Mansoor, J.— 1. Appellants through the medium of appeal on hand have invoked jurisdiction of this Court in terms of Section 39 of the Jammu and Kashmir Arbitration Act, 2002, (1945 A.D.) (for short, Act 2002) questioning judgement dated 10.02.2010 (for short, impugned judgment) passed by learned Single Judge in A.A. No. 50 of 2001 on the grounds taken in the memo of appeal. 2. Tenders were invited for construction of O.T.M. Accommodation Phase-I and Phase-II at Akhnoor under Contract No. CEUZ 46/1987-88. Respondent herein being successful bidder was allotted the said contract. The dispute arose in between the parties and the matter was referred to the sole Arbitrator, namely, Sh. T.K. Miltal nominated by the appellants, who entered upon the reference and passed a detailed speaking Award. 3. The Award came to be filed in this Court by the sole Arbitrator and consequently notices were issued to the parties. Appellants resisted the Award by filing objections. Objections to the same were also filed by the claimant-respondent. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues came to be framed vide order dated 08.03.2002:- "1. Whether the Arbitrator has mis-conducted himself or the proceedings, if so, to what effect? OP Objector. 2. If the award is otherwise invalid? OPP 3. Relief." 5. Appellants-objectors were asked to lead evidence and file affidavits, which they did not do and vide order dated 12.02.2004 four weeks last and final opportunity was granted to them to file affidavits. Despite last and final opportunity, they failed to file the affidavits. Accordingly, their right to file the same was closed vide order dated 29.04.2004. 6. It was the appellants-objectors, who had to plead and prove the misconduct in terms of issue No.1, which they failed. Having noticing failure of the appellants to discharge their duties despite various opportunities, learned Single Judge made Award dated 30.06.2001 passed by the sole Arbitrator, namely, Sh.T.K. Mittal in respect of contract agreement No.CEUZ-46/1987-88, rule of the Court. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that learned Single Judge has not taken into consideration the fact that sole Arbitrator had not completed the arbitration proceedings within the timeframe. Neither said ground has been taken in the objections filed by the appellants nor was there any issue to that effect. 8. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that learned Single Judge has not taken into consideration the fact that sole Arbitrator had not completed the arbitration proceedings within the timeframe. Neither said ground has been taken in the objections filed by the appellants nor was there any issue to that effect. 8. It is worthwhile to mention herein that the appellants have also not taken that ground in the memo of the appeal. Moreso, they have not raised any such objection right from the expiry of time of one year, i.e., from the date when Arbitrator entered upon the reference, till the filing of appeal on hand. Thus, they cannot raise this ground at this stage. 9. It is profitable to reproduce Section 28 of Chapter V of the Jammu and Kashmir Arbitration Act, 2002 (1945 A.D.) herein:- "28. Power to Court only to enlarge time for making award:- (1) The Court may, if it thinks fit, whether the time for making the award has expired or not and whether the award has been made or not, enlarge from time to time, the time for making the award. (2) Any provision in any arbitration agreement whereby the arbitrator or i umpire may, except with the consent of all the parties to the agreement, enlarge the time for making the award, shall be void and of no effect." 10. Parties have consented for extension of time, participated and contested the arbitration proceedings before learned Single Judge as discussed herein above, as such, they are precluded to take this ground at this stage. Our this view is fortified by the judgment passed by the Apex Court in case titled Hindustan Steels Works Construction Ltd. V.C. Rajasekhar Rao reported in (1987) 4 SCC 93 , wherein in para No. 2, it is held as under: - "2. He, however, firstly contends that the award was made beyond time. He further contends that the umpire had no jurisdiction to proceed with the arbitration on or about 18th of December, 1984 as the period of two months from the date of his entering upon the reference viz, October 20, 1984 had expired on December 18,1984. According to the said objections, the umpire became functus-officio. He further contends that the umpire had no jurisdiction to proceed with the arbitration on or about 18th of December, 1984 as the period of two months from the date of his entering upon the reference viz, October 20, 1984 had expired on December 18,1984. According to the said objections, the umpire became functus-officio. It was contended that the power to extend the period of passing the award was vested in the court alone under section 28 of the Arbitration Act and it was not permissible for the parties to extend the time. We are unable to accept this position. Mr. Markendeya drew our attention to certain observations of this Court in the case of Stale of Punjab v. Hardyal. He relied on the observations of the Court at page 656 and emphasized that law precludes parties from extending time after the matter had been reffered to the arbitrator, it would be contradiction in terms to hold that the same result could be brought about by the conduct of the parties. These observations, in our opinion, are out of the context. The policy of law is that the arbitration proceedings should not be unduly prolonged. The arbitrator therefore has to give the award within the time prescribed or such extended time as the court concerned may in its discretion extend and the court alone has been given the power to extend time for giving the award. The court has got the power to extend time even after the award has been given or after the expiry of the period prescribed for the award. But the court has to exercise its discretion in a judicial manner. In that case this Court found that the High Court was justified in taking the view that it did. This power, however, could be exercised even by the appellate court. In view of the policy of law that the arbitration proceedings should not be unduly prolonged and in view of the fact that the parties have been taking willing part in the proceedings before die arbitrator without a demur and had all along been willing to extend time, this will be a fit case, in our opinion, for the extension of time. We accordingly extend the time for giving the award and the award will be deemed to have been given in time. We accordingly extend the time for giving the award and the award will be deemed to have been given in time. In this case, it appears that under section 28 and in the light of section 3 of the First Schedule the patties are allowed to extend the time. In this connection reference may be made to H.K. Wattal v. V.N. Pandya, where this Court reiterated that sub-section (2) of section 28 indicated one exception to the above rule that the arbitrator could not enlarge the time, and that was when the parties agreed to such an enlargement. It is clear this Court reiterated that the arbitrator gets the jurisdiction to enlarge the time for making the award only in a case where after entering on the arbitration the parties to the arbitration agreement consent to such enlargement of time. In this case precisely it happened. Furthermore the parties have proceeded before the umpire on that basis which is just and proper and-farther more the time should be extended as was done in the case of State of Punjab v. Hardyal. In the aforesaid view of the matter we are unable to accept the submission on behalf of Shri Markendeya that the award of the umpire was beyond time." 11. We are also fortified by the view taken by the Apex Court in case titled Nagar Palia, Mirzapur v. The Mirzapur Elect. Supply Co. Ltd. reported in AIR 1990 SC 2273 wherein it is held in Para No. 5 as under- "5. Dr. Ghosh further pointed out that the time for arbitration expired on 31st December, 1970 and the Award was made by the Arbitrator 27 days late on 27.01.1971 without formal extension of time. This argument does not appeal to us. The conduct of the parties is a major factor to waive the extension of time given by the Court. The time be taken as extended." 12. The grounds projected in the objections filed by the appellants have not been proved or substantiated, thus, learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the objections of the objectors and made Award dated 30.06.2001 passed by the sole Arbitrator, namely, Sh. T.K. Mittal in respect of contract agreement No. CEUZ-46/1987-88, rule of the Court. 13. The grounds projected in the objections filed by the appellants have not been proved or substantiated, thus, learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the objections of the objectors and made Award dated 30.06.2001 passed by the sole Arbitrator, namely, Sh. T.K. Mittal in respect of contract agreement No. CEUZ-46/1987-88, rule of the Court. 13. In the given circumstances, we are of the considered view that learned Single Judge has passed a legal and well reasoned Judgment dated 10.02.2010 which needs no interference. Accordingly, this CIMA is dismissed along with connected CMA, if any.