Singh is concerned, his case appears to have been compromised. It was urged that acquittal recorded pursuant to a compromise should not be treated as a disqualification because that will frustrate the purpose of Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. We see no merit in this submission. Compromises or settlements have to be encouraged to bring about peaceful and amiable atmosphere in the society by according a quietus to disputes. They have to be encouraged also to reduce arrears of cases and save the litigants from the agony of pending litigation. But these considerations cannot be brought in here. In order to maintain integrity and high standard of police force, the Screening Committee may decline to take cognizance of a compromise, if it appears to it to be dubious. The Screening Committee cannot be faulted for that. 34. The respondents are trying to draw mileage from the fact that in their application and/or attestation form they have disclosed their involvement in a criminal case. We do not see how this fact improves their case. Disclosure of these facts in the application/attestation form is an essential requirement. An aspirant is expected to state these facts honestly. Honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of the police force. The respondents should not, therefore, expect to score any brownie points because of this disclosure. Besides, this has no relevance to the point in issue. Disclosure of these facts in the application/attestation form is an essential requirement. An aspirant is expected to state these facts honestly. Honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of the police force. The respondents should not, therefore, expect to score any brownie points because of this disclosure. Besides, this has no relevance to the point in issue. It bears repetition to state that while deciding whether a person against whom a criminal case was registered and who was later acquitted or discharged should be appointed to a post in the police force, what is relevant is the nature of the offence, the extent of his involvement, whether the acquittal was a clean acquittal or an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt because the witnesses turned hostile or because of some serious flaw in the prosecution, and the propensity of such person to indulge in similar activities in future. This decision, in our opinion, can only be taken by the Screening Committee created for that purpose by the Delhi Police. If the Screening Committee’s decision is not mala fide or actuated by extraneous considerations, then, it cannot be questioned. 35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police force. The Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of taking decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee. The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In recent times, the image of the police force is tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward manner by misusing power are in public domain and are a matter of concern. The reputation of the police force has taken a beating. The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In recent times, the image of the police force is tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward manner by misusing power are in public domain and are a matter of concern. The reputation of the police force has taken a beating. In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the importance and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening Committee created by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police force. At the same time, the Screening Committee must be alive to the importance of trust reposed in it and must treat all candidates with even hand. 13. On conjoint reading of aforesaid paragraphs and findings of Supreme Court in Mehar Singh makes it clear that police authorities are well within their rights to decide the candidature of a person who is acquitted on benefit of doubt or on the basis of compromise. The only question is whether such candidature can be rejected on the threshold by holding that they were involved in criminal cases and their acquittal is on benefit of doubt or on basis of compromise. 14. The Delhi Police appointed a screening committee of expert officers to examine various aspects mentioned in the judgment of Mehar Singh. No such mechanism is shown to this Court by the respondents. The important question is whether every exoneration of candidate on benefit of doubt or on basis of compromise will make him ineligible for appointment in police force? Before dealing with this aspect, in my opinion, it is a matter of common knowledge that in various cases, because of personal enmity and rivalry etc. false reports are lodged even against those persons who are not at all involved in the incident. Cases are not unknown where quarrel takes place between two persons and complainant registers report against the all family members and relatives of the other person. In such cases, many a times good sense prevails on the parties subsequently and they enter into a compromise. Cases are not unknown where quarrel takes place between two persons and complainant registers report against the all family members and relatives of the other person. In such cases, many a times good sense prevails on the parties subsequently and they enter into a compromise. If as a thumb rule it is decided that all cases where acquittal of candidate is on Rajinama makes them disentitled for recruitment in police/Government job, it will be an extreme decision which will result into serious injustice to genuine and otherwise innocent candidates. 15. The Apex Court in (Preeti Gupta and another Vs. State of Jharkhand and another) reported in, (2010) 7 SCC 667 opined that the ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty and protect the innocent. This is an Herculean task. The tendency of implicating the husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon. The allegations of harassment of husband's close relations who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have different complexion. The Apex Court emphasized the need of scrutiny with great care and circumspection. Needless to mention that false complaint takes place in variety of cases/offences including matrimonial matters. Thus in case of exoneration on basis of compromise and benefit of doubt it needs to be meticulously examined what are the basis for exoneration. This aspect is already dealt with by Supreme Court in aforesaid reproduced paragraphs. 16. As analyzed above, in my opinion, the respondents are bound to apply mind about the nature of the case and reason for exoneration etc. Respondents may appoint a Screening Committee of expert officers for this purpose. There has to be application of mind to see whether benefit of doubt is given because the witnesses have turned hostile or because there is some serious flaw in the prosecution. It also needs to be seen whether there is any possibility of involvement of the candidate in similar nature of crime in future. The Apex Court in para 34 and 35, reproduced above, opined that the decision of Screening Committee can be put to judicial scrutiny only if it is malafide or actuated by extraneous considerations. The Apex Court also dealt with the case of exoneration on compromise. The Apex Court in para 34 and 35, reproduced above, opined that the decision of Screening Committee can be put to judicial scrutiny only if it is malafide or actuated by extraneous considerations. The Apex Court also dealt with the case of exoneration on compromise. It is opined that Screening Committee needs to examine such cases and may reject the candidature if it is found that the compromise is dubious. 17. In the considered opinion of this Court, in the present case, there is no material to show whether respondents have meticulously examined individual cases of the petitioners on the basis of relevant consideration mentioned above. In the light of aforesaid, in my opinion, this aspect needs to be considered in the light of judgment of Mehar Singh (supra). In the light of recent judgment of Supreme Court in Mehar Singh which deals with recruitment in disciplined police force, cases cited by petitioners are of no assistance to them. Petitioners have not chosen to challenge validity of Annexure R/2, wherein the respondents have declared certain offences as "moral turpitude". In absence of challenge to Annexure R/2, I am not inclined to examine its validity or correctness. 18. Thus, without setting aside the impugned orders herein, I deem it proper to direct the respondents to consider the aforesaid aspect and decide the suitability of the petitioners for appointment. It will be open for the respondents to constitute a Screening Committee for this purpose. It is made clear that it will be open for the Screening Committee/department to accept or reject the candidature of the petitioners after due consideration of relevant aspects discussed in this judgment. This Court has not expressed any opinion on the entitlement of the petitioners on merits. This needs to be examined by the respondents. This entire exercise must be completed within 60 days from the date of production of certified copy of this order. Outcome shall be communicated to the petitioners. With the aforesaid, petitions are disposed of. No Costs.