Md. Faiz Akhtar v. State Of Bihar Through The Secretary, Human Resources Development Department, Bihar
2013-10-30
NAVIN SINHA, SHAILESH KUMAR SINHA
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
Order Navin Sinha, J. We have heard counsels for the appellant, the State and the respondents. 2. The present appeal arises from order dated 15.04.2013 allowing CWJC No. 4367 of 2010 filed by respondent no. 9. 3. Learned Single Judge held that the appellant had not filed any complaint within time under Rule 18 of Bihar Panchayat Primary Teachers (Appointment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2006 (hereinafter called ‘the Rules’) raising any grievance with regard to appointment of respondent no. 9 and denial of appointment to him. The fact that he may have filed his representation/grievances before any authority other than the authority designated under the rules, was irrelevant. The complaint before the Tribunal, constituted in lieu of the Block Development Officer under rule 18 was made three years after the appointment. The authorities had contended that the appellant had not participated in the selection process. The Tribunal acted inappropriately by directing appointment when it could at best had given directions to consider for appointment. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that he had filed his objections before the District Magistrate and the District Superintendent of Education within time which tantamounts to an objection raised in accordance with law. It cannot be said that he was negligent in seeking remedy for his grievances. Reliance was placed on a Division Bench order in LPA No. 1526 of 2009 (Amarjeet Kumar Singh Vs. The State of Bihar & Others) to submit that in similar circumstances where the original grievance was raised before the authority other than the Block Development Officer, yet the subsequent grievance raised before the Tribunal was approved. The appellant had 70.33 % marks while respondent no. 9 only had 69.58 % marks. The order of the Tribunal recites that the appellant had produced receipt in confirmation of having submitted an application. His contention was that his application was deliberately misplaced by the selection committee. Thus, there is no infirmity in the order of the Tribunal calling for interference. There had been no intentional delay in moving the Tribunal as the appellant collected all necessary information with regard to issue under Right to Information Act and then moved the Tribunal. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 9 submitted that the learned Single Judge has rightly opined that submission of an application before an authority other than the statutory authority amounts to no application at all.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 9 submitted that the learned Single Judge has rightly opined that submission of an application before an authority other than the statutory authority amounts to no application at all. Reliance was placed on 2011 (4) BBCJ, 279 (Indu Kumari Vs. The State of Bihar). If the appointments were made in 2007, the application filed by the appellant before the Tribunal in 2009 was highly belated. Even if no time limit is prescribed under Rule 18 for filing of complaint, considering that 3rd party rights accrue in the meantime, it has to be read and understood as ‘reasonable time’ of three to four months as held in 2011(4) PLJR, 846 (Rajni Bari Vs. The State of Bihar). The respondent, in his reply before the Tribunal, had specifically taken the objection that appellant had never filed any application before the Block Development Officer. 6. We have considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties. If the rules provided for grievances to be raised before a specified authority mentioned therein, the filing of a grievance before an authority other than the designated statutory authority, in our opinion, amounts to submission of no application at all. This aspect of the matter has been fully discussed in the case of Indu Kumari (supra) and we need not dwell upon it further. In matters relating to appointment/termination there is always an urgency as 3rd party rights accrue in the meantime. The appellant claims to have been an applicant in possession of acknowledgement for having applied, yet he offers no explanation as to why no objections were filed by him to the select list under Rule 9. 7. Be that as it may, any information obtained by the appellant under the Right to Information Act may give him ground to support his cause of action. The information obtained under the Act does not furnish a cause of action for the first time. The cause of action accrued when he was denied consideration in the select list. The appellant was fully conscious of the fact that he was being denied consideration, yet filed no objection under Rule 9 or before the Block Development Officer and acted casually by filing it before the District Magistrate and the District Superintendent of Education who had no jurisdiction to entertain such objection.
The appellant was fully conscious of the fact that he was being denied consideration, yet filed no objection under Rule 9 or before the Block Development Officer and acted casually by filing it before the District Magistrate and the District Superintendent of Education who had no jurisdiction to entertain such objection. If he could have filed a grievance before other authorities, there has to be an explanation why he did not file it before the designated statutory authority. The appellant offers no explanation in this regard. 8. Even if Rule 18 prescribes no time limit, it has already been held in Rajni Bari (supra) that it had to be done within a reasonable time of three to four months. The appellant moved the Tribunal two years later. In the case of Amarjeet Kumar Singh (supra) relied upon on behalf of the appellant, the Division Bench likewise held that in absence of any time limit under Rule 18 it has to be read as reasonable time. A delay of two years therein was also held to be not falling within the definition of reasonable time. 9. The decision in Amarjeet Kumar was rendered on its own facts, and no law was laid down. It therefore has no precedent value. 10. The appeal is dismissed.