JUDGMENT 1. The petitioners herein initially filed the present Writ Petition seeking the following relief: “To issue a Writ of Mandamus or other appropriate order or direction in the nature of a writ declaring the draft notification issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act vide No.G.1/4239/2005 dated 5.7.2006 published in A.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 23.8.2005 insofar as the land of the petitioners is concerned in Sy.No.460, 461 and 462 in Uppal Bhagath village, Uppal mandal, Ranga Reddy district as also all the proceedings as arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14, 21 and 300(A) of the Constitution of India and contrary to the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, illegal, void and violative of principles of natural justice.” 2. In view of the amendment permitted vide separate order in W.P.M.P.No.42047 of 2013, the relief in the main Writ Petition is as follows: “To issue a Writ of Mandamus or other appropriate order or direction in the nature of a writ declaring the draft notification issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act vide No.G.1/4239/2005 dated 5.7.2006 published in A.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 23.8.2005 insofar as the land of the petitioners is concerned in Sy.No.460, 461 and 462 in Uppal Bhagath village, Uppal mandal, Ranga Reddy district as also all the proceedings including award bearing No.14/2008 in File No.LA/363/155/05 dated 19.7.2008 as arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14, 21 and 300(A) of the Constitution of India and contrary to the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, illegal, void and violative of principles of natural justice.” 3. Briefly stated, case of the petitioners as per the pleadings available on record, is as infra: 4. Petitioners 1 and 2 are the husband and wife respectively and 3rd petitioner is a private limited company incorporated under the provisions of Companies Act, 1956. After purchasing an extent of Ac.0-30 guntas of land in Sy.No.460, Uppal Bhagath, Uppal mandal, Ranga Reddy district, 1st petitioner gifted the same in favour of 2nd petitioner by way of gift deed dated 15.3.2002. The 3rd petitioner owns an extent of Ac.0-17 guntas in Sy.No.460, Ac.2-12 guntas in Sy.No.461 and Ac.1-08 guntas in Sy.No.462 of the said village. The said lands are adjacent to Uppal main road, which joins National Highway No.9 from Hyderabad to Vijayawada. River Moosi is at a distance of 1650 ft. The 3rd petitioner owns an extent of Ac.0-17 guntas in Sy.No.460, Ac.2-12 guntas in Sy.No.461 and Ac.1-08 guntas in Sy.No.462 of the said village. The said lands are adjacent to Uppal main road, which joins National Highway No.9 from Hyderabad to Vijayawada. River Moosi is at a distance of 1650 ft. on southern side and the land admeasuring Ac.0-17 guntas in Sy.No.460 of 3rd petitioner is on the other side of the Uppal main road. The District Collector, Ranga Reddy District-2nd respondent herein issued a notification bearing No.G1/4289/2005 dated 23.8.2005 under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ‘the Act’) proposing to acquire a total extent of Ac.91-18 guntas of land in various survey numbers of Uppal Bhagat village, Uppal mandal, Ranga Reddy District including the above mentioned lands of the petitioners herein for Moosi River Conservation and River Front Development. Assailing the said notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, petitioners earlier filed Writ Petition No.20863 of 2005, which was dismissed by a learned single Judge of this Court by order dated 11.11.2005. The said order was assailed in W.A.No.2588 of 2005 and the Division Bench of this Court while permitting the petitioners to withdraw the said W.A.No.2588 of 2005 and also W.P.No.20863 of 2005 by order dated 2.1.2006 granted liberty to the petitioners to raise all legally permissible objections including those taken in the Writ Petition before the competent authority. The Division Bench also directed to consider the said objections independently without being influenced by the observations of the learned Judge in W.P.No.20863 of 2005. 5. Petitioners submitted objections under Section 5A of the Act and requested for the following information saying that for filing objections effectively, the said information is necessary. “(i) Letter of the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, bearing No.1355/AC (A)/Peshi/MCH/2005 dated 1.4.2005 which letter was referred to in GOMs.No.330, Municipal Administration and Urban Development (F2) dated 23.4.2005. (ii) The report of the Departmental Committee constituted through GOMs No.330 Municipal Administration and Urban Development (F2) Dated 23.4.2005 on river Moosi. (iii) The report of School of Planning and Architecture, JNTU, Hyderabad on river Moosi. (iv) The proceedings of the review meeting dated 10.6.2005 in the chambers of the Hon'ble Chief Minister on river Moosi. (v) Proceedings of the review meeting dated 8.7.2005 in the chambers of the Hon'ble Chief Minister on river Moosi. (iii) The report of School of Planning and Architecture, JNTU, Hyderabad on river Moosi. (iv) The proceedings of the review meeting dated 10.6.2005 in the chambers of the Hon'ble Chief Minister on river Moosi. (v) Proceedings of the review meeting dated 8.7.2005 in the chambers of the Hon'ble Chief Minister on river Moosi. (vi) The total project cost of Moosi River Conservation and River Front Development. (vii) The particulars of works for purported achieving Moosi River Conservation and River Front Development including details of the area where such works are proposed to be undertaken. (viii) The conceptual plan given by Mr.Hafeez, contractor. (ix) Details of the area constituting Metropolitan Precinct. (x) Proposed Development with sufficient details in Metropolitan Precinct. (xi) What is the source of funding and what is the component of private funding. (xii) Details of the arrangement with the private agencies to undertake Development of Metropolitan Precinct. (xiii) Beneficiaries of the commercial Development particularly in Uppal Bhagath and in our S.Nos.460, 461 and 462. (xiv) Two copies of all the minutes of the meeting of Hyderabad Urban Development Authority held in connection with the Moosi River Conservation and River Front Development. (xv) True copies of the plan or blue print or a scheme relating to Moosi River Conservation and River Front Development. (xvi) True copy of the minutes of the 189th meeting of Hyderabad Urban Development Authority held on 31.8.2005. (xvii) Videos, CD’s and/or discs or other storage devices connected with Moosi River Conservation and River Front Development”. 6. Petitioners also made applications to the Public Information Officer, HUDA and Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department under the Right to Information Act seeking the above information. Responding to the same, the Additional Secretary to the Government issued proceedings of the review meeting dated 10.6.2005 and 8.7.2005 and advised the petitioners to approach the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and Vice Chairman, HUDA for other documents. The Secretary, HUDA vide letter dated 3.2.2006 furnished the minutes of 18th meeting of HUDA dated 31.8.2005 and copy of compliance of 189th meeting of HUDA dated 2.12.2005 and a copy of the minutes held in the chambers of Hon'ble Chief Minister on 10.6.2005 and advised the petitioners to approach the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad for other items. The Secretary, HUDA vide letter dated 3.2.2006 furnished the minutes of 18th meeting of HUDA dated 31.8.2005 and copy of compliance of 189th meeting of HUDA dated 2.12.2005 and a copy of the minutes held in the chambers of Hon'ble Chief Minister on 10.6.2005 and advised the petitioners to approach the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad for other items. As per the petitioner, the said information emanated under the Right to Information Act was placed before the Land Acquisition Officer, HUDA while considering the objections filed under Section 5A of the Act and he was requested either to defer the enquiry or to furnish the information. He did not accede to either of the requests. It was specifically urged before Land Acquisition Officer that holding of enquiry without supplying the required information would be an empty formality and that the petitioners would be prejudiced and the enquiry would be in violation of principles of natural justice. While raising a number of other contentions also, the present Writ Petition has been filed, seeking to set aside the proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act. 7. On 28.9.2006, this Court granted stay of dispossession. A counter affidavit, deposed by the 3rd respondent is filed, contending interalia that the impugned notification is one of the components of entire project and purpose of acquisition is mentioned that the lands under acquisition are intended for Moosi River Conservation and River Front Development which itself defines ‘public purpose’ involved in acquiring the lands in question and that the petitioners selectively made allegations ignoring the predominant object of sewing the river Moosi and that the proposed project includes various components with an aim to protect the environment in the surrounding areas of the Moosi river. It is further contended that it is incorrect to state that the State or its authorities are utilizing the lands for commercial Development without serving any public purpose. It is also stated in the counter that the claimants who have not filed objections to 4(1) notification cannot be permitted to contend before the Court that Section 5-A enquiry is vitiated nor they can be permitted to seek quashing of Section 6 declaration on the said ground. It is further stated that non-furnishing of some of the documents, which would not materially affect 5A enquiry is not fatal. It is further stated that non-furnishing of some of the documents, which would not materially affect 5A enquiry is not fatal. It is further stated that all the objections raised by the petitioners were considered by the Land Acquisition Officer and a report was submitted to the Collector, Ranga Reddy District for taking decision. It is also stated that the petitioners have no say as to what extent of land is required and the locality of the land to be acquired and it is for the authority to decide. Counter further denies the allegations that the Government is trying to do real estate business through HUDA and attempting to deprive the petitioners and other innocent persons of their valuable property while misusing the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. It is further stated that at the stage of issuing preliminary notification, complete details of the project need not be mentioned. 8. Additional counter, deposed by the 2nd respondent herein, is filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2, contending interalia that the petitioners herein earlier filed Writ Petition No.20863 of 2005 questioning the 4(1) notification and the same was dismissed and as against the order in the said Writ Petition, W.A.No.2588 of 2005 was filed and the same was withdrawn by the petitioners with a liberty to raise objections in the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. As such, the petitioners are not entitled to question the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act once again. Additional counter further states that the constitution of departmental committee vide GOMs.No.330 dated 22.4.2005 chaired by the Chief Secretary to Government is also with reference to technical and hyper-technical study undertaken by the School of Planning and Architect, JNTU, Hyderabad. The said additional counter further states that the award was passed on 19.7.2008 within time. It is further eventually stated that if the land is required for public purpose, the State, in its eminent domain, is empowered to acquire the land by paying compensation under the Act. 9. Heard Sri B.Nalin Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Advocate General for respondents and perused the entire material available on record. 10. It is further eventually stated that if the land is required for public purpose, the State, in its eminent domain, is empowered to acquire the land by paying compensation under the Act. 9. Heard Sri B.Nalin Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Advocate General for respondents and perused the entire material available on record. 10. It is contended by the learned counsel for petitioners that the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District-2nd respondent herein has neither jurisdiction nor power to issue declaration under Section 6 of the Act and as such the impugned declaration is ultravires the powers of the District Collector. It is further contended that the expression ‘Moosi River Conservation and River Front Development’ as indicated in the impugned notification and declaration is vague, as such the proceedings are not valid. It is further contended that even though the purpose of acquisition initially stated to be for Moosi River Conservation and River Front Development, but now the land is sought to be handed over to Metro Rail Project, as such the continuation of acquisition proceedings is illegal. It is further strenuously urged by the learned counsel for petitioners that the right of the petitioners to raise objections during enquiry under Section 5A of the Act is defeated by failure to furnish the information sought for by the petitioners and non-consideration of the objections of the petitioners in proper perspective and failure to apply mind and mechanical acceptance of Section 5A report are not proper. It is argued by the learned counsel that the action of the respondent authorities in confining the land acquisition only to the land on the northern side of the River Moosi and not touching the land on the southern side of the River is arbitrary and discriminatory. It is further contended by the learned counsel that acquiring large extents of land for developing commercial projects at Nagole Growth Corridor is not for public purpose. The land admeasuring Ac.0-17 guntas of 3rd petitioner which is situated on the other side of the Uppal main road is not suitable for the present acquisition and that Moosi River Conservation and River Front Development are inter-connected and the River Front Development has to be in the context of River Conservation and if that being so, the lands of the petitioners which are far away i.e. approximately 1650 ft from River Moosi is not suitable for acquisition. In support of his submissions and contentions, the learned counsel for petitioners places reliance on the judgments reported in SURINDER SINGH BRAR v. UNION OF INDIA (2013) 1 SCC 403 , MADHYA PRADESH HOUSING BOARD v. MOHD. SHAFI (1992) 2 SCC 168 , DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. GURDIP SINGH UBAN (2000) 7 SCC 296 , KAMAL TRADING PRIVATE LIMITED V. STATE OF WEST BENGAL (2012) 2 SCC 25, and HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPN. LTD. V. DARIUS SHAPUR CHENAI (2005) 7 SCC 627 . 11. Reiterating the pleadings of the respondents herein, it is contended by the learned Advocate General that all the issues raised by the petitioners herein were considered by this Court in the judgment reported in 2006(1) ALD 457 and the judgment in W.P.No.17005 of 2006 and batch dated 28.2.2011. It is further contended by the learned Advocate General that strictly adhering to the mandatory provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, the District Collector passed award on 19.7.2008. It is further contended by the learned Advocate General that the contention that the District Collector is not competent to issue Section 6 declaration is unsustainable and that in view of delegation of powers under GOMs.No.4288 dated 11.9.1980, which fell for consideration in the judgment reported in 1989 (2) APLJ 147 and in view of the law laid down by this Court in the judgment reported in 2006(2) ALD 342 , which was carried in appeal in W.A.No.112 of 2006 dated 27.2.2006, the said contention cannot be sustained. It is further contended that similar contentions were raised in Writ Petition No.20028 of 2006 and the same were negatived by this Court in the judgment dated 25.4.2013 which was upheld in W.A.No.793 of 2013. It is further contended by the learned Advocate General that there is no discrimination in the acquisition of the land as the land is acquired on both sides of the river. It is further contended by the learned Advocate General that there is no discrimination in the acquisition of the land as the land is acquired on both sides of the river. In support of his contentions and submissions, the learned Advocate General places reliance on the judgments reported in M.PADMANABHA IYENGAR v. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AIR 1990 AP 357 , RAMNIKLAL N. BHUTTA V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (1997) 1 SCC 134 , MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, AHMEDNAGAR V. SHAH HYDER BEIG (2000) 2 SCC 48 , NAND KISHORE GUPTA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (2010) 10 SCC 282 , MAY GEORGE v. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR AND OTHERS (2010) 13 SCC 98 and judgment dated 27.2.2006 in W.A.No.112 of 2006 and judgment in W.A.No.794 of 2013. 12. In the light of the respective pleadings and contentions of parties to the present litigation, the following points emerge for consideration of this Court. (1) Whether the District Collector is empowered to issue Declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act? (2) Whether the Respondent authorities conducted enquiry in accordance with the provisions of Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act and as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court and whether the respondent authorities considered the objections in accordance with law? (3) Whether the impugned proceedings starting from notification under Section 4(1) till the award are sustainable? (4) Whether this Court can interfere with the impugned proceedings in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? 13. (3) Whether the impugned proceedings starting from notification under Section 4(1) till the award are sustainable? (4) Whether this Court can interfere with the impugned proceedings in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? 13. For the purpose of dealing with contention of the petitioners that the District Collector has neither jurisdiction nor power to issue declaration under Section 6 of the Act and as such Section 6 declaration issued in the instant case is ultravires the powers of the Act, it would be apt and appropriate to refer to Section 6 of the Act as amended by Land Acquisition (Andhra Pradesh Amendment) Act 22 of 1976 and the same reads as follows: Where the appropriate Government or District Collector is satisfied that any particular land is needed for the purpose of construction, extension or improvement of any dwelling house for the poor, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or any other officer duly authorised to certify their orders or District Collector as the case may be and different declarations may be made, from time to time in respect of different parcels of land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1): Provided that no such declarations shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by the local authority”. 14. Section 3-A of the Act is inserted by Act 22/76, which stipulates that the State Government may, by notification in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, direct that any power conferred or any duty imposed on them by this Act, shall in such circumstances and under such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the notification be exercised or discharged by the District Collector. The Government of Andhra Pradesh issued G.O.Ms.No.4288 Revenue (K) Department dated 11.9.1980, delegating powers under Sections 4, 5-A, 6 and sub-section 4 of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act to the District Collectors of Visakhapatnam, Vizianagaram, Krishna, Guntur, Hyderabad, Medak and Ranga Reddy Districts in exercise of the powers conferred under Sections 3-A of the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of acquisition of lands for construction and improvement of houses and other developmental purposes undertaken by the Visakhapatnam, Vijayawada, Guntur, Tenali, Mangalagiri Urban Development Authorities and Hyderabad Urban Development Authority. 15. The question of jurisdiction and powers of the District Collectors pursuant to the delegation given by the State Government fell for consideration before this Court and this Court while dealing with such delegation effected under G.O.Ms.No.4288 Revenue (K) Department dated 11.9.1980 in MUNAGALA SAMBI REDDY v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, GUNTUR 1989(2) APLJ 147 = 1988(1) ALT 32 (NRC) upheld such delegation holding that the District Collector had power under the delegated authority to issue notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. 16. In KILARAPU SATYAVATI v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR 2006(2) ALD 342 , a learned single Judge of this Court at paragraphs 7, 11 and 12 held as under: “7. The learned Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue (Land Acquisition), Sri Purushotham Reddy, after referring to relevant provisions of the Act, submits that having regard to Section 4 (1) of the Act as amended by Andhra Pradesh Legislature, it is even competent to District Collector to issue a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act for acquiring the land for establishment of a compost yard by a Municipality. The Government already delegated the power to the District Collectors under Section 3A of the Act. He would also submit that there was urgent need for establishment of new compost yard and therefore, the enquiry under Section 5Aof the Act was dispensed with. The first question that requires consideration is whether the District Collector -the first respondent herein; is competent to acquire the land for establishment of a compost yard for Ramachandrapuram Municipality. It is necessary to notice the definitions of the terms "Collector" and "appropriate Government", as defined in Clauses (c) and (ee) of Section 3 of the Act respectively. Section 3(c): the expression "Collector" means the Collector of a district, and includes a Deputy Commissioner and any officer specially appointed by the Ins. It is necessary to notice the definitions of the terms "Collector" and "appropriate Government", as defined in Clauses (c) and (ee) of Section 3 of the Act respectively. Section 3(c): the expression "Collector" means the Collector of a district, and includes a Deputy Commissioner and any officer specially appointed by the Ins. By Act 68 of 1984 w.e.f. 24-9-1984 [appropriate Government] to perform the functions of a Collector under this Act. Section 3(ee): the expression "appropriate Government" means in relation to acquisition of land for the purposes of the Union, the Central Government, and, in relation to acquisition of land for any other purposes, the State Government. 11. A plain reading of Section 4(1) as amended in A.P. would show that if it appears that the land is required for any public purpose, appropriate Government or the District Collector may publish a notification to that effect. However under Section 6 of the Act - as amended in A.P. the power of the District Collector to issue a declaration was restricted to the purpose of construction, extension or improvement of any dwelling house for the poor. If any public purpose exists for which the land is required the Government and the District Collector can issue notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, but when it comes to issuing a declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act, the Government is competent to issue a declaration for any public purpose whereas the District Collector can issue a declaration only when the land is required for providing dwelling houses to the poor. By the same amendment Act, Section 3A was inserted conferring power of delegation on the State Government. Under the said provision, the Government can direct that any power conferred or any duty imposed on them by the Act may be exercised or discharged by the District Collector. Accordingly, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued G.O. Ms. No.1311 dated 17.7.1986 directing that all the District Collectors in the State shall exercise all powers under Sections 4, 5A, 6 and 17(4) of the Act for acquisition of the lands on behalf of the Municipalities. The relevant file in relation to the said Government Order is placed before this. 12. Accordingly, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued G.O. Ms. No.1311 dated 17.7.1986 directing that all the District Collectors in the State shall exercise all powers under Sections 4, 5A, 6 and 17(4) of the Act for acquisition of the lands on behalf of the Municipalities. The relevant file in relation to the said Government Order is placed before this. 12. The position that emerges from the above discussion is that by reason of the delegation of the powers to the District Collectors under Section 3A of the Act and also by reason of the amendments made to Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act the appropriate Government or the District Collector can issue notifications under the Act for acquiring the land for Municipality. The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the power under Section 3A of the Act can be delegated only in such circumstances on such conditions to be specified in the notification and for want of specification the delegation of the powers is illegal, cannot be accepted. As noticed hereinabove, Section 4(1) of the Act itself was amended and in a given case even without there being any delegation under Section 3A of the Act, a notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act by the District Collector would be valid.” 17. The above said judgment was carried in Writ Appeal No.112 of 2006 and a Division Bench of this Court, after a thoughtful and meticulous consideration of the provisions of Sections 3-A, 4 (1) and 6(1) of the Act as amended by Andhra Pradesh Amendment Act 22 of 1976 held as follows: “A reading of the plain language of Section 4(1) and (2) of the Act, as amended by Andhra Pradesh Act No.XXII of 1976 makes it clear that the District Collector can initiate process for acquisition of land needed for or is likely to be needed for any public purpose. Under sub-section (2), the District Collector can authorize any person to take actions or do the things enumerated in that sub-section. The power exercisable by the District Collector under Section 4(1) and (2) is not hedged with any condition. He can exercise this power for any public purpose. It has neither been pleaded by the appellants nor their advocate argued that setting up of new compost yard for Ramachandrapuram Municipality is not a ‘public purpose’. The power exercisable by the District Collector under Section 4(1) and (2) is not hedged with any condition. He can exercise this power for any public purpose. It has neither been pleaded by the appellants nor their advocate argued that setting up of new compost yard for Ramachandrapuram Municipality is not a ‘public purpose’. Therefore, notification dated 18.11.2005 issued by the District Collector for acquisition of land cannot be faulted or declared as nullity on the ground that he did not have the jurisdiction to initiate the process for acquisition of land on behalf of the municipality. No doubt, Section 6(1) of the Act, as amended by Andhra Pradesh Act No.XXII of 1976, lays down that where the land is required for the purpose of construction, extension or improvement of any dwelling house for the poor, a declaration is required to be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to the appropriate Government or any other officer duly authorized to certify their orders or the District Collector, but, if this section is read in conjunction with main Section 6 and Section 3-A, it becomes clear that the power exercisable by the Government under Section 6 of the Act can be delegated to District Collector. This is precisely what was done by G.O.Ms.No.1131 dated 17.7.1986, a reading of which makes it clear that the State Government had delegated powers under Sections 4, 5-A, 6 and 17(4) of the Act for acquisition of lands on behalf of the municipalities. Therefore, we agree with the learned Single Judge that notification dated 23.11.2006 is not ultra vires the power of the District Collector.” 18. In view of the above referred judgment of this Court and the law laid down therein and delegation given by Government of Andhra Pradesh vide G.O.Ms.No.4288 Revenue (K) Department dated 11.9.1980 in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 3-A of the Act, the contention of the petitioner that the District Collector has neither jurisdiction nor power to issue Section 6 declaration, as such the same is ultra vires the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be sustained and accordingly the said contention is rejected. 19. 19. The next question which falls for consideration of this Court, is as to whether the respondent authorities scrupulously and strictly adhered to the mandatory provisions of Section 5A of the Act and whether the respondent authorities considered the objections submitted by the petitioners from proper perspective. 20. The petitioners herein filed W.P.No.20863 of 2005 before this Court and the same ended in dismissal on 11.11.2005. As against the said order of dismissal, petitioners herein filed W.A.No.2588 of 2005 and by virtue of order dated 2.1.2006, petitioners herein were granted liberty to withdraw the Writ Appeal as well as Writ Petition and the petitioners herein were also given liberty to raise all legally permissible objections including those taken in the Writ Petition before the competent authority. In the said order in W.A.No.2588 of 2005 the Division Bench also directed the respondents to consider the objections independently without being influenced by the observations of the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.20863 of 2005. It is the case of the petitioners herein that while submitting objections in pursuance of the said orders, they requested the respondent authorities to furnish information as indicated in paragraph 9 of the writ affidavit. It is also the case of the petitioners that they submitted application to the Public Information Officer, HUDA and Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department under Right to Information Act, requesting to furnish the said information and in response to the same, the Additional Secretary to Government furnished information with regard to review meetings dated 10.6.2005 and 8.7.2005 and advised the petitioners to approach the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and Vice Chairman, HUDA for other documents and the Secretary, HUDA vide letter dated 3.2.2006 furnished the minutes of 18th meeting of HUDA dated 31.8.2005 and copy of compliance of 189th meeting of HUDA dated 2.12.2005 and a copy of the minutes held in the chambers of Hon'ble Chief Minister on 10.6.2005 and advised the petitioners to approach the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad for other items. As per the petitioner, the said information emanated under the Right to Information Act was placed before the Land Acquisition Officer, HUDA at the time of consideration of objections and a request was made either to defer the enquiry or to furnish the information and the said request was not acceded to. 21. As per the petitioner, the said information emanated under the Right to Information Act was placed before the Land Acquisition Officer, HUDA at the time of consideration of objections and a request was made either to defer the enquiry or to furnish the information and the said request was not acceded to. 21. In the counter filed by 3rd respondent herein, it is contended that the claimants who did not file objections to 4(1) notification, cannot be permitted to contend before the Court that Section 5-A enquiry is vitiated nor they can be permitted to seek quashing of Section 6 declaration on the said ground. It is also the case of the respondent authorities that non-furnishing of some of the documents, which would not materially affect 5A enquiry is not fatal. It is also the case of the respondent authorities that all the objections raised by the petitioners were considered by the Land Acquisition Officer and a report was submitted to the Collector, Ranga Reddy District for taking decision and that the petitioners have no say as to what extent of land is required and the locality of the land to be acquired and it is for the authority to decide. 22. Now it is required to be seen as to whether the said contentions are sustainable and tenable in the light of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court. 23. In DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. GURDIP SINGH UBAN (3 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph 53 held as under: “Now objections under Section 5-A, if filed, can relate to the contention that (i) the purpose for which land is being acquired is not a public purpose, (ii) that even if the purpose is a public purpose, the land of the objector is not necessary, in the sense that the public purpose could be served by other land already proposed or some other land to which the objector may refer, or (iii) that in any event, even if this land is necessary for the public purpose, the special fact-situation in which the objector is placed, it is a fit case for omitting his land from the acquisition. Objection (ii) is personal to the land and Objection (iii) is personal to the objector.” 24. Objection (ii) is personal to the land and Objection (iii) is personal to the objector.” 24. While relying upon the said judgment, it is contended by the learned counsel for petitioners that the petitioners herein are deprived of right to raise objections elaborately under the provisions of Section 5A of the Act in view of failure on the part of the respondent authorities in furnishing the documents as sought by the petitioners. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for petitioners that had the information as sought for by the petitioners is furnished, the petitioners would have been in a position to demonstrate before the authorities with regard to public purpose and lack of necessity of acquisition of petitioners’ property and would have made out their case for omitting the land for acquisition. 25. In SURINDER SINGH BRAR v. UNION OF INDIA (1 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that Section 5-A, which embodies the most important dimension of the rules of natural justice, lays down that any person interested in any land notified under Section 4(1) may, within 30 days of publication of the notification, submit objection in writing against the proposed acquisition of land or of any land in the locality to the Collector and the Collector is required to give the objector an opportunity of being heard either in person or by any person authorised by him or by pleader. After hearing the objector(s) and making such further inquiry, as he may think necessary, the Collector has to make a report in respect of land notified under Section 4(1) with his recommendations on the objections and forward the same to the Government along with the record of the proceedings held by him and the Collector can make different reports in respect of different parcels of land proposed to be acquired. 26. In KAMAL TRADING PRIVATE LIMITED v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL (4 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 22 and 29 held as under: “13. Section 5-A(1) of the LA Act gives a right to any person interested in any land which has been notified under Section 4(1) as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose to raise objections to the acquisition of the said land. Section 5-A(1) of the LA Act gives a right to any person interested in any land which has been notified under Section 4(1) as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose to raise objections to the acquisition of the said land. Sub-section (2) of Section 5-A requires the Collector to give the objector an opportunity of being heard in person or by any person authorised by him in this behalf. After hearing the objections, the Collector can, if he thinks it necessary, make further inquiry. Thereafter, he has to make a report to the appropriate Government containing his recommendations on the objections together with the record of the proceedings held by him for the decision of the appropriate Government and the decision of the appropriate Government on the objections shall be final. 14. It must be borne in mind that the proceedings under the LA Act are based on the principle of eminent domain and Section 5-A is the only protection available to a person whose lands are sought to be acquired. It is a minimal safeguard afforded to him by law to protect himself from arbitrary acquisition by pointing out to the authority concerned, inter alia, that the important ingredient, namely, “public purpose” is absent in the proposed acquisition or the acquisition is mala fide. The LA Act being an expropriatory legislation, its provisions will have to be strictly construed. 15. Hearing contemplated under Section 5-A(2) is necessary to enable the Collector to deal effectively with the objections raised against the proposed acquisition and make a report. The report of the Collector referred to in this provision is not an empty formality because it is required to be placed before the appropriate Government together with the Collector’s recommendations and the record of the case. It is only upon receipt of the said report that the Government can take a final decision on the objections. It is pertinent to note that declaration under Section 6 has to be made only after the appropriate Government is satisfied on the consideration of the report, if any, made by the Collector under Section 5-A(2). As said by this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. It is pertinent to note that declaration under Section 6 has to be made only after the appropriate Government is satisfied on the consideration of the report, if any, made by the Collector under Section 5-A(2). As said by this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. [ (2005) 7 SCC 627 ] the appropriate Government while issuing declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act is required to apply its mind not only to the objections filed by the owner of the land in question, but also to the report which is submitted by the Collector upon making such further inquiry thereon as he thinks necessary and also the recommendations made by him in that behalf. 22. In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. [ (2005) 7 SCC 627 ] this Court again referred to Om Prakash [ (1998) 6 SCC 1 ] and observed that it is trite that hearing given to a person must be an effective one and not a mere formality. This Court observed that: (Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Case [ (2005) 7 SCC 627 ] p. 635, para 9) “9. Formation of opinion as regards the public purpose as also suitability thereof must be preceded by application of mind as regards consideration of relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones.” This Court further observed that the State in its decision-making process must not commit any misdirection in law. This Court observed that it cannot be disputed that – “Section 5-A of the LA Act confers a valuable important right and having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution it has been held to be akin to a fundamental right” (Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Case [ (2005) 7 SCC 627 ] p. 635, para 9). Pertinently, this Court made it clear that in a case where there has been total non-compliance or substantial non-compliance with the provisions of Section 5-A of the LA Act, the Court cannot fold its hands and refuse to grant relief to the appellant. Again, in Dev Sharan [ (2011) 4 SCC 769 ] this Court reiterated the same view. 29. Having examined this case, in the light of the law laid down by this Court, we are of the opinion that the High Court wrongly rejected the prayer made by the appellant that the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act be quashed and set aside. 29. Having examined this case, in the light of the law laid down by this Court, we are of the opinion that the High Court wrongly rejected the prayer made by the appellant that the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act be quashed and set aside. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court, therefore, needs to be set aside and is, accordingly, set aside. Since no hearing was given to the appellant resulting in noncompliance with Section 5-A of the LA Act, the declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act dated 24-10-1997 published in the Government Gazette on 29-10-1997 must be set aside and is set aside. In view of the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N. [ (2002) 3 SCC 533 ], the State Government cannot now rely upon Notification dated 29-7-1997 for the purposes of issuing fresh declaration under Section 6(1) of the LA Act. The said Notification dated 29-7-1997 issued under Section 4 is also, therefore, set aside. It would be, however, open to the State Government to initiate fresh land acquisition proceedings in accordance with law if it so desires.” 27. As per the above said judgment, it is obligatory on the part of the authority while issuing Section 6 declaration to apply its mind not only to the objections filed by the land owners, but also the report, if any, upon making such further enquiry thereon. In the above said judgment, for non-compliance of requirement of provisions of Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, the Apex Court set aside the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act while keeping it open to the State Government to initiate fresh land acquisition proceedings in accordance with law if so desires. 28. In M.CHANDRA SEKHAR RAO v. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH 2010(5) ALD 611 , this Court at paragraph 6 held as under: “In this context, it needs to be noticed that Section 5-A(2) of the Act imposes an obligation on the appropriate Government to take a final decision, whether or not to proceed with the acquisition, duly taking into account the report, that may be submitted to him. The 2nd respondent is the substitute for the appropriate Government, in this context. The 2nd respondent is the substitute for the appropriate Government, in this context. He was required to take into account the remarks, undertake discussion and form his own opinion. Mere putting a seal of approval for the remarks offered by the Land Acquisition Officer cannot be said to be a proper exercise of statutory power. The only protection given to a citizen against compulsory acquisition cannot be reduced to an empty formality. Therefore, there is a serious defect as to the exercise of power by the 2nd respondent.” 29. In this context, it needs to be noted that Section 5-A(2) of the Act imposes an obligation on the 2nd respondent to take a final decision whether or not to proceed with acquisition, duly taking into account the report that may be submitted to him. The 2nd respondent is the substitute for the appropriate Government, in this case. He is required to take into account the remarks, undertake discussion and form his own opinion. Mere putting a seal of approval for the remarks offered by the Land Acquisition Officer cannot be said to be a proper exercise of statutory power. The only protection given to a citizen against compulsory acquisition cannot be reduced to an empty formality. Therefore, there is a serious defect as to the exercise of power by the 2nd respondent in the present case. 30. In RADHY SHYAM v. STATE OF U.P. (2011) 5 SCC 553 , the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph 7 held as under: “The High Court distinguished the judgment of this Court in Om Prakash v. State of U.P. [ (1998) 6 SCC 1 ], albeit without assigning any cogent reason, relied upon the judgments of the Division Benches in Kshama Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. v. State of U.P. [(2007) 1 All WC 327], Jasraj Singh v. State of U.P. [ (2008) 8 ADJ 329 ] and Jagriti Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. v. State of U.P. [ (2008) 9 ADJ 43 ] and held that the decision of the Government to invoke Section 17(1) cannot be subjected to judicial review. The High Court also rejected the appellants’ plea that in terms of the policy framed by the State Government, the land covered by abadi cannot be acquired by observing that no material has been placed on record to show that the policy framed in 1991 was still continuing. The High Court also rejected the appellants’ plea that in terms of the policy framed by the State Government, the land covered by abadi cannot be acquired by observing that no material has been placed on record to show that the policy framed in 1991 was still continuing. To buttress this conclusion, the High Court relied upon the judgment of this Court in Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana [ (2005) 9 SCC 164 ]. 31. Section 5A enquiry report obtained by the petitioners herein under Right to Information Act is available on record. A reading of the said report clearly and manifestly demonstrates that the District Collector did not undertake any objective consideration of the objections of the petitioners herein and the remarks offered by the Land Acquisition Officer. Even though the said report has a specific column as to the orders of the District Collector, the entire column is blank. This vividly and unequivocally demonstrates that there is absolutely no objective consideration of the objections submitted by the petitioners herein by the District Collector. 32. Right to property is a constitutional right as enshrined under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India which mandates that no citizen shall be deprived of his/her property except in accordance with law. As per the said provision of the Constitution, due procedure needs to be adhered to while depriving a citizen of his property. Deprivation of property by way of compulsory acquisition is a matter of serious consequence. The right created under Section 5A of the Act to an objector of the acquisition is not an empty formality and on the other hand, it is a substantial and valuable right having regard to Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and is akin to fundamental right as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. This right is the only protection created to a citizen to put-forward his difficulties and grievances in the enquiry. The plan produced by the respondents herein before this Court clearly shows that the property only on one side of the river Moosi is proposed for acquisition and had the petitioner was afforded with an opportunity, by furnishing the information sought by them, they would have certainly brought to the notice of the authorities all their objections in an effective manner. 33. 33. In the judgment cited on behalf of the respondents by the learned Advocate General in M.PADMANABHA IYENGAR v. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH (6 supra), this Court at paragraph 21 held as under: “It is then argued that in W.A. No. 1363/89 (arising from W.P. No. 8759/88), the persons interested not only filed objections to the acquisition on 29-7-1987 (in the enquiry under Sec. 5A, but also filed a petition on 26-8-1987 to summon certain documents, including the Master Plan, and stating specifically that oral evidence will be led by the objectors only after those documents are produced. It is also brought to our notice that on receiving such application the Land Acquisition Officer addressed the T.T.D. authorities for supplying him with a copy of the Master Plan, but that the authorities told him that the Master Plan is already available with him. It is also pointed out that the Land Acquisition Officer neither sent any communication to the objectors in the said matter, nor did he supply a copy of the Master Plan. It is submitted that this amounts to denial of opportunity to the objectors to establish their case. On account of non-supply of documents asked for by, them, including the Master Plan, the objectors could not adduce oral evidence which they wanted to adduce, it is contended. On a consideration of the relevant material, we are of the opinion that though there has been a certain defect in the procedure in conducting the enquiry under Section5-A, it does not warrant interference by this Court. The reasons are the following in the notification concerned in this Writ Appeal, three purposes were mentioned, viz., (i) construction of Kalyan Mantapam, (ii) construction of Choultry, and (iii) implementation of Master Plan. Implementation of Master Plan was not the only purpose; it was one of the three purposes. So far as the first two purposes are concerned, they are clear and specific, and no grievance can be made on that account. The entire objection pertains to the third purpose mentioned in the notification. We agree that, when the objector in this Writ Appeal specifically asked for supplying him with a copy of the Master Plan, either he should have been supplied with such copy, or he ought to have been told why it cannot be supplied to him. The entire objection pertains to the third purpose mentioned in the notification. We agree that, when the objector in this Writ Appeal specifically asked for supplying him with a copy of the Master Plan, either he should have been supplied with such copy, or he ought to have been told why it cannot be supplied to him. To this extent the enquiry under S. 5A must be said to suffer from an irregularity. But the question then arises whether that by itself warrants interference in the matter? The notification concerned in this Writ Appeal is one of the 52 notifications issued. All the objectors knew the real purpose of acquisition, viz., acquisition of private properties for a proper/planned development of Tirumala. This is not an individual case where the non-supply of a particular document has disabled the objector from putting forward his objections effectively. Since the test in all such cases is one of prejudice (see K. L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India [ AIR 1984 SC 273 : 1983 LAB IC 1680], no interference is called for in this case on this count. It must also be remembered that, the remedy under Art. 226 is a discretionary one. The Court is not bound to interfere merely on the establishment of an irregularity or illegality. The Court must further be satisfied that such interference is called for to meet, or to further, the ends of justice. If by interfering in the matter the interests of justice are going to suffer, this Court will withhold its arm; (see Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, [ AIR 1955 SC 425 ] and Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh [ AIR 1966 SC 828 ]. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances, we do not think that this Court should interfere and quash the enquiry under S. 5A in W.A. No. 1363/89 on the above ground.” 34. In the said judgment, taking into consideration of the facts and circumstances of the said case, this Court held that non-furnishing of master plan to the objector would not vitiate the proceedings. But the said judgment would not render any help to the respondent authorities in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the subsequent judgments referred above. 35. But the said judgment would not render any help to the respondent authorities in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the subsequent judgments referred above. 35. The learned Advocate General places reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in MAY GEORGE v. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR AND OTHERS (10 supra) and contends that non-service of notice under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act is not fatal nor the service is mandatory. The learned Advocate General also places reliance on the judgment in RAMNIKLAL N. BHUTTA V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (7 supra) with regard to change of land use and also while placing reliance on the judgment in MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, AHMEDNAGAR V. SHAH HYDER BEIG (8 supra) at paragraphs 2, 3, 17 and 18 of the said judgment, contends that there cannot be any interference with the proceedings under Article 226 of Constitution of India. 36. The judgment relied upon by the learned Advocate General in MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, AHMEDNAGAR V. SHAH HYDER BEIG (8 supra) would not render any help in view of later judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to maintainability of the Writ Petition questioning the award. The judgment in NAND KISHORE GUPTA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (9 supra), on which reliance is placed by the learned Advocate General would not render any assistance to the present in view of later judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V.K.M. KATTHA INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. V. STATE OF HARYANA (2013) 9 SCC 338 which dealt with maintainability of Writ Petition against the award. 37. In SURINDER SINGH BRAR v. UNION OF INDIA (1 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court had categorically held that the formation of opinion on the issue of need of land for a public purpose and suitability thereof is sine qua non for issue of a declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act and that any violation of the substantive right of the landowners and/or other interested persons to file objections or denial of opportunity of personal hearing to the objector(s) vitiates the recommendations made by the Collector and the decision taken by the appropriate Government on such recommendations. The Hon'ble Court further held in the said judgement that the recommendations made by the Collector without duly considering the objections filed under Section 5-A(1) and submissions made at the hearing given under Section 5-A(2) or failure of the appropriate Government to take objective decision on such objections in the light of the recommendations made by the Collector will denude the decision of the appropriate Government of statutory finality. The Supreme Court further held in the said judgment that the satisfaction recorded by the appropriate Government that the particular land is needed for a public purpose and the declaration made under Section 6(1) will be devoid of legal sanctity if statutorily engrafted procedural safeguards are not adhered to by the authorities concerned or there is violation of the principles of natural justice. 38. In the instant case, the mode and manner in which the District Collector considered the objections is highly preposterous and not in confirmity with the object and intention of Section 5A of the L.A. Act nor in consonance with the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments referred to in this order. The Land Acquisition Act is an ex-propriety legislation and the provisions of the same require scrupulous and strict adherence, keeping in view compulsory acquisition of private property notwithstanding the wish of the land owners and keeping in view the constitutional mandate as enshrined under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Further, non-furnishing of information sought by the petitioners herein would definitely tantamount to flagrant violation of mandatory provisions of legislation and violation of principles of natural justice. 39. In V.K.M. KATTHA INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. V. STATE OF HARYANA (15 supra) (at page 343) the Hon'ble Supreme Court while turning down the plea of latches, quashed the land acquisition proceedings. 40. In view of the reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraphs and having regard to the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court in the judgments referred to in the above paragraphs, this Court, after giving thoughtful consideration to the various issues involved in the present Writ Petition, is of the opinion that the acceptance of report by the Collector without undertaking any exercise in the direction of objective consideration and simply concurring with the remarks of the Land Acquisition Officer and issuing Section 6 declaration cannot be sustained followed by passing of Award dated 19.7.2008. Accordingly, point No.2 is answered in favour of the petitioner. In view of the findings in the preceding paragraphs, point No.3 is partly answered in favour of the petitioners holding that the proceedings starting from 5A till the award are unsustainable. Point No.4 is also answered in favour of the petitioners holding that the present Writ Petition is maintainable in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to in the preceding paragraphs. 41. For the foregoing reasons, the Writ Petition is partly allowed, setting aside the report of 5-A enquiry communicated to the petitioners by HUDA vide letter No.LA/363/RR/155/05 dated 11.9.2006 and the declaration issued by the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District dated 20.7.2006 and the award dated 19.7.2008 to the extent of the petitioners herein. The matter is remanded back for fresh enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act and the respondent authorities are directed to conduct enquiry afresh under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act by giving notice and opportunity of being heard to the petitioners by supplying the relevant material sought by the petitioners. Till the completion of the proceedings, Status quo as on today shall be maintained. It is also made clear that even though a number of objections have been raised by the petitioners with regard to impugned proceedings, this Court does not propose to deal with the same in view of the remand of the matter for fresh enquiry and it is open for the petitioners to agitate the same before the enquiring authority under Section 5-A of the L.A. Act. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.