JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30.05.1998 passed by learned Additional District Judge No.1, Bikaner, whereby, the petition filed by the respondent husband for grant of divorce under the provisions of Section 13 (1A)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 ('the Act') has been accepted and the decree for divorce has been granted. 3. The facts in brief are that parties entered into wedlock on 01.11.1987 at Bikaner and, out of the said wedlock, two children were born. It was alleged that on 24.08.1995, the wife left the matrimonial home and, as such, an application under Section 9 of the Act was filed for restitution of conjugal rights. 4. The said application under Section 9 of the Act came to be allowed by way of compromise vide judgment and decree dated 12.09.1996 passed by the District Judge, Bikaner. 5. The present petition under Section 13(1A)(ii) of the Act came to be filed by the husband alleging that despite passing of the decree under Section 9 dated 12.09.1996 and passage of one year, the wife has not returned back to the matrimonial home and, as such, the husband was entitled to a decree for divorce. 6. On notice being issued, the wife appeared and resisted the petition filed by the husband seeking divorce and the averments made in the petition were refuted. 7. The learned trial court framed two issues and evidence was led by the parties. 6. On notice being issued, the wife appeared and resisted the petition filed by the husband seeking divorce and the averments made in the petition were refuted. 7. The learned trial court framed two issues and evidence was led by the parties. However, the trial court examined the evidence with the predetermined notion that the Court is not required to look into the aspect that for whose fault the restitution failed and after narrating the abstract of evidence stated thus:- " tSlk fd ge mijksDr esa dh pqds gSa fd gesa ;g ugha ns[kuk gSa fd blesa =qfV fdldh jgh gSA fof/kr% mDr izdkj ds izko/kku ds v/khu fu.kZ; ls ,d lky dh vof/k rd i{kdkjksa esa lgokl iqu% ugha gksus ls rykd dh fMdzh fof/kr% ikfjr fd;k tkuk izko/kkfur gS vkSj mlh ds vuqlj.k esa ge ikrs gSa vizkFkhZ ds fo:) Lohdkj fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS vkSj ;g izkFkhZ us fl) dj fn;k gS fd panzdyk fnukad 12-9-1996 dks ftyk U;k;ky; chdkusj }kjk /kkjk 9 fgUnw fookg vf/kfu;e] ds vUrxZr ikfjr fMdzh ds ikl t;izdk'k ds lkFk ,d o"kZ ls vf/kd dh vof/k ls ugha jg jgh gSA vr% ;g rudh izkFkhZ ds i{k esa ,oa vizkFkhZ ds fo:) r; dh tkrh gSA " Consequently, the decree as stated hereinbefore for divorce was passed. 8. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the approach of the learned trial court is contrary to the provisions of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act and, as such, the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court deserves to be quashed and set aside. Reliance was placed on judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar v. Sunanda, AIR 2001 SC 1285 . 9. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the law has been cry stallized in the year 2001 and when the order impugned was passed in the year 1998 the legal position was fluid as noticed by the learned trial court. 10. I have considered the rival submissions made at the Bar. 11. It is not in dispute that the learned trial court has not complied with the mandatory requirement of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act while passing the decree. 10. I have considered the rival submissions made at the Bar. 11. It is not in dispute that the learned trial court has not complied with the mandatory requirement of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act while passing the decree. On the other hand, as noticed above, the trial court has clearly held otherwise that it was not required to look into as to who was at fault in non-compliance of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights passed by the Court. 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hirachand Srinavas Managaonkar (supra) has held as under:- "In this connection it is also necessary to clear an impression regarding the position that once a cause of action for getting a decree of divorce under section 13(1-A) of the Act arises the right to get a divorce crystallises and the Court has to grant the relief of divorce sought by the applicant. This impression is based on a mis-interpretation of the provision in section 13(1-A). All that is provided in the said section is that either party to a marriage may present a petition for dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground that there has been no resumption of cohabitation between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year or more after the passing of a decree for judicial separation in a proceeding to which they were parties or that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year or more after the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in a proceeding to which both the spouses were parties. The section fairly read, only enables either party to a marriage to file an application for dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on any of the grounds stated therein. The section does not provide that once the applicant makes an application alleging fulfillment of one of the conditions specified therein the Court has no alternative but to grant a decree of divorce. Such an interpretation of the Section will run counter to the provisions in section 23(1)(a) or (b) of the Act. The section does not provide that once the applicant makes an application alleging fulfillment of one of the conditions specified therein the Court has no alternative but to grant a decree of divorce. Such an interpretation of the Section will run counter to the provisions in section 23(1)(a) or (b) of the Act. In section 23(1) it is laid down that if the Court is satisfied that any of the grounds for granting relief exists and further that the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief and in clause (b) a mandate is given to the Court to satisfy itself that in the case of a petition based on the ground specified in clause (i) of sub-section(1) of section 13, the petitioner has not in any manner been accessory to or connived at or condoned the act or acts complained of, or where the ground of the petition is cruelty the petitioner has not in any manner condoned the cruelty and in (bb) when a divorce is sought on the ground of mutual consent such consent has not been obtained by force, fraud or undue influence. If the provisions in section 13(1A) and section 23(1)(a) are read together the position that emerges is that the petitioner does not have a vested right for getting the relief of a decree of divorce against the other party merely on showing that the ground in support of the relief sought as stated in the petition exists. It has to be kept in mind that relationship between the spouses is a matter concerning human life. Human life does not run on dotted lines or charted course laid down by statute. It has also to be kept in mind that before granting the prayer of the petitioner to permanently snap the relationship between the parties to the marriage every attempt should be made to maintain the sanctity of the relationship which is of importance not only for the individuals or their children but also for the society. Whether the relief of dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce is to be granted or not depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. In such a matter it will be too hazardous to lay down a general principle of universal application." 13. Whether the relief of dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce is to be granted or not depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. In such a matter it will be too hazardous to lay down a general principle of universal application." 13. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court cannot be sustained and the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. 14. In view of the above discussion, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree dated 30.05.1998 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No.1, Bikaner is set aside. The Civil Misc. Case No. 2 of 1998, Jai Prakash v. Chandra Kala is restored back to its file and the learned trial court is directed to deal with the matter afresh keeping in view the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It will be open for the learned trial court to transfer the matter to the Family Court, Bikaner, if the jurisdiction in the meanwhile stands transferred to the Family Court, Bikaner. As the matter is quite old, it is expected that the learned trial court shall deal with the matter as expeditiously as possible.The record of the trial court be returned back forthwith. No costs.Appeal Allowed. *******