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2013 DIGILAW 1267 (DEL)

AMAR SINGH VERMA v. UNION OF INDIA

2013-07-10

VALMIKI J.MEHTA

body2013
JUDGMENT VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL) 1. This writ petition is filed by the petitioner-Mr. Amar Singh Verma seeking quashing of the orders passed by the Departmental Authority imposing the punishment of dismissal from service upon the petitioner. 2. Petitioner was an employee of the respondent No.2/ Indian Nursing Council. By the memorandum dated 1.12.1995, and which was accompanied by the Article of Charges and imputation of misconduct with the facts, enquiry proceedings were initiated against the petitioner. There were a total of three Articles of Charges against the petitioner. The sum and substance of the charges against the petitioner was that when he was functioning as an Assistant Secretary (Admn.) of the respondent No.2 during the period 1992-95 he wrongly granted affiliation/recognition to Gandhi Memorial Medical Training Institute and College, Pathankot although the same was beyond his powers. There are also charges of issuance of communication dated 15.9.1992 to the said college for starting the General Nursing Training Course as a special case. Petitioner is also guilty of addressing a communication allowing 27 first year general Nursing students to appear in examinations. Petitioner was also found guilty of writing letters to V.V.I.Ps such as the Governor of Himachal Pradesh, Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh and Registrar of Himachal Pradesh Nursing Registration Council to derecognize the Himachal Pradesh State Nursing Registration Council. Petitioner is also charged with writing a number of communications at his own level without proper authority to over a dozen of institutions as stated in Article II of charges. Petitioner has been charged with acting in a manner to favour these institutions stated in Article II. Petitioner is also charged with joining hands with one Mrs. R.D. Verma in making manipulations to make it appear that recognition had been secured by the Gandhi Memorial Medical Training Institute and College and which aspect was adversely commented upon by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in W.P. No.1537/1993. In sum and substance, the petitioner is charged with doing various acts not falling in the scope of his powers/duties. 3. Enquiry proceedings culminated by passing of the report by the Enquiry Officer dated 23.4.1997 which reads as under:- “ENQUIRY REPORT AGAINST SHRI A.S. VERMA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY (ADMINISTRATION), INDIAN NURSING COUNCIL The undersigned is appointed to hold an enquiry against Shri A.S. Verma, Assistant Secretary (Admn.), Indian Nursing Council vide Order No.20-12/89-INC, dated 26-6-1996. 3. Enquiry proceedings culminated by passing of the report by the Enquiry Officer dated 23.4.1997 which reads as under:- “ENQUIRY REPORT AGAINST SHRI A.S. VERMA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY (ADMINISTRATION), INDIAN NURSING COUNCIL The undersigned is appointed to hold an enquiry against Shri A.S. Verma, Assistant Secretary (Admn.), Indian Nursing Council vide Order No.20-12/89-INC, dated 26-6-1996. The enquiry committee meetings were held on 8th August, 18th Dec. And 27th December, 1996 in which Smt. Kanta Sangar, Presenting Officer and Shri A.S. Verma, Charged Officer attended the meetings and Mrs. A.K. Ahluwalia, Vice President of Indian Nursing Council, Mrs. R. Gujral, Secretary, Indian Nursing Council also participated as witnesses. Shri Verma was asked whether he was given specific powers to discharge the statutory functions of Indian Nursing Council other than the administrative work. Shri Verma replied that he was not specifically given any order allowing him to discharge statutory functions of the Indian Nursing Council. Smt. Kanta Sangar presented the case of Shri A.S. Verma and read out the article of charges in the Chargesheet. The records of the Indian Nursing Council were produced the undersigned that Shri Verma showed undue favour to Gandhi Memorial Medical Training Institute and College, Registration Council, Shimla to registrar Gandhi Memorial Medical Training Institute and College, Pathankot with their official communication. The approval of competent authorities were not taken before issue of such letters and thereby violating the provisions of the Indian Nursing Council Act, 1947. Further records were showed that Shri A.S. Verma addressed letters to the Governor, Himachal Pradesh, Health Commissioner-cum-Health Secretary, Government of Himachal Pradesh to allow 27 1st Year General Nursing Students of the Gandhi Memorial Medical Training Institute, Pathankot to appear in September/October, 1993 exams conducted by Himachal Pradesh State Nursing Registration Council. These letters were also issued by Shri A.S. Verma without approval from any higher authorities. Records were shown by the Presenting Officer that Shri A.S. Verma had written to the number of Nursing Institutions located in Bangalore, Nellore, Hoogly informing that their Institutions have been included in the list of recognized Institutions prepared by the Indian Nursing Council. These letters were also addressed by Shri Verma without approval of the competent authorities. The Charge under article 3 relates to High Court of Himachal Pradesh and Supreme Court of India judgments and the undersigned has no comments to offer. These letters were also addressed by Shri Verma without approval of the competent authorities. The Charge under article 3 relates to High Court of Himachal Pradesh and Supreme Court of India judgments and the undersigned has no comments to offer. In the light of the foregoing paragraphs, the charges against Shri A.S. Verma, Assistant Secretary (Admn.), Indian Nursing Council in articles (1) and (2) are proved based on the records shown to the undersigned. (D. THANAPAUL) INQUIRY OFFICER” 4. A reference to the aforesaid report shows that during the course of enquiry proceedings the petitioner replied that he was not specifically given any order allowing him to discharge the statutory functions of the Indian Nursing Council. The Enquiry Officer’s report also shows that the records of the Indian Nursing Council were produced to show the favours given by Mr. Verma to Gandhi Memorial Medical Training Institute and College, Pathankot. The record also shows that the approval by the competent authorities was not taken before writing letters to various authorities for recognizing of the said Gandhi Memorial College. Record also reveals that the petitioner addressed letters to the Governor of Himachal Pradesh as also the Health Commissioner-cum- Health Secretary of Government of Himachal Pradesh to allow 27 first Year General Nursing students to appear in examination. Record was also perused and shown to the Enquiry Officer with respect to writing of letters to over a dozen institutions as mentioned in Article of Charges and which was beyond the powers of the petitioner. Letters were issued without approval of the competent authorities. 5. Before proceeding further, It is necessary at this stage to refer to the ratio of the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India and Ors. Vs. Narendra Kumar Pandey 2013 (2) SCC 740 . In this judgment the Supreme Court has held that once the record comes before the Enquiry Authority, there is no formal need to prove the said record. Supreme Court has observed that strict rules of Evidence Act do not apply in departmental proceedings. It was held that in exparte proceedings charges would stand proved from the documents which were maintained in the normal course of business and no oral evidence is necessary to prove those documents. Putting it differently it is held that uncontroverted documentary evidence in such situation is sufficient to prove the charges. It was held that in exparte proceedings charges would stand proved from the documents which were maintained in the normal course of business and no oral evidence is necessary to prove those documents. Putting it differently it is held that uncontroverted documentary evidence in such situation is sufficient to prove the charges. On the facts of that case Supreme Court held that documents which were not controverted by the charged official were sufficient in themselves to prove the charges against the officer concerned. Supreme Court has reiterated that in departmental enquiries, Disciplinary Authority is expected to see that the charges are proved not beyond all reasonable doubt but only on preponderance of probabilities. Paras 22 and 23 of the said judgment read as under:- “22. We are of the view that the High Court also committed an error in holding that since no witness was examined in support of charges, it was a case of no evidence. In an ex parte inquiry, in our view, if the charges are borne out from documents kept in the normal course of business, no oral evidence is necessary to prove those charges. When the charged officer does not attend the inquiry, then he cannot contend that the Inquiring Authority should not have relied upon the documents which were not made available or disclosed to him. of course, even in an ex parte inquiry, some evidence is necessary to establish the charges, especially when the charged officer denies the charges, uncontroverted documentary evidence in such situation is sufficient to prove the charges. 23. The Inquiring Authority has examined each and every charge levelled against the charged officer and the documents produced by the presenting officer and came to the conclusion that most of the charges were proved. In a departmental inquiry, the disciplinary authority is expected to prove the charges on preponderance of probability and not on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Reference may be made to the judgments of this Court reported in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur and R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab. The documents produced by the bank, which were not controverted by the charged officer, supports all the allegations and charges levelled against the charged officer. Reference may be made to the judgments of this Court reported in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur and R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab. The documents produced by the bank, which were not controverted by the charged officer, supports all the allegations and charges levelled against the charged officer. In a case, where the charged officer had failed to inspect the documents in respect of the allegations raised by the bank and not controverted it is always open to the Inquiring Authority to accept the same. (underlining added). 6. The Supreme Court in the case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Vs. K.S. Gandhi and Ors. (1991) 2 SCC 716 has held that strict rules of Evidence Act and the standards of proof envisaged therein do not apply to departmental proceedings in a domestic Tribunal and it is open to the authorities to receive and place on record documents and acceptable materials which are strictly not in conformity with the Evidence Act. It has also been held that there is no requirement of Enquiry Officer writing a judgment like a Judge of a Court. Supreme Court further clarifies in this judgment that when facts are not in dispute then recording of reasons in support of the conclusions does not violate the principles of natural justice. The relevant paras of this judgment are paras 17, 22, 32, and 37 and which read as under:- “17. The students involved at the examination of secondary education are by and large minors but that by itself would not be a factor to hold that the students were unfairly treated at an inquiry conducted during the domestic inquiry. Assistance of an Advocate to the delinquent at a domestic enquiry is not a part of the principles of naturaljustice. It depends on the nature of the inquiry and the peculiar circumstances and facts of a particular case. The regulations and the rules of enquiry specifically excluded the assistance of an Advocate at the inquiry. Therefore, the omission to provide the assistance of a counsel at the inquiry is not violative of the principles of natural justice. The show cause notice furnished wealth of material particulars on which the tampering was alleged to be founded and given the opportunity to each student to submit the explanation and also to adduce evidence, oral or documentary at the inquiry. The show cause notice furnished wealth of material particulars on which the tampering was alleged to be founded and given the opportunity to each student to submit the explanation and also to adduce evidence, oral or documentary at the inquiry. Each student submitted the explanation denying the allegation. At the inquiry the questionnaire in the pro-forma was given to each student. It is undoubted that the allegation of fabrication was stated to have been done at the behest of either the student/parents or guardians and the parents or guardians were not permitted to participate in the inquiry. Inspection of documents was given. Their answer-sheets and marks secured were perused by the students and were asked to testify whether the answer-books belongs to him or her and to identify the marks awarded by the examiner to each answer to the question and the total marks awarded. It was also asked to verify and state whether the moderator's marks-sheets were tampered in the concerned subject or subjects as the case may be. The student could easily identify and in fact identified his or her answer books and verified the marks awarded and answered positively that the marks were fabricated in the moderators' mark-sheets. The questionnaire was also given to indicate their educational background in the previous school years and also the marks they expected at the final examinations. The need of the assistance of the parents/guardians was thus absolutely nil. Further question in the proforma was to ascertain from the students, due to tampering, whether or not the marks were increased to his or her advantage. It could be answered by a mere look at the marks. No outside assistance is needed. All the students have admitted that the answer books belong to them. They also admitted the marks initially awarded by the examiner or added or subtracted, if any, by the moderat Ors. They also admitted that the fabrication in the moderators' marks-sheets in the subject or subjects and the marks were increased to their advantage. They also denied the complicity of him or her or of parents or guardians. It is not the case of the respondents that they were coerced to answer the questions in a particular manner. It is obvious from the record that they had prior consultations with the counsel. They also denied the complicity of him or her or of parents or guardians. It is not the case of the respondents that they were coerced to answer the questions in a particular manner. It is obvious from the record that they had prior consultations with the counsel. Thus it could be seen that the procedure adopted at the inquiry is fair and just and it is not vitiated by any procedural irregularity nor is violative of the principles of natural justice. The absence of opportunity to the parents or guardians, in this background does not vitiate the legality or validity of the inquiry conducted or decision of the Committee. 22. From this perspective, the question is whether omission to record reasons vitiates the impugned order or is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The omnipresence and omniscience of the principle of natural justice acts as deterrence to arrive at arbitrary decision in flagrant infraction of fair play. But the applicability of the principles of natural justice is not a rule of thumb or a straight jacket formula as an abstract proposition of law. It depends on the facts of the case nature of the inquiry and the effect of the order/decision on the rights of the person and attendant circumstances. It is seen from the record and is not disputed, that all the students admitted, the talcum of fabrication and it was to his or her advantage and that the subject/subjects in which fabrication was committed belong to him or her. In view of these admissions the Inquiry Officer obviously did not find it expedient to reiterate all the admissions made. If the facts are disputed, necessarily the authority or the Inquiry Officer, on consideration of the material on record, should record reasons in support of the conclusion reached. Since the facts are admitted, the need to their reiteration was obviated and so only conclusions have been stated in the reports. The omission to record reasons in the present case is neither illegal, nor is violative of the principles of natural justice. Whether the conclusions are proved or not is yet another question and would need detailed consideration. …………. …………. 32. The omission to record reasons in the present case is neither illegal, nor is violative of the principles of natural justice. Whether the conclusions are proved or not is yet another question and would need detailed consideration. …………. …………. 32. It was held that in evaluating the evidence of circumstantial nature it is the duty of the prosecution that all the circumstances must be fully established circumstances should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. This standards of proof also is not relevant nor to be extended to consider the evidence in an inquiry by the domestic tribunal. .................................... 37. It is thus well settled law that strict rules of the Evidence Act, and the standard of proof envisaged therein do not apply to departmental proceedings or domestic tribunal. It is open to the authorities to receive and place on record all the necessary, relevant, cogent and acceptable material facts though not proved strictly in conformity with the Evidence Act. The material must be germane and relevant to the facts in issue. In grave cases like forgery, fraud, conspiracy, misappropriation, etc. seldom direct evidence would be available. Only the circumstantial evidence would furnish the proof. In our considered view inference from the evidence and circumstances must be carefully distinguished from conjectures or speculation. The mind is prone to take pleasure to adapt circumstances to one another and even in straining them a little to force them to form parts of one connected whole. There must be evidence direct or circumstances to deduce necessary inferences in proof of the facts in issue. There can be no inferences unless there are objective facts, direct or circumstantial from which to infer the other fact which it is sought to establish. In some cases the other facts can be inferred with as much practical as if they had been actually observed. In other cases the inferences do not go beyond reasonable probability. If there are no positive proved facts, oral, documentary or circumstantial from which the inferences can be made the method of inference fails and what is left is mere speculation or conjecture. Therefore, when an inference of proof that a fact in dispute has been held established there must be some material facts or circumstances on record from which such an inference could be drawn. Therefore, when an inference of proof that a fact in dispute has been held established there must be some material facts or circumstances on record from which such an inference could be drawn. The standard of proof is not proof beyond reasonable doubt "but" the preponderance of probabilities tending to draw an inference that the fact must be more probable. Standard of proof cannot be put in a straight Jacket formula. No mathematical formula could be laid on degree of proof. The probative value could be gauged from facts and circumstances in a given case. The standard of proof is the same both in civil cases and domestic enquiries.” (underlining added). 7. It may also be mentioned that it is settled law that this Court will interfere with the findings and conclusions of the Disciplinary Authority only if the findings are against the rules of the organization or the findings are perverse or against the principles of natural justice. This Court while hearing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not sit as an appellate Court to re-apprise the findings of facts and conclusions arrived at in departmental proceedings, and unless clear cut perversity is shown, findings in the departmental proceedings are not interfered with. Keeping the aforesaid legal parameters in mind let us turn to the facts of this case. 8. The enquiry report has already been reproduced above and which shows that the petitioner did not dispute that he was not given any order allowing him to discharge the statutory functions of the respondent No.2. Surely grant of recognition to a college, allowing classes to start or holding of examinations or directing deregistration of a State Council are all functions which would solely be in the realm of the functions of the Executive Council of the respondent No.2. No individual officer obviously, unless he is able to show a resolution of the Executive Council of delegation to him or such a rule of the organization, can exercise powers of recognition of a college or allowing commencement of classes or allowing holding of the examinations or directing that there should be deregistration of a State body by writing letters to the Governor or Chief Minister or the Secretary of the State. In fact, the ultra vires acts of the petitioner were adversely commented upon by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in its judgment passed in W.P.(C) No.1537/1993. Surely, records of the respondent No.2 itself or of the Court are not such documents which in departmental proceedings require to be proved only through witnesses as is done in the civil court. Technical rules of evidence of civil court of proving of documents do not apply in departmental proceedings, and more so when the petitioner/charged official admitted that he had no powers which could statutorily be only exercised by the Executive Council of respondent No.2. Though counsel for the petitioner did try to make an endeavour to argue that the enquiry report wrongly records the admission of the petitioner however the only way in which this aspect could have been challenged was by making of a representation to this effect before the Disciplinary Authority. Admittedly, to the Disciplinary Authority no such representation was made that the enquiry officer has wrongly recorded the admission of the petitioner. In fact, counsel for the petitioner admits that to the show cause notice dated 25.4.1997 issued by the Disciplinary Authority no representation/response was given by the petitioner. It is alleged on behalf of the petitioner that no representation was given because the time given by the show cause notice was too short, however, there is nothing on record that the petitioner asked the Disciplinary Authority to give him more time because time given was short. Therefore this argument now raised that no reply could be given to the show cause notice because of the short time is an afterthought argument and the same stands rejected. 9. On behalf of the petitioner, it was sought to be argued before me that the petitioner has not been given an opportunity to lead evidence or cross examine the witnesses and therefore the proceedings have to fail on account of violation of principles of natural justice. Reliance in this regard is placed upon para 14 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation and Anr. Vs. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee (1980) 3 SCC 459 and which reads as under:- “14. The appellant is a Corporation constituted under the Uttar Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation (Act 28) of 1956, which was subsequently replaced by the Central Act 58 of 1962. Vs. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee (1980) 3 SCC 459 and which reads as under:- “14. The appellant is a Corporation constituted under the Uttar Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation (Act 28) of 1956, which was subsequently replaced by the Central Act 58 of 1962. It is a statutory body wholly controlled and managed by the Government. Its status is analogous to that of the Corporations which were under consideration in Sukhdev Singh's case (ibid). The ratio of Sukhdev Singh's case, therefore, squarely applies to the present case. Even if at the time of the dismissal, the statutory regulations had not been framed or had not come into force, then also the employment of the respondent was public employment and the statutory body, the employer, could not terminate the services of its employee without due enquiry in accordance with the statutory Regulations, if any in force or in the absence of such Regulations, in accordance with the rules of natural justice. Such an enquiry into the conduct of a public employee is of a quasi-judicial character. The respondent was employed by the appellant-Corporation in exercise of the powers conferred on it by the statute which created it. The appellants' power to dismiss the respondent from service was also derived from the statute. The Court would therefore, presume the existence of a duty on the part of the dismissing authority to observe the rules of natural justice, and to act in accordance with the spirit of Regulation 16, which was then on the anvil and came into force shortly after the impugned dismissal. The rules of natural justice in the circumstances of the case, required that the respondent should be given a reasonable opportunity to deny his guilt, to defend himself and to establish his innocence which means and includes an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses relied upon by the appellant-Corporation and an opportunity to lead evidence in defence of the charge as also a show-cause notice for the proposed punishment. Such an opportunity was denied to the respondent in the instant case. Admittedly, the respondent was not allowed to lead evidence in defence. Further, he was not allowed to cross-examine certain persons whose statements were not recorded by the Enquiry Officer (Opposite Party No. 1) in the presence of the respondent. There was controversy on this point. Such an opportunity was denied to the respondent in the instant case. Admittedly, the respondent was not allowed to lead evidence in defence. Further, he was not allowed to cross-examine certain persons whose statements were not recorded by the Enquiry Officer (Opposite Party No. 1) in the presence of the respondent. There was controversy on this point. But it was clear to the High Court from the report of enquiry by the Opposite Party No. 1 that he relied upon the reports of some persons and the statements of some other persons who were not examined by him. A regular departmental enquiry takes place only after the charge-sheet is drawn up and served upon the delinquent and the latter's explanation is obtained. In the present case, no such enquiry was held and the order of dismissal was passed summarily after perusing the respondent's explanation. The rules of natural justice in this case, were honoured in total breach. The impugned order of dismissal was thus bad in law and had been rightly set aside by the High Court.” 10. No doubt, where in departmental proceedings a person should be allowed to lead his evidence and cross examine the witnesses of the other party, however this request made must be reflected from the record of the departmental proceedings. Nothing could be pointed out to me on behalf of the petitioner that in the departmental proceedings, petitioner in any manner prayed for leading of evidence. In fact, in the petitioner’s admission it is noted that he did not have the powers of the Executive Council to do the acts which are imputed to him in the Article of Charges. Assuming that the petitioner had made a prayer before the Enquiry Officer and which was allegedly not recorded in the enquiry proceedings, the first point of time when such a stand should have been raised was by replying to the show cause notice by the Disciplinary Authority after the enquiry report was given. As already stated above, no response was given by the petitioner to the show cause notice issued by the Disciplinary Authority and therefore raising of a ground for the first time in this Court that petitioner was denied an opportunity to lead evidence is therefore only an afterthought. As already stated above, no response was given by the petitioner to the show cause notice issued by the Disciplinary Authority and therefore raising of a ground for the first time in this Court that petitioner was denied an opportunity to lead evidence is therefore only an afterthought. The fact that this is an afterthought also becomes clear from the fact that the enquiry report shows that all the relevant records were produced and which were of the respondent No.2 itself and as stated above in the judgments of the Supreme Court that documents in departmental proceedings do not have to be strictly proved as per the Evidence Act. The report in this case of the Enquiry Officer really turned upon existence of delegation of statutory powers of the Executive Council of the respondent No.2 to the petitioner, and surely it was the petitioner who could also have shown this aspect because the nature of charges in present case were such that they clearly showed actions or functions which by their nature could not have been performed by anyone except the Executive Council of the respondent No.2. Supreme Court has held that compliance of principles of natural justice is dependent on the peculiarities of a particular enquiry and principles of natural justice are not inflexible technical rules. Therefore, I reject the argument that the petitioner had prayed for leading of evidence and which alleged prayer was denied to him. Petitioner therefore cannot complaint of violation of principles of natural justice. 11. Reliance is also placed by the petitioner upon paras 27 and 28 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. Vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha (2010) 2 SCC 772 and which read as under:- “27. A bare perusal of the aforesaid sub-Rule shows that when the respondent had failed to submit the explanation to the charge sheet it was incumbent upon the inquiry officer to fix a date for his appearance in the inquiry. It is only in a case when the Government servant despite notice of the date fixed failed to appear that the enquiry officer can proceed with the inquiry ex parte. Even in such circumstances it is incumbent on the enquiry officer to record the statement of witnesses mentioned in the charge sheet. It is only in a case when the Government servant despite notice of the date fixed failed to appear that the enquiry officer can proceed with the inquiry ex parte. Even in such circumstances it is incumbent on the enquiry officer to record the statement of witnesses mentioned in the charge sheet. Since the Government servant is absent, he would clearly lose the benefit of cross examination of the witnesses. But nonetheless in order to establish the charges the department is required to produce the necessary evidence before the enquiry officer. This is so as to avoid the charge that the enquiry officer has acted as a prosecutor as well as a judge. 28. An inquiry officer acting in a quasi judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents.” The reliance upon the judgment in the case of Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra) by the petitioner is misconceived because in the present case the Enquiry Officer has perused the record with respect to the Article of Charges and has held the petitioner guilty on the basis of the record of the respondent No.2. It is not therefore as if the Enquiry Officer has arrived at a finding without considering the evidence in the case. Necessary evidence has been produced. The necessary evidence being the record of the respondent No.2 has been considered. Only thereafter the Enquiry Officer has given his report and thus it cannot be said that the Enquiry Officer in the present case has acted both as a prosecutor and the Judge. Necessary evidence has been produced. The necessary evidence being the record of the respondent No.2 has been considered. Only thereafter the Enquiry Officer has given his report and thus it cannot be said that the Enquiry Officer in the present case has acted both as a prosecutor and the Judge. Enquiry Officer has given his report only after referring to the evidence which has established the charge against the petitioner and more so keeping the vital fact in mind that petitioner admitted that he could not file any proof of his powers exercised by him and which he did not have as stated in the Articles of Charges. 12. Counsel for the petitioner then sought to argue that the enquiry report is a non-speaking report and therefore the same is liable to be quashed. Even this argument on behalf of the petitioner is misconceived because Enquiry Officer’s report is not like a judgment of a Judge of a civil court and it is enough if from the report the reasons are perceptible which show that the Enquiry Officer was convinced with respect to guilt of the charged official- vide Maharashtra State Board’s case (supra). All that the enquiry report has to show is that the facts in question have been considered and the Enquiry Officer is convinced on the basis of the evidence before him with regard to the establishing of the Articles of Charges. The enquiry report in this case may not be a detailed judgment which proceeds article by article however the report does give necessary findings and conclusions. The findings and conclusions in this case are bound to be mixed up because all the charges effectively are with respect to exercise of powers by the petitioner beyond the scope of his powers/duties. Therefore, there is nothing wrong with the Enquiry Officer in not proceeding in very great detail but giving his conclusions and findings in reasonable language. This argument of the petitioner is also therefore rejected that the enquiry report is not a speaking report. 13. Another argument raised on behalf of the petitioner was that the order of the Disciplinary Authority was served upon the petitioner after his retirement on 30.4.1997 i.e the Disciplinary Authority’s order was served on 1.5.1997 post retirement. This argument of the petitioner is also therefore rejected that the enquiry report is not a speaking report. 13. Another argument raised on behalf of the petitioner was that the order of the Disciplinary Authority was served upon the petitioner after his retirement on 30.4.1997 i.e the Disciplinary Authority’s order was served on 1.5.1997 post retirement. In my opinion, there cannot be an illegality in serving of the disciplinary order after the retirement because what is required in law is that ordinarily the disciplinary proceedings must be held during the period of service of the employee and admittedly proceedings in this case were held by the departmental authorities before the retirement of the petitioner. Even the disciplinary order has been passed before the retirement of the petitioner and the service of such order after the retirement on the petitioner is not an illegality which can vitiate the entire departmental proceedings. I have not been shown any judgment or a provision of law that order of Disciplinary Authority passed before the retirement of a person becomes illegal merely because it is served after the retirement of the charged official. The argument of the petitioner therefore of order of the Disciplinary Authority being illegal on account of same having been served after the retirement is a misconceived argument and is accordingly rejected. 14. An endeavour was also made on behalf of the petitioner to argue that the Disciplinary Authority in the present case who has signed the order dated 30.4.1997 was not competent to do so because the President who has signed the order dated 30.4.1997 imposing the punishment of dismissal of services had no such power, however, when asked to point out as to how this ground is substantiated by which Rule of the respondent No.2, counsel for the petitioner could not point out to me any Rule as to why the Disciplinary Authority in the present case being the President of the respondent No.2 is not the Disciplinary Authority. If the petitioner wanted to seriously argue this point, petitioner ought to have filed the Rules of the respondent No.2 to show who was actually the Disciplinary Authority and only thereafter it could have been shown that the President of respondent No.2 could not be the Disciplinary Authority. If the petitioner wanted to seriously argue this point, petitioner ought to have filed the Rules of the respondent No.2 to show who was actually the Disciplinary Authority and only thereafter it could have been shown that the President of respondent No.2 could not be the Disciplinary Authority. I may note that the Disciplinary Authority’s order dated 30.4.1997 specifically refers to not only passing an order of dismissal of the petitioner but also of consultation with the Executive Committee of the respondent No.2. The argument of the petitioner therefore that the Disciplinary Authority is not an authorized Disciplinary Authority is an argument without any substance and is accordingly rejected. 15. The next argument which was raised on behalf of the petitioner was that show cause notice for response of petitioner to the Enquiry Officer’s report in the present case was issued by the Secretary of the respondent No.2, and the Secretary was incompetent to issue the notice because the Secretary was one of the witnesses who had proved the case of the department in the enquiry proceedings. However, I note that Secretary has issued the show cause notice pursuant to the order of the Enquiry Officer only as an administrative act and the order in question of punishment has been passed by the Disciplinary Authority being the President of the respondent No.2 and not by the Secretary who issued the show cause notice. Secretary of the respondent No.2 was thus only exercising administrative powers for issuing of a show cause notice calling upon the petitioner to give his reply to the enquiry report and thus this action of Secretary cannot be such an act which can lead to setting aside of the order of the Disciplinary Authority. There is no law that if after completion of an enquiry one of the witnesses issues and signs an administrative letter calling for reply to the enquiry report then that action will make the enquiry report or the order of the Disciplinary Authority bad in law. I may also, at this stage, note that at once it was sought to be argued on behalf of the petitioner that the show cause notice dated 25.4.1997 given after the enquiry report does not refer to any specific punishment to be imposed and it is therefore violative of the ratio in the case of Vijay Narayan Vajpayee (supra). I may also, at this stage, note that at once it was sought to be argued on behalf of the petitioner that the show cause notice dated 25.4.1997 given after the enquiry report does not refer to any specific punishment to be imposed and it is therefore violative of the ratio in the case of Vijay Narayan Vajpayee (supra). However, even this argument raised on behalf of the petitioner is misconceived because what the show cause notice issued on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority requires is response to the action proposed and which is therefore the penalty to be imposed if the enquiry report is accepted and it is not the law that in the show cause notice issued by the Disciplinary Authority pursuant to the enquiry report must show that a specific penalty is proposed to be imposed and which specific penalty has to be replied to by the guilty official. This argument urged on behalf of the petitioner is thus rejected. 16. Finally, it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner has been exonerated in the criminal case and therefore the orders of the departmental authorities have to be set aside for this reason. Though this is not a ground in the petition yet let us examine the same. This argument raised on behalf of the petitioner is also misconceived because the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions has held that the scope of enquiries before a Criminal Court and in the Departmental Proceedings are totally separate. Whereas in the criminal proceedings the charges have to be proved beyond all reasonable doubt, but, in the departmental proceedings the charges have to be proved only on preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, merely because the petitioner has been acquitted in criminal case cannot mean that on this ground itself petitioner will stand exonerated and orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority have to be quashed for this reason only because the charges against the petitioner independently stands established in the departmental proceedings. 17. In view of the above, there is no merit in the petition, which is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.