JUDGMENT Hon’ble A.N. Mittal, J.—Heard learned counsel for the revisionist and learned AGA. This criminal revision has been filed against order dated 20.4.2010 passed by Special Judge, Court No. 7, District Aligarh, by which the revisionist has been summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to face the trial. Learned counsel for the revisionist has submitted that revisionist does not resides with the family of other accused persons and he is residing in village Maulasar Tehsil Didwana District Nagaur of Rajasthan regarding which the certificate has been filed. It has also been submitted that he had received his education in Rajasthan and is also working in Shri Ramabai Senior Secondary School, Manglana Road, Makrana, Rajasthan since 1.7.2006. This certificate has been alleged to have issued on 25.3.2010. 2. It has also been submitted that the allegations regarding revisionist are of general nature and no specific role has been assigned to him. It has also been submitted that during the investigation, the involvement of revisionist was not found in the alleged suicidal death of the deceased and it has also not been proved that the deceased was given poison by the revisionist. It has also been submitted that another accused Braj Kumari who is the mother-in-law of the deceased has not been summoned on the ground that she is a lady of unsound mind. Learned AGA has defended the impugned order. 3. After recording the evidence of Brijendra Singh PW.1 and Munni Devi PW.2, the prosecution had moved an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to summon Kuldeep and Braj Kumari. Witness Brijendra Singh in his statement has alleged that present revisionist was also indulged in demanding extra dowry from the deceased. Munni Devi has also stated in her statement that her daughter was being tortured by present revisionist due to insufficient dowry and she was administered poison by present revisionist alongwith other accused persons. Learned Court below after hearing both the parties, has summoned the present revisionist to face the trial for the offence punishable under Section 306 IPC. 4. In Sarojben Ashwinkumar Shah and others v. State of Gujarat and another, 2011 (105) AIC 36 (SC), the Hon’ble Apex Court after taking note of several pronouncements laid guidelines for exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. These guidelines have been provided in paragraph 16 of its judgment, which reads as follows : “16. 4. In Sarojben Ashwinkumar Shah and others v. State of Gujarat and another, 2011 (105) AIC 36 (SC), the Hon’ble Apex Court after taking note of several pronouncements laid guidelines for exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. These guidelines have been provided in paragraph 16 of its judgment, which reads as follows : “16. The legal position that can be culled out from the material provisions of Section 319 of the Code and the decided cases of this Court is this : (i) The Court can exercise the power conferred on it under Section 319 of the Code suo motu or on an application by someone. (ii) The power conferred under Section 319(1) applies to all Courts including the Sessions Court. (iii) The phrase “any person not being the accused” occurring in Section 319 does not exclude from its operation an accused who has been released by the police under Section 169 of the Code and has been shown in Column 2 of the charge-sheet. In other words, the said expression covers any person who is not being tried already by the Court and would include person or persons who have been dropped by the police during investigation but against whom evidence showing their involvement in the offence comes before the Court. (iv) The power to proceed against any person, not being the accused before the Court, must be exercised only where there appears during inquiry or trial sufficient evidence indicating his involvement in the offence as an accused and not otherwise. The word ‘evidence’ in Section 319 contemplates the evidence of witnesses given in Court in the inquiry or trial. The Court cannot add persons as accused on the basis of materials available in the charge-sheet or the case diary but must be based on the evidence adduced before it. In other words, the Court must be satisfied that a case for addition of persons as accused, not being the accused before it, has been made out on the additional evidence let in before it. (v) The power conferred upon the Court is although discretionary but is not to be exercised in a routine manner. In a sense, it is an extraordinary power which should be used very sparingly and only if evidence has come on record which sufficiently establishes that the other person has committed an offence. (v) The power conferred upon the Court is although discretionary but is not to be exercised in a routine manner. In a sense, it is an extraordinary power which should be used very sparingly and only if evidence has come on record which sufficiently establishes that the other person has committed an offence. A mere doubt about involvement of the other person on the basis of the evidence let in before the Court is not enough. The Court must also be satisfied that circumstances justify and warrant that other person be tried with the already arraigned accused. (vi) The Court while exercising its power under Section 319 of the Code must keep in view full conspectus of the case including the stage at which the trial has proceeded already and the quantum of evidence collected till then. (vii) Regard must also be had by the Court to the constraints imposed in Section 319 (4) that proceedings in respect of newly - added persons shall be commenced afresh from the beginning of the trial. (viii) The Court must, therefore, appropriately consider the above aspects and then exercise its judicial discretion.” 5. This Court in Smt. Zeenat Parveen and another v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 (7) ADJ 502 , has held that the summoning order cannot be set-aside on the ground that the statement of the witnesses relied upon by the Court for passing the summoning order have not been subjected to cross-examination. 6. In Sarabjit Singh and another v. State of Punjab and another, 2009 Cri LJ 3978, the Apex Court has held that the provision of Section 319 of the Code, on a plain reading, provides that such an extraordinary case has been made out must appear to the Court. Has the criterion laid down by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rastogi, (1983) 1 SCC 1 , been satisfied is the question? Indisputably, before an additional accused can be summoned for standing trial, the nature of the evidence should be such which would make out grounds for exercise of extraordinary power. The materials brought before the Court must also be such which would satisfy the Court that it is one of those cases where its jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly. 7. Indisputably, before an additional accused can be summoned for standing trial, the nature of the evidence should be such which would make out grounds for exercise of extraordinary power. The materials brought before the Court must also be such which would satisfy the Court that it is one of those cases where its jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly. 7. In Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab and others, 2009 (65) ACC 768, Hon’ble the Apex Court has considered the definition of word “Evidence” appearing in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. and has held that it is difficult to accept the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the term “Evidence” used in sub-section (1) of Section 319 Cr.P.C. would mean evidence which is tested by cross-examination. It has further been held that the word “Evidence” occurring in sub-section 1 of Section 319 is used in comprehensive and broad sense which would also include the material collected by the Investigating Officer and the evidence which comes before the Court and from which the Court is satisfied that person not arraigned before it is involved in the commission of the crime. Hon’ble the Apex Court in the aforesaid case has considered the matter from another angle also and has held as follows: “The matter can still be looked at from another angle. The Code has taken care by sufficiently protecting and safeguarding the interest of such added accused. Sub-section (4) of Section 319 expressly provides that where the Court exercises power under sub-section (1) and proceeds against a person not arrayed as an accused, “the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and witnesses reheard”. Thus, after exercise of power by the Court under Section 319(1), such added accused would be placed in the same position as other accused and will get all rights an accused can get under the Code. The proceedings against the added accused shall be commenced afresh and witnesses will be reheard. Their evidence, prior to addition of the accused cannot be used against the accused who was not there earlier. The question of prejudice, hence, does not arise at all.” 8. In the present case, the revisionist is the elder son of the father-in-law of the deceased. Their evidence, prior to addition of the accused cannot be used against the accused who was not there earlier. The question of prejudice, hence, does not arise at all.” 8. In the present case, the revisionist is the elder son of the father-in-law of the deceased. The incident is said to have taken place on 22.10.2006 and learned counsel for the revisionist has submitted that the revisionist is permanent resident of Rajasthan from where he had received his all education and is working at Rajasthan therefore, there was no occasion to demand or torture for any dowry from the deceased. Moreover, he was not the beneficiary of the alleged dowry. 9. Learned counsel for the revisionist has relied upon Sarabjit Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2009 SC 2792 , in which, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under : “The provision of Section 319 of the Code, on a plain reading, provides that such an extraordinary case has been made out must appear to the Court. Has the criterion laid down by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) been satisfied is the question? Indisputably, before an additional accused can be summoned for standing trial, the nature of the evidence should be such which would make out grounds for exercise of extraordinary power. The materials brought before the Court must also be such which would satisfy the Court that it is one of those cases where its jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly. We may notice that in Y. Saraba Reddy v. Puthur Rami Reddy and another, JT 2007 (6) SC 460, this Court opined: “.....Undisputedly, it is an extraordinary power which is conferred on the Court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking action against a person against whom action had not been taken earlier. The word “evidence” in Section 319 contemplates that evidence of witnesses given in Court.....” An order under Section 319 of the Code, therefore, should not be passed only because the first informant or one of the witnesses seeks to implicate other person(s). Sufficient and cogent reasons are required to be assigned by the Court so as to satisfy the ingredients of the provisions. Mere ipse dixit would not serve the purpose. Such an evidence must be convincing one at least for the purpose of exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction. Sufficient and cogent reasons are required to be assigned by the Court so as to satisfy the ingredients of the provisions. Mere ipse dixit would not serve the purpose. Such an evidence must be convincing one at least for the purpose of exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction. For the aforementioned purpose, the Courts are required to apply stringent tests; one of the tests being whether evidence on record is such which would reasonably lead to conviction of the person sought to be summoned.” 10. Learned counsel for the revisionist has further relied upon Geeta Mehrotra and another v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 (10) ADJ 464 (SC), in which, Hon’ble the Apex Court has held as under : “In the case at hand, when the brother and unmarried sister of the principal accused Shyamji Mehrotra approached the High Court for quashing the proceedings against them, inter alia, on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction as also on the ground that no case was made out against them under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 including Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, it was the legal duty of the High Court to examine whether there were prima facie material against the appellants so that they could be directed to undergo the trial, besides the question of territorial jurisdiction. The High Court seems to have overlooked all the pleas that were raised and rejected the petition on the solitary ground of territorial jurisdiction giving liberty to the appellants to approach the trial Court. The High Court in our considered opinion appear to have missed that assuming the trial Court had territorial jurisdiction, it was still left to be decided whether it was a fit case to send the appellants for trial when the FIR failed to make out a prima facie case against them regarding the allegation of inflicting physical and mental torture to the complainant demanding dowry from the complainant. Since the High Court has failed to consider all these aspects, this Court as already stated hereinbefore, could have remitted the matter to the High Court to consider whether a case was made out against the appellants to proceed against them. Since the High Court has failed to consider all these aspects, this Court as already stated hereinbefore, could have remitted the matter to the High Court to consider whether a case was made out against the appellants to proceed against them. But as the contents of the FIR does not disclose specific allegation against the brother and sister of the complainant’s husband except casual reference of their names, it would not be just to direct them to go through protracted procedure by remanding for consideration of the matter all over again by the High Court and make the unmarried sister of the main accused and his elder brother to suffer the ordeal of a criminal case pending against them specially when the FIR does not disclose ingredients of offence under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506, IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. We, therefore, deem it just and legally appropriate to quash the proceedings initiated against the appellants Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra as the FIR does not disclose any material which could be held to be constituting any offence against these two appellants. Merely by making a general allegation that they were also involved in physical and mental torture of the complainant-respondent No. 2 without mentioning even a single incident against them as also the fact as to how they could be motivated to demand dowry when they are only related as brother and sister of the complainant’s husband, we are pleased to quash and set aside the criminal proceedings in so far as these appellants are concerned and consequently the order passed by the High Court shall stand overruled. The appeal accordingly is allowed.” 11. The present case also relates to matrimonial dispute in which the first information report was lodged against the present revisionist. In the first information report, there were general allegations regarding all the accused persons and those allegations were based on the information received by the complainant from someone else. It has not been disclosed in the first information report that by whom the complainant got the information that present revisionist who is elder son of the father-in-law of the deceased was also engaged in demanding additional dowry and administering poison to her. It has not been disclosed in the first information report that by whom the complainant got the information that present revisionist who is elder son of the father-in-law of the deceased was also engaged in demanding additional dowry and administering poison to her. The complainant Brijendra Singh in his statement on oath, has also not stated clearly that the deceased was tortured for the demand of dowry by the present revisionist but has only said that he was also involved in demand of dowry. Munni Devi PW.2 has further developed her statement alleging that she was tortured by present revisionist. 12. The incident has taken place within four months of marriage. It is the specific case of the revisionist that he is residing and working in Rajasthan. The alleged allegation of causing physical and mental torture to the deceased for demand of dowry have not been made against the revisionist. Moreover, the revisionist cannot be said to be a beneficiary of alleged dowry. In matrimonial dispute, it is a common feature now a days that first information report is lodged against all the relatives and near relatives ignoring the possibility whether actually they are involved in the alleged crime or not. In Geeta Mehrotra (supra) it has been further held that : “However, we deem it appropriate to add by way of caution that we may not be misunderstood so at to incur that even if there are allegation of overt act indicating the complicity of the members of the family named in the FIR in a given case, cognisance would be unjustified but what we wish to emphasize by highlighting is that, if the FIR as it stands does not disclose specific allegation against accused more so against the co-accused specially in a matter arising out of matrimonial bickering, it would be clear abuse of the legal and judicial process to mechanically send the named accused in the FIR to undergo the trial unless of course the FIR discloses specific allegations which would persuade the Court to take cognizance of the offence alleged against the relatives of the main accused who are prima facie not found to have indulged in physical and mental torture of the complainant-wife. It is the well-settled principle laid down in cases too numerous to mention, that if the FIR did not disclose the commission of an offence, the Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings preventing the abuse of the process of law. Simultaneously, the Courts are expected to adopt a cautious approach in matters of quashing specially in cases of matrimonial dispute whether the FIR in fact discloses commission of an offence by the relatives of the principal accused or the FIR prima facie discloses a case of over-implication by involving the entire family of the accused at the instance of the complainant, who is out to settle her scores arising out of the teething problem or skirmish of domestic bickering while settling down in her new matrimonial surrounding.” 13. The present matter is also regarding matrimonial dispute in which the revisionist who is brother-in-law of the deceased, has been dragged to face prosecution without any specific allegations. For the aforesaid reasons and in view of guide lines laid down in para 16(v) of Sarojben Ashwinkumar Shah (supra) I come to the conclusion that learned Court below has exceeded in its jurisdiction in summoning the revisionist under Section 319 Cr.P.C. The revision is allowed. The impugned order dated 20.4.2010 is set aside. It is made clear that observations made herein shall not affect the merits of the trial against other accused persons. —————