Judgment : 1. These Writ Appeals by the appellants-writ petitioners are directed against the common order of the learned Single Judge dated 12.2.2013 in W.P.Nos.685 and 691 of 2013 respectively dismissing the writ petitions filed by the appellants whereby the learned single Judge had declined to issue a mandamus declaring the proceedings in C.C.Nos.1, 2 and 3 of 2010 on the file of XXI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad as arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and the provisions of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and consequently declare the whole proceedings in the said cases as null and void. 2. For convenience sake, the parties will be referred to by their status in the writ petitions. 3. Briefly noted the facts leading to the filing of the writ petitions are: The matter relates to a biggest Corporate offences committed by Chairman and other officials of M/s Satyam Computer Services Limited (SCSL) diverting funds from SCSL by fudging the books of accounts and other records and purchasing lot of immovable properties in their names, in the names of their family members, relatives and other benami names using the proceeds of the company. One Smt. Leena Mangat, Secunderabad, lodged a complaint with the CB-CID on 9.1.2009 alleging that she had purchased shares in SCSL believing that the share prices would go up having regard to the figures reflected in the books of accounts, but, subsequently, it was found that the records were manipulated, as a result of which, the share value of the shares of SCSL fell down. The said complaint was registered as Crime No.2 of 2009. The crime was thereafter transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Petitioner and others who were arrayed as accused in the crime were arrested on 5.4.2009 and remanded to judicial custody. After completion of investigation three charge sheets were filed on different spells i.e on 7.4.2009, 22.11.2009 and 7.1.2010 which were numbered as C.C.Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of 2010 for the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 406, 409, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 477-A IPC. Petitioner in W.P.No.685 of 2013, the then Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of SCSL was arrayed as Accused No.3 in all the three cases. 1, 2 and 3 of 2010 for the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 406, 409, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 477-A IPC. Petitioner in W.P.No.685 of 2013, the then Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of SCSL was arrayed as Accused No.3 in all the three cases. Petitioner in W.P.No.691 of 2010, the then Vice President, My Home Hub, SCSL was arrayed as A.7 in C.C.Nos.1 and 3 of 2010 and arrayed as A.6 in C.C.No.2 of 2013. While the proceedings were pending, the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) registered ECIR/1/W20/2009 on 23.1.2009 under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) and after investigation passed provisional orders of attachment attaching certain properties of the accused which were confirmed subsequently by the adjudicating authority. Though this Court granted bail to the petitioners in Crl.P.No.6181 and 6182 of 2010 on 20.7.2010, but, on appeal preferred by the CBI, the Supreme Court by order dated 26.10.2010 in Crl. Appeal Nos.2068-2072 cancelled the bail. The Supreme Court, however, directed the Trial Court to take up the case on day-to-day basis and conclude the trial as expeditiously as possible, in any event, on or before 31.7.2011. In the said order, this Court was requested not to transfer the notified judicial officer until the trial is concluded. In case, the trial is not concluded for any reason before 31st July, 2011, the respondents were given the liberty to approach the trial court for grant of bail. 4. The trial court commenced the trial of the case and examined 211 witnesses in chief between 8.11.2010 and 29.4.2011 and they were cross-examined by the defense between 8.11.2010 and 2.5.2011 and thereafter 15 investigation officers were examined in chief by the prosecution during the period 11.7.2011 to 29.7.2011. In the meanwhile the ED filed an application on 11.5.2011 before the Supreme Court requesting the Court to permit the Central Government to approach the High Court of A.P. to designate the learned XXI ACMM, who is of rank of Additional Sessions Judge, to exercise jurisdiction as such within the meaning of Section 9(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and notify the said Court as a “Court of Sessions” to be a “Special Court” within the meaning of Section 43(1) of PMLA for the purpose of conducting the trial arising out of the case registered by the ED. A counter-affidavit was filed before the Supreme Court by one of the accused contending that the High Court had no power to designate the Court of XXI ACMM as a Special Court under PMLA and the XXI ACMM, being inferior to the Special Sessions Judge, could not be notified as a Special Court under the provisions of PMLA. 5. In the meanwhile, as the trial could not be completed before 31.7.2011, petitioners and others again applied for bail, which were dismissed. The petitioner in W.P.No.685 of 2013 filed Criminal Appeal No.2013 of 2011 before the Supreme Court. On his furnishing an affidavit undertaking that he would not examine any of the given up prosecution witnesses as defence witnesses in the trial, the Supreme Court by order dated 4.11.2011, granted bail to him and others. Subsequent thereto, the investigation officers were cross-examined by the defence during the period 19.7.2011 to 11.5.2012 thereby examination of prosecution witnesses was concluded. The accused were examined under section 313 Cr.P.C. and several witnesses were examined on behalf the defence and thereafter written defence statements were filed during the period 25.9.2012 to 3.10.2012. The prosecution in all examined 226 witnesses and marked 3137 exhibits. On behalf of the accused several witnesses were examined and 75 exhibits were marked. 6. While things stood thus, the CBI filed Crl.P.Nos.11277-11281 of 2011 in Crl.A.Nos.2068-2072 of 2010 before the Supreme Court seeking clarification of orders passed by the Supreme Court on 26.10.2010. The clarification sought was, whether it will be open to the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in the capacity of Special Court notified under Section 43(1) of the PMLA to take cognizance, hear the parties and complete the trial of the complaint proposed to be filed under the said Act by the ED. After hearing both sides, the Supreme Court by order dated 10.12.2012 passed the following order: “ ….. Counter affidavit has been filed by the respondent contending, inter alia, that under Section 43(1) of the Act, only a “ Court of Sessions” can be designated as a Special Court, therefore, the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate who is trying the offences under the Act against the respondent is not competent to be designated as a Special Court in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Mr. Mr. Mohan Parasaran, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the petitioner-appellant has brought to our notice the orders passed by this Court on 26th October, 2010 which may give an impression that only the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate who is trying the offences against the respondent can hear and decide the matters also under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. We clarify that the orders passed by this Court on 26th October, 2010 in the aforementioned Criminal Appeals will not stand in the way of the High Court taking up the petition of the Enforcement Directorate for designating a competent Court for passing appropriate orders under the Act, keeping in mind the provisions of the relevant law. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion in this order as to which is the Court that is to hear the proceedings under the Act and the High Court may consider the issue in accordance with law. The Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions stand disposed of accordingly.” 7. At the time the writ petitions are filed, the stage of the trial is that the parties have to advance their arguments. At this stage, the present writ petitions are filed. The main contention of the petitioners is that since the ED made a categorical statement before the Supreme Court that they are contemplating to file a complaint to prosecute the accused for committing the offence under Section 3 of PMLA punishable under section 4 in the Special Court to be notified under Section 43(1) of PMLA, continuance of the proceedings on the file of XXI ACMM in relation to the offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code would be illegal and without jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions of PMLA because a Special Court designated under Section 43(1) and 44 of PMLA will have jurisdiction to try such offences to the exclusion of the normal courts of jurisdiction and any further continuance of proceedings in the CBI cases and compelling the accused to advance their arguments would result in disclosure of their defence which would give the ED an opportunity to fill up the defects and lacunae in the prosecution, in respect of the offence punishable under Section 3 of PMLA which would cause prejudice to the accused. According to the petitioners, such a course would be in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. 8. According to the petitioners, such a course would be in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. 8. In the counter-affidavit filed by the 3rtd respondent – CBI it is stated that the present petitions are filed only to delay the proceedings which are at an advanced stage. It is stated that the offence under Section 3 of PMLA is separate and distinct from the offences under Sections 120-B IPC read with sections 420, 419, 467, 468, 471, 477-A, 201 and 409 IPC with which the accused were charged in the CBI cases. The ED had not taken the stand that the CBI cases should be transferred to the Special Court whenever designated. It is a mere apprehension of the petitioners that if the CBI cases are decided, even before a Special Court is designated under the PMLA, prejudice may be caused to the petitioner. The prayer of the ED is only that after conclusion of the CBI cases, the offence of money laundering under PMLA may have to be taken up by the same Court. The offence of money laundering is a distinct and separate offence from the scheduled offences defined in Section 2(1)(y) of the Act. The offences with which the accused are charged in the CBI cases are under the Indian Penal Code which are not scheduled offences for the purpose of Section 4 of the PMLA. 9. The 2nd respondent-ED in it’s counter-affidavit stated that it had approached the Supreme Court on 11.5.2011 requesting that XXI ACMM be designated as Court of Session to be a “Special Court” within the meaning of Section 43(1) of the PMLA. The contention of the petitioners that their defence would be known to the ED if they are compelled to advance their arguments and cause prejudice to their interest is not correct because the defence of the petitioners before the XXI ACMM would be relevant only for the offences charged in the CBI cases, whereas the offence of money laundering under section 3 of PMLA is distinct from the scheduled offences as the evidence to be adduced in the complaint would be specific to the offence of money laundering. Since the issue of designating the XXI ACMM Court as a designated court is pending, the writ petitions are not maintainable. 10. Since the issue of designating the XXI ACMM Court as a designated court is pending, the writ petitions are not maintainable. 10. We are informed that the prosecution has advanced their final arguments and the matter was posted to 10.1.2013 for arguments of the defence, whereas the petitions were filed on 7.1.2013. The learned single Judge while ordering notice before admission granted interim stay. 11. After hearing the parties, the learned single Judge examined the arguments of the parties under different sub-heads. 11. On the question of maintainability of the writ petitions, it was held that the writ petitions are maintainable. The findings recorded by the learned single on various sub-heads need not be gone into by us as they were recorded after an analysis of various decisions of the Supreme Court and we are in complete agreement with the findings arrived at by the learned single Judge. We are in agreement with the view of the learned single Judge that the petitioners have failed to establish the element of arbitrariness and violation of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution if the arguments of the defence are not deferred. Dealing with the scope of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 300 Cr.P.C. the learned Judge held: “This submission of the Learned Senior Counsel is based on the premise that the High Court would decline to accede to the request of the E.D. that the XXI ACMM be upgraded as a Sessions Court, and be designated as a Special Court under PMLA; the E.D. would then file its complaint before the presently designated Special Court under PMLA filling up the gaps and loopholes pointed out during defence arguments; trial in the said designated Special Court under PMLA would be expedited; and judgment would be delivered by the Special Court, even before the XXI ACMM delivers judgment in the CBI cases. This premise is too far fetched, outrageous, and extremely remote, to even merit consideration. Even if hypothetically, such a far fetched eventuality were to arise in future, it would always be open to the petitioners to avail their legal remedies at that stage. This premise is too far fetched, outrageous, and extremely remote, to even merit consideration. Even if hypothetically, such a far fetched eventuality were to arise in future, it would always be open to the petitioners to avail their legal remedies at that stage. They cannot as at present, when the High Court has not even communicated its decision on the ED’s request for designating the XXI ACMM Court as the Special Court under the PMLA, seek a mandamus from this Court directing the XXI ACMM to defer defence arguments, in the CBI cases, indefinitely.” 12. On the question whether the writ petitions were filed only to delay the proceedings before the XXI ACMM, the learned single Judge held that having obtained bail from the Supreme Court on an undertaking having been given on their behalf by their counsel, despite the petitioners being aware that a complaint was about to be filed by the ED under the PMLA, the petitions seeking deferment of the CBI cases is not only an undisguised attempt to delay completion of the trial but alsolan abuse of the process of the Court. Finally, the learned single Judge concluded: “I see no reason, in these circumstances, to grant the relief sought for in both the Writ Petitions. Needless to state that the XXI ACMM shall, in compliance with the directions of the Supreme Court in its orders dated 26.10.2010 and 04.11.2011, ensure that the trial of the CBI cases is completed at the earliest. Both the Writ Petitions fail and are, accordingly, dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs.25,000/-(Rupees twenty five thousand only) each which shall be paid by both the petitioners, in these two Writ Petitions, to the A.P. State Legal Services Authority, Hyderabad within four weeks from today.” 13. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. Learned counsel reiterated the very same arguments advanced before the learned Single Judge and it is not necessary to reiterate the same again. 14. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that since the trial contemplated under PMLA and the Indian Penal Code must happen together on a complaint being filed by the ED, divulging the defence arguments before the ED case is closed before the Special Court under PMLA would cause grave prejudice to the accused. 14. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that since the trial contemplated under PMLA and the Indian Penal Code must happen together on a complaint being filed by the ED, divulging the defence arguments before the ED case is closed before the Special Court under PMLA would cause grave prejudice to the accused. The complaint proposed to be filed by the ED under PMLA would result in transfer of the trial of the scheduled offences to the Special Court under PMLA. It was further contented that since it is the specific case of the 2nd respondent that the offences under section 4 under PMLA and the scheduled offences under the Indian Penal Code shall be tried by the Special Court, separate trial for scheduled offences in other courts and separate trial under section 4 before Special Court may amount to contravening the procedure established by law, the intention of the 2nd respondent is clear that both the cases should be tried by the Special Court constituted under PMLA only. Therefore, till such eventuality had occurred, the petitioners should not be compelled to advance their arguments. 14. The only question that arises for consideration is, whether the learned single Judge is justified in dismissing the writ petitions. 15. We have carefully gone through the judgment of the learned single Judge in detail and we see no ground to interfere with the order impugned. We are in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the learned Judge. There is no dispute that trial in C.C. Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of 2010 on the file of XXI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad has already been concluded and we were informed that the prosecution has also advanced their arguments and the case is now pending for advancement of arguments on behalf of the defence only. Whatever may be grounds urged on behalf of the petitioners, in our considered opinion, at this stage, it would not be proper for this Court to stall the further proceedings. Whatever may be grounds urged on behalf of the petitioners, in our considered opinion, at this stage, it would not be proper for this Court to stall the further proceedings. The contention of the petitioners that the offences under the Indian Penal Code which are categorized as ‘scheduled offences’ under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 are to be dealt with by the ‘Special Court’ constituted under Section 43(1) of the said Act only cannot be accepted since proceedings before the Court are at the concluding stage and any interference by this Court at this stage would amount to violating the orders of the Supreme Court dated 26.10.2010 wherein the Apex Court specifically directed the trial court to take up the case on day-to-day basis and conclude the trial of the case as expeditiously as possible, in any event, on or before 31st July, 2011. Nearly 19 months had passed since then, therefore, it would not be proper for this Court to further delay the proceedings before the trial Court, particularly, when the arguments on behalf of the prosecution are already over and the matter is pending only for advancement of arguments by the defence. We may also notice that no orders are passed by the High Court as to the constitution of a Special Court under Section 43 of PMLA. Further, the offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code and the offence under section 3 of PMLA being distinct and separate, in our opinion, no prejudice would be caused to the petitioners if arguments are advanced. Further, the defence had already examined their witnesses and also adduced documentary evidence. In such circumstances, we fail to understand what prejudice would be caused to the petitioners when they had already adduced oral and documentary evidence on their behalf, and, having filed statement of defence, it cannot be accepted that prejudice would be caused to the petitioners. In such view of the matter, we find no ground to interfere with the order under appeal. 16. In the result, the writ appeals are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs in these appeals.