JUDGMENT 1. - Smt. Maya, the petitioner, has laid this writ petition for craving the under mentioned reliefs: (a) That the respondent may be directed to provide employment to the petitioner. (b) That she may not be evicted from the quarter in which she is living at present with her three minor children. (c) That she may be allowed the back wages from the date of death of her husband i.e. 06.05.2001. (d) Costs of the writ petition may be awarded to the petitioner. (e) Any other relief which is in favour of the petitioner and in the interest of justice may be allowed. 2. The foundation of claiming the aforesaid reliefs, as adumbrated from the facts narrated in the writ petition, is that husband of the petitioner, Om Prakash, was in employment of the respondent company since 1984. While serving the respondent as regular employee "Mazdoor", Shri Om Prakash Harijan died in harness on 6th of May 2001. As per the petitioner, Late Om Prakash was allotted residential accommodation in the form of Quarter No.A-47/1 by the respondent for dwelling. After death of Om Prakash, who was the sole bread winner of the family, the petitioner applied for appointment on compassionate grounds vide her application dated 10th of March 2002 at Rajpura Dariba office of the respondent. After receiving the application, the petitioner was conveyed that she could inquire about further action in the month of June, however, up to June 2002 when no heed was paid to her application, she again visited Rajpura Dariba office. On approach to the said office, the petitioner was intimated that requisite information in this connection could be divulged by the Head Office at Udaipur. Thereafter, as per the version of the petitioner, she contacted the concerned officer at Head Office, Udaipur, where she was informed that the application seeking appointment on compassionate grounds has been filed after three months from the date of death of her husband, therefore, the said application is not worth consideration. The petitioner has further asserted that the concerned officer of the Head Office also advised her to file fresh application with requisite explanation of the delay and thereupon yet another application was submitted by her on 18th of June 2002 for seeking appointment on compassionate grounds. The petitioner has further asserted that the concerned officer of the Head Office also advised her to file fresh application with requisite explanation of the delay and thereupon yet another application was submitted by her on 18th of June 2002 for seeking appointment on compassionate grounds. Highlighting her educational qualification as Secondary School Examination, the petitioner has specifically pleaded in the writ petition that she is unemployed and therefore unable to maintain the bereaved family consisting of three members. Adverting to the residential accommodation in the form of quarter allotted to her late husband by the respondent company, the petitioner has categorically averred that the respondent company has deducted Rs. 30,000 from PF amount of her husband against the rent of the quarter although no such deduction from the PF amount is permissible. The petitioner has also raised her grievances against the respondent in the petition by alleging that the respondent company is harassing her and compelling her to vacate the quarter. Requisite notice for eviction issued under the Rajasthan Premises (Unauthorized Occupants) Act dated 3rd of March 2002 is also annexed with the writ petition. 3. Staking her claim for appointment on compassionate grounds, the petitioner has referred to Memorandum of Settlement arrived at between management of the respondent company and the workers' union under Section 12 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. Laying specific emphasis on term No.5.1 of the settlement, the petitioner has pleaded that the respondent is bound to provide her appointment on compassionate ground. Although the petitioner has taken shelter of the Memorandum of Settlement, but neither copy of the Settlement was placed on record, nor material particulars about the said settlement were incorporated in the pleadings. Asserting the financial hardship of the bereaved family due to the death of bread winner, the petitioner has averred in the writ petition that denial of appointment to her is unjust and so also the action of the respondent company in her eviction from the quarter, which was allotted to her late husband. 4. At the threshold, in response to the show cause notice issued by this Court, on behalf of the respondent company preliminary reply was submitted on 1st of April 2002. In the preliminary reply, the respondent company has questioned the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the company is not amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court. 4. At the threshold, in response to the show cause notice issued by this Court, on behalf of the respondent company preliminary reply was submitted on 1st of April 2002. In the preliminary reply, the respondent company has questioned the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the company is not amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court. The respondent has asserted with full emphasis that it does not fall within the ambit of definition of "other authorities" envisaged under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and as such the writ petition against it is not tenable. With a view to clarify the position, the respondent has pleaded in the return that earlier respondent was a Government of India enterprise but recently Government of India has disinvested 26% equity of the respondent company and the entire management of the company has been transferred to strategic partner (S.P.) M/s. Sterlite Opportunities and Ventures Limited (for short, hereinafter referred to as`SOVL') on 11th April 2002. In support of this assertion, the respondent has also placed on record Memorandum dated 15th of May 2002 issued by the Government of India as Annex.R/1 making it crystal clear that now the respondent company is no longer a Public Sector Undertaking. Substantiating its stand that the respondent company is not amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court, in the reply, the respondent has indicated that strategic partner i.e. SOVL now owns 45.90% capital of the company and out of eleven Board of Directors of the company, six belong to SOVL and only five Directors belong to Government of India. On the anvil of these facts, the respondent company has emphatically asserted in the preliminary reply that the Government of India does not have a deep and pervasive control over functioning of the company. 5. Taking a dig at the laconic pleadings of the petitioner that there is no factual foundation about the status of the respondent company so as to categorize it as State within the meaning of Article 12, or its instrumentality, the respondent has craved for dismissal of the writ petition solely on the ground of maintainability. On 8th of October 2012, the matter came up for admission before the Court and the coordinate Bench while admitting the petition, passed following order: "Admit. List this matter on 5.11.2012. On 8th of October 2012, the matter came up for admission before the Court and the coordinate Bench while admitting the petition, passed following order: "Admit. List this matter on 5.11.2012. The question with regard to maintainability of the writ petition will be taken into consideration at the time of final hearing." 6-7. After admission of the writ petition, detailed reply to the writ petition was submitted on behalf of the respondent. Reiterating its stand that writ petition is not maintainable against the respondent company, the respondent has also seriously disputed the claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground. For that purpose, the respondent has placed on record letter dated 20th July 1993, wherein it is clearly stipulated that the company has decided to offer appointment on compassionate ground uptil cut-off date i.e. 30th of June 1993. Memorandum of Settlement Annex.R/2 is also placed on record by the respondent company. It is averred that after issuance of letter dated 20th of July 1993, the Memorandum of Settlement was also renewed on 6th of November 1998, wherein a provision was incorporated for providing appointment on compassionate grounds in special cases and for payment of lumpsum amount of compensation in case of death of an employee in harness. While laying emphasis on Clause 4.0, as per Settlement Annex.A, the respondent has pleaded that appointment on compassionate grounds is only available when an employee dies due to accident on duty or declared physically unfit because of accident on duty (including occupational disease covered under the Workmen Compensation Act). The complete text of clause 4.0 of Annex.A, as incorporated in the reply to writ petition, is reproduced as under: 4.0 - Regarding employment for one dependent of employees who die due to accident on duty or declared physically unfit because of accident on duty (including occupational disease covered under the Workman's Act), the Management will continue to give immediate employment to one dependent whether male or female as per the practice followed till now. 8. Claiming shelter of the aforementioned clause, the respondent has averred in the reply that the petitioner is not entitled for appointment on compassionate grounds but the answering respondent is ready and willing to settle her case by way of lumpsum payment in terms of the Settlement D/d. 6.11.1998. 9. 8. Claiming shelter of the aforementioned clause, the respondent has averred in the reply that the petitioner is not entitled for appointment on compassionate grounds but the answering respondent is ready and willing to settle her case by way of lumpsum payment in terms of the Settlement D/d. 6.11.1998. 9. The respondent has also placed reliance on yet another Settlement dated 31st March 2004 (Annex.R/2), wherein same clause, as envisaged in the Settlement of 6.11.1998, is reiterated. The complete text of Clause 2 of Settlement D/d. 31.03.2004 is reproduced as under: 2. Employment of dependents of workers who die due to accident of accident on duty OR declared permanent disable because of accident on duty (including Occupational diseases covered under the Workmen's Compensation Act). 10. Placing heavy reliance on the Settlement, the respondent has made a categorical statement in the reply that the petitioner is only entitled for lumpsum amount of compensation and the answering respondent is ready and willing to pay the same. With the Memorandum of Settlement dated 31st of March 2004, a list Annex.I is also enclosed under the caption "Pending cases of Dependents of Deceased Employees as on 31.12.2003". In the said list, name of Om Prakash Harijan, husband of the petitioner, is shown at Serial No. 8 and amount of lumpsum compensation is also quantified for a sum of Rs. 5 lacs. Objections regarding availability of alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the petitioner is also specifically pleaded in the reply. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. B.R. Mehta with Mr. Sheetal Kumbhat has strenuously urged that being dependent of a deceased employee of the respondent, the petitioner is entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that as per term 5.1 of the Settlement, she is entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. Learned counsel for the petitioner would urge that the application submitted by the petitioner has not been decided so far inasmuch as no communication has been addressed to her declining her prayer for the same. With these submissions, the learned counsel has made an attempt to substantiate the claim of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner would urge that the application submitted by the petitioner has not been decided so far inasmuch as no communication has been addressed to her declining her prayer for the same. With these submissions, the learned counsel has made an attempt to substantiate the claim of the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner for authenticating his submissions has also relied on a verdict of learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Smt. Kunku Devi v. Hindustan Zinc Limited (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2756 of 1989, decided on 3rd July 1992) . In the said decision, the learned Single Judge has held that writ petition is maintainable against the respondent. Adverting to the objection of the respondent about maintainability of the writ petition, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that respondent company is a State within the meaning of Article 12 India and as such is amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court. For substantiating his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the Full Bench decision of this Court in case of P. Paliwal v. Hindustan Zinc Limited & Ors. with other connected writ petitions, reported in 2010 (3) WLC (Raj) pg. 1 . The Full Bench of this Court in P. Paliwal's case, in the background of facts and circumstances of that case, concluded that respondent company is "other authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The relevant Para 43 is reproduced as infra: 43. In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the respondent HZL is the "other authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and reference is answered accordingly. 12. Per contra, Mr. Rajesh Joshi, appearing for the respondent, while reiterating the stand of the company in the reply has urged that respondent is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 and therefore it is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Emphasising that the instant writ petition has been filed after disinvestment i.e. May 2002, the learned counsel for the respondent would urge that issue relating to the status of the respondent as "other authority" within the four corners of Article 12 of the Constitution of India is still open. Emphasising that the instant writ petition has been filed after disinvestment i.e. May 2002, the learned counsel for the respondent would urge that issue relating to the status of the respondent as "other authority" within the four corners of Article 12 of the Constitution of India is still open. For this proposition, the learned counsel for the respondent has also placed reliance on the Full Bench judgment in P. Paliwal's case (supra). Mr. Rajesh Joshi, the learned counsel for the respondent has urged that the issue relating to disinvestment has been left open by the Full Bench of this Court while deciding P. Paliwal's case. The learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on Para 42 of the verdict in this behalf. The complete text of Para 42 of the judgment in P. Paliwal's case is as under: 42. Since the issue of dis-investment and its effect has been raised by the respondent-company for the first time in the writ petition no.236/1984 before the Full Bench by submitting additional submissions in the year 2010, which were not part of pleading in the writ petition before the single bench and even before the division bench who referred the question and that too inspite of the fact that the dis-investment was made in the year 2002 and yet point was not raised before the learned Single Judge when first order of reference dated 10.5.2005 was passed nor it was raised before the Division Bench when matter was referred to the Larger Bench and in view of the fact that in all other writ petitions the pleading of dis-investment was taken which have not yet been replied by the petitioners nor petitioners have raised any ground to challenge the dis-investment and pleadings are not complete on these issue of dis-investment and its validity and there are no contradictory decisions of the Benches of this court, therefore, single bench hearing the writ petitions can decide the issue, therefore, we are leaving the issues open to be decided by the Single Benches in accordance with law. 13. Mr. Rajesh Joshi, learned counsel for the respondent, has contended that pleadings of the petitioner are absolutely vague and cryptic vis-`-vis the status of the respondent as State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 13. Mr. Rajesh Joshi, learned counsel for the respondent, has contended that pleadings of the petitioner are absolutely vague and cryptic vis-`-vis the status of the respondent as State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Authenticating his submissions in this behalf, the learned counsel for the respondent would urge that pleadings are absolutely laconic inasmuch as there is no whisper in the writ petition that how and in what manner the respondent company is amenable to writ jurisdiction. He further submits that there is no averment worth the name in the petition that the Central or the State Government is having deep and pervasive control over the company so as to bring it within the four corners of a State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.14. Mr. Joshi has strenuously urged that the petitioner has laid this petition as proxy litigation in the guise of claim for appointment on compassionate grounds as according to him the precise object of the petitioner is to retain the possession of the quarter which was allotted to her late husband by the company. Placing heavy reliance on the documents produced with the reply to writ petition, the learned counsel for the respondent has urged that after disinvestment the respondent company is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 and therefore the writ petition is not maintainable.15. Joining the issue with the petitioner on merits, in the alternative Mr. Joshi has argued that in view of Settlement dated 6.11.1998 and its reiteration in Settlement dated 31.03.2004 the claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds is not at all tenable. Mr. Joshi has very fairly conceded that the respondent company is prepared to pay the lumpsum amount of compensation to the petitioner to the tune of Rupees five lacs as quantified in Annex.I appended with Annex.R/2.16. Refuting the claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds, learned counsel for the respondent has urged that the original application submitted by her for the said cause was belated and now since death of husband of the petitioner, who was in employment of the respondent, more than a decade has elapsed and therefore no fruitful purpose will be served if appointment on compassionate grounds is offered to her. According to submission of Mr. According to submission of Mr. Joshi, as the family has survived for such a longer duration, now it is not desirable to grand any sort of indulgence to the petitioner. 17. I have heard the learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the materials on record. The core issue which requires adjudication in the matter hovers around the status of the respondent as "State" or "other authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Factually, it is not in dispute that before disinvestment respondent was a Government of India enterprise and as such it was amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court. After disinvestment, the whole scenario has changed altogether. The Government of India has also issued memorandum dated 15th of May 2002 declaring that the respondent company is no longer a public sector company. Now, after disinvestment, the strategic partner SOVL holds 45.90% capital of the company. In such a situation, apparently, there is no deep and pervasive control of the Central Government on the respondent company. In view of the observations made by the Full Bench of this Court in P. Paliwal's case (supra), there is obviously no impediment for this Court to examine the status of the respondent company within the four corners of Article 12 of the Constitution of India because the Full Bench of this Court has left this question open for examination of the writ court after phenomenon of disinvestment has taken place. Therefore, the Full Bench decision of this Court in P. Paliwal's case (supra) is of no assistance to the petitioner. So far as Kunku Devi's case (supra), the ratio decidendi of the said verdict cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner because the said verdict was rendered by the learned Single Judge almost a decade before disinvestment.18. A seven Judges' Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology [ (2002) 5 SCC 111 ] per majority while quoting the observations of the Apex Court in case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India. [ (1979) 3 SCC 489 ] , whereby tests were propounded for determining status of a Corporation as an instrumentality or agency of the Government, reproduced in Para 27 as infra: 27. [ (1979) 3 SCC 489 ] , whereby tests were propounded for determining status of a Corporation as an instrumentality or agency of the Government, reproduced in Para 27 as infra: 27. Ramana was noted and quoted with approval in extenso and the tests propounded for determining as to when a corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of the Government therein were culled out and summarised as follows: (1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. (2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with Governmental character. (3) It may also be a relevant factor whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. (4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to Governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. (6) Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government. 19. The Apex Court in its majority judgment has ultimately held that for determining status of a body akin to State within the meaning of Article 12, each case has to be examined in the light of facts of the case. The majority judgment has recorded its conclusions in Para 40 of the verdict as under: 40. The picture that ultimately emerges is that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia are not a rigid set of principles so that if a body falls within any one of them it must, ex hypothesi, be considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12. The question in each case would be whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. The question in each case would be whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State. 20. Following the majority judgment in Pradeep Kumar Biswas's case (supra), in case of Zee Telefilms Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. [ (2005) 4 SCC 649 ] , the Constitution Bench of Apex Court per majority has reiterated the same principles and in final conclusion made following observations in Para 35 of the verdict: 35. In conclusion, it should be noted that there can be no two views about the fact that the Constitution of this country is a living organism and it is the duty of Courts to interpret the same to fulfil the needs and aspirations of the people depending on the needs of the time. It is noticed earlier in this judgment that in Article 12 the term "other authorities" was introduced at the time of framing of the Constitution with a limited objective of granting judicial review of actions of such authorities which are created under the Statute and which discharge State functions. However, because of the need of the day this Court in Rajasthan SEB and Sukhdev Singh noticing the socio-economic policy of the country thought it fit to expand the definition of the term "other authorities" to include bodies other than statutory bodies. This development of law by judicial interpretation culminated in the judgment of the seven-Judge Bench in the case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas. It is to be noted that in the meantime the socio-economic policy of the Government of India has changed [See Balco Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India & Ors. ] and the State is today distancing itself from commercial activities and concentrating on governance rather than on business. It is to be noted that in the meantime the socio-economic policy of the Government of India has changed [See Balco Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India & Ors. ] and the State is today distancing itself from commercial activities and concentrating on governance rather than on business. Therefore, the situation prevailing at the time of Sukhdev Singh is not in existence at least for the time being, hence, there seems to be no need to further expand the scope of "other authorities" in Article 12 by judicial interpretation at least for the time being. It should also be borne in mind that as noticed above, in a democracy there is a dividing line between a State enterprise and a non-State enterprise, which is distinct and the judiciary should not be an instrument to erase the said dividing line unless, of course, the circumstances of the day require it to do so. 21. The learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Saifuddin Nagori v. Hindustan Zinc Limited & Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.965 of 2012, decided on 06.02.2012) , has held that respondent company is not discharging or involved in public duty. In the final conclusion, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable by making following observations: "In view of the discussion made and material placed before me, I do not find that respondent Company falls under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In the aforesaid background, writ petition against it is not maintainable. The same is accordingly dismissed. This disposes of stay application also." 22. Applying the ratio decidendi of the verdicts of Apex Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas's case and Zee Telefilms's case (supra) and also on the verdict of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Saifuddin's case, in the backdrop of the facts and circumstances of the instant case, I have no hesitation to conclude that there is no material on record to show that financial assistance of the State Government is so much as to meet almost all expenditure of the company. Moreover, there exists no deep and pervasive control of the State on the respondent, and the functioning of the company are also not of public importance and closely related to Governmental functions. Moreover, there exists no deep and pervasive control of the State on the respondent, and the functioning of the company are also not of public importance and closely related to Governmental functions. As these conditions are not satisfied and are conspicuously missing vis-`-vis respondent, after disinvestment the irresistible conclusion of this Court is that respondent company is not a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In this view of the matter, writ petition against the respondent is not maintainable and merits dismissal on this count alone.23. Although this Court has concluded that writ petition is not maintainable but on merits also the matter was examined by the Court and in the light of Settlement placed on record by the respondent, there is no room of doubt that claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds is not tenable. The legal position is no more res-integra that appointment on compassionate grounds cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The right of an individual, if any, is only traceable from the rules, regulations, schemes or any settlement and not otherwise. No such claim dehors the rules, regulation or scheme is entertainable. Therefore, on merits also, no relief can be granted to the petitioner in this petition. 24. Resultantly, the present writ petition is dismissed. It is made clear that the dismissal of this writ petition shall not preclude the petitioner from claiming the lumpsum amount of compensation to be paid to the bereaved family which was determined by the respondent employer. The respondent is expected to abide by its commitment and shall ensure payment of lumpsum amount of compensation to the petitioner as expeditiously as possible. Costs are made easy. Writ Petition dismissed. *******