Judgment : 1. This Appeal is filed under Section 88 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1977 (for short “the Act”) challenging the order dt.13-10-2010 in O.A.No.1337 of 2010 of the A.P. Endowments Tribunal at Hyderabad. 2. The said O.A. was filed by 1st respondent under Section 87(1)(h) of the Act to recognize him as a Founder Trustee of Sri Agasteswara Swamy Temple, Vangiuram village, Prathipadu Mandal, Guntur District. 3. In the said O.A., he contended that his father Valluri Raghavendra Rao and his grand father Valluri Subbaiah were continued not only as trustees but also as Archakas of the above temple for generations together; that the temple was founded by his ancestors; that it was also declared as exempted temple in the proceedings of the Commissioner of the erstwhile Madras Religious Endowment Board in B.O./No.2717/A dt.19-11-1934 within the meaning of Section 9(5) of Act 2 of 1927; that the scheme was settled in the above order which states that the administration of the temple vests with the hereditary trustees and the applicant’s family has been continuing as such; that in Column No.4-B of the Register maintained under Section 38 of the Act, his father was recorded as the hereditary trustee, that he applied to the Endowments Department to be recognized as Founder Trustee and after due enquiry, his father was recognized as Founder Trustee vide proceedings Rc.No.A5/1644/98 dt.09-04-1998. He further contended that the concept of Hindu Temples recognizes Archaka trustees ever since the temples were constructed and there is no conflict of Archaka and Trusteeship Rules; and therefore, he ought to be declared as a Founder Trustee. 4. This was opposed by the Executive Officer of the said temple principally on the ground that under the Act, one cannot function both as Founder Trustee as well as Archaka simultaneously. 5. By order dt.13-10-2010, the A.P. Endowments Tribunal at Hyderabad rejected the objection of the Executive Officer of the above temple and held that 1st respondent is entitled to be recognized as Member of Founder’s family of the above temple with no disqualification under section 19(1)(g), by virtue of Section 15(2) proviso (2) of the Act and as Chairman of Board of Trustees as Ex-Officio Trustee while continuing as Archaka. 6. Challenging the same, the Executive Officer of the above temple has filed the above appeal. 7. 6. Challenging the same, the Executive Officer of the above temple has filed the above appeal. 7. Heard Sri V.T.M.Prasad, learned counsel for appellant and Smt.V.Dyumani, learned counsel for 1st respondent. 8. The learned counsel for appellant contended that the Tribunal erred in allowing the application filed by 1st respondent recognizing him as a Member of the Founder’s family of the above temple as under the Act, the same person cannot be both Archaka and a Trustee. 9. The learned counsel for 1st respondent, on the other hand, contended that the Executive Officer has no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Tribunal, as he is not the “person aggrieved” by the order passed by the Tribunal; that the Executive Officer is appointed under Section 29 of the Act to carry out the lawful directions of the trustee, be responsible for the proper maintenance and custody of all the records, accounts and other documents, and of all the jewels, valuables, money, funds and other properties of the Institution or Endowment; and considering the nature of duties of the Executive Officer as provided in Section 29 of the Act, he cannot consider himself to be aggrieved by the recognition of 1st respondent as a Founder trustee of the above temple. She, therefore, prayed that the appeal be dismissed as not maintainable. 10. I have noted the submissions of both sides. 11. Section 88 of the Act provides the filing of an appeal against the order passed by an Endowment Tribunal under Sections 87 and 119 of the Act by any person aggrieved by the said decision. It states : “88. Right to appeal against the decision of the Endowments Tribunal under Section 87:- Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Endowments Tribunal under Section 87 and Section 119 may, within ninety days from the date of receipt of the decision prefer an appeal to the High Court.” 12. Section 17 of the Act deals with procedure for making appointment of trustees of the Trust Board of a temple and enables a founder or one of the members of the family of the founder, if qualified as prescribed, shall be appointed as one of the Trustees. Section 19 of the Act provides certain disqualifications for appointment of a person as a Trustee. Section 19 of the Act provides certain disqualifications for appointment of a person as a Trustee. Clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act prohibits a person from being appointed as a trustee if he is an office holder or servant attached to, or a person in receipt of any emolument or perquisite from such institution or endowment. As per Section 87(1)(h) of the Act, the Endowment Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide any dispute as to the question whether a person is a founder or a member from the family of the founder of an Institution or Endowment. In the present case, the Tribunal, by the impugned order, has decided in favour of 1st respondent. 13. Under Section 29(3)(a) of the Act, an Executive Officer of a Religious Institution such as a temple shall be responsible for carrying out all lawful directions issued by a trustee of the said Institution from time to time. Therefore, he is subordinate in hierarchy to a trustee. The Act does not envisage any role for the Executive Officer in the matter of appointment of trustees. He cannot be allowed to arrogate to himself such a role when it is not provided in the statute. When the Tribunal, after enquiry, has upheld the claim of 1st respondent to be recognized as a founder trustee of the temple, it would be a travesty of justice to permit the Executive Officer of the temple to question the same. 14. In Competition Commission of India Vs. Steel Authority of India Limited and another ((2010) 10 S.C.C. 744), the Supreme Court considered the scope of Section 53-A(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002 ( which provided for an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against any directions issued or a decision made or ordered passed by the Competition Commission). It held that a direction under section 26 (1) of the said Act after formation of a prima facie opinion is only a direction simpliciter to cause an investigation into the matter and it does not effectively determine any right or obligation of the parties to the lis, that it is only a step towards final decision under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act and only final order under Section 26(2) is appealable. It held that an order under section 26 (1) of the Act cannot be appealed under Section 53-A (1) (a). It held that an order under section 26 (1) of the Act cannot be appealed under Section 53-A (1) (a). In that context the Supreme Court observed the right of appeal is neither a natural nor inherent right vested in a party and it is a substantive statutory right regulated by the statute creating it. It held that such a right should be provided by law in force and cannot be assumed by logical analysis much less by exercise of inherent jurisdiction. It held that: “51……..In absence of any specific provision creating a right in a party to file an appeal, such right can neither be assumed nor inferred in favour of the party. 52. A statute is stated to be the edict of legislature. It expresses the will of legislature and the function of the court is to interpret the document according to the intent of those who made it. It is a settled rule of construction of statute that the provisions should be interpreted by applying plain rule of construction. The courts normally would not imply anything which is inconsistent with the words expressly used by the statute. In other words, the court would keep in mind that its function is jus dicere, not jus dare. The right of appeal being creation of the statute and being a statutory right does not invite unnecessarily liberal or strict construction. The best norm would be to give literal construction keeping the legislative intent in mind.” 15. In view of this decision, since the Act did not envisage any role to the Executive Officer in the matter relating to appointment of a trustee, merely because the temple represented by him was arrayed as a party respondent before the Tribunal, he cannot claim that he is aggrieved by the impugned order. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that this appeal filed by the Executive Officer of the temple is not maintainable and he has no locus to file it. 16. Therefore, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. No costs. 17. Miscellaneous applications pending if any in this Appeal shall stand closed.