JUDGMENT Mudgal.J. 1. Appellant/plaintiff has filed this appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 8.10.2004 passed by the First Additional District Judge of the Court of I Additional District Judge, Gwalior (Shri Rajendra Mahajan) in Civil Suit No. 42A of 2003 dismissing the suit for partition on the ground that the house in question is exclusively used by the joint family for its dwelling purpose and the plaintiff having failed to prove the plea that the suit house is partly tenanted one. In this appeal, the appellant is referred to as ‘the plaintiff’ and respondents as ‘the defendants’. 2. The admitted facts are as follows : (I). Parties in this case are sons and daughters of Late Hariram. The disputed house bearing Municipal No. 43/1101 is situated in Deedwana Oli, Fauzdaron-Ka-Mohalla, Lashker Gwalior which was owned by Late Hariram which is referred to as “the disputed house” in this case. 3. Facts in brief of the plaint are that the plaintiff filed a suit on 18.1.2001 against defendants for partition of the disputed house belonging to a joint Hindu family consisting of plaintiff and defendants wherein, the plaintiff has claimed separate title along with possession of ¼th share. The plaintiff has further pleaded that the suit house is partly occupied by the tenants on its ground floor and first floor is in occupation of joint Hindu family and defendants No.1 and 2 are residing therein. Since the request made by the plaintiff to the defendants for partition of the disputed property being joint Hindu family property was declined, the suit was filed for partition of the disputed property. 4. The defendant No. 3 did not put any written statement despite service on her and she was thus, proceeded against ex parte in trial. 5. Denying the allegations of the plaint, the defendants No. 1 and 2 have alleged that the plaintiff being a female has no right in dwelling house fully occupied by members of the joint family. As such, no partition can be effected at the instance of the plaintiff in favour of the legal heir contemplated under section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act. It was further pleaded that apart from the plaintiff and defendants, another brother was Shyambabu who died unmarried and mother was Vidyadevi. After death of Shyambabu, his share devolved to his mother Vidyadevi. It was further pleaded that apart from the plaintiff and defendants, another brother was Shyambabu who died unmarried and mother was Vidyadevi. After death of Shyambabu, his share devolved to his mother Vidyadevi. Thus, Vidyadevi had got 2/6th share in the disputed house. She bequeathed her share vide will dated 21.5.1991 Ex. D/1 executed in favour of defendants No.1 and 2, thus plaintiff’s share is only 1/6th in the disputed property, hence, prayed for rejection of the suit. 6. Learned trial Court after framing 10 issues and after recording evidence of both the parties and having discussed the recorded evidence in detail, has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 7. The defendant has not challenged in this appeal the findings given by the learned trial Court regarding the plaintiff having 1/4th share in the disputed property. 8. The questions which are required to be adjudged are as follows:- (i) Whether, the plaintiff being female heir can ask for partition of the dwelling house of joint family property? (ii) Whether the amended provision of section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act w.e.f. 2005 hereinafter referred to the Act will be applicable retrospectively in this case. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned trial Court has erred in dismissing the suit for partition filed by the plaintiff inspite of holding that the plaintiff has 1/4th share in the disputed property (house) stating that the plaintiff being female heir of the deceased Hariram was not entitled to get the dwelling house partitioned under section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act among the cosharing brothers unless they make the partition of the same. The counsel further pleaded that the section 6 of the Act has been amended from 9.9.2005 whereby equal right of ownership in coparcenary property has been granted to the daughter as has been given to son. The counsel further urged that the amended provision of the Act in such matters shall be applicable retrospectively following which the plaintiff can be given the advantage of the said provision. Eventually, the effect of the section 23 of the Act has been eliminated. Therefore, the findings being based on section 23 of the Act recorded by the learned trial Court having dismissed the suit deserve to be set aside and the suit filed by the plaintiff be decreed in her favour. 10. Eventually, the effect of the section 23 of the Act has been eliminated. Therefore, the findings being based on section 23 of the Act recorded by the learned trial Court having dismissed the suit deserve to be set aside and the suit filed by the plaintiff be decreed in her favour. 10. Controverting the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the findings of the learned trial Court being based on proper logic and merit are not required to be interfered in. 11. Heard the arguments of both the parties and perused the record. 12. On perusal of the impugned judgment, it is evident that the following findings have come out after considering the recorded evidence:- (i) The disputed house was owned by Hariram who was the father of the plaintiff and the defendants. (ii) The plaintiff and the defendant No. 3 Smt. Sharda are Hariram’s daughters and the defendant No.1 Ramababu and defendant No.2 Jagdish are his sons. (iii) The 1/4th share of each of the plaintiff and the defendants has been determined in the disputed property. (iv) The suit was dismissed by the learned trial Court stating that the plaintiff being female heir was not entitled to get the dwelling house partitioned from coparcener brothers unless they make the partition of the property. (v) It is true that when the suit was decided by the learned trial Court on 8.10.2004 the amended provision of section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 2005 was not in force which has been later enforced from 9.9.2005. 13. The question which is required to be adjudged is whether plaintiff being a female heir can ask for partition of the dwelling house of a joint family. 14. No doubt before amended Act 2005 coming into force certainly plaintiff being female heir of Hindu coparcener was not entitled to ask for partition of the dwelling house occupied by joint Hindu family until the male heirs choose to divide their respective shares therein but section 23 of the Act has been omitted by section 4 of the Amendment Act of 2005 which would mean that from the date of enforcement of amended provision to the Act, the female heir of a coparcener can ask for partition of the dwelling house because according to section 6 of the Act, her status is also that of a coparcener. 15. 15. The same issue was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ganduri Koteshwaramma and another v. Chakiri Yanadi and another, 2012 (1) MPLJ 333 and has held as under:- “14. The new section 6 provides for parity of rights in the coparcenary property among male and female members of a joint Hindu family on and from September 9, 2005. The Legislature has now conferred substantive right in favour of the daughters. According to the new section 6, the daughter of a coparcener becomes a coparcener by birth in her own rights and liabilities in the same manner as the son. The declaration in section 6 that the daughter of the coparcener shall have same rights and liabilities in the coparcenary property as she would have been a son is unambiguous and unequivocal, Thus, on and from September 9, 2005, the daughter is entitled to a share in the ancestral property and is a coparcener as if she had been a son.” 16. On the basis of the aforesaid judgment, it is inferred that the plaintiff inspite of being female member/heir is a coparcener of the deceased Hariram’s property and has equal right for getting the disputed dwelling house partitioned by her brothers. Considering this, it is also evident that the provision of section 23 of the Act does not affect the plaintiff’s right for partition as the effect of the section 23 has been nullified. 17. Now the question for consideration is whether or not the amended provision of section 6 of the Act shall be applicable with retrospective effect. 18. The same issue has been considered by this Court in the case of Prabhudayal (dead) through L.Rs. v. Smt. Ramsiya and Anr., 2009(I) MPWN 49 = AIR 2009 MP 52 and it has held in para 10 of the judgment as under:- “10. On going through the amended section 6 as well as omitted section 23 of the Act, there is no provision that pending proceedings shall continue under the old provision which has been omitted. On going through the Amendment Act of 2005, it is revealed that it does not contain the saving clause which would mean that omitted section 23 of the Act is not saved for pending cases. On going through the Amendment Act of 2005, it is revealed that it does not contain the saving clause which would mean that omitted section 23 of the Act is not saved for pending cases. Since there is no saving provision in favour of the pending proceedings, in view of the decision of Supreme Court Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. ( AIR 2000 SC 811 ) (supra), section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application and therefore I am of the view that plaintiff/respondent No.1 Smt. Ramsiya is having 1/4th share in the dwelling house of Udaipura and village Rehma and is entitled to get those houses partitioned up to the extent of her share.” 19. Having taken into account the aforesaid judgment, it is inferred here that the amended provision of section 6 of the Act shall be effective in this case also. Consequently, the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to 1/4th share and to get the disputed property partitioned by the defendants. Hence, the findings of the learned trial Court referred in paras 18 to 21 regarding non-partition of the disputed house deserve to be set aside and the plaintiff’s suit deserves to be decreed. 20. Therefore, allowing the appeal, setting aside the impugned judgment as stated earlier, the plaintiff’s suit is decreed for the title of 1/4th share in the disputed house and she is entitled to get the disputed property partitioned by the defendants. Considering the facts of the case, no order as to the cost. Decree be drawn up accordingly. R.P. Rathi for appellant; F.A. Shah for respondent No. 1; None for responent No. 2.