JUDGMENT Hon'ble SHARMA, J.— The instant application has been filed by the State of Rajasthan under Section 378(iii) Cr.P.C. for grant of leave to appeal against the impugned judgment dated 11.9.2012 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Banswara, whereby respondents have been acquitted of the charge framed against them under Sections 498-A and 304-B and in alternate 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. Notices of application were issued to respondents and trial court record was called for. 3. The factual matrix of the case comes out from the trial court record and impugned judgment is that on 17.12.2011 at about 7:30 P.M. complainant Mogji S/o Nanak Ram submitted a written report at Police Station Anandpuri to the effect that his daughter Manjula alongwith her two children died. It was further stated in the report that his daughter Manjula got married with accused Jayanti Lal on 25.3.2007 at the time of marriage sufficient dowry was given as per his capacity. Since last two years, husband, mother-in-law and father-in-law of Manjula were harassing and torturing her for bringing lesser dowry and were asking her to bring ornaments and cash from her parents. On 17.12.2011, he received an information that his daughter Manjula alongwith her children jumped into a well and died, therefore, he reached at Serawala and managed to drive out the dead bodies from well. It is further stated that his daughter died due to ill treatment and harassment given by her husband, mother-in-law and father-in-law. 4. On this, a case bearing No. 254/2011 for the offence under Section 498-A, 304-B of the IPC was registered at Police Station Anandpuri and after investigation, challan was filed against the accused respondents before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Bagidora, where-from the case was committed to the Sessions Court, Banswara for its trial. 5. Learned trial court after hearing the arguments of both the parties, framed the charges for the offences under Sections 498-A, 304-B of IPC in alternate Section 302 of IPC against the accused persons and explained them, who denied for the same and claimed for trial. 6. To substantiate the charges, prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited 14 documents. After completion of prosecution evidence, statements of accused persons under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded, wherein they stated that they have been falsely implicated. 6. To substantiate the charges, prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited 14 documents. After completion of prosecution evidence, statements of accused persons under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded, wherein they stated that they have been falsely implicated. Child of Manjula felt down in the well, she alongwith her other child who was in her lap, too fell down in the well while trying to rescue her children. In defence, accused produced 4 witnesses and exhibited 6 documents. 7. Learned trial court after hearing the final arguments of both the parties, acquitted the accused respondents for the charges levelled against them vide impugned judgment dated 11.9.2012. 8. We have heard learned Public Prosecutor Mr. K.R. Bishnoi, for State and learned counsel for the respondents Mr. Pankaj Gupta and gone through the impugned judgment and the record of trial court. 9. Mr. K.R.Bishnoi, learned Public Prosecutor has submitted that PW.1 Mogji in his statement clearly stated that the accused respondents harassed and tortured his daughter Manjula in connection with demand of dowry. They always asked his daughter to bring ornaments and cash from her parents. Jayanti Lal and Lal Singh respondents always gave beatings to his daughter and his daughter used to make complaint about this. He further argued that PW 1 Mogji in his statement clearly alleged that his daughter died alongwith her children due to ill-treatment and torturing by the accused-respondents and his statement is fully corroborated by the statements of PW.2 Heera Lal, PW.4 Smt. Shanti and PW. 6 Nathu Lal. He further submitted that learned trial court failed to appreciate the evidence of the witnesses in right prospective and wrongly acquitted the accused respondents. As such, the leave to appeal filed by appellant-State may be granted. 10. Per contra, Mr. Pankaj Gupta learned counsel for the accused-respondents has supported the impugned judgment of acquittal and stated that there are material contradictions in the statements of defence witnesses. He further stated that PW.3 Raju and PW. 7 Gajendra who are the prosecution witnesses clearly stated that it was an accident and deceased Manjula fell down in the well in course of saving her child. He further argued that application filed by appellant State deserves to be dismissed. 11. To decide the issues raised by the respective counsels, a brief of synopsis of relevant evidence on record as led by the prosecution may be opposite. 12. He further argued that application filed by appellant State deserves to be dismissed. 11. To decide the issues raised by the respective counsels, a brief of synopsis of relevant evidence on record as led by the prosecution may be opposite. 12. PW.1 Mogji father of deceased Smt. Manjula, PW. 4 Smt. Shanti mother of Smt. Manjula, PW.2 Heera Lal uncle of Manjula and PW.5 Smt. Ratna stated in their respective statements stated that deceased Manjula got married with respondent Jayantilal on 25th March, 2007 and at the time of marriage dowry was given as per their capacity. They further stated that since last two years husband, mother-in-law and father-in-law were harassing and giving beatings to deceased Manjula, in connection with bringing less dowry. They further stated that whenever Manjula visited at her parental house she used to tell them about the demand of dowry raised by her in-laws. 13. In cross-examination, PW.1 Mogji stated that after marriage, her daughter came only for three times and she did not disclose the fact of giving beating as such it has not been mentioned in F.I.R. Ex. P.1 and in his police statement Ex.D.1. He further admitted in his cross examination that accused respondent Lal Singh and Smt. Meera i.e. father-in-law and mother-in-law of deceased were living in another village. 14. PW.4 Smt. Shanti mother of deceased Manjula also admitted in her cross-examination that though she stated before the police that respondents were given beating to Manjula but the said fact is not there in her statement Ex. D.3. Similarly, this fact has also does not find place in her police statement Ex. D.3 that if the money will not be brought by her than, she will be murdered. She further admitted that her daughter came at their house before six months from her death and at that time she did not tell them anything about the harassment and demand for ornaments and cash. As such this statement of PW.4 Smt. Shanti falsify the statement of PW.1 Mogji. 15. PW.2 Heeralal uncle of deceased Manjula has also improved her statement in court. While in her statement Ex. D.2 it has not been mentioned that respondents have threatened deceased Manjula that if their demand will not be fulfilled, they will kill her. He also admitted that respondent Lal Singh and Meera were living in another village. 15. PW.2 Heeralal uncle of deceased Manjula has also improved her statement in court. While in her statement Ex. D.2 it has not been mentioned that respondents have threatened deceased Manjula that if their demand will not be fulfilled, they will kill her. He also admitted that respondent Lal Singh and Meera were living in another village. He further admitted that he went only twice at the house of in-laws of deceased Manjula. 16. PW.5 Smt. Ratna who is the sister-in-law (Bhabhi) of deceased Manjula, admitted that whenever Manjula came at her parental house, she came in morning and returned to her in-laws in the evening. 17. PW.6 Nathu Lal, in his examination-in-chief stated that at the time of marriage, dowry was demanded by the in-laws of Manjula. He further admitted that in their society, there is no custom for dowry and he has no knowledge about the date, day, month or year that when the demand of dowry was raised. He further stated that in their community the money is being given by the family of bridegroom to the family of bride. 18. PW.8 Dr. Ravi Upadhyay, Medical Jurist, who conducted post-mortem report of deceased Manjula, alongwith Ms. Renuka and Pappu has opined that cause of death of all the three deceased was drowning. He stated that no injury was noticed on the body of deceased Manjula. 19. Respondents accused in their statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. pleaded that they have been implicated falsely as deceased Manjula fell down in the well while rescuing her female child. Respondent Jayanti Lal stated that he was a tailor at Anantpuri and when incident took place he was not present at the place of occurrence. 20. PW. 3 Raju and PW.7 Gajendra and defence witnesses DW-1 Gattu, DW-2 Afzal, DW-3 Ramanlal and DW-4 Ramlal who are neighbours of the respondents stated in their respective statements that there was no parapet on the well situated near the house of respondents and a female child, Ms. Renuka fell down in the well and to save her child Manjula (deceased) alongwith her six months' child Pappu fell down in the well to save Ms. Renuka during the course of rescue, all the three were died. 21. Renuka fell down in the well and to save her child Manjula (deceased) alongwith her six months' child Pappu fell down in the well to save Ms. Renuka during the course of rescue, all the three were died. 21. Learned trial court after appreciating the evidence reached at the conclusion that though the death of Manjula was unnatural and the incident took place within seven years of marriage but prosecution failed to prove that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with demand of dowry soon before her death. 22. Further relying on the defence evidence and statements of PW.3 Raju and PW.7 Gajendra reached at the conclusion that the daughter of Manjula fell down in the well at that time she was having her child aged six months in her lap and during the process to save her lap and during the process to save her daughter, she also fell down in the well with her six months child, as there was no parapet on the well. Learned trial court disbelieved the statements of prosecution witnesses regarding demand of dowry, harassment, and beatings. 23. We have considered the rival arguments and gone through the impugned judgment ad trial court record. 24. It is not in controversy that three persons died as a result of drowning in the well in question, which as per site plan Ex. P.3 is situated near shop and house of respondent Lal Singh having water up to 25 ft. and there was no parapet on the well. 25. The essential ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC are (i) death of a woman must have caused by causing burns such bodily injury or otherwise then under normal circumstances; (ii) such death must have caused within seven years of marriage; (iii) soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or relative of hr husband; (iv) such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with the demand of dowry; and (v) such cruelty is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. 26. Thee concept of cruelty varies from place to place and individual to individual and also according to social and economic status of the person involved. 26. Thee concept of cruelty varies from place to place and individual to individual and also according to social and economic status of the person involved. Cruelty postulates such a treatment as would cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the wife that her living with husband will be harmful and injurious to her life. Therefore, to decide the question of cruelty, the relative factors are the matrimonial relationship between the husband and the wife, their cultural and temperamental status in life, state of their health and their interaction in daily life which dominates the aspect of cruelty. The word "harassment" has not been defined in Section 498-A IPC, but dictionary meaning of the word, "harassment" is subject to someone to continuous vexatious attack, questions, demands or other unpleasantness. 27. It is not disputed that deceased died other than under normal circumstance i.e. drowning in well within seven years of marriage. The mother of deceased Manjula, PW.4 Shanti in her cross-examination clearly stated that deceased Manjula visited her house six months before the incident and before her death she did not tll anything to her about ill treatment or cruelty and she also admitted that in their community parents/relatives of bride never give jewellery rather the parents/relatives of bridegroom give jewellery. As such, there no evil custom of dowry is prevailing in the society of respondents and complainant party. 28. Regarding harassment and cruelty and allegations made are omnibus in nature and has been mad without any specific instances and there are material improvements and contradictions in the statements of PW.1 Mogji, PW.2 Heera Lal, PW. 4 Smt. Shanti, PW.5 Smt. Ratna, PW.6 Nathu Lal and PW.10 Ramesh regarding demand of dowry, harassment and torturing deceased Manjula. Above witnesses did not discos anything about the amount which was said to be demanded as dowry but PW.10 Ramesh, the brother of deceased stated that respondents were demanding one lac rupees from Manjula. Though this fact has not been stated by him in his police statement Ex. D.4. Further, he stated that after marriage, he never met to Manjula. He came to know about this fact from his father PW.1 Mogji on phone but his father has not disclosed this fact in his statement. Though this fact has not been stated by him in his police statement Ex. D.4. Further, he stated that after marriage, he never met to Manjula. He came to know about this fact from his father PW.1 Mogji on phone but his father has not disclosed this fact in his statement. The allegations regarding alleged beatings or harassment or any other ill-treatment by respondents to deceased Manjula were also without mentioning of any specific dates or near about dates and time. It is very unnatural that a married lady was subjected to cruelty by her in-laws and whenever she visited her parents house, she does not disclose anything about this fact to anyone and specially to her mother. Therefore, it shows that no cruelty or harassment were committed with deceased Manjula. Generic allegations about alleged harassment without any specific dates or near about dates and times were also not relied upon by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sunil Bajaj vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2001) 9 SCC 417 and it was held that conviction cannot be on the basis of vague and inconsistent and generic allegation. 29. In Surinder Kaur vs. State of Harayana reported in (2004) 4 SCC 109 , at page 111 the Hon'ble Supreme Court had not relied on the allegations of harassment which were omnibus in nature and which had been made without any specific instances and the same was levelled only to involve the entire family. 30. The statements of prosecution witnesses which can be considered against the respondents are to the effect that deceased was tortured by them and she was given beaten by them. On perusal of statements it reveals that no particulars of the alleged torture by the respondents were stated by the witnesses. Thus, the allegations against respondents are absolutely vague and are general in nature, without specific instance and without indicating that in what manner the deceased was tortured by the respondents. Only PW.10 Ramesh stated in his statement that Rs. 1,00,000/- was demanded while h admitted that after marriage of Manjula, he never met Manjula and this fact is not being corroborated by the other statements of witnesses. 31. In Kans Raj vs. State of Punjab and Ors. Only PW.10 Ramesh stated in his statement that Rs. 1,00,000/- was demanded while h admitted that after marriage of Manjula, he never met Manjula and this fact is not being corroborated by the other statements of witnesses. 31. In Kans Raj vs. State of Punjab and Ors. reported in AIR 2000 SC 2324 the Hon'ble Supreme Court, inter alia, observed as under:- "In cases where such accusations are made, the overt acts attributed to persons other than husband are required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. By mere surmises and conjectures and implications such relations cannot be held guilty for the offence relating to dowry deaths." 32. This is not in dispute that unless the conclusions of the Court drawn on the evidence on record are unreasonable, perverse or unsustainable the High Court should not interfere with the order of acquittal, although the power of the High Court to reassess the evidence and reached to its own conclusions are as extensive as in an appeal against the order of conviction, yet as a rule of prudence, the High Court should always give proper consideration to matters such as (i) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of witnesses; (ii) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weekend by the fact that he has been acquitted at the trial; (iii) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (iv) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had advantage of seeing the witnesses. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances, this court does not find that the conclusions arrived at by the learned trial court are unreasonable, perverse or unsustainable. 33. On the grounds which have been raised by the petitioner seeking leave against the judgment of the trial court dated 11th September, 2012 giving benefit of doubt to all the three accused and acquitted them of the offences under Sections 498-A and 304-B in alternate 302 IPC. It would also be relevant to note that where a view taken by the learned trial Judge is reasonable and probable view, merely because some other view may also be probable or possible view, would not require any interference by the appellate court. 34. It would also be relevant to note that where a view taken by the learned trial Judge is reasonable and probable view, merely because some other view may also be probable or possible view, would not require any interference by the appellate court. 34. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in `Allarakha K. Mansuri vs. State of Gujarat, 2002(1) RCR (Criminal) 748', held that where, in a case, two views are possible, the one which favours the accused, has to be adopted by the Court. This view has been reiterated in State of Goa vs. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC 755 ', and `Chandrappa vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 .' 35. In `Mrinal Das & others vs. The State of Tripura, 2011(9) SCC 479 ,' decided on September 5, 2011, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after looking into many earlier judgments, has laid down parameters, in which interference can be made in a judgment of acquittal, by observing as under: "An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons", for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/ report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed." 36. Similarly, in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Shera Ram alias Vishnu Dutta, (2012) 1 SCC 602 ,' the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- "7. A judgment of acquittal has the obvious consequence of granting freedom to the accused. This Court has taken a consistent view that unless the judgment in appeal is contrary to evidence, palpably erroneous or a view which could not have been taken by the court of competent jurisdiction keeping in view the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, this Court shall be reluctant to interfere with such judgment of acquittal. 8. The penal laws in India are primarily based upon certain fundamental procedural values, which are right to fair trial and presumption of innocence. A person is presumed to be innocent till proven guilty and once held to be not guilty of a criminal charge, he enjoys the benefit of such presumption which could be interfered with only for valid and proper reasons. A person is presumed to be innocent till proven guilty and once held to be not guilty of a criminal charge, he enjoys the benefit of such presumption which could be interfered with only for valid and proper reasons. An appeal against acquittal has always been differentiated from a normal appeal against conviction. Wherever there is perversity of facts and/or law appearing in the judgment, the appellate court would be within its jurisdiction to interfere with the judgment of acquittal, but otherwise such interference is not called for." 37. Thereafter, in the above case a large number of judgments were discussed and then it was opined as under:- "10. There is a very thin but a fine distinction between an appeal against conviction on the one hand and acquittal on the other. The preponderance of judicial opinion of this Court is that there is no substantial difference between an appeal against acquittal except that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal the Court keeps in view the position that the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused has been fortified by his acquittal and if the view adopted by the High Court is a reasonable one and the conclusion reached by it had its grounds well set out on the materials on record, the acquittal may not be interfered with. Thus, this fine distinction has to be kept in mind by the Court while exercising its appellate jurisdiction. The golden rule is that the Court is obliged and it will not abjure its duty to prevent miscarriage of justice, where interference is imperative and the ends of justice so require and it is essential to appease the judicial conscience." 38. Learned Public Prosecutor has failed to show any error of law or on facts on the basis of which interference can be made by this Court in the judgment under challenge. 39. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the petition seeking a leave to appeal has no substance and the same deserves dismissal, which is hereby dismissed and leave is declined. 40. Let the record of the trial Court record be remitted back alongwith copy of this order.