JUDGMENT By Court.-The petitioner has approached this Court seeking a direction for payment to him, the retiral benefits including the amount of G.P.F., gratuity, leave encashment, group insurance, etc. of one Gayatri Prasad Burnwal. 2. The brief facts shorn of unnecessary details are that, one Gayatri Prasad Burnwal, who was appointed on compassionate ground on 12.07.1994, died on 24.10.2008. She executed a Will in favour of the petitioner on 12.04.2007 and the said Will was probated on 10.10.2012. She had also submitted an application on 19.03.2007 in the office and filled in the GPF Form nominating the petitioner in presence of two witnesses namely, Suresh Singh, Junior Field Investigator and Anil Dubey, B.S.S. In these facts, the petitioner has claimed that the retiral dues of said Gayatri Prasad Burnwal should be given to him. 3. A counter-affidavit has been filed denying the claim of the petitioner on the ground that, one Pratima Kumari, who was the adopted daughter of the said Gayatri Prasad Burnwal, has also raised a similar claim. 4. Heard counsel for both the parties and perused the documents on record. 5. Mr. K.P. Deo, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that, since the name of the petitioner was nominated by the deceased employee namely, Gayatri Prasad Burnwal in the GPF Form and she executed a Will in favour of the petitioner wherein also it has been specifically stated that the petitioner is nominated for receiving the retiral benefits of the said Gayatri Prasad Burnwal and since, the said Will has been probated by a competent Court of law therefore, the petitioner is entitled for payment of the retiral dues of the Gayatri Prasad Burnwal, to him. 6. Per contra, Mr. A.K. Mishra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State has submitted that, since there is a dispute with respect to the legal heir of the deceased employee, the claim of the petitioner was not finalised. He has further submitted that even the nomination in favour of the petitioner in the GPF Form is suspicious. The alleged Will though has been probated, one Pratima Kumari, who claimed herself the adopted daughter of the deceased employee, was never noticed in the probate proceeding and therefore, the claim of the petitioner cannot be accepted. 7. Mr. He has further submitted that even the nomination in favour of the petitioner in the GPF Form is suspicious. The alleged Will though has been probated, one Pratima Kumari, who claimed herself the adopted daughter of the deceased employee, was never noticed in the probate proceeding and therefore, the claim of the petitioner cannot be accepted. 7. Mr. Sudarshan Shrivastava, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.7 has submitted that, 'nomination' of a person only indicates the hand which will receive the amount and it does not confer any right in the person so nominated, to claim ownership of the amount. The learned counsel has referred to judgments reported in (1984) 1 SCC 424 and (1991) 1 SCC 725 . 8. Having considered the rival submissions, I am of the opinion that the short point involved in this case is, “what is the effect of nomination of the petitioner to receive the retiral benefits?” 9. The word “nomination” has been defined in the Black's Law Dictionary as “1. The act of proposing a person for election or appointment. 2. The act of naming or designating a person for an office, membership, award, or like title or status.” In the Halsbury's Law Dictionary also, the word “nomination and payment out on death” has been discussed as under: 189. “Nomination and payment out on death: A holder of stock registered on the National Savings Stock Register, if he was a holder who has attained the age of 16, had power to make a nomination before 1 May 1981 directing that, on his death, his interest in any stock then held by him and registered in his name should devolve on the persons specified, and in the portions or fractions specified, in the nomination. Where, on the death of the holder of any stock so registered, any payment is made in accordance with the law of the place where the holder resided at the date of his death, the payment is to be deemed to have been duly made unless, before the payment was made, the Director of Savings had been notified in writing that the holder was at that time domiciled elsewhere. Subject to certain exceptions, the production of a statement from the Commissioners of Inland Revenue as to the payment of tax chargeable on death is required before any payment or transfer may be made on the death of a holder the aggregate value of whose specified assets exceeds £50,000. In the case of stock so registered the Director of Savings may require evidence to be given to his satisfaction of the identity of any person or the title of any person to any stock, document or money. A statement or information that a person has not been heard of for seven years or more may be accepted as conclusive proof of death. Where the value of the holding at the time of the holder's death does not exceed £50,000 or, as the case may be, the amount due to the depositor at the time of his death does not exceed £50,000 exclusive of interest, payment may be made to the appropriate person entitled without requiring probate or letters of administration.” 10. The legal effect of nomination was considered as early as in the year, 1924 in “Aimai Vs. Awabai Dhanjishaw Jamsetii and Ors.”, reported in AIR 1924 Sind 57. In the said case, the nomination made by one Master, a widower at the relevant time in favour of his only daughter, Aimai was questioned by his second wife and other children from second wife who survived him, claiming the amount of provident fund being the estate of the deceased and thus, to be given to the widow (second wife, Awabai). The Court held that the nominee does not get any right or title by virtue of nomination alone. The Court has observed thus, “I should hesitate, unless the words of the Statute and of the rules framed thereunder were explicit, to suppose that the perpetration of such unnatural injustice was rendered obligatory on a subscriber to a Provident Fund. Nor can I conceive why the Provident Fund should wish to introduce so strange a law of inheritance. I do not find in the Statutes anything which renders it obligatory for me to take this view. The object of Section 4, as amended by Act IV of 1903, is to render the fund incapable of attachment in the hands of the nominee for debts due by the subscriber. I do not find in the Statutes anything which renders it obligatory for me to take this view. The object of Section 4, as amended by Act IV of 1903, is to render the fund incapable of attachment in the hands of the nominee for debts due by the subscriber. It is true that the Legislature uses the word “vest” but that word does not necessarily connote title. A person, in whom the property of another vests, has the same rights of dominion over the property as the owner wold have had, no more and no less. But no one has the right to deal with his property so as to defeat the legal claims of others.” 11. In “Hardial Devi Ditta Vs. Janki Das and Anr.”, reported in AIR 1928 Lahore 773, it has been held that, “Nomination would not amount to a Will or a gift or trust in favour of the nominee. The nominee would only get the right to receive the amount and he holds the amount for the benefit of the heirs.” 12. In “D. Mohanavelu Mudaliar and Anr. Vs. Indian Insurance & Banking Corporation Ltd. Salem and Anr.”, reported in AIR 1957 Mad 115 the scope of Section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938 was considered and the Court has held as under, “So far as nomination is concerned we do not see any appreciable difference between the English and American Laws on the one hand, and what obtains in our country. According to the English Law the payee or the nominee is nothing more than an agent to receive the money, which money remains as the property of the assured and at his disposal during his life time and on his death forms part of the estate. The result is that the payee or the nominee takes no beneficial interest in it.” 13. In “Ramballav Dhandhania Vs. Gangadhar Nathmall”, reported in AIR 1956 Cal. 275 , the Court has held that nomination only indicates the person who should receive the money when the owner dies. The receiver of money is not the owner of the money. He is only authorized to collect money. The nominee does not become the owner of the money. Section 39 (6) of Insurance Act uses the words “shall be payable” to such nominee. The receiver of money is not the owner of the money. He is only authorized to collect money. The nominee does not become the owner of the money. Section 39 (6) of Insurance Act uses the words “shall be payable” to such nominee. Thus, the Insurance Act does no more than to make the nominee, a receiver to receive the money from the insurance policy, without deciding the question of title. The said view has been affirmed by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in “Sarojini Amma Vs. Neelakanta Pillai”, reported in AIR 1961 Kerala 126. 14. The petitioner has brought on record a copy of application dated 09.03.2007 written by Gayatri Prasad Barnwal and a copy of the Form under First schedule to the Bihar G.P.F. Rules, 1948 wherein his name appears as the “nominee”. Relying on these documents the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that insofar as, the amount of G.P.F. is concerned, the petitioner is entitled to receive the same. As noticed hereinabove, the law relating to nomination of a person has been settled by a catena of judgments. In “Shipra Sengupta Vs. Mrinal Sengupta and Others”, reported in (2009) 10 SCC 680 , the issue was “whether nomination of mother by a member of a provident fund before his marriage confers ownership on the nominee and destroys the right of succession of the widowwife under the Succession Act?”, and the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the amount under any head can be received by the nominee but the amount can be claimed by the heirs of the deceased in accordance with the law of Succession governing them. 15. In “Sarbati Devi (Smt) and Anr. Vs. Usha Devi (Smt)”, reported in (1984) 1 SCC 424 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, “A mere nomination made under Section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1939 does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorized to receive the amount on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with law of succession governing them.” 16. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorized to receive the amount on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with law of succession governing them.” 16. Taking note of the judgment in “Sarbati Devi”, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Vishin N. Khanchandani Vs. Vidya Lachmandas Khanchandani”, reported in (2000) 6 SCC 724 , has held thus, 13. “.................... the law laid down by this Court in Sarbati Devi holds the field and is equally applicable to the nominee becoming entitled to the payment of the amount on account of National Savings Certificates received by him under Section 6 read with Section 7 of the Act who in turn is liable to return the amount to those in whose favour the law creates a beneficial interest, subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of Section 8 of the Act.” 17. From the aforesaid judgments, there cannot be any manner of doubt that the nomination of a person does not entitle the person to become the owner of the property. A nominee holds the property only for executing or distributing the property amongst the legal heirs and the entitlement of the property has to be decided according to the law of succession. From the facts as disclosed in the writ petition, it does not appear that the petitioner falls under the category of legal heir. It is also not clear whether the claim of Pratima Kumari as legal heir of the deceased employee has been accepted by any Court and therefore, the claim raised by the petitioner cannot be entertained even for the purpose of distribution amongst the legal heirs. 18. Next is the question of legal effect of probate of a Will or grant of Letters of Administration. The effect of probate of a Will has been considered in “Kashi Nath Singh Vs. Dulhin Gulzari”, reported in AIR 1945 Patna 475, wherein Shearer, J. has held as under, “In an application for probate of a Will or for the grant of Letters of Administration with a copy of the Will annexed the sole question that arises is whether or not the Will is a true one. Dulhin Gulzari”, reported in AIR 1945 Patna 475, wherein Shearer, J. has held as under, “In an application for probate of a Will or for the grant of Letters of Administration with a copy of the Will annexed the sole question that arises is whether or not the Will is a true one. It is not open to the Probate Court to decide whether or not the property with which a testator has purported to deal, in fact, belonged to him........” 19. In “Birj Nath De Vs. Chander Mohan Banerji”, reported in (1897) ILR 19 AH. 458, it has been held that it is much safer in the interests of the public that issues as to the title of the property should be decided when the issues are raised in the regular suit and not on an application for grant of probate. The application of caveator was rejected holding that caveator who claims no interest in the property otherwise than by the reason of his alleged title by prescription had no right to be heard by the Probate Court. 20. In “John Simon Vs. George John”, reported in AIR 1955 Trav Co 177, 179, T.K. Joseph, J. observed thus, 9. “As regards the argument that the application is a transparent device to secure from the Probate Court a decision upon a disputed question of title to the properties, it is difficult to see how a decision in the Probate Court can at all operate to help the parties one way or the other in a contested title suit. The grant of probate or Letters of Administration is decisive only of the genuineness of the Will and the right of the person to whom the grant is made to represent the estate. It is impossible to say, therefore, that the grant of probate or Letters of Administration with a copy of the Will annexed would be at all a bar to the determination of any question of title or to a suit for construction of the Will. The fact that third parties may have acquired rights in the properties can be no ground for refusing probate or letters of administration as the one cannot prejudice or be prejudiced by the other.” 21. In “Ishwardeo Narain Singh Vs. The fact that third parties may have acquired rights in the properties can be no ground for refusing probate or letters of administration as the one cannot prejudice or be prejudiced by the other.” 21. In “Ishwardeo Narain Singh Vs. Kamta Devi & Ors.”, reported in AIR 1954 SC 280 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under, “The Court of Probate is only concerned with the question as to whether the document put forward as the last Will and testament of a deceased person was duly executed and attested in accordance with law and whether at the time of such execution the testator had sound disposing mind. The question whether a particular bequest is good or bad is not within the purview of the Probate Court. It is surprising how this elementary principle of law was overlooked by both the Courts below. However, as learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has not sought to support this ground nothing further need be said on that.” 22. In “Chiranjilal Srilal Goenka Vs. Jasjit Singh and Ors.”, reported in (1993) 2 SCC 507 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court after taking note of decision in “Ishwardeo Narain Singh” (supra) has held as under, 15. “..........Therefore the only issue in a probate proceedings relates to the genuineness and due execution of the Will and the Court itself is under duty to determine it and preserve the original Will in its custody. The Succession Act is a self-contained Code insofar as the question of making an application for probate, grant or refusal of probate or an appeal carried against the decision of the Probate Court. This is clearly manifested in the bascule of the provisions of the Act. The probate proceedings shall be conducted by the Probate Court in the manner prescribed in the Act and in no other ways. The grant of Probate with a copy of the Will annexed establishes conclusively as to the appointment of the executor and the valid execution of the Will. Thus it does no more than establish the factum of the Will and the legal character of the executor. Probate Court does not decide any question of title or of the existence of the property itself.” 23. Thus, it is clear that merely because the Will executed by Gayatri Prasad Burnwal has been probated, the petitioner cannot claim ownership over the retiral dues of the deceased employee. Probate Court does not decide any question of title or of the existence of the property itself.” 23. Thus, it is clear that merely because the Will executed by Gayatri Prasad Burnwal has been probated, the petitioner cannot claim ownership over the retiral dues of the deceased employee. Coming to the question of entitlement of the petitioner insofar as pension/ family pension is concerned, I find that an employee during his lifetime cannot nominate a person for family pension as the exemployee would have no claim over the family pension and therefore, he cannot make a testamentary disposition bequeathing family pension to a person. 24. In “G.L. Bhatia Vs. Union of India and Anr.”, reported in (1999) 5 SCC 237 , though the nomination by the wife, a Central Government servant, was not in favour of the husband, as the relationship between the two was estranged and both were staying separately, the Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the contention that, since the nomination was not in favour of the husband he was not entitled for family pension. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, since there was no divorce between the husband and wife, even though they were staying separately, the husband would be entitled to the family pension in terms of the rules and the authorities therefore, committed error in not granting family pension to the husband on the ground of the nomination made by the deceased wife. 25. In “Smt. Violet Issaac and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors.”, reported in (1991) 1 SCC 725 , when the widow made an application for grant of family pension though, due to strained relationship her husband had nominated his brother to receive the retiral benefits and also executed a Will in favour of his brother bequeathing all his properties to him, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the family pension scheme is to provide relief to the widow and minor children of the deceased employee and since the rules do not provide for nomination of any person by the deceased employee during his lifetime for the payment of family pension, the deceased employee had no title to the same and therefore, he should not have disposed of the same by nominating his brother by testamentary disposition. 26. 26. In the present case, there is no conclusive evidence brought on record which would establish the claim of any person as the legal heir of the said Gayatri Prasad Burnwal, though, one Pratima Kumari has raised a claim as the adopted daughter of the said Gayatri Prasad Burnwal, and she has made serious allegations against the petitioner. I am of the view that no direction can be issued in favour of the petitioner even to receive the amount of retiral benefits of the said Gayatri Prasad Burnwal. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Supreme Court, the petitioner cannot claim a right of ownership over the retiral benefits of Gayatri Prasad Burnwal on the basis of his nomination and the Will executed by Gayatri Prasad Burnwal. 27. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this writ petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.