JUDGMENT : JAYANT PATEL, J. 1. The present appeal is directed against the order dated 5.10.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Special Civil Application No.4477 of 2012; whereby, learned Single Judge for the reasons recorded in the order, has dismissed the petition on the ground of delay. 2. We have heard Mr.Vadera, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. 3. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner was pursuing the remedy inasmuch, after the proposal was rejected in October, 1995, the petitioner had addressed several letters by way of representation in the year 2000. 4. However thereafter as in respect of one co-employee of the petitioner, the learned Single Judge of this Court in Special Civil Application No.9572 of 1999 as well as the Division Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.490 of 2000 did not accept the prayer for availability of the pension on the premise that the resignation cannot be equated with the retirement, the petitioner did not take any action. It is submitted that since the Honble Apex Court in case of Shreekumar Jain v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., AIR 2011 SC 2990 , has taken the view that the resignation and retirement are the same connotation, the benefit would be available to the petitioner for pensionary benefit. The petition was preferred before this Court which came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge on the ground of delay. It was submitted that in view of the above referred decision of the Apex Court in case of Shreekumar Jain (supra) there is a good case on merits and the learned Single Judge has committed an error in dismissing the petition on the ground of delay and therefore, this Court may consider in the present appeal. 5. It appears that it is an admitted position that the petitioner has retired from service as back as from 20th January, 1991. After the rules, in question, came into force, he applied under the scheme by letter dated 8th August, 1995. It is also admitted position that such proposal came to be not accepted and rejected by LIC vide decision dated 5.10.1995. The petitioner, thereafter, did nothing nor raise any grievance at any point of time. Correspondences, as stated by way of representation, are also of the year 2000. It is also admitted position that such proposal came to be not accepted and rejected by LIC vide decision dated 5.10.1995. The petitioner, thereafter, did nothing nor raise any grievance at any point of time. Correspondences, as stated by way of representation, are also of the year 2000. Even after year 2000, the petitioner has not preferred any petition nor raised the grievance until 2012 i.e. until the filing of the present petition. If the date of retirement is considered after 1995 for making of the representation, after the rules came into force, then it could be said that the petition was delayed by about 17 years since the proposal came to be dismissed as back as on October, 1995. The contention that some letters were addressed in 2000 even if considered for the sake of examination, no grievance is raised by the petitioner at the relevant point of time. Merely because, in respect of his co-employee, the petition was not entertained by this Court and the decision was further not interfered by the Division Bench of this Court, could not be termed as valid ground for ignoring the aspects of such a long delay. Even after 2000, no action whatsoever was taken by the petitioner till 2012 i.e. till the filing of the main special civil application. 6. Under these circumstances, we find that the ground of delay considered by the learned Single Judge for declining the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, could not be said as erroneous. 7. Apart from the above, we do find that there is binding decision of co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.490 of 2000 decided on 28.8.2000 in case of Kantilal R.Vora v. Union of India; whereby, this Court observed, inter-alia, as under: "In P.K. Masani v. United India Insurance Company (supra), the Court while considering the provisions of General Insurance (Employees) Pension Scheme, 1995, rejected a similar contention of the employee to treat his resignation as voluntary retirement. Examining the provisions of the Regulations of the Pension Scheme, the Court found that the elements present in cases of voluntary retirement were not there where an employee resigns from service. We are in respectful agreement with the ratio of the said decision. Examining the provisions of the Regulations of the Pension Scheme, the Court found that the elements present in cases of voluntary retirement were not there where an employee resigns from service. We are in respectful agreement with the ratio of the said decision. When a person puts his resignation from the employment, there is a unilateral termination of contract by him and when the terms and conditions of his employment entitled an employee to earn pensionary benefits only after putting requisite number of years of service, a person who puts an end to the contract unilaterally by resigning his service cannot be equated with a person who is entitled to pensionary benefits after putting in continued service of requisite number of years in accordance with the terms and conditions of the employment. Those who quit service unilaterally putting resignation cannot stand in the same class in which others who in compliance with the terms and conditions of the contract continue in service till the date of their retirement. There is therefore, absolutely no valid basis for making any comparison between these two classes of persons. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge was right in holding that because the petitioner had resigned from service he was not entitled to the pensionary benefits which were admissible to those who had voluntarily retired under the Scheme. The appeal is therefore, dismissed". 8. The aforesaid shows that the view taken by this Court is that resignation cannot be equated with the retirement and therefore, the benefits could not be available. The said view is taken in case of co employee of the petitioner who was, as stated by the petitioner, similarly situated. 9. Therefore, it could be said that on merits also, it may not be possible for this Court to take a different view since there is a binding decision of co-ordinate bench of this Court. 10. The attempt made by the learned counsel for the appellant to rely upon the decision in case of Shreekumar Jain (supra), in our view, cannot be countenanced for 2 reasons, one is that this Court has considered very scheme and thereafter, has taken the view in respect of other co-employee and the benefits were not extended. The second is that, such a long delay of about 17 years cannot be leniently viewed in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The second is that, such a long delay of about 17 years cannot be leniently viewed in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge has referred to the decision of the Apex Court for considering the aspects of delay. We find that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary and equitable jurisdiction. When the equity has a role to play, the question of delay would always be required to be considered in a case the delay may defeat the equity. 11. If this Court in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution finds that on account of long and inordinate delay of 17 years, the petitioner should not be permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, such a view cannot be said to be erroneous, which may call for interference in exercise of power of intra-court appeal under Letters Patent. 12. In view of the aforesaid, we find that ultimate decision taken by the learned Single Judge for dismissal of the petition does not call for interference. The present appeal is dismissed. Notice discharged. Letters Patent Appeal dismissed.