JUDGMENT 1. This Second appeal is focussed by the defendants animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated 23.11.2011 passed in A.S.No.287 of 2011 by the IV Additional City Civil Court, Chennai, reversing the judgment and decree of the XVI Assistant City Civil Court, Chennai in I.A.No.3667 of 2011 in O.S.No.12958 of 2010. 2. The parties are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. The germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this Second Appeal would run thus: The plaintiffs filed the suit seeking the following relief: (a) To declare that the "Thirutani Arulmigu Murugan Educational Trust" executed and registered under Regn.No.810 of 1997 on 15.09.1997 and granted Registration u/s 12AA of Income Tax Act, 1961 under letter No.DIT (E) No.2 (1072) 06-07 dated 17.09.2007 and rectified under 'Cancellation Deed cum Rectification Deed' dated 05.02.2010 as the only valid Board of Trustees; (b) For permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in the management, administration and affairs of the Trust and of "Thiruthani, Polytechnic College" functioning under the said Trust in Thiruthani in any manner whatsoever; (c) For permanent injunction restraining the defendants from using and or claiming any rights by virtue of the Supplementary Deed dated 10.07.2007 executed and registered on the basis of a Resolutions dated 25.10.1999 and 1.7.2002 in any manner whatsoever; (d) For permanent injunction restraining the defendants from using and or claiming any rights by virtue of the fabricated 'Ten Minutes of the Meetings from 1.10.1997 to 25.10.1999 filed on 11.09.2006 during the proceedings in O.S.No.5851 of 2004 whatsoever; (e) For permanent injunction restraining the defendants from using and or claiming any rights by virtue of the fraudulent Minutes/Resolution dated 1.1.2000 in any manner whatsoever; and (f) For costs." (extracted as such) 4. The defendants filed the written statement resisting the suit, and an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC for rejection of plaint was also filed by them. The lower Court after giving markings to the documents filed on the side of the plaintiffs and the defendants, allowed the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC and rejected the plaint; whereupon the plaintiffs preferred the appeal. The appellate Court reversed the order of the lower Court and mandated that the suit should be proceeded with, as per law. 5. The appellate Court reversed the order of the lower Court and mandated that the suit should be proceeded with, as per law. 5. Challenging and impugning the judgment of the first appellate Court, this Second Appeal has been focused on various grounds and also suggesting the following substantial questions of law: "(a) That whether the first Appellate court is right in reversing the judgment of the trial Court (b) Whether the failure to consider the legality of the pleadings regarding fraud as enunciated in Order 6 Rule 4 and sec 17 Contract Act. (c) Whether the reasoning of the 1st Appellate Court to decide the questions of jurisdiction at the time of Trial (d) Whether the limitation as per the decision reported in 2009(3) CTC S.C. 192, could be decided under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC (e) Whether the First Appellate Court is right in its reasoning that the cause of action for the suit arises only on 25.08.2010 as against the admission in O.S.No.40 of 2005 Ex.P.82." (extracted as such) 6. Heard both. 7. The learned counsel for the defendants would pyramid his argument, which could succinctly and pithily be set out thus: (a) The plaintiffs suppressing the material facts about the filing of the earlier suit in O.S.No.40 of 2005 and also the contents of paragraph 4 therein as under: "4. The plaintiff further submits subsequently Mr. Selvanayagam, Tamilselvi Radhakrishnan and Mr. S. Sengottaselvan also joined as Trustees." filed the present plaint. (b) The present plaint averments would connote and denote that before the wrong forum they filed the suit, because as per their own averment, the Trust is now functioning only at Thiruttani and in such a case, the Court at Madras was having no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The trial Court appropriately and appositely, correctly and legally understanding the project contra rejected the plaint. However, the appellate Court wrongly reversed the reasoned order of the lower Court and simply mandated that the suit should be proceeded with as per law. (c) The suit also was barred by limitation as they referred to a resolution dated 10.07.2007, which they seek to get declared it void. However, the appellate Court wrongly reversed the reasoned order of the lower Court and simply mandated that the suit should be proceeded with as per law. (c) The suit also was barred by limitation as they referred to a resolution dated 10.07.2007, which they seek to get declared it void. However, the suit filed beyond the three years' limitation period also looms large in this case and it is ex facie and prima facie clear also and those points, without any detailed evidence could be decided under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC. (d) Once it is clear to the Court's knowledge from the averments, nothing more is required to invoke Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC, then the same should be resorted to. However, the first appellate Court failed to invoke its jurisdiction properly. (e) Incessantly and persistently, suit after suit the plaintiffs are filing, so as to harass the defendants who have been smoothly conducting the Trust and running the educational institutions and as such, immediate relief is required for the defendants, for which invocation of Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC would be most appropriate. But the first appellate Court failed to adhere to it for no good reason. (f) As such taking into account the grounds found set out in the affidavit accompanying the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC, the appellate Court could have very well confirmed the order of the lower Court, but it failed to do so. 8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs in a bid to slap down and torpedo the arguments as put forth and set forth on the side of the defendants, would advance his arguments, the warp and woof of the same would run thus: (a) Order 7 Rule 10 of CPC adequately takes care of the right of the defendants, if at all the defendants' plea relating to jurisdiction is a valid one. Even in such a case, the question of rejecting the plaint would not arise, but transfer of the suit from one Court to another alone would be correct. Even in such a case, the question of rejecting the plaint would not arise, but transfer of the suit from one Court to another alone would be correct. However, in this case the plaintiffs are not admitting that the main office of the Trust is at Thiruttani and it is still at Chennai and that without giving opportunity to the plaintiffs to establish those facts, the trial Court was not justified in simply accepting the plea of the defendants for gospel truth in rejecting the plaint. (b) The limitation point raised is not applicable to this case. The resolution dated 10.07.2007 referred to in para 28 is one of the facts for the purpose of justifying and buttressing the prayer of the plaintiffs for declaration and that itself cannot be taken as one governing the law of limitation; continuing cause of action could be discerned from the plaint. (c) The requirement of the plaintiffs is for declaration and injunction, in view of the fact that the plaintiffs do face trouble at the hands of the defendants continuously. The appellate Court correctly considering the factual matrix thought that the suit has to be proceeded with further as per law. (d) There is no question of law much less substantial question of law is involved in this Second Appeal. Accordingly he would pray for the dismissal of the Second Appeal. 9. From the aforesaid facts and also the typed set of papers, what I would like to observe is that the Second Appeal would arise only if there is any substantial question of law. 10. I would like to refer to the recent decision of the Hon'ble Court reported in 2012 (8) SCC 148 [Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and another]; an excerpt from it would run thus: "59. Section 100 CPC provides for a second appeal only on the substantial question of law. Generally, a second appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. In SBI v. S.N. Goyal (2008) 8 SCC 92 , this Court explained the terms "substantial question of law" and observed as under: (SCC p.103, para 13) "13. Section 100 CPC provides for a second appeal only on the substantial question of law. Generally, a second appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. In SBI v. S.N. Goyal (2008) 8 SCC 92 , this Court explained the terms "substantial question of law" and observed as under: (SCC p.103, para 13) "13. .....The word "substantial" prefixed to 'question of law' does not refer to the stakes involved in the case, nor intended to refer only to questions of law of general importance, but refers to impact or effect of the question of law on the decision in the lis between the parties. 'Substantial questions of law' means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties ......any question of law which affects the final decision in a case is a substantial question of law as between the parties. A question of law which arises incidentally or collaterally, having no bearing on the final outcome, will not be a substantial question of law......There cannot, therefore, be a straitjacket definition as to when a substantial question of law arises in a case." (emphasis added) 11. It has to be seen as to whether any substantial question of law is involved in this Second Appeal. No doubt, the defendants are having some grievance as against the plaintiffs for they having filed certain suits and having initiated litigations as against the defendants. In the earlier litigation it appears, at the instance of the first defendant herein the matter went up to the Supreme Court and his claim based on the memorandum of understanding was rejected. However, it is the case of D1 and others, that they are still running the educational institutions and that the plaintiffs who had already detached and severed themselves from the administration as well as from the Trust, cannot veer round and take any plea as against the defendants. This is certainly a point which has to be considered by the trial Court on entertaining evidence. 12. Jurisdiction point also is something which requires evidence in view of the contentious point as to whether the main office is still in Chennai or in Thiruttani. This is certainly a point which has to be considered by the trial Court on entertaining evidence. 12. Jurisdiction point also is something which requires evidence in view of the contentious point as to whether the main office is still in Chennai or in Thiruttani. Ex facie and prima facie it is clear that the trial Court was not justified in allowing the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC on the finding that the suit was filed in the wrong Court having no jurisdiction. If a Court comes to the conclusion that it is having no jurisdiction then appropriate procedure under Order 7 Rule 10 of CPC should be adhered to, but while observing so, I do not hold that the Court at Chennai is having no jurisdiction and it all depends upon the facts and figures that would be placed before the Court at the appropriate stage of the case. 13. The learned counsel for the defendants also would try to canvass the point to the fact that the plaintiffs were not justified in portraying and projecting themselves as the trustees before they get themselves declared as trustees and as such, the suit was bad. In my considered opinion, such an argument fails to carry conviction with this Court. According to the plaintiffs, they are the trustees and they want declaration from the Court. The onus probandi is on them. 14. At this juncture, I recollect the following maxims: (1) Affirmantis est probare : The person who affirms must prove (2) Affirmanti, non neganti, incumbit probatio : The proof is incumbent on the one who affirms, not on the one who denies. 15. So it is the for the plaintiffs to prove their case and it is open for them to project themselves in any manner they like. A party approaching the Court with some nomenclature or capacity cannot be prevented to do so but he should prove it. It all depends upon evidence that would be adduced at the appropriate stage of the case. 16. Regarding suppression of material facts are concerned, the learned counsel for the appellants would cite the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2012 (4) CTC 308 [The Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society, represented by its Chairman v. Ponniamman Educational Trust, represented by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee]. 17. 16. Regarding suppression of material facts are concerned, the learned counsel for the appellants would cite the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2012 (4) CTC 308 [The Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society, represented by its Chairman v. Ponniamman Educational Trust, represented by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee]. 17. What I would like to observe is that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the factual matrix of that case appropriately highlighted and spotlighted the fact that in a suit for specific performance without even referring to the details relating to the alleged agreement to sell, cannot choose to file a suit. Here the factual matrix is entirely different and my discussion supra would demonstrate and display the same. 18. Hence I am of the considered view that the contentious issues involved in this case could be dealt with by the trial Court only on entertaining evidence. Whether a preliminary issue or issues have to be framed is a matter to be considered by the trial Court at the request of the defendant under Order 14 of CPC and accordingly, I am of the considered view that in this Second Appeal there is no question of law much less substantial question of law is involved. Accordingly, this second appeal is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 19. The learned counsel for the defendants would make an extempore submission that the plaintiffs are not diligent in conducting the case, for which the learned counsel for the plaintiffs would deny such accusation. Be that as it may, I would like to mandate that the lower Court shall do well to see that the matter is disposed of within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.