JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Shri Shatrughan Choudhary learned Additional Chief Standing counsel and Shri B.N.Rai for the respondents. 2. Instant petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred against the impugned judgement and order passed by the U.P. Public Services Tribunal as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition. According to learned counsel for the petitioner earlier petitioner was punished by order dated 7.2.1996 followed by order dated 19.4.1996 with dismissal from services. Order of the punishment was impugned before the tribunal in claim petition No. 198 of 1996 decided by judement and order dated 7.6.2005. The operative portion of the judgement and order dated 7.6.2005 is reproduced as under : “The claim petition succeeds and is hereby allowed and the order dated 7.2.1995 and 19.4.1996 are hereby quashed and the opposite parties are directed to reconsider the petitioner’s case in respect of imposition of penalty to the petitioner in the light of the observations made and the case law referred too in the body of judgement. In the circumstances of the case parties shall bear their own costs.” 3. It appears that while reconsidering the case of claimant respondent afresh with regard to penalty in the light of observation made by the tribunal lesser punishment has been awarded, with forfeiture of one month salary. The subsequent punishment awarded was impugned before the tribunal in claim petition No. 1249 of 2007. The tribunal allowed the claim petition by judgement and order dated 3.4.2012, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition. While allowing the claim petition the tribunal had recorded a finding that salary was incorrectly fixed of the claimant respondents and after setting aside of the order of punishment and being restored in service he is entitled for payment of entire salary. The tribunal further held that while deciding the controversy earlier tribunal had not recorded a finding and issued direction thereon that the period during the petitioner was not in service should be treated as discontinuation of service. Accordingly tribunal had allowed the claim petition with regard to forfeiture of salary of about a month. 4. While assailing the impugned order it has been submitted by learned Additional Chief Standing counsel that subsequent claim petition was barred by principle of constructive res judicata. Accordingly tribunal had allowed the claim petition with regard to forfeiture of salary of about a month. 4. While assailing the impugned order it has been submitted by learned Additional Chief Standing counsel that subsequent claim petition was barred by principle of constructive res judicata. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a Full Bench judgement of this Court in Surya Deo Mishra, etc.v. State of U.P. and others etc., 2006 (1) ADJ 467 (FB). Full Bench of this Court held that the petition shall be maintainable to quash subsequent illegal order regarding payment of post retiral dues as it would be a fresh cause of action. For convenience para 24 of the Full Bench judgement (surpa) is reproduced as under : “In the result the answers to the questions formulated for decisions by us are as follows : (1) The petitioner is entitled to the salary for the period that he has worked under the interim order of the Court in view of the law laid down in Subh Nath’s case while has not been overruled. We have therefore, modified the order passed in the first petition. (2) where a writ petition in which interim orders were granted is dismissed without any reference to the salary for the period that the petitioner had worked under the interim orders of the Court, a second writ petition for claiming the salary of the same period is not maintainable. However, it may be maintainable to quash any subsequent illegal order regarding payment of post retirement benefit, as it would be a fresh cause of action.” 5. The other judgement relied upon by the petitioner’s counsel is in Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar and another, 2005 (1) SCC 787 . However, it may be maintainable to quash any subsequent illegal order regarding payment of post retirement benefit, as it would be a fresh cause of action.” 5. The other judgement relied upon by the petitioner’s counsel is in Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar and another, 2005 (1) SCC 787 . Their lordship of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhanu Kumar Jain (supra) held as under : “The dichotomy, in our opinion, can be resolved by holding that whereas the defendant would not be permitted to raise a contention as regards the correctness or otherwise of the order posting the suit for exparte hearing by the trial Court and/or existence of a sufficient case for non-appearance of the defendant before it, it would be open to him to argue in the first appeal filed by him under Section 96 (2) of the Code on the merits of the suit so as to enable him to contend that the materials brought on record by the plaintiffs were not sufficient for passing a decree in his favour or the suit was otherwise not maintainable. Lack of jurisdiction of the Court can also be a possible plea in such an appeal. We,however, agree with Mr. Chaudhari that the “Explanation” appended to Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code shall receive a strict construction as was held by this Court in Rani Choudhury, P. Kiran Kumar and Shyam Sundar Sarma v. Pannalal Jaiswal.” 6. A plain reading of the aforesaid case law relied upon by the petitioner’s counsel reveals that Hon’ble Supreme Court with regard to filing of subsequent suit held that the defendant could not raise contention as regard the correctness or otherwise of the order posting the suit for exparte hearing by the trial Court and/or existence of a sufficient case or non appearance of defendant before it but it would upon to him to argue the first appeal filed under the statutory provision. 7. Cases relied upon by petitioner’s counsel does not seem to applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case for the reasons discussed hereinafter. 7. Cases relied upon by petitioner’s counsel does not seem to applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case for the reasons discussed hereinafter. A perusal of the operative portion of the order passed by the Tribunal while deciding the claim petition dated 7.6.2005 reveals that tribunal had quashed and directed to reconsider the petitioner’s case in respect of imposition of a penalty to the petitioner in the light of observations made and the case law referred to, in the body of the judgement. The word penalty has got wide connotation. 8. In Blacks Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition by Bryan A. Garner, the word penalty has been defined as under : “Penalty Punishment imposed on a wrongdoer, usu. in the form of imprisonment or fine; esp., a sum of money exacted as punishment for either a wrong to the state or a civil wrong (as distinguished from compensation for the injured party’s loss). Though usu. for crimes, penalties are also sometimes imposed for civil wrongs. 9. In The Law Lexicon by P Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition the word penalty has been defined as under : Penalty Penalty is a liability composed as a punishment on the party committing the breach of contract. Agreement to pay at default interest at a higher rate does not amount to penalty. 10. In view of aforesaid dictionary meaning the word penalty should not be narrowly interpreted. It shall include the decision order passed by the disciplinary authority whether reducing or enhancing the order of punishment while adjudicating the controversy afresh. Since, disciplinary authority applied mind afresh in pursuance to order passed by the tribunal a cause of action shall arose for interference by the tribunal. 11. Petitioner’s counsel has relied upon one other judgment order dated 1.3.2013 passed in writ petition No. 1602 of 2011 Govind Prasad v. State Public Services Tribunal and others. The facts and circumstances of the said writ petition is entirely different. It does not seem to apply to the present case. 12. 11. Petitioner’s counsel has relied upon one other judgment order dated 1.3.2013 passed in writ petition No. 1602 of 2011 Govind Prasad v. State Public Services Tribunal and others. The facts and circumstances of the said writ petition is entirely different. It does not seem to apply to the present case. 12. It is well-settled proposition of law that judgment of the Court should be looked into in reference to context and issue decided thereon vide H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur and others v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 530 ; M/s. Amar Nath Om Parkash and others v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1985 SC 218 ; Rajpur Ruda Meha and others v. State of Gurajat, AIR 1980 SC 1707 ; C.I.T. v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd., (1992) 4 SCC 363 ; Sarv Shramik Sangh, Bombay v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. and another, (1993) 2 SCC 386 ; Haryana Financial Corporation and another v. M/s. Jagdamba Oil Mills and another, AIR 2002 SC 834 ; Mehboob Dawod Shaikh v. State of Maharastra, (2004) 2 SCC 362 ; ICICI Bank and another v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others, AIR 2005 SC 3315 ; M/s. Makhija Construction and Enggr. Pvt. Ltd. v. Indore Development Authority and others, AIR 2005 SC 2499 ; and Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. and another, (2005) 7 SCC 234 . 13. It is well-settled proposition of law that cause of action depend upon the bundle of factors and no straitjacket formula can be applied to it. In Blacks Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition by Bryan A. Garner, the word ‘cause of action’ has been defined as under: Cause of action—A group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in Court from another person. 14. In view of above, while adjudicating the controversy afresh in the claim petition filed by the claimant respondent to subsequent order passed by the disciplinary authority by interfering with it the tribunal had not committed wrong. The claim petition is not barred by constructive res judicata as argued by learned counsel for the petitioner. In view of above, we feel that claim petition is not barred by principle of res judicata. 15. The claim petition is not barred by constructive res judicata as argued by learned counsel for the petitioner. In view of above, we feel that claim petition is not barred by principle of res judicata. 15. In view of above, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the tribunal. 16. We express our displeasure to the decision of State Government to file the present writ petition with regard to forfeiture of one month salary on the ground discussed hereinabove. There appears to be no reason to prefer a writ petition against every order passed by the tribunal. State may be aware that power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is extraordinary remedy and where substantial question of law is involved and order is patently absurd only then a writ petition should be preferred. 17. In view of above, writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merit. No order as to costs. —————