ORAL ORDER Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsels for the State and private respondent nos. 2 and 3. 2. The petitioner seeks quashing of the order dated 16.9.2005 passed in Pre-litigation Case No. 121 of 2005 as also the order dated 4.3.2008 passed by Permanent Lok Adalat, Buxar in Misc. Case No. 3 of 2006. 3. The facts of the case are that the lands under dispute bearing Khata Nos. 108 and 109, plot Nos. 1981 and 1980 having total area 35 ¾ decimals in village Ahirauli, P.S. Buxar (Industries) District-Buxar were sold by respondent no.2 through registered sale deed dated 25.7.2005 for Rs. 77,000/- to respondent no.3. The respondent no. 3 thereafter got the land mutated in his name by order dated 8.8.2005 of the Circle Officer. The petitioner being the boundary raiyat, filed an application under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 on 26.8.2005 claiming pre-emption of the land before the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Buxar which was registered as Ceiling Case No. 7/2005-06. The DCLR after issuing notice to the respondent no. 3 and hearing the parties, allowed the case by order dated 22.9.2005 and the respondent no. 3 was directed to execute a sale deed in favour of the petitioner with respect to the disputed lands. 4. In the meantime, the respondent no. 2 filed a Pre-litigation Case No. 121/2005 before the so called Permanent Lok Adalat, Buxar on 6.9.2005 against the respondent no.3 for declaration that the sale deed dated 25.7.2005 executed by respondent no. 2 in favour of respondent no.3 is without consideration and, accordingly, the respondent no. 3 has no right and title over the land in dispute. The petitioner was not made party in the said Pre-litigation case nor the pendency of Ceiling Case No. 7/2005-06 was mentioned therein, allegedly in collusive manner in order to defeat the pre-emption case with a mala fide intention. The respondent no. 3 appeared in the matter even without the notice dated 13.9.2005 being received by him, on 16.9.2005 along with an application of compromise and on the same date the compromise petition was moved and accepted by the Lok Adalat and the case was allowed in terms of the compromise decree. The respondent no. 3 appeared in the matter even without the notice dated 13.9.2005 being received by him, on 16.9.2005 along with an application of compromise and on the same date the compromise petition was moved and accepted by the Lok Adalat and the case was allowed in terms of the compromise decree. The petitioner filed an application in Pre-litigation Case No. 121/2005 stating the concealment of the ceiling case and fraud played upon the Lok Adalat and requested to implead him as party. The application was allowed on 1.3.2006. When the respondents raised objection to the maintainability of the application, the Lok Adalat directed the petitioner to withdraw the application and file a fresh Misc. Case. Accordingly, the application was withdrawn on 10.11.2006 and Misc. Case No. 3/2006 for setting aside the compromise order passed in Pre-litigation Case No. 121/2005 was filed. 5. In the meantime, the respondent nos. 2 and 3 challenged the order of the DCLR passed in Ceiling Case No. 7/2005, by filing Ceiling Appeal No. 145/2005-06, 31/2005-06, 178/2005-06 and 38/2005-06 before the Collector, Buxar. The said appeals were allowed by order dated 12.1.2007 by the Additional Collector holding that since the sale deed dated 25.7.2005 was set aside by the order of the Lok Adalat on the basis of compromise between the parties and the DCLR had accepted the claim of pre-emption on the basis of such sale deed being valid, therefore, only after it is declared as legal by any competent Court any order of pre-emption can be passed in favour of the petitioner. The order of the DCLR was, accordingly, set aside by the Additional Collector, Buxar. Against the order dated 12.1.2007, the petitioner has filed Ceiling Revision before the Divisional Commissioner which is pending. It is further alleged that during the pendency of Miscellaneous Case No. 3/2006, the respondent no. 2 again sold the land to another person, namely, Akhilesh Rai through a registered sale deed dated 7.3.2007. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there has been gross abuse of the process of law by the respondents by filing pre-litigation case before the Lok Adalat with the sole purpose to frustrate the ceiling case. 7. 2 again sold the land to another person, namely, Akhilesh Rai through a registered sale deed dated 7.3.2007. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there has been gross abuse of the process of law by the respondents by filing pre-litigation case before the Lok Adalat with the sole purpose to frustrate the ceiling case. 7. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction to entertain a case that is filed directly before it and it only acquires jurisdiction and can take cognizance of cases on reference being made by the Courts to it under Section 20(1) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 or on a reference being made by the Authority or Committee organizing the Lok Adalat under Sub-Section (2) of Section 20 of that Act. 8. It is submitted that it is not open to the Lok Adalat to directly entertain any Pre-litigation case filed before it since mere nomenclature as Permanent Lok Adalat, Buxar would not have made it a true Permanent Lok Adalat established under Section 22-B of the Legal Services Authorities Act. It is submitted that such Permanent Lok Adalats can be established only with respect to a public utility service which has been defined in the Act itself and would include any other service which the Central Government or the State Government may by notification declare to be a public utility service. It is submitted that the present Pre-litigation Case No. 121/2005 certainly does not relate to any public utility service and thus could not have been directly instituted before the Lok Adalat. It is thus, urged by learned counsel that any proceedings pursued on a wrongful assumption of jurisdiction by the so called Permanent Lok Adalat, Buxar can only be non-est and without any authority of law. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that even on merits, the proceedings before the Lok Adalat cannot be utilized so as to affect 3rd party rights which has been sought to be done in the present case by getting the decree on compromise with the respondent nos. 2 and 3 without impleading the petitioner or making any reference to the proceedings of the pre-emption case which has serious effect on the case of the petitioner and led to setting aside of the pre-emption order passed by the DCLR at the appellate stage. 10. 2 and 3 without impleading the petitioner or making any reference to the proceedings of the pre-emption case which has serious effect on the case of the petitioner and led to setting aside of the pre-emption order passed by the DCLR at the appellate stage. 10. Learned counsels for the respondent nos. 2 and 3, on the other hand, submit that the Permanent Lok Adalat has jurisdiction under Section 22-C of the Act to take cognizance of any case even before the dispute cropped up before any Court on an application being made for settlement of the dispute and thus the action of the Permanent Lok Adalat, Buxar cannot be considered to be contrary to law. 11. In support of the aforesaid stand, learned counsels rely upon a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Panna Lal Prasad Vs. Manoj Kumar Gupta & Anr.: 2012 (3) PLJR 579 , in paras 9 and 12 to 14 of which it has been held as follows: “9. In the case of Interglobe Aviation Limited Vs. N. Satchidanand 2011 (7) SCC 463 , the Apex Court has held at paragraph 32 and 33 as follows : - “32. We may also at this juncture refer to the confusion caused on account of the term Permanent Lok Adalat being used to describe two different types of Lok Adalats. The LSA Act refers to two types of Lok Adalats. The first is a Lok Adalat constituted under Section 19 of the Act which has no adjudicatory functions or powers and which discharges purely conciliatory functions. The second is a Permanent Lok Adalat established under Section 22-B(1) of the LSA Act to exercise jurisdiction in respect of public utility services, having both conciliatory and adjudicatory functions. The expression “Permanent Lok Adalat” should refer only to Permanent Lok Adalats established under Section 22-B(1) of the LSA Act and not to the Lok Adalats constituted under Section 19. However, in many States, when Lok Adalats are constituted under Section 19 of the LSA Act for regular or continuous sittings (as contrasted from periodical sittings), they are also called as Permanent Lok Adalats even though they do not have adjudicatory functions. 33. However, in many States, when Lok Adalats are constituted under Section 19 of the LSA Act for regular or continuous sittings (as contrasted from periodical sittings), they are also called as Permanent Lok Adalats even though they do not have adjudicatory functions. 33. In LIC v. Suresh Kumar 2011 (7) SCC 491 , this Court observed : “It is needless to state that Permanent Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction or authority vested in it to decide any lis, as such, between the parties even where the attempt to arrive at an agreed settlement between the parties has failed.” The said decision refers to such a “Permanent Lok Adalat” organized under Section 19 of the Act and should not be confused with Permanent Lok Adalats constituted under Section 22-B(1) of the Act. To avoid confusion, the State Legal Services Authorities and the High Courts may ensure that Lok Adalats other than the Permanent Lok Adalats established under Section 22-B(1) of the Act in regard to public utility services, are not described as Permanent Lok Adalats. One way of avoiding the confusion is to refer to the Lok Adalats constituted under Section 19 of the Act on a regular or permanent basis as “Continuous Lok Adalats”. Be that as it may.” “(12) In the case of State of Punjab and Others Vs. Ganpat Raj 2006 (8) SCC 364 , the Apex Court has held at paragraph 7 as follows : “7. The specific language used in sub-section (3) of Section 20 makes it clear that the Lok Adalat can dispose of a matter by way of a compromise or settlement between the parties. Two crucial terms in sub-sections (3) and (5) of Section 20 are “compromise” and “settlement”. The former expression means settlement of differences by mutual concessions. It is an agreement reached by adjustment of conflicting or opposing claims by reciprocal modification of demands. As per Terms de la Ley, “compromise is mutual promise of two or more parties that are at controversy”. As per Bouvier it is “an agreement between two or more persons, who, to avoid a law suit, amicably settle their differences, on such terms as they can agree upon”. The word “compromise” implies some element of accommodation on each side. It is not apt to describe total surrender. A compromise is always bilateral and means mutual adjustment. “Settlement” is termination of legal proceedings by mutual consent. The word “compromise” implies some element of accommodation on each side. It is not apt to describe total surrender. A compromise is always bilateral and means mutual adjustment. “Settlement” is termination of legal proceedings by mutual consent. The case at hand did not involve compromise or settlement and could not have been disposed of by the Lok Adalat. If no compromise or settlement is or could be arrived at, no order can be passed by the Lok Adalat. Therefore, the disposal of Civil Writ Petition NO.943 of 2000 filed by the respondent is clearly impermissible.” 13. In view of the above settled principle of law, the Permanent Lok Adalat can pass award only on the basis of agreement between the parties, i.e., compromise. If there is no compromise, the Permanent Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction to pass any order. No Lok Adalat has the power to hear parties to adjudicate cases as a Court does. The Act does not contemplate nor require an adjudicatory judicial determination, but a non-adjudicatory determination based on a compromise or settlement arrived at by the parties with guidance and assistance from Lok Adalat. “Award” of Lok Adalat does not mean any independent verdict or opinion arrived at by any decision making process. The making of Award is merely an Administrative Act of incorporating the terms of compromise in the form of an executable order under the seal of Lok Adalat. It cannot be said that so far the Misc. case is concerned, now there will be compromise between the parties. Therefore, the Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction to settle the present dispute raised by the present petitioner and, therefore, the learned Court below has rightly dismissed the Misc. application. Therefore, the Award of the Permanent Lok Adalat will never bind the present petitioner. 14. In the Division Bench of this High Court referred to above, it has clearly been held that as proposition of law, it is well established that a person who was not party, the proceeding will not be bound by any order passed therein unless he / she was impleaded through a representative like karta or an authorized agent who may in appropriate situation represent others.” 12. It is also urged by learned counsels that the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the order of the Lok Adalat as it was made between respondent nos. 2 and 3. 13. It is also urged by learned counsels that the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the order of the Lok Adalat as it was made between respondent nos. 2 and 3. 13. I have considered the submissions of learned counsels for the parties. It appears that much of the mischief in matters before the Lok Adalats are being caused by designating them as Permanent Lok Adalats, a fact which has been noticed by the Apex Court in the case of Interglobe Aviation Limited Vs. N. Satchidanand: (2011) 7 SCC 463 quoted in the Panna Lal Prasad’s case (supra). 14. It is evident that in so far as the present matter is concerned, the Lok Adalat of Buxar was not certainly functioning as Permanent Lok Adalat as no matter relating to a public utility service was there before it rather a dispute between the two private parties relating to a sale deed was involved. Such matter cannot come within the jurisdiction of Permanent Lok Adalat rather they would be only within the purview of Lok Adalat established under Section 19 of the Act. Such Lok Adalat cannot directly entertain a case or an application unless the matter in question is referred to the Lok Adalat either by the Court or by the Legal Services Authority or Committee organizing the Lok Adalat in terms of Section 20 (1) and (2) of the Legal Services Authorities Act. It is thus, evident that the very institution of Pre-litigation case No. 121/2005 by the respondent no. 2 before the Lok Adalat, Buxar was uncalled for and the direction by the Lok Adalat to initiate, register and admit the case was completely without jurisdiction. Thus any further action taken by the Lok Adalat including the final order passed would also be without jurisdiction. 15. So far as the stand of the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the order dated 16.9.2005 passed by the Lok Adalat is concerned, the same does not appear to be correct as the said order substantially affected the petitioner in pre-emption case as on the basis of the order dated 16.9.2005 of the Lok Adalat, Buxar the Additional Collector in the Ceiling Appeal has set aside the order of pre-emption passed by the LRDC in favour of the petitioner. 16. 16. So far as the reliance by learned counsels for the respondents on Panna Lal Prasad’s case (supra) is concerned, the case, in fact, goes against the respondents. It is evident that the Lok Adalat in question in the present matter is not a Permanent Lok Adalat. Moreover it has been held in the Panna Lal Prasad’s case (supra) that any such order by the Lok Adalat cannot bind a 3rd party which was not before the Lok Adalat. If that proposition is taken into consideration then the Additional Collector in the Pre-emption Appeal could not have set aside the order of the DCLR on the basis of any compromise order passed by the Lok Adalat in a case in which only respondent nos. 2 and 3 were parties but not the petitioner as no such award or decree would affect the right of the petitioner. 17. Be that as it may, since the Pre-litigation case No. 121/2005 itself has been held by me to be without jurisdiction, the entire proceedings of the case including the order dated 16.9.2005 are quashed. The consequential order dated 4.3.2008 in Misc. Case No. 3/2006 shall also stand quashed. 18. In view of the mischief that is being caused due to wrong nomenclature of Permanent Lok Adalat being used by the Lok Adalats in the various districts of the State including in the present matter and various other matters brought before this Court, it would be appropriate that the Bihar State Legal Services Authority takes prompt action in the matter in terms of the observations of the Apex Court in Interglobe Aviation Limited case (supra) and ensures that such wrong nomenclature is removed so far as the Lok Adalats having regular and continuous status in the districts are concerned and give an appropriate name to them as suggested in the aforesaid decision or any other name which may not cause any confusion in the minds of the litigant public as to the legal status of such Lok Adalat. 19. The writ application is allowed with the aforesaid observations and directions. 20. Let copies of the order be sent to the Chairman and the Secretary respectively of the Bihar State Legal Services Authorities.