ORDER 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellants. 2. The present appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, hereinafter referred to as the “Code”, has been placed for hearing under Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code. The appellants are aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 31st of March, 2010 passed by the learned Additional District Judge-IVth, Begusarai in Title Appeal No. 16 of 2007, whereby he has allowed the appeal and reversed the judgment and decree dated 23.2.2007 passed by the learned First Munsif, Begusarai in T.S. No. 104 of 1995. The appellants were defendants second set in the title suit filed by the plaintiffs Shib Ram Mahto and others. 3. The suit land as described in Schedule II of the plaint, as per records of the present appeal is the land bearing Khesra No. 2763 apertaining to khata No.52 admeasuring 1 Bigha 9 dhurs. The suit was filed for declaring the three sale deeds dated 22.5.1995 and 25.5.1995 as void. 4. Briefly stated, the case of the plaintiffs before the Courts below was that Chhathu Mahto was their common ancestors who had three sons, namely, Bino Mahton, Nandlal Mahton and Palakdhari Mahton. Bino Mahton had two sons, namely, Ramjee Mahton and Shib Lal Mahton. Nandlal Mahton had two sons, namely, Saryug Mahton and Shibram Mahton. Saryug Mahton had two sons, namely, Amit Mahton and Ram Udgar Mahton. Shibram Mahton had one son, namely, Ashok Kumar who is respondent no.2 in the present appeal. Ramjee Mahton had two sons, namely, Siyaram Mahton and Ram Chandra Mahton (Respondent nos. 12 and 13) respectively. He had a daughter also, namely, Mukhia who has been impleded as respondent no.8 in the present appeal. Shib Lal Mahto, on the other hand, had three sons, namely, Ram Swaroop Mahton, Ram Nandan Mahton and Bhujangi Mahton who have been impleded as Respondent nos. 9 to 11. The descedants of said Chhathu Mahton are plaintiffs in the suit. 5. The plaintiffs claimed that the suit land bearing Khesra No. 2763 appertaining to Khata No. 52 were the Khatiyani land of Chhathu Mahton and Tulsi Mahton, sons of Kanchan Mahton. Tulsi Mahton and his descendants had no concern with the disputed land. It was their further plea that the plaintiffs were in possession over the aforesaid Khesra No. 2763 ad-measuring 1 bigha 9 dhurs. Tulsi Mahton and his descendants had no concern with the disputed land. It was their further plea that the plaintiffs were in possession over the aforesaid Khesra No. 2763 ad-measuring 1 bigha 9 dhurs. The plaintiffs sought for declaring the sale deeds dated 22.2.1995 and 25.5.1995 executed by the defendants ( Appellants) as they did not have any right, title or interest over the suit land as void ab-initio. By sale deed dated 22.2.1995, 5 kathas of land out of the suit land was said to have been transferred to Ram Khelawan Mahton, while by two other sale deeds dated 25.5.1995, 10 katha 9 dhurs and 5 katha of land respectively were said to have been transferred to Sonia Devi wife of Ram Khelawan Mahton, Raghu Nandan Mahton and other sons of Ram Khelawan Mahton. The plaintiffs claimed that all the sale deeds executed by the appellants/defendants second set in favour of the defendant first set were forged and fabricated. They claimed that the defendants second set had no right title and interest over the property and had no authority to execute the sale deed in favour of the defendants first set. 6. The defendants filed their written statement. They did not dispute the fact that the suit land was originally recorded in the Khatiyan in the name of Chhathu Mahto, the ancestors of the plaintiffs and Tulsi Mahton. The defendants, however, asserted that said Chhathu Mahton and Tulsi Mahton transferred the disputed land through verbal sale on 10.10.1925 with consideration for Rs.90/- to Lalo Mahton, the ancestors of the defendants second set, appellants herein. It was pleaded that Lalo Mahton had been paying rent to the ex-landlord. After death of Lalo Mahton, Faudi Mahto came in his possession and he also got the rent receipts issued by the ex-landlord. Faudi Mahto died in the year 1989 leaving behind him the present appellants who came in possession over the suit land. The case of defendants second set before the Courts below was that in the background as above, they had right title and interest over the property which they could validly transfer by the sale deeds which was challenged by the plaintiffs. 7. On the basis of the pleadings and rival contentions, the learned trial Court framed eight issue including issue Nos. 5 and 6 which reads as follows:- “5. 7. On the basis of the pleadings and rival contentions, the learned trial Court framed eight issue including issue Nos. 5 and 6 which reads as follows:- “5. Whether the defendant second set had got valid right and title to execute the sale deed in favour of the defendant first set? 6. Whether the sale deed executed by defendant second set in favour of defendant first set was void ab-initio and not enforceable?” 8. The witnesses were examined. Evidences were adduced before the trial Court. The trial Court on the basis of such evidence and material available decided all the eights issues framed in the suit against the plaintiffs and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs thereafter, preferred the appeal which was registered in the file of the learned Additional District Judge-IVth, Begusarai as Title Appeal No. 16 of 2007 who vide his impugned judgment and decree dated 31st March, 2010 reversed the finding of learned trial Court and held that the three sale deeds ( Ext.1, Ext.A/1 and Ext. A/2) were void ab-initio. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants, challenging the order of the first appellate Court, has vehemently submitted that the suit was not maintainable as framed as the only relief which was sought was to declare the sale deed as unenforceable and no relief was sought for possession over the suit land. He has submitted that the suit was barred in view of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, there being no relief sought in consequence of relief of declaration of title over suit land. Reference has been made to the judgment of the Apex Court reported in 2013(1) PLJR(SC) 48 ( Union of India Vs. Ibrahim Kabir and another). He has further submitted that suit was also barred by non-joinder of necessary parties in as much as Raghunandan Mahton in whose favour also one of the sale deeds was executed was not impleaded as party defendant in the suit and the suit was fit to be dismissed on this ground alone. He has further submitted that the onus to establish title was heavy on the plaintiffs which the first appellate Court wrongly shifted on the defendants and, therefore, the first appellate Court committed serious error of law, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of appellate power under Section 100 of the Code. 10. He has further submitted that the onus to establish title was heavy on the plaintiffs which the first appellate Court wrongly shifted on the defendants and, therefore, the first appellate Court committed serious error of law, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of appellate power under Section 100 of the Code. 10. From the impugned orders it would appear that there is no dispute over the fact that ancestors of the plaintiffs had initial title over the suit land. The defendants took the plea that their common ancestors Lalo Mahto had purchased the suit land, through oral sale in 1925. In such circumstance the onus was on the defendants to prove the said oral sale and subsequent possession over the suit land. Learned appellate Court rightly held so in the judgment under appeal that the onus to prove of title was on executants of the sale deed. The defendants in support of their claim of title over the suit land relied upon the rent receipts which were filed on their behalf. Learned appellate Court refused to accept the rent receipts to be treated to documents of title. I do not find any illegality in this regard. Learned first appellate Court has taken into account the recitals in the sale deeds dated 25.5.1995 and 22. 2.1995. He has taken note of the fact that appellant no.2 made statement in his sale deed dated 25.5.1995 (Ext.-A) that land as mentioned in the sale deed was acquired by his ancestors through settlement, whereas appellant no.1 stated in the sale deed dated 22.2.1995 (Ext. A/1) that the land mentioned in the sale deed, plot No. 2763 was acquired by his father through sale deed. Thereafter, when appellant no. 1 and appellant no.2 jointly executed the sale deed (Ext. A/2) regarding plot no. 2763 ad-measuring area 10 kathas 9 dhurs in favour of Sonia Devi, they jointly asserted that the land mentioned in the sale deed was acquired by their father through settlement. The appellate Court, therefore, rightly doubted the case of the defendants as they had made contradictory statements in the sale deeds ( Ext.A/2) regarding mode of acquisition of the land in question by their ancestors. 11. The appellate Court, therefore, rightly doubted the case of the defendants as they had made contradictory statements in the sale deeds ( Ext.A/2) regarding mode of acquisition of the land in question by their ancestors. 11. From the impugned order of the first appellate Court, it also appears that DW-14 Lakhan Mahton himself in course of cross-examination had admitted possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land and also that ancestors of the plaintiffs were also in possession over the suit land. Learned appellate Court in that background came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs had possession and title over the suit land. 12. In view of the specific findings by learned first appellate Court on the basis of material available on record; in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code, I do not find it a fit case to enter into the correctness of findings as no perversity in finding has been alleged. It is not the case of the appellants that the findings of the first appellate Court are contrary to the material available on record or without any material available. It is well settled that this Court in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code will normally not interfere with the findings of fact unless it is shown to be perverse and based on surmises and conjectures. 13. As regards the plea that the suit was barred for non-joinder of necessary parties, I find that this aspect has properly been dealt by the learned appellate Court by referring to the sale deeds ( Exts. 1, A/1 and A/2). This is not in dispute that father of Raghunandan Mahto, namely, Ram Khelewan Mahto was impleaded as party defendants who contested the suit and appeared as DW-12. On the basis of recitals in the sale deeds learned first appellate Court came to the finding that it was Ram Khelewan Mahton who had purchased the suit land. In course of cross-examination as DW-12, he admitted that he had himself paid the consideration money to the executants. In such view of the matter, it was rightly held by the First appellate Court that interest of Raghunandan was not jeopardized in his absence as his interest was being looked after well by his father Ram Khelewan Mahton, and therefore, the suit could not be rejected on the ground of defect of non-joinder of necessary parties. 14. In such view of the matter, it was rightly held by the First appellate Court that interest of Raghunandan was not jeopardized in his absence as his interest was being looked after well by his father Ram Khelewan Mahton, and therefore, the suit could not be rejected on the ground of defect of non-joinder of necessary parties. 14. It has been very vehemently contended that as the plaintiffs did not seek consequential relief of possession over the property and in that view of the matter, the suit was barred by provisions under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The contention has been made to be rejected. As in the present case the plaintiffs throughout took the plea that they were in possession and, therefore, no such relief was required to be sought for and the suit cannot be held to be defective for this reason in the facts and circumstances of the case. 15. In view of the above, the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.