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2013 DIGILAW 1291 (BOM)

T. S. K. Reddy v. State of Maharashtra

2013-07-11

M.L.TAHALIYANI

body2013
Judgment : 1. The applicants have moved this Court by filing the present application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the proceedings pending before the learned Special Judge, at Kelapur, District Yavatmal vide Special Case No.2/2008. The applicants along with the other accused are facing trial for the offences punishable under Sections 120B, 166, 420 and 468 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(2)(vii) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The said chargesheet was filed after investigation of Crime No.15/2003 of Patan Police Station, District Yavatmal. The applicants are Forest Officers and two other accused are contractor Mr. Amin Seth and his accountant Mr. Prabhakar Madavi. The said crime was registered on the complaint made by the complainant Sonu Pandu Atram. The complainant Sonu Pandu Atram admittedly belongs to 'Gond' community, which is a Scheduled Tribe. Admittedly, he had agricultural field situated at Gat No.6/1, Pandharkawada. Admittedly, there were teak wood trees in the said field. It is further admitted position that the complainant was covered by the provisions of the Maharashtra Sale of Trees by Occupants Belonging to Scheduled Tribes (Regulation) Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act'). The applicant No.6 Shri Pawar falls within the definition of 'Collector' as defined in Section 2(1)(c) of the Act. The 'Collector' is defined as under: “Collector” includes a revenue officer not below the rank of Tahsildar, or a Forest Officer not below the rank of Range Forest Officer, specially empowered by the State Government to perform all or any of the functions of the Collector under this Act, and different officers may be empowered to perform different functions or the same function of the Collector;” Section 6 of the said Act runs as under: “6. (1) Any occupant, who on and after the commencement of the Maharashtra Sale of Trees by Occupants belonging to Scheduled Tribes (Regulation) (Amendment) Act, 1974, intends to sell any trees in his holding, shall make an application to the Collector for assistance for the sale of the trees. (1) Any occupant, who on and after the commencement of the Maharashtra Sale of Trees by Occupants belonging to Scheduled Tribes (Regulation) (Amendment) Act, 1974, intends to sell any trees in his holding, shall make an application to the Collector for assistance for the sale of the trees. Such application shall be in the prescribed form, and shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the permission, if any granted under section 3 of the Maharashtra Felling of Trees (Regulation) Act, 1964, and where such permission is deemed to have been granted under sub-section (1C) of section 3 of that Act, the application shall state such fact therein.” (2) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Collector shall, after hearing the applicant and making such inquiry as he may deem fit, decide whether the assistance sought for should be granted (or not) for sale of the trees through a Forest Officer.” “Occupant” has been defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the said Act as under: “occupant” means an occupant belonging to a Scheduled Tribe”. As such it is absolutely clear that the complainant was occupant of Gat No.6/1 and he had teak wood trees in the said land. Therefore, his teak wood trees could to be sold in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. 2. The applicant Nos.1 to 6 were working as, Deputy Conservator of Forest, Pandharkawada; Assistant Conservator of Forest; Pandharkawada, Forester, Pandharkawada; Forest Guard, Pandharkawada; Range Forest Officers, Pandharkawada respectively. The complainant had sought permission to sell 303 teak wood trees described hereinabove. It is alleged by the complainant that the documents were manipulated by the applicants and instead of granting him permission of cutting 303 teak wood trees, a permission was granted for cutting 129 teak wood trees. It is further alleged that the applicants managed to engage the contractor to cut the teak wood trees and they had cut all 303 teak wood tees in his field and by manipulating the documents they had shown that only 129 teak wood trees were cut. The amount recovered after selling of trees was deposited in the bank account of the complainant. The sale proceeds for rest of the trees were allegedly pocketed by the applicants and other accused. This incident had occurred about one year before lodging of the complaint. The complaint was lodged on 29th June, 2003. The amount recovered after selling of trees was deposited in the bank account of the complainant. The sale proceeds for rest of the trees were allegedly pocketed by the applicants and other accused. This incident had occurred about one year before lodging of the complaint. The complaint was lodged on 29th June, 2003. It is necessary to be mentioned here that the complaint was not personally lodged by the complainant, but it was lodged by Vidarbha Jan Andolan Samiti accompanied by affidavit of the complainant. On such complaint being made to Patan Police Station, investigation was taken up. During the course of investigation, it was found that in fact 303 teak wood trees were cut and the complainant was given sale proceeds of 129 teak wood trees. The sale proceeds of rest of the trees, in collusion with the contractor, were pocketed by the contractor and other accused including the Forest Officers who are applicants herein. The loss allegedly caused to the complainant due to this act on the part of the applicants and others was estimated as Rs.6,00,000/-. 3. During the course of investigation, the police had visited the field from where the teak wood trees were cut. Panchanama was drawn and statements of witnesses were recorded. It was revealed during the course of investigation that in fact there were 303 teak wood trees standing in the agricultural field and all the trees were cut and were taken away. 4. The case of the applicants is that they had, in fact, assisted the complainant in cutting 129 teak wood trees and selling the same in accordance with the law. The rest of the teak wood trees were not cut at the instance of the applicants. It is stated by the applicants that rest of the trees were cut by brother of the complainant without following the procedure laid down under the Act. A forest case had been registered against complainant and his brother. The brother of complainant namely Potu and others, who were responsible for cutting of the said trees, were imposed a fine of Rs.500/- each under the provisions the Maharashtra Felling of Trees (Regulation) Act, 1964. 5. A forest case had been registered against complainant and his brother. The brother of complainant namely Potu and others, who were responsible for cutting of the said trees, were imposed a fine of Rs.500/- each under the provisions the Maharashtra Felling of Trees (Regulation) Act, 1964. 5. In this regard, it may be mentioned here that Potu Pandu Atram, the brother of the complainant, is cited as non-applicant No.3 in the present application, the complainant is cited as non-applicant No.2, State of Maharashtra, through Secretary of Forest Department is cited as non-applicant No.4 and State of Maharashtra, through Home Department, Police Station Patan is also cited as non-applicant No.1. 6. Non-applicant No.1, however, alleged that the complaint against brother of the complainant and others in respect of cutting of rest of the teak wood trees of Gat No.6/1 was manipulated by the applicants only with a view to save their own skin from the present prosecution. 7. The applicants had moved the Special Court, Kelapur for discharge. It was contended before the learned Special Judge that the prosecution could not continue as there was no requisite sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code for prosecution of the applicants. The prayer was however rejected. A revision application was filed before this Court challenging the order of the learned Special Judge, Kelapur. The said revision was withdrawn by the applicants as non-applicant No.1 had made a statement that an application filed by non-applicant No.1 before the Government for grant of sanction was pending. 8. It is admitted position that the Government refused to grant sanction for prosecution of the applicants. Therefore, a fresh application was made before the learned Special Judge for discharge. The said application has also been rejected and hence, the present application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 9. The facts of the case have been stated by me in brief hereinabove. The details of investigation are not necessary to be stated in the present order. The said application has also been rejected and hence, the present application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 9. The facts of the case have been stated by me in brief hereinabove. The details of investigation are not necessary to be stated in the present order. The application moved by the applicants is based on three grounds namely (i) the prosecution cannot continue for want of sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, (ii) the complainant has filed an affidavit before the trial Court as well as before this Court stating inter alia that he has no grievance against the applicants, and (iii) the First Information Report was delayed by near about nine months and that the prosecution against the applicants was not at the instance of the complainant but at the instance of disgruntle elements who instigated the complainant to file the complaint. 10. The prime question, which arises for determination in the present case, is that as to whether the prosecution could continue without sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. To determine this issue, it is necessary to examine whether the acts alleged to have been committed by the applicants were committed by them while acting or purporting to act in discharge of their official duty. It is contended by learned Senior Counsel Shri A.M. Gordey on behalf of the applicants that the applicants are admittedly Forest Officers and applicant No.6 is one of the Officers who comes within the definition of “Collector” as defined in the Act and he had authority to grant permission to cut trees belonging to a person of Scheduled Tribes. It is admitted position that an application was made for cutting 303 teak wood trees. What is alleged is that instead of granting permission to cut 303 teak wood trees, documents were manipulated to show that 129 teak wood trees were to be cut. Non-applicant No.2, the original complainant Sonu Atram, being illiterate tribal person could not follow the proceedings. The applicants had, allegedly taking advantage of his illiteracy, forged the documents to show that 129 teak wood trees were cut. It is submitted by learned Senior Counsel Shri Gordey that since applicant No.6 was empowered to grant requisite permission, he had granted the permission. What is alleged is that he had manipulated the documents during the course of proceedings which he was authorised to conduct. It is submitted by learned Senior Counsel Shri Gordey that since applicant No.6 was empowered to grant requisite permission, he had granted the permission. What is alleged is that he had manipulated the documents during the course of proceedings which he was authorised to conduct. It is further submitted that acts committed by applicant No.6 and others were committed while acing in discharge of their official duty. It is further submitted that if at all it is submitted on behalf of non-applicant No.1 that the acts were not committed in discharge of official duty of the applicants, at least the acts of the applicants can be said to have been committed while purporting to act in discharge of their official duty. It is contended that if the protective umbrella extended to a public servant under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code is available to the applicants in the present case, the whole purpose of Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code will be frustrated. Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code was introduced to protect the public servants from frivolous and vexatious prosecution. 11. Learned Senior Counsel Shri A.M. Gordey has further submitted that this Court may take note of the fact that non-applicant No.2, original complainant, had no grievance against the applicants and he had not filed any complaint at Police Station on his own accord. It is one of the so called Non-Governmental Organisation who had instigated non-applicant No.2 to file the complaint. It was also brought to my notice that so far as cutting of other teak wood trees are concerned, the deceased non-applicant No.3, brother of non-applicant No.2/complainant and others were fined by the Forest Department under the Provisions of the Maharashtra Felling of Trees (Regulation) Act, 1964. It is also brought to my notice that the complainant/non-applicant No.2 was also fined by one and the same order. Learned Senior Counsel Shri A.M. Gordey has further submitted that what is pertinent to note is that the said order of the Forest Officer has not been challenged anywhere. 12. It is also brought to my notice that the complainant/non-applicant No.2 was also fined by one and the same order. Learned Senior Counsel Shri A.M. Gordey has further submitted that what is pertinent to note is that the said order of the Forest Officer has not been challenged anywhere. 12. Learned Senior Counsel Shri A.M. Gordey has invited my attention to the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to support his submission that the public servant is protected not only in the cases where the offences are allegedly committed while acting in discharge of their official duty, but they are also protected if the offences are committed by them while purporting to act in discharge of their official duty. He has relied upon the judgment in case of State of Orissa and others .vs. Ganesh Chandra Jew reported at AIR 2004 SC 2179 . My attention was invited, particularly to Para Nos.11 and 12. The Para Nos.11 and 12 of the said judgment run as under: “11. Such being the nature of the provision the question is how should the expression, “any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty”', be understood? What does it mean? “Official” according to dictionary, means pertaining to an office, and official act or official duty means an act or duty done by an officer in his official capacity. In B. Saha and Others v. M. S. Kochar ( 1979 (4) SCC 177 ), it was held : (SCC pp. 18485, para 17): "The words 'any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty’ employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, 'it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be’. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between two extremes. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197 (1), an Act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution and the said provision." Use of the expression, “official duty” implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public in the course of his service and that it should have been in discharge of his duty. The Section does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty. 12. It has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty. That is under the colour of office. Official duty therefore implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and such act or omission must have been performed as part of duty which further must have been official in nature. The Section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determined its applicability to any act or omission in course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of duty. But once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. For instance a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the Section has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. For instance a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the Section has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. But once it is established that act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of the Section in favour of the public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction shall stand frustrated. For instance a police officer in discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty and without any justification therefor then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. To what extent an act or omission performed by a public servant in discharge of his duty can be deemed to be official was explained by this Court in Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari ( AIR 1956 SC 44 ) thus: "The offence alleged to have been committed (by the accused) must have something to do, or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official duty ... there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable (claim) but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty." 13. It is stated that the offences alleged to have been committed must have some relation or nexus with the official duty. It is further stated that there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty. It is also stated that the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable (claim) but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty. 14. Learned Senior Counsel Shri A.M. Gordey has submitted that in the present case, the claim of the applicants was not fanciful but it is a reasonable claim. 14. Learned Senior Counsel Shri A.M. Gordey has submitted that in the present case, the claim of the applicants was not fanciful but it is a reasonable claim. The applicants claim that they had granted permission to cut only 129 teak wood trees and that a private case was registered against non-applicant Nos.2 and 3 and others for cutting extra trees without requisite permission. This claim of the applicants and the facts of both the cases were necessary to be examined by the Government to determine as to whether the Government should grant sanction for prosecution of the applicants for the alleged offence. The Government had examined the pros and cons of both the cases and had ultimately come to the conclusion that the sanction could not be granted for prosecution of the applicants for the alleged offences. Learned Senior Counsel Shri A.M. Gordey has submitted that since the Government had refused to grant sanction, it follows that the Government was of the view that the allegations made by non-applicant No.2 at the instance of some Non-Governmental Organizations in the light of facts of the other case where non-applicant No.3 and others were fined for cutting trees without requisite permission, did not permit the Government to grant sanction for prosecution of the applicants. 15. At this stage, it is necessary to be stated here that despite refusal of Government to grant sanction, the Court is not prevented from taking cognizance of the offence if Court is of the view that the acts allegedly committed by the accused were not committed while acting in discharge of their official duty or while purporting to act in discharge of their official duty. Once it is established that the alleged acts had some nexus with the official duty of the applicants, it follows that the sanction is necessary. The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment cited (Supra) at Para 12 are very pertinent to note in this regard. 16. In this regard, this Court may also refer the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anjani Kumar v. State of Bihar and Another reported at AIR 2008 SC 1992 . The earlier judgment reported at AIR 2004 SC 2179 was also referred in the judgment reported at AIR 2008 SC 1992 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated the view expressed in the earlier judgment. 17. The earlier judgment reported at AIR 2004 SC 2179 was also referred in the judgment reported at AIR 2008 SC 1992 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated the view expressed in the earlier judgment. 17. In the present case also Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code has to be construed strictly while determining the applicability to the acts or purported acts of the applicants, which they claim to have been committed in the course of discharge of their official duty and once it is established that the acts alleged by the applicants have been committed while acting in discharge of their official duty or while purporting to act in discharge of their official duty the section has to be construed liberally. The applicants admittedly were concerned with the cutting of trees under the provisions of the Act. Applicant Nos.5 and 6 were admittedly empowered to grant requisite permissions. The applicant Nos. 5 and 6 are admittedly included in the definition of “Collector”. Applicant Nos.5 and 6 were working as Range Forest Officers. The permission for cutting of trees were granted by applicant No.6. The allegations are that the papers in respect of cutting of only 129 teak wood trees were prepared and factually 303 teak wood trees were cut from the field described as Gat No.6/1 belonging to non-applicant Nos.2 and 3. It is thus abundantly clear that the permission was granted while acting in discharge of their official duty. The wrong has been committed while granting the said permission. Applicant No.6 had thus committed the alleged act while acting in discharge of his duty or while purporting to act in discharge of his duty. The other officers are alleged to be the coconspirators as Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code has been applied by non-applicant No.1 in the chargesheet filed against the applicants and the co-accused. Two of eight accused are private persons. Once it is found by the Court that the alleged offence was committed while applicant No.6 was acting in discharge of his duty or was purporting to act in discharge of his duty, it follows that any act alleged to be an offence or incidental act to the main act alleged to be an offence requires sanction for prosecution of applicant No.6. It follows that the other applicants being public servants and alleged coconspirators also could not have been prosecuted or in other words no Court could have taken cognizance of the alleged offence against them without requisite sanction granted by the competent authority under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 18. In the present case, what is further pertinent to note is that the competent authority (State Government) has refused to grant sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code for taking cognizance of the alleged offence against the applicants. In my considered opinion, continuation of such a prosecution, where this Court has come to the conclusion that sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code was necessary and where the competent authority has refused to grant sanction, amounts to abuse of process of Court. Therefore, this Court can exercise powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing such proceedings. 19. Apart from the view of this Court on the legal issue involved in the present case, what is additionally to be noted is that the complainant is no more interested in prosecuting the applicants. He has admittedly filed an affidavit before the learned Special Judge as well as in this Court in response to the application filed by the applicants. The complainant is non-applicant No.2 and he has filed affidavit that he is no more interested in prosecuting the applicants. He has stated on oath that 129 teak wood trees were cut pursuant to the permission and rest of the trees were cut without permission for domestic use. Some of the trees were cut and were stolen by the neighbours of non-applicant No.2. With this affidavit on record it is abundantly clear that non-applicant No.2 is no more interested in prosecution launched against the applicants at the instance of non-applicant No.2. The whole prosecution, in fact, is mainly based on the oral testimony of non-applicant No.2. If non-applicant No.2 is not interested in supporting the case launched against the applicants by non-applicant No.1, it follows that there are all chances of the prosecution failing to establish the charges against the applicants. The whole prosecution, in fact, is mainly based on the oral testimony of non-applicant No.2. If non-applicant No.2 is not interested in supporting the case launched against the applicants by non-applicant No.1, it follows that there are all chances of the prosecution failing to establish the charges against the applicants. The learned Senior Counsel Shri A.M. Gordey has submitted that in such a scenario, this Court has to exercise powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the proceedings where there are bleak changes of success of prosecution launched against the applicants and others. Shri A.M. Gordey has relied upon the judgment in the case of B.S. Joshi and others .vs. State of Haryana and another reported at (2003) 4 SCC 675 . Paragraph 11 of the said judgment reads as under: “11. In MadhavraoJiwajirao Scindia & Ors. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, it was held that while exercising inherent power of quashing under Section 482, it is for the High Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. Where, in the opinion of the Court, chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may, while taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings.” 20. In the present case, I have already stated that in view of the affidavit of non-applicant No.2, there are bleak chances of non-applicant No.1 succeeding in the prosecution launched against the applicants and others. As far as special features are concerned, it is noted that there are allegations of forgery and cheating. As far as cheating is concerned, non-applicant No.2 is no more interested in supporting the case. The charges of forgery also cannot be established unless there is support of non-applicant No.2. Non-applicant No.2 has categorically stated that only 129 teak wood trees were cut and rest of the teak wood trees were cut without permission. Some of the teak wood trees were cut by the neighbours and they were stolen. 21. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor Shri S.S. Doifode has submitted that despite the affidavit of non-applicant No.2, this Court may take note of the fact that the charges are of serious nature. Some of the teak wood trees were cut by the neighbours and they were stolen. 21. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor Shri S.S. Doifode has submitted that despite the affidavit of non-applicant No.2, this Court may take note of the fact that the charges are of serious nature. The offences are against the Society. It is submitted that though the teak wood trees belonged to non-applicant No.2, but the offences of forgery and conspiracy are not the offences personally against non-applicant No.2 and as such non-applicant No.2 has no authority to compound or settle amicably such cases out of Court. It is further submitted that the Court shall discourage such elements and may not direct the prosecution to be quashed. 22. I have considered arguments of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. I agree with the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that in such cases where the offences are against the society, the Court normally would not direct quashing of the proceedings. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has rightly relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rumi Dhar (SMT) .v. State of West Bengal and another reported at (2009) 6 SCC 364 . Para No.24 of the said judgment runs as under:-“24. The jurisdiction of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is not in dispute. Exercise of such power would, however, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and this Court, in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution of India, would not direct quashing of a case involving crime against the society particularly when both the learned Special Judge as also the High Court have found that a prima facie case has been made out against the appellant herein for framing the charge.” 23. In this regard, I have taken note of the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code also depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. There cannot be any straightjacket formula to decide the nature of cases in which the powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code shall be exercised. The exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code also depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. There cannot be any straightjacket formula to decide the nature of cases in which the powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code shall be exercised. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of G ian Singh .v. State of Punjab & Another reported at 2012(9) SCALE 257 has said at paragraph 39 as under: “39. …...... 17. …...... 18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. .....” 24. It is thus clear that there cannot be an exhaustive list of situations where powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code can be exercised by the High Court. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case, the facts of the case have been briefly stated by me. The situation in which the offence came to be registered has also been stated and it has also further been stated that a separate case was registered by the Forest Department against non-applicant No.2/complainant and his brother non-applicant No.3 for cutting more than 129 teak wood trees. Non-applicant No.2 has filed an affidavit that rest of the trees were cut by him without prior permission and some of the trees were stolen by the neighbours. Non-applicant No.2 has no grievance against the applicants. Moreover the Government has refused to grant sanction for prosecution of the applicants. In view of this situation, continuation of prosecution against the applicants, in my considered opinion, is abuse of process of law and to serve the ends of justice, it is necessary for this Court to intervene and to quash the proceedings pending against the applicants. Hence, I pass the following order. In view of this situation, continuation of prosecution against the applicants, in my considered opinion, is abuse of process of law and to serve the ends of justice, it is necessary for this Court to intervene and to quash the proceedings pending against the applicants. Hence, I pass the following order. The proceedings pending in the Special Court, Kelapur, District Yavatmal vide Special Case No.2/2008 as against the applicants shall hereby stand quashed. The bail bonds, if any, of the applicants shall stand cancelled. Since the relief is granted in terms of prayer clause (A) of the application, prayer clause (B) does not survive. The application stands disposed of accordingly.