JUDGMENT B.S. Patil, J. These two appeals arise out of the judgment dated 13.01.2003 passed by the learned Principal Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.), Srirangapatna, in O.S. No. 43/1996. 2. R.F.A. No. 429/2003 is filed by defendant No. 6 in O.S. No. 43/1996. Whereas, R.F.A. No. 506/2003 is filed by defendants 1 to 5. The suit was filed by deceased plaintiff-respondent No. 1 in both these appeals seeking a declaration that the Sale Deed dated 27.06.1996 executed by defendant 1 to 5 in favour of defendant No. 6 in respect of 36 acres of land in Sy. No. 26 of Mogarahalli Village in Srirangapatna was null and void and not binding on the plaintiff. A further declaration was sought by the plaintiff that she was the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property apart from seeking a restraint order against the defendants by way of decree of permanent injunction from interfering with her possession and enjoyment. 3. The relationship between the parties is not in dispute. The plaintiff is the mother of defendant No. 1. Defendant Nos. 2 to 5 are her grandchildren being the sons of defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 6 is the purchaser of the property from the 1st defendant under a registered Sale Deed dated 27.06.1996. 4. The case of the plaintiff was that there was a division in the family property during the life time of her husband - Kuntegowda by way of Panchayath Palu Patti dated 02.09.1968 and in the said partition/division, the suit schedule land fell to the share of the plaintiff and her husband. Plaintiffs husband died during the year 1982. Upon his death, she came in possession of the property as absolute owner thereof. Her son the 1st defendant secured illegal entries in his name in respect of the said property which led to the plaintiff filing an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner. As the 1st defendant and his children without having any right over the suit property were asserting their right over the property and as defendants 1 to 5 sold a portion of the suit schedule property in favour of the 6th defendant by executing a registered Sale Deed dated 27.06.1996, plaintiff was constrained to file the suit seeking a declaratory relief and also for permanent injunction. 5. The suit was resisted by the defendants. Defendants 1 to 5 filed joint written statement. 5. The suit was resisted by the defendants. Defendants 1 to 5 filed joint written statement. Whereas, defendant No. 6 filed separate written statement resisting the suit. Defendants 1 to 5 contended that the suit schedule property was the ancestral property. The schedule property was allotted to the share of Kuntegowda and his wife for their maintenance. However, the possession of the property was continued with the 1st defendant who was paying maintenance to his parents. Upon the death of Kuntegowda, the 1st defendant went on paying the maintenance. The sale of 36 acres of land was effected for the family benefit of the 1st defendant and that the plaintiff had absolutely no right, title or interest in or over the suit schedule property much less its possession. He further contended that upon the death of Kuntegowda, his four sons including the 1st defendant and five daughters who had interest in the property ought to have been arrayed as parties and therefore, the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. The 6th defendant, on his part, contended that he has purchased only a portion of the land comprised in Sy. No. 26/ 1A which was sold for family necessity and that he was a bonafide purchaser in good faith. 6. Based on the pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following issues : 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the suit schedule property is the self-acquired property of her husband Kuntegowda? 2. Whether she further proves that the suit schedule property fell to the share of herself and her husband in a Panchayath Palu Patti dated 2/9/68? 3. Whether she further proves that she is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property by virtue of the Palu Patti? 4. Whether she further proves that she is in lawful possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of suit? 5. Whether she further proves that the Sale Deed dated 27/6/1996 executed by defendants 1 to 5 in the name of defendant No. 6 in respect of 36 acres out of Sy. No. 26 of Mogarahalli Village is null and void and not binding on her? 6. Whether she is entitled to the declaration and injunction sought for? 7. Whether defendants 1 to 5 prove that the suit schedule property was allotted to the plaintiff and her husband only by way of maintenance? 8. No. 26 of Mogarahalli Village is null and void and not binding on her? 6. Whether she is entitled to the declaration and injunction sought for? 7. Whether defendants 1 to 5 prove that the suit schedule property was allotted to the plaintiff and her husband only by way of maintenance? 8. Whether they further prove that the first defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property all through out? 9. Whether they further prove that they sold 36 ares out of the suit land to defendant No. 6 for family legal necessity? 10. Whether they further prove that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? 11. Whether the defendant No. 6 proves that he is a bonafide purchaser for value in good faith? 12. For what reliefs are the parties entitled? 7. On behalf of the plaintiff, the plaintiff examined herself as P.W.1 and two other witnesses were examined as P.Ws. 2 & 3. Exs. P1 to P7 were produced and marked. On behalf of the defendants, the 1st defendant - Bettegowda examined himself as D.W.1 and two other witnesses were examined as D.Ws. 2 & 3. 8. The Trial Court, having considered .the oral and documentary evidence on record, has held that the suit schedule property was the ancestral property of Kuntegowda and the same had fallen to the share of the plaintiff and her husband in the Panchayath Palu Patti effected on 02.09.1968 and that the plaintiff successfully proved .that she was its absolute owner by virtue of the Panchayat Palu Patti and also in terms of the provisions contained in Explanation 2 to Section 6 and Section 14(1) Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short, 'the Act') The Trial Court has also found that the plaintiff was able to prove her actual possession over the suit schedule property as on the date of the suit. Consequently, the Trial Court has decreed the suit declaring the absolute right of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property and also holding that the Sale Deed dated 27.06.1996 executed by defendants 1 to 5 in favour of defendant No. 6 in respect of 36 ares of land out of Sy. No. 26 was void and was not binding on the plaintiff. Consequential relief of permanent injunction has been granted. Aggrieved by this judgment and decree, the two appeals have been filed. 9. No. 26 was void and was not binding on the plaintiff. Consequential relief of permanent injunction has been granted. Aggrieved by this judgment and decree, the two appeals have been filed. 9. I have heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri S.P. Shankar appearing for the appellant (defendant No. 6) in R.F.A. No. 429/2003 and the learned Counsel Sri G.S. Bhat appearing for the appellants (defendants 1 to 5) in R.F.A. No. 506/2003 and Sri K.V. Narasimhan appearing for Jayalaxmamma - plaintiff/respondent No. 1 herein represented by her L.Rs., after her death. 10. Sri S.P. Shankar, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant in R.F.A. No. 429/2003 contends that Ex.P.7 has to be excluded from consideration as this document which is compulsorily registrable has not been registered and therefore, cannot be taken into consideration. If this document is excluded from consideration, then the very foundation for the findings recorded by the Court below would go, as the Court below has proceeded to hold that as per Ex.P.7, the property had fallen to the joint share of the plaintiff - Jayalaxmamma and her husband. 11. It is next contended by him that the Trial Court has erroneously recorded a finding that Section 14(1) of the Act is applicable to the case on hand. He further urges that the Court below erred in holding that in terms of Explanation 2 to Section 6 of the Act, the plaintiff had become the absolute owner of the property and the 1st defendant who had separated from the family was not entitled to succeed to the property left behind by his father. It is his submission that upon the death of Kuntegowda, his widow (plaintiff), his son - defendant No. 1 along with other heirs would succeed to the property of the deceased in terms of Section 8 of the Act. He has further contended that if Ex. P.7 is construed as an instrument, then the provision applicable is Section 14(2) and not Section 14(1) of the Act. 12. In support of his contention that unregistered family arrangement is inadmissible in evidence, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the following judgments: 1. Kale and Others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others, (1976) 3 SCC 119 . 2. Roshan Singh and Others Vs. Zile Singh and Others, AIR 1988 SC 881 . 3. Capt. (Now Major) Ashok Kashyap Vs. Mrs. Kale and Others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others, (1976) 3 SCC 119 . 2. Roshan Singh and Others Vs. Zile Singh and Others, AIR 1988 SC 881 . 3. Capt. (Now Major) Ashok Kashyap Vs. Mrs. Sudha Vasisht and Another, AIR 1987 SC 841 . 13. Sri G.S. Bhat, learned Counsel appearing for appellants in RFA No. 506 of 2003 contends that the entire approach of the Trial Court in proceeding on the premises that Section 14(1) and Explanation 2 to Section 6 of the Act were applicable to the facts of the present case is erroneous. If Ex.P.7 is to be relied upon, then it is Section 14(2) which is applicable and not Section 14(1). He contends that as per the recitals in Ex.P.7, the right retained by deceased Kuntegowda while effecting partition amongst himself and his son in respect of suit property was right to maintain himself and his wife and no exclusive right of maintenance is granted in favour of the plaintiff - Jayalaxmamma. He submits that in a case where the widow succeeds to husband's property even under a Will, she will not get absolute interest in the property, if a limited right is conferred under the said Will for life. She would only secure the life interest given under the Will in terms of Section 14(2) of the Act. In this connection, he has placed reliance on the following judgments: 1. Mst. Karmi Vs. Amru and Others, (1972) 4 SCC 86 . 2. Jagan Singh (Dead) Through L.Rs. Vs. Dhanwanti and Another, (2012) 2 SCC 628 . 3. Gaddam Ramakrishna Reddy and Others Vs. Gaddam Ramireddy and Another, (2010) 9 SCC 602 . 4. Muninanjappa and Others Vs. R. Manual and Another, AIR 2001 SC 1754 . 14. Sri K.V. Narasimhan, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No.1 - plaintiff vehemently contends that the effect of the document - Ex.P.7 is to earmark the property in question for the maintenance of Kuntegowda and his wife. The property is virtually retained in favour of both of them. Therefore, upon the death of Kuntegowda, the property that is the source of maintenance for his wife blossoms into an absolute right under Section 14(1) of the Act to succeed to the property. The property is virtually retained in favour of both of them. Therefore, upon the death of Kuntegowda, the property that is the source of maintenance for his wife blossoms into an absolute right under Section 14(1) of the Act to succeed to the property. He further points out that the plaintiff had pre-existing right for maintenance from her husband and in recognition of this right, it is stated in Ex.P.7 that the property shall have to be retained for himself and his wife, hence it has to beheld that upon the death of Kuntegowda, the property would pass on to his wife towards her maintenance and in terms of Section 14(1), it becomes her absolute property because she was in actual possession of the same on the death of her husband. He has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Smt. Gulwant Kaur & Another Vs. Mohinder Singh & Others, AIR 1987 SC 2251 in support of the said proposition. 15. Having carefully considered the contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the parties, in the light of the pleadings and the evidence on record, both oral and documentary, the following points arise for consideration in these appeals: 1) Whether the Trial Court has erred in placing reliance on Ex. P.7 and in recording a finding that there was partition on 06.09.1968 between Kuntegowda and his sons? 2) Whether the Trial Court was right and justified in holding that as per recitals in Ex. P. 7, the suit schedule property shall be regarded as having been earmarked for the maintenance of plaintiff - Jayalaxmamma and therefore, upon the death of her husband, the limited interest possessed by her blossomed into absolute right, in terms of Section 14(1) of the Act? 3) Whether the Trial Court erred in law in holding that the 1st defendant having separated from the family was not entitled to succeed to the estate of deceased Kuntegowda in terms of Explanation 2 to Section 6 of the Act? POINT NO. 1 16. A perusal of Ex.P.7 makes it clear that it is a Deed of Partition that brings about division of the property between the members of the family. As rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel such document requires compulsory registration, if it has to be relied upon for the purpose of proof of partition. POINT NO. 1 16. A perusal of Ex.P.7 makes it clear that it is a Deed of Partition that brings about division of the property between the members of the family. As rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel such document requires compulsory registration, if it has to be relied upon for the purpose of proof of partition. But in the instant case, the fact that there was a partition in the family effected by Kuntegowda and his sons is not in dispute. Indeed, in the written statement filed, defendants 1 to 5 have admitted that there was a division under Panchayat Palu Patti dated 02.09.1968 and the schedule property was allotted to the share of Kuntegowda for supporting himself and his wife. The Trial Court has placed reliance on this document holding that for collateral purpose, the document could be looked into. It has looked into the document only for the purpose of finding out the nature of the right given to plaintiff - Jayalaxmamma. It has rightly found that as defendants 1 to 5 had admitted the division of the property and the fact that the suit property had fallen to the share of the father and mother of the 1st defendant, question of non-registration of the document Ex.P.7 pales into insignificance. Therefore, no fault can be found in the approach adopted by the Trial Court in proceeding to look into the document Ex.P.7 for the limited purpose of appreciating and understanding the right claimed by the plaintiff with regard to her maintenance by referring to Ex.P.7 in this regard. Hence, point No. 1 is answered accordingly. POINT NO. 2 & 3 17. A perusal of Ex.P.7 for the purpose of understanding the right conferred on the plaintiff would clearly show that the parties to the Deed did not give the suit property for maintenance of the plaintiff Jayalaxmamma. Indeed Kuntegowda, the head of the family has retained this property so as to support himself and his wife. He has virtually taken this property as his share to maintain himself and his wife. There is nothing in the document Ex.P.7 to show what should happen to the property upon his death. He has not stated that upon his death, this land should go to his wife towards her maintenance, far from saying that during his life time itself the property was given to her for her maintenance. There is nothing in the document Ex.P.7 to show what should happen to the property upon his death. He has not stated that upon his death, this land should go to his wife towards her maintenance, far from saying that during his life time itself the property was given to her for her maintenance. The argument advanced by the learned Counsel for plaintiff - respondent No. 1 is that the recital in this document made to the effect that the property has been retained by Kuntegowda for maintaining himself and his wife is sufficient to hold that the entire property was earmarked for the maintenance of his wife upon his death cannot be accepted. In the absence of any intention expressed either by Kuntegowda or by the other parties to the document that the entire property, upon the death of Kuntegowda shall be retained by Jayalaxmamma towards her maintenance, question of applying the provision contained in Section 14(1) of the Act to hold that once Kuntegowda died, the right vested in the plaintiff for her maintenance gets blossomed into absolute right in her favour does not arise. 18. To press into service, the provisions contained under Section 14(1) of the Act, it is necessary to establish that the female Hindu possessed the property, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act. In the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that Jayalaxmamma had acquired the property. There is nothing in the document Ex.P.7 to show that either before or after Kuntegowda's death the property was to serve as source of maintenance for the wife i.e., Jayalaxmamma. Hence, the right that Jayalaxmamma acquires in the property upon the death of her husband is the right to succeed to the same along with other heirs of Kuntegowda. The property was not given to her for her maintenance. 19. Sri K.V. Narasimhan, learned Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of V. Tulasamma and Others Vs. V. Sesha Reddi (dead) by LRs, (1977) 3 SCR 261 . The question that fell for consideration in the said case was as to whether property given to a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance under an instrument which in so many terms restricted the nature of the interest given to her in the property was governed by Section 14(1) or by Section 14(2) of the Act. The question that fell for consideration in the said case was as to whether property given to a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance under an instrument which in so many terms restricted the nature of the interest given to her in the property was governed by Section 14(1) or by Section 14(2) of the Act. In that context the Apex Court has held that Explanation to sub-section (1) includes within the scope of that sub-section property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition or in lieu of maintenance where the instrument, decree, order or award giving the property to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance would contain a provision prescribing restricted estate in the property. 20. The facts and circumstances of the present case, do not disclose that the suit property was given to the plaintiff towards her maintenance. The recital in Ex.P.7 makes it clear that the property was retained by Kuntegowda towards his share and the reason why he had retained this property for himself is expressed by him stating that it was retained for the support and maintenance of himself and his wife. This cannot be construed to mean that the entire suit schedule property was earmarked for the maintenance of Jayalaxmamma, the plaintiff in recognition of her pre-existing right. Such a construction is neither permissible nor warranted in the wake of the facts of the case keeping in mind the recitals in Ex.P7. Such an inference will lead to serious consequences inasmuch as the other natural heirs who would normally succeed, as per Section 8 of the Act, upon the death of the member of the family, would be deprived of their share and the entire property will exclusively go to plaintiff. This intention is not expressed in the document Ex.P.7, nor can it be presumed to have ensued in the present case, by referring to Section 14(1) of the Act. In the case of Smt. Gulwant Kaur & Another Vs. Mohinder Singh & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 2251 on which reliance is placed by Sri Narasimhan, the facts involved therein disclosed that the husband and wife were estranged and living separately. The husband had entrusted to the appellant - wife the land in dispute and agreed to pay 100/- per month towards her maintenance. Mohinder Singh & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 2251 on which reliance is placed by Sri Narasimhan, the facts involved therein disclosed that the husband and wife were estranged and living separately. The husband had entrusted to the appellant - wife the land in dispute and agreed to pay 100/- per month towards her maintenance. Later on, the husband sold the said land to the plaintiff, who filed the suit for injunction against the wife. In that context, the Apex Court held by referring to sub-sections (1) & (2) of Section 14 of the Act that the property acquired in lieu of maintenance ripens into full ownership because such acquisition is traceable to an antecedent right. In the instant case, the plaintiff was not in possession of the property pursuant to or in recognition of her right to maintenance. She has come in possession of the property after the death of her husband. It is not her case that during the life time of her husband, she was put in possession of the property in recognition of her right towards her maintenance. Therefore, the said decision of the Apex Court has no application to the facts of the present case. 20. The Trial Court by wrongly construing the provisions contained in Explanation 2 to Section 6 of the Act, as it stood earlier to amendment has held that the other heirs particularly, defendant No. 1 herein who is the son of Kuntegowda is excluded from the right to succeed to the property left behind by his father as he had separated from the family earlier. It is necessary, at this stage, to refer to Section 6 of the Act, as it stood earlier. It reads as under: "6. When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenery property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenery and not in accordance with this Act: Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative, specified in that class who claims, through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenery property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. Explanation I.-For the purpose of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Explanation 2.-Nothing contained in the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself from the coparcenery before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein. This section may be read with Sections 8 and 30 of the Act." 21. The exclusion contemplated under Explanation 2 to Section 6 of the Act comes into operation when the coparcenary continues to exist after one of the members separates from the family by taking his share. In the instant case, there is no coparcenary in existence. The father and the sons have separated from the family. In fact, this aspect is dealt with by the learned Author Mulla in his treatise Hindu Law. Reference can be usefully made to the commentary and the illustrations given at page 774 of Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law, Sixteenth Edition by Sunderlal T. Desai. The two illustrations which bring out the purport and tenor of Explanation 2 to Section 6 are extracted as under: (1) A and his sons B and C constitute a Mitakshara coparcenary. B separates himself from the family and takes his one-third share of the coparcenary property. A and C continue to be joint as before. A dies intestate in 1958 leaving him surviving his daughter D and his two sons. On A's death A's interest in the coparcenary will not devolve upon C by survivorship, but by operation of the proviso it will devolve by succession upon C and D in equal shares (Section 8). B will have no claim for any share in the same. He will, however, be entitled to a share in the separate or self-acquired property left by A. (see illustration (P) on p.771 supra). (2) A and his son B (by his first wife) constitute a Mitakshara coparcenary. B separates from his father and takes his one-half share in the coparcenary property. He will, however, be entitled to a share in the separate or self-acquired property left by A. (see illustration (P) on p.771 supra). (2) A and his son B (by his first wife) constitute a Mitakshara coparcenary. B separates from his father and takes his one-half share in the coparcenary property. A dies intestate thereafter leaving him surviving his second wife W, two daughters C and D by his first and second wife respectively and his divided son B. There being no coparcenary in existence at the death of A this section will have no application and the property left by A will devolve by succession under Section 8 on W, C, D and the divided son B in equal shares. 22. It is very clear from illustration 2 referred to above that there being no coparcenary in existence at the time of death of Kuntegowda, Explanation 2 to Section 6 will have no application and the property left behind by Kuntegowda will devolve by succession under Section 8 of the Act in favour of his heirs i.e., widow and children. Therefore, point Nos. 2 & 3 are answered accordingly holding that the Trial Court is grossly in error in understanding the scope of Section 14(1) of the Act and Explanation 2 to Section 6 of the Act. 23. In the result, these two appeals are allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court is set aside. The suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent herein is dismissed. It is made clear that upon the death of Kuntegowda, the suit property would devolve by succession under Section 8 among all the heirs of Kuntegowda including the plaintiff and the 1st defendant. As the plaintiff has not arrayed the other heirs of Kuntegowda to this suit, this Court will not hazard the exercise of referring to the exact share to which each one of them are entitled. Parties to bear their respective costs.