JUDGMENT Mr. Hemant Gupta, J.: - Challenge in the present writ petition is to the appointments of the private respondents as Additional District & Sessions Judges in the State of Punjab and to issue a writ of mandamus directing the High Court to hold interview afresh of the eligible candidates. 2. The High Court advertised 21 posts of Punjab Superior Judicial Service to be filled up by direct recruitment in the State of Punjab through competitive examination under Rule 7(3)(c) of the Superior Judicial Service Rules, 2007 (for short ‘the Rules’) vide notification dated 02.02.2008. Out of the said posts, 10 posts were meant for General Category, 6 posts for Scheduled Castes Category, 2 posts for Backward Class Category, 1 for Backward Class (Ex-Servicemen) category, 1 for Ex-Servicemen (General Category) and 1 for Physically Challenged Category of Locomotor or Orthopedic Disability. 3. In pursuance of such advertisement, the petitioner applied for one of the posts meant for General Category. A written examination was conducted, the result of which was declared on 29.05.2008. 31 candidates from the General Category were declared successful. On 02.07.2009 to 04.07.2009, interviews were conducted for which the petitioner was called for to appear in the viva voce on 03.07.2008. The interview was conducted by a Committee of five Judges. 4. The challenge in the writ petition inter-alia is to the conduct of written examination and viva voce by the Committee. The said issue was also raised in CWP No.16456 of 2008 titled as “Dharm Chand Vs. The State of Punjab & others”. The said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 08.02.2011. It has been held that proceedings of the Recruitment Committee were approved by the Full Court and thereafter recommendations were made leading to consequential appointments. It has also been held that having participated in the selection process and not succeeding, the petitioner is estopped to challenge the selection process. 5. Another writ petition bearing CWP No.20729 of 2008 titled as “Sudeepti Sharma vs. State of Punjab & others”, came to be decided by this Court on 19.08.2013, wherein numerous grounds to challenge the same selection process remained unsuccessful. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that most of the grounds to challenge have remained unsuccessful in the two cases, still he has the following submissions to make to impugn the selections. He submits that: 1. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that most of the grounds to challenge have remained unsuccessful in the two cases, still he has the following submissions to make to impugn the selections. He submits that: 1. Since the vacancies advertised occurred prior to the promulgation of the Rules, therefore, such vacancies have to be filled up in terms of the Rules applicable at the time of accrual of vacancies. In support of such argument, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Y.V. Ranghia and others vs. State of A.P. AIR 1983 SC 852 ; 2. Rule 7(3) (c) of the Rules contemplating accelerated promotion to the extent of 25% amongst in-service candidates, is illegal as it violates the mandate of Article 233 of the Constitution of India, which contemplates that a person already in service cannot be appointed as a District Judge including Additional District Judge as a candidate with less than seven years practice at the Bar can also seek promotion; and 3. Hemant Gopal-respondent No.9 is ineligible for appointment, as he was in full time employment by Bhai Gurdas Institute of Law, Sangrur and also he was running an academy. In support of such argument, the petitioner relies upon the prospectus of Bhai Gurdas Institute of Law, Sangrur, wherein in respect of respondent No.9, it is said to the following effect: “The law students should not pass out only as law graduates but they should pass out with full advocacy skills, is the motto our young and hard working lecturer Hemant Gopal who is B.com, P.G.D.B.M. LL.B., LL.M., and has been practicing since 1999 in the Civil Courts, Barnala and have been nominated as a member of DLSA Sangrur (Lok Adalat) by District Legal Services Authority, Sangrur and Legal Aid Counsel by Free Legal Services Committee, Sangrur. He has been appointed as Moot Courts Incharge at college campus. The teaching of Academic session along with practical training programme is the main task assigned to him.” 6. In reply filed on behalf of respondent No.9, it is asserted that he set up his practice at Barnala on the next day of his enrolment as an Advocate. He took up part time teaching assignment at Bhai Gurdas College of Law, Sangrur. He taught Hindu Law and the Law of Evidence to LL.B. students during the period 02.01.2006 to 30.08.2007 as a practicing lawyer. He took up part time teaching assignment at Bhai Gurdas College of Law, Sangrur. He taught Hindu Law and the Law of Evidence to LL.B. students during the period 02.01.2006 to 30.08.2007 as a practicing lawyer. He was made in-charge of the moot courts at college. The teaching assignment involved 2/3 lectures a day in a five days week with Saturdays off. He denied that he was working as a full time Lecturer. It is pointed out that prospectus (Annexure P-4) pertains to the year 2006-07 and falsifies the reckless allegation that he was teaching in the year 2005. It has also been asserted that part time teaching work in law is accepted as consistent with law practice by the Bar Council of India under Part VI Chapter II of Bar Council of India Rules, which deals with restriction on other employment. Engagement in lecturing and teaching subjects both legal and non-legal is permissible under the said Rules of Bar Council of India. It is also pointed out that the allegation of running of academy on regular basis is incorrect. It is asserted that he was member of the Society but he resigned before his appointment to the Punjab Superior Judicial Service. The said society was established by his father. The society used to run Holy Institute of Management and Information Technology at Barnala on ‘no profit no loss’ basis. He was not involved actively or otherwise and his brothers and their wives helped his father in the management of the Institute. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and find no merit in the present writ petition. 8. The judgment in Y.V. Ranghia’s case (supra) has no applicability to the facts of the present case. In the said case, an in-service candidate was claiming promotion. The ratio has no application in respect of direct recruits, whose rights are governed by Rules at the time of inviting applications or later at the time of appointment. The petitioner has participated in the selection process without any demur and therefore, in terms of the order passed in respect of the same selection process in Dharm Chand’s case (supra), he is estopped to challenge the selection process initiated after the promulgation of Rules. 9. The petitioner has participated in the selection process without any demur and therefore, in terms of the order passed in respect of the same selection process in Dharm Chand’s case (supra), he is estopped to challenge the selection process initiated after the promulgation of Rules. 9. The argument that in terms of Article 233 of the Constitution of India, no appointment by way of accelerated promotion can be made from amongst the in service judicial officers is wholly misconceived. The petitioner has no claim against the quota for accelerated promotion. Even prior to the creation of the separate rule of accelerated promotion, the quota of direct recruits under the old rules was also 25%. The Civil Judge (Senior Division) with 5 years’ qualifying service is competent to compete for accelerated promotion. Therefore, the argument that an officer with less than seven years’ experience as an Advocate or as the judicial officer can be appointed, is not made out, as an officer is designated as Civil Judge or Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) generally after 5 years of service. Such channel of promotion has been provided in terms of the Supreme Court in All India Judges’ Association & others Vs. Union of India & others (2002) 4 SCC 247 . Therefore, for the same reasons as laid down in Dharm Chand’s case (supra), the petitioner is estopped to challenge the selection process initiated after the commencement of Rules. 10. In respect of appointment of Hemant Gopal-respondent No.9, the reliance of the petitioner is on the prospectus of the Institute. A reading of the same shows that it is mentioned that respondent No.9 has been practicing since 1999 and that teaching of academic session along with practical training programme is the main task assigned to him. The said profile does not give any inference that it was a whole time appointment. 11. Part VI, Chapter-II of the Rules deals with the Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette. Section VII of the said Chapter is in respect of ‘other Employments’. Section VII reads as under: “Section VII – Section on other Employments 47. An Advocate shall not personally engage in any business; but he may be a sleeping partner in a firm doing business provided that, in the opinion of the appropriate State Bar Council, the nature of the business is not inconsistent with the dignity of the profession. 48. Section VII reads as under: “Section VII – Section on other Employments 47. An Advocate shall not personally engage in any business; but he may be a sleeping partner in a firm doing business provided that, in the opinion of the appropriate State Bar Council, the nature of the business is not inconsistent with the dignity of the profession. 48. An advocate may be Director or Chairman of the Board of Directors of a company with or without any ordinary sitting fee, provided none of his duties are of an executive character. An Advocate shall not be a Managing Director or a Secretary of any company. 49. An advocate shall not be a full-time salaried employee of any person, government, firm, corporation or concern, so long as he continues to practice, and shall, on taking up any employment, intimate the fact to the Bar Council on whose roll his name appears, and shall thereupon cease to practice as an advocate so long as he continues in such employment. xx xx xx 51. An advocate may review Parliamentary Bills for a remuneration, edit legal text books at a salary, do press-vetting for newspapers, coach pupils for legal examination, set and examine question papers; and, subject to the rules against advertising and full-time employment, engage in broadcasting journalism, lecturing and teaching subjects, both legal and non-legal.” 12. A perusal of the above Section shows that there is a prohibition for an advocate to be in full-time salaried employment of a person, government, firm, corporation or concern, so long as he continues to practice, whereas clause 51 permits an advocate, inter alia, to lecture and teach subjects both legal and non-legal. 13. A perusal of the certificates attached with the written statement filed by respondent No.9 as Annexure R9/1 (colly) issued by Bhai Gurdas College of Law, Sangrur shows that the said respondent was working as a part-time Lecturer. As per the affidavit of respondent No.9, the teaching assignment was 2/3 lecturers in a day in a five days week. There is no rebuttal to such assertion on behalf of the petitioners. Therefore, it cannot be said that it was a full time salaried employment of respondent No.9. Still further, clauses 51 as reproduced above shows that an advocate is permitted to lecturer and teach subjects both legal and non-legal. There is no rebuttal to such assertion on behalf of the petitioners. Therefore, it cannot be said that it was a full time salaried employment of respondent No.9. Still further, clauses 51 as reproduced above shows that an advocate is permitted to lecturer and teach subjects both legal and non-legal. Therefore, the part time teaching assignment is not prohibited under the Rules framed by the Bar Council of India. An advocate, who is practicing can simultaneously teach both legal and non-legal subjects. 14. The assertion of the petitioner that he was running an academy at Barnala, in the evening, is again not made out. As per the written statement, he was a member of the society and not actively involved in the working of the society, which was working on ‘no profit no loss’ basis. Though, respondent No.9 has asserted that he was not involved with the active working of the society, but even non-legal teaching is permissible under Clause 51 of the Rules. 15. In view thereof, the part-time assignment of respondent No.9 with Bhai Gurdas College of Law, Sangrur and involvement, if any, in Holy Institute of Management and Information Technology, Barnala cannot be said to be a disqualification for the said respondent. Therefore, we find that respondent No.9 was eligible for appointment as Additional District Judge. He was a practicing advocate from the date of his enrolment and not in full time employment of any person or Institute. 16. In view of the above discussion and the judgments of this Court in Dharm Chand’s case (supra) and Sudeepti Sharma case (supra), we do not find any merit in the present writ petition. The same is dismissed. --------0.B.S.0------------