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2013 DIGILAW 1262 (RAJ)

Islam v. State of Rajasthan

2013-07-12

MAHESH CHANDRA SHARMA

body2013
JUDGMENT 1. - Appeal No. 319 of 1991 has been filed by accused appellants Islam, and Rahman, and Appeal No. 310 of 1991 has been filed by the accused appellants Roozdar, Parmal, Nijarli, Bhoormal and Hurmat against the judgment dated 19.8.1991 of Additional Sessions Judge Kishangarhbas in Sessions Case No. 34/1989, whereby the accused appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under: (1) Islam, (2) Rahman, (3) Parmal, (4) Nirjarli, (5) Bhoormal, and (6) Hurmat- Under Section Sentence 147 I.P.C. 1 month R.I. 148 I.P.C. 3 months R.I., fine Rs. 100/- 323 I.P.C. 3 months R.I., fine Rs. 100/- In default 2 months further R.I. on each count. Roozdar- Under Section Sentence 147 I.P.C. 1 month R.I. 148 I.P.C. 3 months R.I., fine Rs. 50/- 307 I.P.C. 5 Years' R.I., fine of Rs. 100/- 3/25 of Arms Act 3 months R.I., fine Rs. 50/- In default of payment of fine 3 months R.I. 2. Since both these appeals relate to common judgment dated 19.8.1991, they are being disposed by this common judgment. 3. Brief facts.of the case are that an F.I.R. was lodged by Jurudeen on 14.4.1989 at Police Station Kishangarhbas. The same was registered as F.I.R. No. 71/1989 for the offence under Sections 147, 148, 149, 447, 307 and 323 I.P.C. against the accused appellants. The police after investigation filed challan in the Court against the accused appellants. As per the prosecution case Khursheed, Batool and Firoza had sustained firearm injuries while other injured were Jurudeen, Asroo, Sheru and Alishar. From the side of the accused party cross F.I.R. No. 72/1989 was registered for the offence under Sections 147,148, 335, 326 and 323 I.P.C. read with Section 149 I.P.C. From the side of accused party Rahman, Nijarli and Varmal were the injured persons. The trial Court framed the charge under Sections 147, 148, 307/149, 323 and 447 I.P.C. against the accused appellants. The accused appellants denied the charges and claimed to be tried. The prosecution produced 22 documents to prove their case. The statements of accused appellants were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. After hearing both the sides, the trial Court vide judgment dated 19.8.1991 convicted and sentenced the accused appellants as mentioned above. Against the said order and judgment these two appeals have been filed. 4. Mr. Samarath Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the accused appellants has contended that the prosecution witness PW-12 Dr. Against the said order and judgment these two appeals have been filed. 4. Mr. Samarath Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the accused appellants has contended that the prosecution witness PW-12 Dr. M.K. Singhal has no where in his statement stated that the injuries caused to the injured were sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. He has also read over the statements of other relevant witnesses of the prosecution which do not fulfill the ingredients of Section 307 I.P.C. It was prayed by the learned counsel for the accused appellants that the conviction of the appellant Roozdar should be altered from Section 307 I.P.C. to 308 I.P.C. 5. In support of his contentions, he has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Munna v. State of Rajasthan, reported in Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 1984 page 529 .Relevant paras are reproduced as under : "5. The question that next arises is with regard to the offence that can be said to have been committed by the accused appellant. The submission of Shri Bhartiya was that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the only offence which can be said to have been committed was falling under Section 308 I.P.C. and that the Additional Sessions Judge has erred in convicting the accused appellant for the offence under Section 307 I.P.C. In this connection Shri Bhartiya has invited my attention to the statement of Dr. Y.K. Sharma PW-6 and has pointed out that Dr. Y.K. Sharma stated that the injury sustained by Jafar Mohd. was sufficient to cause death, but it has not been stated by Dr. Sharma that the said injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 6. I have perused the statement Of Dr. Y.K. Sharma and I find that during the course of examination-in-chief he has stated that the injury found after operation could result in death. Dr. Sharma has not stated that injury that was found on the person of Jafar Mohd., was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 6. I have perused the statement Of Dr. Y.K. Sharma and I find that during the course of examination-in-chief he has stated that the injury found after operation could result in death. Dr. Sharma has not stated that injury that was found on the person of Jafar Mohd., was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In the circumstances it cannot be said that if Jafar Mohd., had died, the appellant would have been guilty of the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. In the facts and circumstances of the case the offence that would have been made out against the appellant in case Jafar Mohd., had died, would have been culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 I.P.C., inasmuch as the appellant could only be attributed with the intention to cause an injury which was likely to cause death. The conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 307 I.P.C., cannot, therefore, be sustained and he can only be held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 308 I.P.C." 6. It was held in the aforesaid paras that Doctor not stating that the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, the conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 307 I.P.C. cannot, therefore, be sustained and he can only be held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 308 I.P.C. He has further requested that looking to the fact that occurrence took place on 1.4.1989, which is about 24 years ago from today and there were six appellants, who are old persons, accused appellant Roozdarsh has remained in confinement for about 6 months and three days; accused appellants, Islam, Rahman, Parmal, Nijarli, Bhoormal and Hurmat have remained in confinement for about 7 days; the appellants should be released on probation and if not, then for the period already undergone by them in confinement, as indicated here-in-above. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants has also placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Jodh Singh v. State of Rajasthan reported in 1984 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 730 .The learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on Naib Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in 1986 Cri.L.J. 2061 . 7. Learned counsel for the appellants has also placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Jodh Singh v. State of Rajasthan reported in 1984 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 730 .The learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on Naib Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in 1986 Cri.L.J. 2061 . Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Naib Singh v. State, of Punjab, reported in 1986 Cri.L.J. 2061 , observed as under: "Accordingly, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The judgment of the High Court convicting the appellant under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code is upheld. As to the sentence, we are inclined to take a lenient view. We are informed that the appellant is a Teacher in a Government School. The circumstances brought out by the prosecution evidence show that he acted in the heat of the moment. Looking to the fact that the incident occurred on 22.4.1973, some 13 years back, we do not think it desirable to send the appellant back to jail. We accordingly reduce the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year awarded by the High Court to imprisonment till the rising of the Court and pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- or in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months. The amount of fine shall be deposited in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Muktsar within a period of one month from today. The amount, if recovered, shall be paid lo the complainant Darshan Singh by way of compensation. Appeal dismissed." 8. He has further placed reliance on Gulab Das & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2011) 10 SCC 765 . He has further placed reliance on Rajendra Harakchand Bhandari & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., AIR 2011 SC 1821 . The appeal Court in Rajendra Harakchand Bhandari (supra), in para 16 observed as under: "16. We must immediately state that the offence under Section 307 is not compoundable in terms of Section 320(9) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and therefore, compounding of the offence in the present case is out of question. However, the circumstances pointed out by the learned senior counsel do persuade us for a lenient view in regard to the sentence. The incident occurred on 17.5.1991 and it is almost twenty years since then. However, the circumstances pointed out by the learned senior counsel do persuade us for a lenient view in regard to the sentence. The incident occurred on 17.5.1991 and it is almost twenty years since then. The appellants are agriculturists by occupation and have no previous criminal background. There has been reconciliation amongst parties; the relations between the appellants and the victim have become cordial and prior to the appellants' surrender, the parties have been living peacefully in the village. The appellants have already undergone the sentence of more than two and a half years. Having regard to these circumstances, we are satisfied that ends of justice will be met if the substantive sentence awarded to the appellants is reduced to the period already undergone while maintaining the amount of fine." 9. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State has opposed the same. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the relevant material on record including the impugned judgment. I have also perused the statement of Dr. M.K. Singhal (PVV-I3), which evinces that he has not stated that injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Thus, the only offence, which can be said to have been committed by the accused appellant Roozdar is falling under Section 308 I.P.C. and not under Section 307 I.P.C. The trial Court has erred in convicting the accused appellant Roozdar for the offence under Section 307 I.P.C, Ends of justice would be met in sentencing the accused appellant Roozdar for Section 308 I.P.C. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not think it proper to release the accused appellants on probation, E contra, the ends of justice would be met if the sentence of the other appellants including the appellant Roozdar for other sections is reduced for the period already undergone by them in confinement, as indicated above. 11. For these reasons, both the appeals an disposed of with the following directions: (i) The appeals filed on behalf of accused appellants Roozdar, Islam, Rahman, Parmal, Nijarli, Bhoormal and Hurmat are partly allowed; (ii) The conviction of the accused appellant Roozdar is altered from Section 307 I.P.C. to Section 308 I.P.C. The conviction of the other appellants is maintained for the offences mentioned above. (iii) The sentence of accused appellants is reduced to the period already undergone by them in confinement, as indicated above. (iv) The accused appellants are on bail. They need not surrender and their bail bonds stand cancelled. Impugned judgment stands modified, as indicated above.Appeal partly allowed. *******