Judgment Jitendra Chauhan, J. 1. The present appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 23/24.1.2002, whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Panipat, convicted and sentenced the accused-appellants for a period of ten years each and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/- each; in default of payment of fine, the defaulter to further undergo RI for six months, under Section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code; and to undergo RI for a period of four years each and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- each; in default of payment of fine, the defaulter to further undergo RI for a period of two months under Section 363 of IPC and to undergo RI for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- each; in default of payment of fine, the defaulter to further undergo RI for a period of four months. The facts necessary for adjudication of the matter as narrated in para 3 of the impugned judgment are as under:- On 8.2.2000 Ram Mehar, complainant father of the prosecutrix Bateri met S.I. Vinod Kumar at Sanjay Chowk, Panipat and gave an application Ex. PJ. In the said application, Ram Mehar disclosed that his daughter Bateri aged about 17 years was missing since 14.1.2000 and he had lodged the report in the police station on 24.1.2000. He searched for his daughter amongst the relatives and brotherhood and during search, he came to know and even has reasons to believe that his daughter Bateri has been enticed by Narender Kumar son of Parivar Singh, resident of Siwah, Binder son of Amar Singh, resident of Palri and Chander Bhan son of Jiya Lal, resident of Bhalsi in order to marry her and she has eloped with them and above mentioned three boys are present near the Railway Station, Panipat in order to go somewhere and action be taken against Narende, Binder and Chander Bhan and his daughter be got released from their clutches. On the application moved by Ram Mehar Ex. PJ, S.I. Vinod Kumar made the endorsement Ex. PJ/1 and sent ruqqa in the police station where on the basis of the same formal FIR No. 36 dated 8.2.2000 was recorded. On the application moved by Ram Mehar Ex. PJ, S.I. Vinod Kumar made the endorsement Ex. PJ/1 and sent ruqqa in the police station where on the basis of the same formal FIR No. 36 dated 8.2.2000 was recorded. Thereafter, on the same day on receipt of secret information against the accused that they were present near Railway Station at Battak Chowk alongwith Bateri Vinod Kumar S.I. (P.W.10) alongwith complainant Ram Mehar and other officials went to Battak Chowk Panipat. The accused and Bateri were apprehended. Their names and addresses enquired. Accused were arrested. Recovery memo Ex. PN was prepared by Vinod Kumar S.I. He also prepared a rough site plan with regard to the place of recovery Ex. Pm and recorded the statements of witnesses. Thereafter, on the same day all the accused were medico-legally examined by Dr. Y.P. Singhmar (P.W.1). Then, S.I. alongwith accused and Bateri went to the police where Bateri was subjected to rape. He prepared site plan Ex. PQ with correct marginal notes of that place and recorded the statement of the prosecutrix. Bateru was handed over to the father of the prosecutrix directing him to bring Bateri on the next day for medical examination. On the next day, Bateri was medico legally examined by lady doctor Jaya Goel (P.W.9). The doctor handed over a sealed parcel to the Investigating Officer which was taken into possession and the same was deposited with the MHC. The statement of Bateri under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal was also recorded on 15.2.2000. 2. After completing all the formalities, a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was presented in the Court. The accused-appellants were charged for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(g) of IPC, to which, they did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 3. In order to substantiate the charge, the prosecution has examined the following witnesses;- P.W.1 Dr. Y.P. Singmar, Medical Officer, G.H. Panipat, who proved the medico legally examination reports of all the accused. P.W.2 HC Bhim Singh, tendered in evidence his affidavit Ex. PD P.W.3 Constable Phool Kumar, tendered in evidence his affidavit Ex. PE P.W.4 Inspector Shish Ram, the then S.H.O., prepared a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., and filed the same in the Court. Y.P. Singmar, Medical Officer, G.H. Panipat, who proved the medico legally examination reports of all the accused. P.W.2 HC Bhim Singh, tendered in evidence his affidavit Ex. PD P.W.3 Constable Phool Kumar, tendered in evidence his affidavit Ex. PE P.W.4 Inspector Shish Ram, the then S.H.O., prepared a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., and filed the same in the Court. P.W.5 P.W. Sushama Lata, Assistant Teacher, GSSS, Siwah, who brought the school record with regard to the date of birth of the prosecutrix i.e. 5.6.1983. P.W.6 Ranbir Singh, Patwari Halqa, proved Akshajra Ex. PF of the spot. P.W.7 Prosecutrix, daughter of the complainant. P.W.8 Ram Mehar, complainant who made an application with regard to the incident. P.W.9 Dr. Jaya Goel who conducted medico legally examination of the prosecutrix. P.W.10 Sub-Inspector Vinod Kumar, who investigated the matter and arrested the accused. 4. When examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused-appellants stoutly denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution evidence against them and pleaded false implication. In defence, he examined D.W. Dilbag Singh and closed their evidence. 5. Before the trial court, the arguments raised by the learned defence counsel were that there are material contradictions in the statements of the prosecution; no injury was noticed on the private parts of the prosecutrix. 6. After analysing the entire evidence and hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned Trial Court rejected the pleas raised by the learned counsel for the accused and convicted/sentenced the accused-appellants, as noticed at the outset. 7. The present appeal was admitted on 23.9.2002 by this Court. 8. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the learned trial Court has committed a grave error while convicting and sentencing the appellants. There are material contradictions in the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 161 of the Code, wherein no allegations as alleged against the appellants have been made, whereas in the statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code, the name of the appellants finds reflected. It is further asserted that even as per the statement of the complainant, the father of the prosecutrix, she was more than seventeen years of age at the time of occurrence. It is further asserted that even as per the statement of the complainant, the father of the prosecutrix, she was more than seventeen years of age at the time of occurrence. The prosecutrix had an affair with appellant No. 1, Narinder, and with the purpose of getting married, they eloped as reflected in the FIR, lodged by the father of the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix is a consenting party. No injury on the person of the prosecutrix was noticed by Dr. Jaya Goel, who examined the prosecutrix. Lastly, it is contended that the prosecutrix did not raise any alarm and or made any attempt to escape. 9. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State submits that the prosecutrix was a minor. He relies on the school leaving certificate Ex. PF, of the prosecutrix. He states that in view of the statutory provision of Section114A of the Indian Evidence Act, the assertion raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that the prosecutrix is a consenting party is of no consequence. Perusal of the statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of the prosecutrix, there is specific assertion by the prosecutrix that she was offered to eat some substance with some sedative. She was removed to some nearby location, and during her detention from 14.1.2000 to 8.2.2000, she was repeatedly raped by all the accused. The prosecution case being fully proved beyond reasonable doubt, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellants. 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record carefully. 11. The provision of Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act reads as under:- 114A. Presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape - In a prosecution for rape under clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) or clause (d) or clause (e) or clause (g) or Sub-section (20 of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped and she slates in her evidence before the Court that she did not consent, the Court shall presume that she did not consent. 12. Section 375 of the Act reads as under:- 375. 12. Section 375 of the Act reads as under:- 375. Rape.--A man is said to commit "rape" who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the six following descriptions:-- First:--Against her will. Secondly:--without her consent. Thirdly:--With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt. Fourthly:--With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly:--With her consent, when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Sixthly:--With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age. Explanation:--Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. Exception:--Sexual intercourse by a man with his wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape. 13. The evidence on record would show that this is not a case of consensual sexual intercourse. The offence of rape, as defined in Section 375 IPC, provides that a man is guilty of committing rape, when he has a sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the six descriptions given in the Section. Thus, when a person has a sexual intercourse against the will of a woman, without her consent and even with her consent, when the consent is obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt etc., then it will be a rape. Thus, where the consent is obtained by putting a lady or any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or hurt, then sexual intercourse would be termed as rape. The prosecutrix in her deposition has specifically named the accused and deposed that she was taken to the house of Binder by both the accused Narender and Binder. Both the accused committed rape upon her after showing her knife. The prosecutrix in her deposition has specifically named the accused and deposed that she was taken to the house of Binder by both the accused Narender and Binder. Both the accused committed rape upon her after showing her knife. When she raised an alarm, her mouth was gagged by putting handkerchief. She was kept in a room from 14.1.2000 to 8.2.2000 and was repeatedly raped by the accused one by one on the point of knife. Her version also would receive support from the evidence of Dr. Jaya Goel, P.W.9, who had opined that the prosecutrix was subjected to sexual intercourse and as per FSL report Ex. PL, human semen was detected on her Salwar, underwear, Swab and slides. The plea of absence of mark of injury would not mean much as obviously, prosecutrix was subjected to sexual intercourse by showing knife and there may not be much physical resistance for it to leave any injury mark. In any event, despite lengthy cross-examination, the defence could not get anything out of the prosecutrix, who stood by core of her testimony. The complaint in this case was lodged by the father of the prosecutrix. S.I. Vinod Kumar P.W.10, has deposed that he apprehended the accused from the Railway Station alongwith the prosecutrix. The record would show that the appellants had made a half hearted attempt to prove prosecutrix being consenting party. This can be made out from the question addressed to her while she was cross- examined. The defence had suggested to her that appellant, Narender had a love affair with the prosecutrix, but beyond suggestion, no efforts were made to substantiate this defence. No material in support of this plea was placed on record. Rather, she has stated that she resisted the accused-appellants each time, they had sexual intercourse with her, and accordingly, the appellants had forcibly subjected her to sexual intercourse. She was repeatedly being threatened by the accused. It is also urged that the story projected by her that she was taken by the appellants, showing knife would sound unnatural and improbable. These are just arguments raised by the defence, which are not supported by any positive evidence led by the prosecution. The prosecutrix has not been attributed any motive, for which she would falsely implicate the Rappel antsy She was of a vulnerable age. These are just arguments raised by the defence, which are not supported by any positive evidence led by the prosecution. The prosecutrix has not been attributed any motive, for which she would falsely implicate the Rappel antsy She was of a vulnerable age. Even if the story of the defence is considered for the sake of arguments, even then the version rendered by the accused is totally unworthy of reliance. The prosecutrix could not have been the consenting party to have sex with all the appellants. It apparently is not a case of consent but both the appellants have clearly violated the body of this young girl and have subjected her to this agony. 14. Otherwise also, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ranjit Hazarkia v. State of Assam, (1998)8 SCC 635 , has held that the version of the prosecutrix is worthy of belief and the Court can not insist upon corroboration. The relevant portion reads as under:- The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, he allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The court while appreciating the evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost on a par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extend is even more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self-inflicted, is considered to be a good witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real culprit, the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It may not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. Inferences have to be drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and not dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape of rule of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial tyranny making justice a causality. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable. 15. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable. 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. Bedem Sundara Rao, 1995 (3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 601: AIR 1996 SC 530 has held as under:- In recent years, we have noticed that crime against women are on the rise. These crimes are affront to the human dignity of the society. Imposition of grossly inadequate sentence and particularly against the mandate of the Legislature not only is an injustice to the victim of the crime in particular and the society as a whole in general but also at times encourages a criminal. The Courts have an obligation while awarding punishment to impose appropriate punishment so as to respond to the society's crime for justice against such criminals. Public abhorrence of the crime needs a refection through the court's verdict in the measure of punishment. The Courts must not only keep in view the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the victim of crime and the society at large while considering imposition of the appropriate punishment. The heinous crime of committing rape on a helpless 13/14 years old girl shakes our judicial conscience. The offence was inhumane. 16. Thus, the statement of the prosecutrix alone would be sufficient to base the conviction against the appellants, even without corroboration. As held in this case, there would not be any necessity to seek corroboration of the version of the victim of sexual offence. 17. In this case, the version of the prosecutrix has received sufficient assurance from the circumstances and the other evidence on record. The prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. The allegations against the appellants are clearly established and proved on the basis of cogent evidence on record. 18. It is also relevant to note that the appellants have not taken such a plea in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. In the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, no recovery of knife and not raising of any alarm cannot rescue the appellants. In view of the above, this Court finds no infirmity or illegality in the judgment delivered by the learned trial Court. As such, the present appeal is dismissed. Appeal allowed.