ORDER In this writ application, an order of the State Election Commissioner dated 06.06.2013, passed in Election Case No.12/2013, is under challenge. In the impugned order, the Election Commissioner has held that petitioner was disqualified to be elected as Mukhiya, as on the date of nomination she was less than 21 years of age. Hence, he has set aside the election of the petitioner and has directed the post to be held as vacant, to be filled up in accordance with law. He has further directed for institution of an FIR against the petitioner. 2. A case was registered in the Election Commission on the complaint of respondent No.5. Taking cognizance of the complaint, the Collector-cum-District Election Officer (Panchayat), Gopalganj, was directed to hold an enquiry and submit a report. Enquiry was accordingly held and it was reported that in her nomination paper, petitioner had mentioned her age as 26 years, whereas, in view of her matriculation certificate, verification report and the report received from the Bihar School Examination Board, she was found to be less than 21 years of age on the date of nomination i.e. on 25.02.2011. Accordingly, notices were issued to the parties, in response to which petitioner appeared through her counsel on 14.05.2013. The matter was thereafter heard and on the basis of unimpeachable documents, it was found that on the date of nomination, petitioner was 20 years 8 months 21 days only. Accordingly, her election was set aside and the post of Mukhiya was held vacant, which was directed to be filled up in accordance with law and an FIR was directed to be instituted, as she had deliberately made a false declaration in her nomination paper that she was 26 years of age. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that age mentioned in the matriculation certificate of petitioner was not sacrosanct. Hence, once her nomination was accepted and she was allowed to contest the election, it was not under legal obligation of the State Election Commissioner to cancel her election on the basis of the matriculation certificate. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that age mentioned in the matriculation certificate of petitioner was not sacrosanct. Hence, once her nomination was accepted and she was allowed to contest the election, it was not under legal obligation of the State Election Commissioner to cancel her election on the basis of the matriculation certificate. In support of this submission, learned counsel has placed reliance upon a Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain Sinha (AIR 1965 Supreme Court 282) and particularly, on the following observations made by the Apex Court in paragraph 20 of the judgment: The appellant case is that once this wrong entry was made in the admission register it was necessarily carried forward to the Matriculation Certificate and was also adhered to in the application for the post of a Sub-Inspector of Police. However much one may condemn such an act of making a false statement of age with a view to secure an advantage in getting public service, a judge of facts cannot ignore the position that in actual life this happens not infrequently. 4. His second submission was that the petitioner was not given any adequate opportunity by the State Election Commissioner to defend her case and, after she appeared in the case before the State Election Commissioner for the first time on 14.05.2013, in hot haste, the Election Commissioner decided and passed a final order on 06.06.2013, i.e. less than in a month. 5. A counter affidavit has been filed supporting the impugned order of the State Election Commissioner and learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on orders of the Division Bench dated 06.03.2013 passed in LPA No.267 of 2013 (Rani Devi v. The State Election Commission), order dated 27.02.2013 passed in LPA No.200 of 2013 (Smt. Babita Kumari v. The State of Bihar & Ors.) and order dated 16.05.2013 passed in LPA No.469 of 2013 (Punam Devi v. The State of Bihar & Ors.) 6. The observation of the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Brij Mohan Singh ( AIR 1965 SC 282 ) (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is apparently not a finding so as to be treated as the law of land in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The observation of the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Brij Mohan Singh ( AIR 1965 SC 282 ) (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is apparently not a finding so as to be treated as the law of land in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. It was just an observation of a possible state of affairs in a given case and cannot be taken into isolation as an abstract proposition. The judgment shows that the election of the appellant before the Apex Court was challenged by the respondent before the Election Tribunal on various grounds, including that appellant was born on October 15, 1937, and hence he was less than 25 years of age on the date of filing of his nomination papers for election as Member of the Bihar Patna High Court Legislative Assembly held in 1962. The Election Tribunal dismissed the election petition of the respondents on contest, against which he moved this Court, which allowed the appeal and set aside the findings of the Election Tribunal, holding appellant Brij Mohan Singh disqualified on account of age and set aside his election. The Apex Court, in its judgment, noticed the case of the parties and evidence produced by them, in detail, in reference to the issue framed by the Election Tribunal in connection with the grounds of challenge contained in the election petition. The Apex Court found that the oral evidence of either of the parties was unreliable. Hence it referred to the documents, including evidence in respect of issue of age of the appellant on the date of his nomination. It found that the “Hath-chitha produced by the Chowkidar of the village, in support of the claim of the appellant of having born on October 15, 1935, was not admissible in terms of the provisions of the Evidence Act as the Chowkidar got entries made in his “Hath-chitha by other persons, although the document itself appeared to be genuine. Then it took notice of the extract of admission register, application made by the appellant for appointment for the post of a Sub-Inspector of Police and his matriculation certificate issued by the Bihar School Examination Board, exhibited on behalf of the election petitioner-respondent as Exhibits 2, 8 and 18, respectively, in all of which date of birth of the appellant was recorded as October 15, 1937. The Apex Court noticed the stand of the appellant that admission register was the first document in which his date of birth was recorded when he had taken admission on January 19, 1946. It noticed that it was the case of the appellant from the very beginning that his date of birth was wrongly recorded in the admission register and the same was wrongly carried over in his application and in the records of the Bihar School Examination Board. The stand of the appellant was noticed in paragraph 20 of the judgment in the following words : His case is that this was an incorrect statement made at the request of the person who went to get him admitted to the school. The request was made, it is suggested, to make him appear two years younger than he really was so that later in life he would have an advantage when seeking public service for which a minimum age for eligibility is often prescribed. 7. This extracted observations as above from paragraph 20 of the Apex Court judgment is just before the observation in the same paragraph, as relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner and extracted earlier. The Apex Court has noticed that the Election Tribunal accepted his explanation but the High Court has rejected it. Thereafter the Apex Court in the next paragraph noticed that neither the election petitioner nor the appellant had been able to prove that the appellant was below 25 years or at least 25 years of age on the date of nomination. However, onus lay upon the election petitioner to prove that the appellant was not below 25 years of age on the date of his nomination which he could not discharge. Hence, it held that, the said ground of challenge to the appellant election must fail. 8. In the present case either before this Court, or before the Election Commission the petitioner has not taken any stand that her age was wrongly recorded in the records of the Bihar School Examination Board. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any document to show that after her appearance, any such stand was taken by her before the Commission. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any document to show that after her appearance, any such stand was taken by her before the Commission. In the circumstances, the Election Commissioner had no reason to doubt the correctness of the certificate and verification letter issued by the Bihar School Examination Board mentioning her date of birth as 04.06.1990. As such, this Court does not find any merit in the first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the same is, accordingly, rejected. 9. Now coming to the second submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court finds that on 14.05.2013, a learned counsel had appeared on her behalf and had filed power. The matter was heard on that date and learned counsel for the petitioner was allowed to examine the original nomination paper filed by her, as available on the records, in which petitioner had given declaration that her age was 26 years. Thereafter learned counsel prayed for some time for final hearing on the ground that notice was received by his client on 07.05.2013 only. Time was granted and 27.05.2013 was fixed for final hearing in the matter. On 27.05.2013 parties appeared and when the matter was taken up, another learned counsel appeared on behalf of the petitioner and produced a vakalatnama without stamps. He took a stand that he assists learned counsel who had appeared for the petitioner on earlier date. He took a stand in the hearing that the District Administration had made enquiries only on the basis of the documents produced by the complainant, in which petitioner was not noticed and was not given any opportunity to be heard. 10. The Election Commissioner found that the District Administration was directed to hold preliminary enquiry and submit a report. He noticed that since the District Administration had not allowed the petitioner to participate and this issue was being raised on her behalf, though the Commission has given her the opportunity to defend her case, but still she was taking undue advantage of this opportunity. However, the Election Commissioner adjourned the matter for 06.06.2013 and, in the meanwhile, deputed a Deputy Secretary of the Commission to visit the office of the Bihar School Examination Board personally and get the matriculation certificate of the petitioner verified and submit a report. However, the Election Commissioner adjourned the matter for 06.06.2013 and, in the meanwhile, deputed a Deputy Secretary of the Commission to visit the office of the Bihar School Examination Board personally and get the matriculation certificate of the petitioner verified and submit a report. On that date it was also made clear that in case petitioner wanted to produce any other certificate or documents before the Commission in the case, she was to do it before 06.06.2013. On 06.06.2013, a third learned counsel appeared for the petitioner and filed a petition that it was not possible for the learned counsel for the petitioner to appear. Hence, time should be granted. The Commissioner noticed that the lawyer who had filed this petition had not filed any vakalatnama on behalf of the petitioner. On the record the vakalatnama of the second counsel was there, but till that date stamps were not supplied. Hence Commissioner proceeded to hear the matter and noticed that the matter had already been heard in detail on 14.05.2013 and on 27.05.2013 and had been adjourned for getting the matriculation certificate of the petitioner once again verified from the Board. Verification report of the Board had come on record through its letter No.873 dated 04.06.2013 certifying that date of birth of petitioner in the record was mentioned as 04.06.1990. The Commissioner found that delaying tactics was being adopted by the petitioner. Hence the Commissioner found that nothing remained to be further enquired into the matter. He thereafter proceeded in the matter, noticed an order of the Apex Court and an order of this Court, and finally held that on the date of nomination, petitioner was of 20 years 8 months 21 days, and in the affidavit enclosed with the nomination paper, she had wrongly mentioned her age as 26 years. As a result the complaint of respondent was allowed and petitioner was held as disqualified on the date of nomination. The election of the petitioner was therefore set aside and the post was held vacant and, as she had given a false declaration on affidavit with regard to her age with her nomination paper, he directed for institution of an F.I.R. against her. 11. The election of the petitioner was therefore set aside and the post was held vacant and, as she had given a false declaration on affidavit with regard to her age with her nomination paper, he directed for institution of an F.I.R. against her. 11. The narration of events, as appearing in the order of the Election Commissioner and noticed above, shows that though on three dates three learned counsels had appeared on behalf of the writ petitioner before the Election Commissioner, but on none of dates any learned counsel took any specific stand with regard to validity or otherwise of her date of birth mentioned in her matriculation certificate. On every date there was an attempt by her learned counsels to linger the matter by seeking adjournments only. Thus, this Court finds that opportunity granted by the Election Commissioner to the learned counsels for the petitioner was not availed of by them by filing any specific defence, explaining the conduct of petitioner of mentioning her age as 26 years as on the date of nomination in the teeth of her date of birth mentioned in her matriculation certificate or taking any stand that for any reason her date of birth mentioned in the matriculation certificate was not correct. 12. In the circumstances, this Court does not find any merit in the second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner also. The same is also rejected. 13. As a result, this Court does not find any error in the impugned order of the Election Commissioner and, therefore, does not find any merit in the writ application. The same is, accordingly, dismissed. Petition dismissed.