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Andhra High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 1229 (AP)

M. S. Rajasekhar v. Chairperson & M. D. , Indian Bank, Chennai

2013-12-30

K.G.SHANKAR

body2013
Judgment : 1. The petitioner seeks for a Writ of mandamus declaring the action of the respondents-Bank in not refunding Rs.3,00,000/- as illegal and for consequential reliefs. 2. The petitioner is an unfortunate employee of the Indian Bank. He joined the services of the Bank on 11-12-1995 as a Probationary Officer. In the appointment orders, para 6 provided that the petitioner shall serve the Bank for a period of 4 years from the date of joining and that if he resigned in the meanwhile, he should be liable to pay liquidated damages of Rs.5,000/- to the Bank. The petitioner executed a Bond accordingly. 3. The petitioner was initially posted to Sirnapally Branch, which was a Rural Branch. He worked there from December, 1996 till January, 1999. In February, 1999, the petitioner was transferred to Mahabubabad Branch, Warangal District. However, he was sent on deputation to Kothaguda Rural Branch, Warangal District. While working at Kothaguda Rural Branch, on 21-01-2000, while the petitioner was on duty, he met with an accident. He was in possession of cash of Rs.2,00,000/- belonging to the Bank at that time. The petitioner took pains to somehow go to the Branch and deposit the cash in his possession although he sustained fracture of his right hand in the accident. 4. In 1997, there was a move in the banks to go for computerization. The respondents-Bank also went for computerization. The petitioner opted out to undergo training in computers. The petitioner was called for an interview by the Bank and was subjected to examination and interview. The petitioner was ultimately selected to work in Regional Electronic Data Processing (REDP), Chittoor Branch. The petitioner joined in REDP, Chittoor Branch on 26-02-2001. He was later sent to Chennai for training in UNIX from 18-6-2001 till 23-6-2001 and was also sent for training in Windows NT from 10-9-2001 till 15-9-2001. 5. Subsequently, on account of the acute ill health of his wife and also in view of the health condition of his parents, the petitioner wanted to resign his position with the Bank. He accordingly submitted a letter on 06-7-2002 to the Chairperson and Managing Director of the Bank informing that he was resigning with effect from the same day and that he was not able to serve 3 months’ Notice as required by Regulation 20(2) of the Indian Bank (Officers) Service Regulations, 1979 (the Regulations, for short). He accordingly submitted a letter on 06-7-2002 to the Chairperson and Managing Director of the Bank informing that he was resigning with effect from the same day and that he was not able to serve 3 months’ Notice as required by Regulation 20(2) of the Indian Bank (Officers) Service Regulations, 1979 (the Regulations, for short). The petitioner subsequently executed a Bond on 09-7-2002 that he was to be given training and that in view of the heavy expenditure for imparting specialized training to the petitioner for gaining knowledge and expertise in indulging electronics and computer appliances, he was undertaking to work in the organization for a period of 3 years after training failing which, he would be liable to pay liquidated damages of Rs.3,00,000/-. 6. When the petitioner resigned, the Assistant General Manager (Operations) issued a letter on 09-7-2002 recommending the acceptance of the resignation of the petitioner, subject to the Bond dated 09-7-2002. Accordingly, the monies due to the petitioner to a tune of Rs.3,20,210/- were deducted from the account of the petitioner in the Bank. The resignation was later accepted. 7. Aggrieved by the fact that Rs.3,00,000/- was deducted from the amounts of the petitioners towards liquidated damages, the petitioner submitted a representation to the Bank on 27-7-2002 that he was not able to pay the amount for the unserved portion of the term mentioned in the Bond and that the terms of the Bond be waived for him. The same has not been done. Questioning the same, the present writ petition is laid. 8. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondents 1 and 2-Bank drew my attention to another factor. On 20th August, 2002, the petitioner issued a letter to the Assistant General Manager permitting the Bank to withdraw Rs.3,20,310/- from his account. It is to be now examined whether the writ petitioner is entitled to relief in this backdrop. 9. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no justification for the bank to insist upon implementation of a bond executed by the petitioner three days after he tendered his resignation. It may be recalled that the petitioner submitted his resignation on 06.07.2002 whereas he executed the bond for Rs.3,00,000/- on 09.07.2002. It is the case of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the bond was obtained from him by coercion. It may be recalled that the petitioner submitted his resignation on 06.07.2002 whereas he executed the bond for Rs.3,00,000/- on 09.07.2002. It is the case of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the bond was obtained from him by coercion. The petitioner submitted a representation on 27.07.2002 seeking for the waiving of the terms of the bond. Even at that time, the petitioner did not contend that bond dated 09.07.2002 was obtained from him by force. Indeed, in his subsequent notice dated 04.08.2003, a stand was taken by the petitioner that bond dated 09.07.2002 was obtained from him by force. 10. I am not able to accept the contention of the petitioner that the bond was obtained from him by coercion. Till he issued legal notice dated 09.07.2003, the petitioner never contended that the bond was obtained from him by coercion. Added to it, the petitioner was an educated person and fairly conversant with computers. It is hard to believe that such a person could be coerced to execute a bond against his consent. If it were true, the petitioner would have reported the matter to police on the very next day. The petitioner has taken no steps at all regarding the execution of the bond if the same was obtained from him by force. I, therefore, consider that there was no proof that the bond was obtained from him by force. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner also attacked the bond as being against public policy. Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. V. Brojo Nath Ganguly ( AIR 1986 SC 1571 (1)) was a land mark decision relating to service contracts. The Supreme Court held that the rule empowering the Government Corporation to terminate the services of its permanent employees by giving notice or pay in lieu of notice period was opposed to public policy and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 12. The Supreme Court referred to “inequality of bargaining power” theory of Lord Denning enunciated in Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy ((1974) 3 All ER 757) and Gillespie Brothers and Company Ltd v. Roy Bowles Transport Ltd.( (1973) 1 QB 400) and referred to the tacit approval of the Doctrine by Lord Diplock in A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay (Formerly Instone) ((1974) 1 W.L.R. 1308). Ltd. v. Macaulay (Formerly Instone) ((1974) 1 W.L.R. 1308). The Supreme Court noticed in this case (in para 76) that in view of Section 19 of the Contract Act, when consent to an agreement was obtained by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, the same would be void. Finally, the Supreme Court held that contracts against public policy would not be recognized. It may, however, be noticed that the whole exercise by the Supreme Court was regarding the service contracts which allow the employer to terminate the services of the employees with notice or with salary in lieu of notice dispensing with former enquiry. The decision of the Supreme Court perhaps is not authority for the principle that a bond executed by an employee after he submitted the resignation letter is unenforceable. 13. Certainly, it is stranger that while the petitioner submitted his resignation on 06.07.2002, he executed a bond on 09.07.2002 undertaking to pay Rs.3,00,000/-. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that as soon as the petitioner obtained training in computers, he was expected to execute the bond and that the petitioner postponed the execution of the bond from time to time and having realized that his resignation might not be accepted unless he executed the bond in compliance of the rules and norms, he has executed the bond. In any event, it is not as though the petitioner was not aware as to the terms of the bond when he executed the bond. The petitioner who wanted to quit the organization of the respondents executed the bond. I am afraid that the petitioner cannot now turn round and claim that the bond was obtained by coercion. 14. For the reasons already stated, such as the petitioner not approaching police and not protesting about the bond it is not difficult to gather that the petitioner voluntarily executed the bond being aware of the consequences thereto. Added to it, the petitioner has issued a letter on 20.08.2002 to the bank authorizing the bank to debit his account for a sum of Rs.3,20,210/- and to send a credit advice to the respondents towards liquidating damages and towards salary for 46 days constituting part of the notice period. In the backdrop of this letter, I opine that the petitioner was thoroughly aware of the consequences of the bond and has executed the same. In the backdrop of this letter, I opine that the petitioner was thoroughly aware of the consequences of the bond and has executed the same. I am also satisfied from these circumstances that the petitioner voluntarily submitted to the consequences of the bond when he tendered his resignation. Having chosen to do so, it is not open for the petitioner now to question that the bond is violative of principles of natural justice or is hit by undue influence and coercion and claim that the same is against the public policy and cannot be implemented. I, therefore, see no merits in this writ petition. 15. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any pending in this writ petition, shall stand closed.