Judgment : N.K. Patil, J. The appellant, questioning the correctness or otherwise of the order impugned passed by the learned Single Judge, in Writ Petition No.3262/2006 (L-TER) dated 15th September 2011, has presented these writ appeals. 2. Along with the appeals, learned counsel appearing for appellant has also filed I.A.1/2012, seeking condonation of delay of 260 days in filing the Appeals. 3. We have heard Shri. T. Jayaram, learned counsel appearing for appellant and perused the statements made in the affidavit, accompanying the application, I.A.1/2012. 4. Learned counsel appearing for appellant submitted that the delay caused in filing the appeals has been explained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the affidavit and sufficient case is shown and the same may be accepted. 5. After perusal of the statements made in the affidavit filed in support of the application, the appellant has stated that the order impugned was passed by the learned Single Judge on 15th September 2011 and an application was filed for obtaining the certified copy of the order on 19-09-2011 and the copy was delivered on 22-10-2011. The copy of the order was forwarded to the Management in the first week of December 2011. It is further stated that the Government has appointed Managing Director of NALCO which is situated in Orissa as Managing Director of the BGML. The said copy of the order was forwarded along with parawise comments to the Managing Director who is at Orissa. Since he was the Managing Director of NALCO as well as BGML, he found it difficult to send his comments to the BGML which is situated at Kolar District. Some where in the month of June 2012, the Managing Director has instructed the management to file appeals against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 15th September 2011. Since after closure of BGML it has only skeletal staff for functioning and after receiving the said instructions from Managing Director of NALCO, he had instructed the present counsel to file appeals against the order of the learned Single Judge. The said instructions came in the first week of July 2012 and thereafter the appeals are prepared and filed and thus there is delay of 260 days in filing the appeals and the same may be condoned and the delay caused is due to bona fide reasons stated above and not an intentional one. The said instructions came in the first week of July 2012 and thereafter the appeals are prepared and filed and thus there is delay of 260 days in filing the appeals and the same may be condoned and the delay caused is due to bona fide reasons stated above and not an intentional one. It is further stated that if the delay in filing the appeals is not condoned, the appellant would be put to great hardship and inconvenience, on the other hand, no hardship or inconvenience would be caused to the other side if the delay is condoned and the balance of convenience is in favour of the appellant. Therefore, the delay may be condoned and the appeals be heard on merits. 6. After perusal of the statements made in the affidavit filed in support of the application, it is seen that that the inordinate delay of 260 days in filing the appeals has not been explained satisfactorily by assigning valid and cogent reasons. The explanation offered is in a very casual manner. Except making bald statements, no credible or trustworthy reasons are assigned for explaining the delay of 260 days in filing the appeals. Whenever there is inordinate delay, the party is bound to explain each day's delay in filing the appeals by setting out the dates and events. Further, the statement made therein is vague and ambiguous in nature. It is stated that 'somewhere' in the month of June 2012. The said vague and ambiguous statement cannot be accepted. Hence, in view of non explanation of inordinate delay in filing the appeals, in a satisfactory manner, the delay cannot be condoned nor the appellant has made out a good case to condone the delay. Hence, for the foregoing reasons, I.A.1/2012 is dismissed as misconceived. Consequently, the appeals filed by appellant are also liable to be dismissed. 7. However, in the interest of justice and equity, we have heard the learned counsel appearing for appellant on merits also for more than 45 minutes. Hence, for the foregoing reasons, I.A.1/2012 is dismissed as misconceived. Consequently, the appeals filed by appellant are also liable to be dismissed. 7. However, in the interest of justice and equity, we have heard the learned counsel appearing for appellant on merits also for more than 45 minutes. During the course of arguments, he has taken us through the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court and other material available on file, including the order passed by the learned Single Judge, which is under challenge in these appeals and vehemently submitted that the learned Single Judge is not justified in modifying the common award passed by the Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court, by setting aside the order of penalty of dismissal dated 7th June 1990 and directing to pay 25% back wages from the date of termination till the date of death of respondent No.1 and superannuation of respondent No.2 and hence, the same cannot be sustained and the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside. 8. The said submission of the learned counsel appearing for appellant cannot be accepted nor we find any substance in the said submission for the reason that, the learned Single Judge, after going through the entire material available on file has specifically observed that the Tribunal, on appreciation of the material on record, noticed that one of the witnesses by name, Sri.Murthy who was a member of the detective squad deposed against the Management and another witness by name Sri. Barland who wrote the Mahazar also deposed against the Management and further the witnesses examined by the respondents are not at all cross-examined and the Enquiry Officer, without considering the said material on record, committed an illegality in holding that the charges leveled against the respondents as proved and the Tribunal, on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove and establish the charge leveled against the respondents, particularly the charge relating to theft is of criminal nature and the same is required to be proved strictly. But, in the instant case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution does not repose confidence to hold that the charge against the respondents as proved. But, in the instant case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution does not repose confidence to hold that the charge against the respondents as proved. The said finding of the Tribunal is supported by the evidence on record and the same is in accordance with law and therefore the learned Single Judge declined to interfere with the same, but modified the common award passed by Industrial Tribunal, on the ground that the dismissal order is passed in the year 1990, the first respondent died during the pendency of the proceedings, the second respondent has attained superannuation and the appellant/Establishment is closed and therefore, the question of reinstatement of respondents will not arise. The appellant/Establishment is closed on account of losses suffered by it from the year 2001 and the respondents have not worked from the date of dismissal. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was of the view that grant of 50% back wages was on the higher side and at the same time, the charge is not proved against the respondents and they shall not go with bare hands and therefore, in order to balance the interest of both parties, modified the payment of back wages from 50% to 25%. The said reasoning given by the learned Single Judge at paragraph 4 of his order is well founded, well reasoned and well considered. We do not find any error or illegality as such committed by the learned Single Judge in passing the said order nor the appellant/Establishment has made out a good case to consider the relief sought for by it in these appeals. Therefore, the appeals filed by appellant are liable to be dismissed on merits also. 9. Accordingly, the appeals filed by the appellant are dismissed on ground of delay and laches as also on merits. In view of dismissal of I.A.1/2012 and also the appeals, the relief sought in I.A.2/2012 does not survive for consideration and accordingly I.A.2/2012 is disposed of as having become infructuous.