ORDER Seeking quashing of order dated 15.11.2011 and order dated 31.01.2013 whereby, the benefit of back wages has been denied to the petitioner, the present writ petition has been filed. 2. The brief facts of the case are that, the petitioner was appointed as Senior Medical Officer on 13.01.1986. A criminal proceeding was initiated against the petitioner and by order dated 24.12.2001 the petitioner was convicted for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(2) r/w Section 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The petitioner was dismissed from service by order dated 09.09.2003. The petitioner's appeal challenging order of conviction and sentence dated 24.12.2001 was allowed by the High Court by order dated 07.09.2010. On 12.11.2010 the petitioner submitted an application seeking reinstatement in service with consequential benefits such as, back wages, continuity in service etc. The petitioner was reinstated in service by order dated 15.11.2011 however, without any back wages and consequential benefits and therefore, he made a representation which was dismissed. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that since the petitioner was dismissed from service on the sole ground of his conviction in the criminal case, the petitioner would be entitled for grant of back wages after his reinstatement in service, as he has been acquitted from criminal charges. Relying on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and Others Vs. Nathu Ram”, reported in 2010 (1) SCC 428 , the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the judgments in “RanchhodJi Chaturji Thakore Vs. Supdt. Engineer, Gujrat Electricity Board”, reported in (1996) 11 SCC 603 and “Union of India and Others Vs. Jaipal Singh”, reported in (2004) 1 SCC 121 , have been considered and distinguished by the Hon'ble Supreme court in “Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited” (supra) and affirmed the order granting back wages to an employee who was reinstated in service after his acquittal in criminal case. He has further submitted that a similarly situated person namely, Dr. S.S. Lal was paid 50 % back wages whereas, the petitioner has been denied the benefit of back wages. 5. He has further submitted that a similarly situated person namely, Dr. S.S. Lal was paid 50 % back wages whereas, the petitioner has been denied the benefit of back wages. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that since the petitioner got himself involved in a corruption case which was instituted at the instance of the 3rd party and consequently, he remained absent from duty on account of his own act/omission therefore, he cannot be granted back wages. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents has further submitted that the case of Dr. S.S. Lal is entirely different from the case of the present petitioner and therefore, the petitioner cannot seek parity with said Dr. S.S. Lal. 6. I find that in “Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limted” (supra), the issue which fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was, whether in terms of Circular dated 03.09.1975 an employee who was dismissed from service on the ground of his conviction in a criminal case, after his reinstatement in service was entitled for full salary and allowances for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of acquittal in the criminal case. In the said case, the Circular which was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme court is reproduced below: “Sub: Action to be taken in cases where Board’s employees are convicted on a criminal charge by a competent court of law. The following procedure should be adopted in a case of conviction of a Board’s employee by a court of law on a criminal charge: (i)-(ii) * * * 2. If an appeal/revision against the conviction succeeds and Board’s employee is acquitted, the order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement based on his conviction which no longer stands, becomes liable to be set aside. A copy of the judgment of the appellate court should be immediately procured and got examined with a view to decide whether despite the acquittal, the facts and circumstances of the case are such as to call for the departmental enquiry against the Board’s employee on the basis of the allegation on which he was previously convicted. If it is decided that a departmental enquiry should be held, formal orders should be made: (1) setting aside the order or dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, and (2) ordering such a departmental enquiry. If it is decided that a departmental enquiry should be held, formal orders should be made: (1) setting aside the order or dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, and (2) ordering such a departmental enquiry. Such an order should also state that under Regulation 9 of the RSEB (CC & A) Regulations 1962, the Board’s employee is deemed to be under suspension with effect from the date of the dismissal/removal/compulsory retirement (a standard Form II is enclosed). In case where neither of the aforesaid course is allowed, a formal order should be made setting aside the previous orders of dismissal, removal and compulsory retirement and reinstating him in service (a standard Form III for such an order is enclosed). The period between the date of dismissal, etc. and the date on which he resumes duty should be dealt with under Regulation 41 of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board Employees’ Service Regulations and in doing so he should be deemed to be entitled to full pay and allowances for the period from the date of his acquittal to the date of his reinstatement, such period being counted for duty for all purposes and for the period from the date of dismissal to the date of acquittal, he should not be allowed pay and allowances less than what would have been admissible to him had he remained under suspension. While issuing orders for dismissal, it should be borne in mind that the order is issued by the authority competent to inflict major penalty against that person.” 7. The Regulation 41 of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board Employees' Services Regulations, 1964 which was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case is extracted below: Regulation 41. “Reinstatement after suspension, removal or dismissal.—When an employee who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated, the authority competent to order the reinstatement shall consider and make a specified order: 1. (a) Regarding the pay and allowance to be paid to the employee for the period of his absence from duty, and (b) Whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. (c) Whether or not the suspension, removal or dismissal was wholly unjustifiable. 2. (a) Regarding the pay and allowance to be paid to the employee for the period of his absence from duty, and (b) Whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. (c) Whether or not the suspension, removal or dismissal was wholly unjustifiable. 2. Where such competent authority holds that the employee has been fully exonerated or in the case of suspension that it was wholly unjustified, the employee shall be given the full pay and dearness allowance to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed, removed or suspended, as the case may be.” 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with the issue in paragraph 17 & 18 in “Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited” (supra) which reads as under: “17. It is not in dispute that the appellant Corporation have themselves given full pay to the respondent from the date of suspension i.e. 30-11-1979 to the date of dismissal i.e. 28-12-1982 and from the date of acquittal i.e. 15-12-1997 to the date of reinstatement i.e. 3-6-1998. Such being the state of affairs, it is not acceptable that there was any reason for the Corporation not to give the suspension allowances for the period of termination i.e. 28-12-1982 to the date of acquittal i.e. 15-12-1997 in terms of the Circular dated 3-9-1975. 18. This circular also says that the period from the date of dismissal to the date of acquittal, the employee should not be allowed pay and allowances less than what would have been admissible to him had he remained under suspension. Therefore, from a reading of the circular, it would be evident that the respondent may be paid the pay and allowances admissible to him had he remained under suspension. This was the view expressed by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court.” 9. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied on Rule 26 which deals with treatment of the period of suspension under the Coal India Executives' Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 which is extracted below: 26.0 “Treatment of the period of suspension. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied on Rule 26 which deals with treatment of the period of suspension under the Coal India Executives' Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 which is extracted below: 26.0 “Treatment of the period of suspension. 26.1 When an order placing an employee under suspension is revoked or would have been revoked but for his retirement (including premature retirement) while under suspension, the Authority competent to order revocation shall consider and make specific orders- (a) Regarding pay an allowances to be paid to the employee for the period of suspension ending with revocation of suspension or date of his retirement (including premature retirement ) as the case may be; and (b)Whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. 26.2 Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 25, where an employee under suspension dies before the disciplinary or court proceedings instituted against him are concluded, the period between the date of suspension and the date of death shall be treated as duty for all purposes and his family shall be paid the full pay and allowance for that period to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended, subject to adjustment in respect of subsistence allowance already paid. 26.3 Where the Authority competent to order revocation is of the opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the employee shall, subject to sub-rule (8), be paid full pay and allowance to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended. Provided that where such authority is of the opinion that the termination of proceedings against the employee had been delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the employee, it may after giving him an opportunity to make his representation within thirty days from the date on which the communication in this regard in served on him and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him direct, for reasons to be recorded in writing that the employee shall be paid for the period of such delay only such amount (not being the whole) of such pay and allowances as it may determine. The pay and allowances so determined should not be less than the subsistence allowance already paid to the employee. 26.4 In a case falling under sub-rule (3), the period of suspension shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes. The pay and allowances so determined should not be less than the subsistence allowance already paid to the employee. 26.4 In a case falling under sub-rule (3), the period of suspension shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes. 26.5 In cases other than those falling under sub-rules (2) and (3) the employee shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rules (7) and (8), be paid such amount (not being the whole) of pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended, as the Competent Authority may determine, after observing the procedure of issuing show cause notice and consideration of representation, if any, submitted by the employee. The amount so determined should not be less than the subsistence allowance already paid to the employee 26.6 Where suspension is revoked pending finalisation of the disciplinary or the court proceeding, any order passed under sub-rule (1) before the conclusion of the proceedings against the employee, shall be reviewed on its own motion after the conclusion of the proceedings by the authority mentioned in sub-rule (1) who shall make an order according to the provisions of sub-rules (3) (4) or (5), as may be applicable. 26.7 In a case falling under sub-rule (5), the period of suspension shall not be treated as a period spent on duty unless the Competent Authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specific purpose. Provided that if the employee so desires, such Authority may order that the period of suspension shall be converted into leave of any kind due and admissible to the employee. 26.8 The payment of allowances under sub-rules (2), (3) or (5) shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances are admissible.” 10. On a plain reading of Rule 26 of Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 which is applicable in the case of the petitioner and Regulation 41 read with Circular dated 03.09.1975 which have been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme court in “Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited” (supra), I find that Rule 26.0 in the Rules of 1978 deals with suspension. In the Circular dated 03.09.1975 considered by the “Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited” (supra), a specific procedure was laid down in cases of conviction on a criminal charge and subsequent acquittal of the Board's employee in the criminal case. In the Circular dated 03.09.1975 considered by the “Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited” (supra), a specific procedure was laid down in cases of conviction on a criminal charge and subsequent acquittal of the Board's employee in the criminal case. The Circular provided that the period between the date of dismissal etc. and the date on which the employee assumed duty would be dealt with under Regulation 41 of the Regulations and the employee was made entitled for the pay and allowances not less than what would have been admissible to him when he was under suspension from the date of his acquittal to the date of his reinstatement. I do not find any such provision in the present case. Moreover, in “Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited” (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court declined to interfere with the order passed by the High Court because the employee was granted full pay during the period of suspension. In the present case for the period of suspension the petitioner was not granted full salary etc. after reinstatement in service. The petitioner has not raised any grievance in that regard. It is not the case of the petitioner that the Coal India Limited has issued any Circular which provides that for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of acquittal, an employee would not be allowed pay and allowances less than what would have been admissible to him had he remained under suspension. In “Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited) (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme court upheld the order granting back wages in view of the specific provision in the Circular dated 03.09.1975 and in view of the fact that the corporation had granted full salary to the delinquent employee from the date of suspension to the date of dismissal after his reinstatement in service. In view of the aforesaid, I find that the facts in the present case are entirely different from the facts in “Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited” (supra), and therefore, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the Judgment in “Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited” (supra), is not tenable. 11. Since, the petitioner got himself involved in a criminal case in which he was convicted, the petitioner was dismissed from service. On his acquittal in the criminal case, the petitioner has been reinstated in service by order dated 15.11.2011. 11. Since, the petitioner got himself involved in a criminal case in which he was convicted, the petitioner was dismissed from service. On his acquittal in the criminal case, the petitioner has been reinstated in service by order dated 15.11.2011. I find that the petitioners' appeal was allowed by order dated 07.09.2010 and he preferred an application on 12.11.2010 and therefore, in view of decision in “Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra)” and other cases, he would be entitled for grant of back wages between the period 12.11.2010 to 15.11.2011. The impugned order dated 15.11.2011 at Annexure-6 is modified to this extent. In so far as, the challenge by the petitioner to order communicating the decision dated 31.01.2013 is concerned, I am of the opinion that the petitioner has not been able to establish that his case is identical to Dr. S.S. Lal and therefore, I find no ground to interfere with the decision communicated in letter dated 31.01.2013. In view of the aforesaid, this writ petition is partly allowed holding that the petitioner is entitled for grant of full back wages from 12.11.2010 to 15.11.2011 and he would be entitled for other consequential benefits such as promotion etc. notionally.