ORDER : Iqbal Ahmed Ansari, J. It is not uncommon for the Courts to be invited to decide the contours of its own powers under a given provisions of law constitutional or statutory. The present Writ Petition, too, calls for determination of the scope of the powers of judicial review under Article 226 and of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India so far as an order passed by an Armed Forces Tribunal, constituted under the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, is concerned and when grievances of a person, subject to the Air Force Act, 1950, relates to alleged arbitrary actions of his superior officers and/or his having allegedly treated discriminatorily by his superior officers. With the help of this writ application, made under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, who functioned as Air Commodore, Chabua Air Force Station, has put to challenge not only the order, dated 20.11.2012, passed, in Original Application (in short, 'OA') No. 32/2012, by the learned Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Branch, Guwahati, (in short, 'the AFT'), but also the order, dated 18.10.2012, passed, by the respondent No. 2, dismissing the petitioner's Redressal of Grievances and the findings, dated 29.08.2012, reached by the Court of Enquiry held at 10 Wing, Air Force Station, Jorhat, as well the findings, dated 06.09.2012, arrived at by the Court of Enquiry held at 16 Wing, Air Force, Hashimara. 2. We have heard Mr. P.K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, for the petitioner, and Mr. R. Sharma, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India, for the respondents. 3. Resisting the writ petition, respondent No. 8 has raised a preliminary objection contending, inter alia, that jurisdiction of this Court, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, stands ousted, particularly, in respect of final orders, which an Armed Force Tribunal passes. 4. Considering the fact that the preliminary objection, which the respondent No. 8 has raised in his affidavit, would, if correct, oust the jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 226 and/or 227, to interfere with a final order passed by an Armed Forces Tribunal, we deem it appropriate to deal with this preliminary objection before we decide to issue Rule. 5. We are guided to take this approach from the decision in Dwarka Nath Vs. 5. We are guided to take this approach from the decision in Dwarka Nath Vs. Income Tax Officer, Special Circle D-ward, Kanpur and Another, AIR 1966 SC 81 wherein the observations, appearing at para. 4 and 5, read as under: "4. Mr. Gopal Singh, learned counsel for the revenue, while supporting the order of the High Court raised a preliminary objection, namely, that the order of the Commissioner u/s 33A of the income tax Act was an administrative act, and therefore, no writ of certiorari would lie to the High Court to quash that order under Article 226 of the constitution. 5. We shall first take the preliminary objection, for, if we maintain it no other question will arise for consideration." (Emphasis is added) 6. In view, however, of the fact that it is the order, dated 20.11.2012, passed by the learned AFT, which is claimed to be beyond the reach of this Court under Articles 226 and 227, we are of the view before we deal with the preliminary objection, raised by the respondents, the relevant observations made, and the penultimate directions passed, by the learned Tribunal, be taken note of and borne in mind. We, accordingly, reproduce, hereinbelow, the relevant observations appearing in the impugned order, dated 20.11.2012, aforementioned: "4. On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that the Central Vigilance Commission letter dated 29.06.1999 with further clarification dated 31.01.2002 do not, per se exclude the authoritative jurisdiction of the respondents to conduct an inquiry. It is further contended that the spirit of the authority of the letters from the CVC are totally different and do not apply to the present case. It is further contended on behalf of the respondents that since the GCM proceedings are convened and the further judicial process has already been started, at this stage, it would not be proper and desirable to quash the findings of the Court of Inquiry. 5. We notice that although the Court of Inquiry submitted its report on 29.08.2012 and the second one on 06.09.2012, the appellant did not challenge the same immediately. In the meantime, the GCM proceeding has been convened and it started functioning against the appellant as submitted. That apart, the statutory complaint filed by the appellant is also yet to be disposed of by the Ministry of Defence. 6. In the case of Lt. Gen. In the meantime, the GCM proceeding has been convened and it started functioning against the appellant as submitted. That apart, the statutory complaint filed by the appellant is also yet to be disposed of by the Ministry of Defence. 6. In the case of Lt. Gen. P.K. Nath vs. UOI (OA No. 610/2010 dated 20.10.2010), the Principal Bench of Armed Forces Tribunal did not interfere with findings of Court of Inquiry when the next procedure of the GCM already started. Again in the case of Union of India and others Vs. Major General Madan Lal Yadav (Retd.), AIR 1996 SC 1340 the Apex Court held that trial commences the moment the General Court Martial assembles to consider the charge and examines wherein they would proceed with the trial. Applying this test also, in the instant case, we find that the trial has already commenced and there has been much progress in the GCM and hence we do not consider to interfere with the Court of Enquiry report on the trial at this stage. 7. In view of the above discussion, we refrain from giving any opinion on the merit of the case and in turn, dispose the appeal with the directions that the respondents, more particularly, respondent No. 1, shall dispose of the statutory complaint of the appellant which must have been forwarded to them by now by the respondent No. 2 as early as possible preferably within a period of six weeks and communicate the result thereof to the appellant forthwith." 7. From a bare reading of the impugned order, dated 20.11.2012, what clearly transpires is that the learned Tribunal has not only taken the view that the proceedings of the General Court Martial (in short, GCM) stand not only commenced, but that much progress has been made in the proceedings of the GCM and that it (i.e., the learned APT) shall not interfere with the report of the Court of Enquiry, when the proceedings of the GCM are already in progress; whereas the reality is that the subject-matter of the OA rests at the stage of recording of Summary of Evidence (popularly called 'S of E') and that neither any formal charge-sheet, as contemplated by Air Force Rules, 1969, has been served on the petitioner nor the GCM has been convened. In fact, it is conceded by the respondents that the GCM has not been convened. In fact, it is conceded by the respondents that the GCM has not been convened. Consequently, the question of the GCM having made much progress, as observed by the learned AFT, does not arise. 8. In order to appreciate the basic ground of challenge to the impugned order, it is imperative that the scheme of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, be taken into account so that the principal issue relating to the correctness, legality and validity of the learned AFT's order, questioned by the petitioner, but sought to be brushed aside by the respondents, be clearly understood and appreciated. 9. In view of the fact that a GCM is, admittedly, convened only when recording of S of E is complete and a formal charge-sheet is framed against an accused and the convening authority orders a Court Martial to be assembled, the learned ASG does not dispute that the learned AFT appears to have misconstrued the S of E as evidence adduced at the GCM and, on these premises, the learned AFT has incorrectly concluded that since the proceedings of the GCM have already commenced and much progress has been made in the proceedings of the GCM, it (the learned AFT) shall not interfere with the findings of the Court of Enquiry at the stage of trial. The learned ASG, therefore, submits that the impugned order, dated 20.11.2012, may, if this Court deems necessary, be set aside and the matter may be remanded to the learned AFT. However, at the same time and in the same breath, the learned ASG insists that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter, in question. 10. Thus, while, on the one had, it is contended by the learned ASG that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to interfere with a final order passed by an AFT, it is, on the other hand, admitted that since the impugned order, passed by the learned AFT, is based on non-existent facts, (in the sense that the GCM has not yet been convened, but the learned AFT has erroneously concluded that the GCM has already made much progress and its proceedings should not be disturbed or intervened), the learned ASG submits that the impugned order may, if this Court deems necessary, be set aside and the matter may be remanded to the learned AFT. 11. 11. The submissions, so made by the learned ASG, are conflicting in nature inasmuch as the question of interference with the impugned order, dated 20.11.2012, does not arise if this Court does not have the jurisdiction under Article 226 and/or 227 to interfere with a final order passed by an Armed Forces Tribunal. This gives an impression to this Court that while the respondents are of the view that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to interfere with a final order, passed by an Armed Forces Tribunal, the respondents are, at the same time, conscious of the fact that the impugned order, based on non-existent facts, cannot stand scrutiny of law. 12. It has to be, therefore, per force decided and determined by this Court whether it has, or does not have, the jurisdiction, either under Article 226 or 227 or under both these constitutional provisions, to examine the correctness, legality and validity of a final order, passed by an Armed Forces Tribunal, or whether such an order is beyond the reach of this Court in exercise of its powers either under Article 226 or under Article 227 or under both these Articles? 13. While dealing with the question posed above, it needs to be noted that appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. P.K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, has contended that Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India form part of the basic structure of the Constitution and even a constitutional amendment, far less a legislation, in the form of ouster of jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227, is not sustainable. In this regard, Mr. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, has extensively referred to, and heavily relied upon, L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1997 SC 1125 . 14. According to Mr. In this regard, Mr. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, has extensively referred to, and heavily relied upon, L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1997 SC 1125 . 14. According to Mr. Goswami, when it has already been held, in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), that Articles 226 and 227 form basic structure of the Constitution, neither the Parliament can take away these powers of the High Court by amending the Constitution nor can a legislation be made or sustained if the legislation seeks to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and/or 227 in respect of a decision of a Tribunal, which exercises its jurisdiction within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of a given High Court, if the Constitution, otherwise, makes a Tribunal's order amenable to High Court's power of judicial review under Article 226 and/or High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227. 15. With regard to the above, Mr. Goswami has also referred to Section 14 of Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (in short, the AFT Act) and pointed out that Section 14(1) clearly mentions that jurisdiction of the High Court, under Article 226 and/or 227, has not been ousted. 16. There is, thus, contends Mr. Goswami, no express bar in the High Court exercising jurisdiction, under Article 226 and/or 227, against a final order passed by an AFT. Far from this, reiterates Mr. Goswami, Section 14 lays down, in no uncertain words, that jurisdiction of the High Court, under Articles 226 and 227, has not been excluded. 17. In support of his contention that the AFT Act does not bar jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and 227 in respect of final orders, which may be passed by an Armed Forces Tribunal, Mr. Goswami has, referring the Sections 30 and 31, pointed out that while Section 30(2) makes an appeal available, 'as of right', to the Supreme Court against an order made, or decision given, by an Armed Forces Tribunal for committing 'contempt', Section 30(1) read with Section 31 does not provide an appeal, as a matter of right, against a final order inasmuch as an appeal, against a final order, points out Mr. Goswami, is subject to the leave, which is required to be obtained from the AFT and the AFT can grant the leave if it finds that a point of law of general public importance is involved in the decision and if the Armed Forces Tribunal does not grant leave, the leave for appeal has to be applied to the Supreme Court and if it appears to the Supreme Court that the point of law is one, which ought to (sic) considered by the Supreme Court, then, it may grant leave. 18. When, therefore, according to Mr. Goswami, there is no definite alternative remedy of appeal provided against final orders passed by an Armed Forces Tribunal, it cannot be contended that a final order, which an Armed Forces Tribunal passes, can be appealed against to the Supreme Court by the aggrieved person as a matter of right. 19. Apart from the fact, points out Mr. Goswami, that the right of appeal, which Section 30 provides, is circumscribed by the limitations of leave as reflected by a comparative reading of Sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 31, it is well-settled that an alternative remedy, in the form of statutory appeal against an order, interim or final, does not put an absolute bar on the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 and, in appropriate cases, under Article 227 and notwithstanding the alternative remedy of appeal, an order may be amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court, particularly, under Article 226, when the action or the order, impugned in a writ proceeding, is without jurisdiction or patently against law or an order, which runs contrary to law or which amounts to refusal to exercise jurisdiction, where the jurisdiction exists, or an order, which is in denial of the principles of natural justice. 20. The exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction, under Articles 226 and 227, is, acknowledges Mr. Goswami, discretionary, which is guided by well-established principles, but he contends that an alternative remedy, in the form of statutory appeal, has never been recognized as an absolute bar for the High Court to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and, in appropriate cases, under Article 227 if the facts and circumstances of a given case so warrant. 21. In support of his above submissions, Mr. Goswami places reliance on The State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Mohammad Nooh, Calcutta Discount Company Limited Vs. 21. In support of his above submissions, Mr. Goswami places reliance on The State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Mohammad Nooh, Calcutta Discount Company Limited Vs. Income Tax Officer, Companies District, I and Another, AIR 1961 SC 372 , Dwarka Nath Vs. Income Tax Officer, Special Circle D-ward, Kanpur and Another, AIR 1966 SC 81 , Samir Ranjan Barman and Another Vs. District Magistrate and Collector and Others, (2009) 1 GLT 465, Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari Vs. Antarim Zila Parishad now Zila Parishad, Muzaffarnagar, AIR 1969 SC 556 and Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others, AIR 1999 SC 22 . 22. Continuing his above trend of submissions, it has been pointed by Mr. Goswami that even when a statutory right of appeal stands provided against discretionary relief of granting or refusing to grant injunction, the exercise of this jurisdiction of granting discretionary relief has not been recognized to impose an absolute bar on the part of the High Court to invoke, in appropriate cases, its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and/or Article 227 or both. Support for this submission is sought to be derived by Mr. Goswami from the case of Samir Ranjan Barman and Another Vs. District Magistrate and Collector and Others, (2009) 1 GLT 465. 23. Referring to the case of Director General, Border Security Force and Others Vs. Iboton Singh (Kh), (2007) 1 GLT 903. Mr. Goswami points out that even a Division of this Court, in Iboton Singh (Kh) (supra), has clearly held that writ jurisdiction can be exercised against an order of Security Force Court, which is constituted under the BSF Act, 1969. 24. Lastly, referring to the cases of Joby Varghese Vs. Armed Forces Tribunal, (2010) 4 KLT 611 and Colonel A.D. Nargolkar Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (2011) 179 DLT 447 which has been decided by the Kerala High Court and Delhi High Court, respectively, Mr. Goswami points out that the Division Bench of these two High Courts have, in no uncertain words, held that the right of appeal, which is provided u/s 30 of the AFT Act, does not bar exercise of writ jurisdiction either under Article 226 or Article 227(4) inasmuch as Article 227(4) restricts administrative supervision of Armed Forces Tribunal and not judicial superintendence. 25. Responding to the above submissions, made on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. 25. Responding to the above submissions, made on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Sharma, learned ASG, has pointed out that as far as the impugned order, dated 20.11.2012, is concerned, the same is a final order, which has been arrived at after discussing the case of the petitioner, and, hence, the petitioner does not have any right to approach this Court either under Article 226 or under Article 227, when a statutory right of appeal has been provided against the impugned order. At the same time and in the same breath, the learned ASG, as already indicated above, has submitted that if this Court finds that the impugned order, dated 20.11.2012, passed by the learned AFT, is not in accordance with law, because of the fact that the GCM had not commenced, when the impugned final order was passed by the learned AFT, this Court may set aside the impugned order and remand the matter to the learned AFT for adjudication afresh. 26. When a query was made by this Court as to how can this Court interfere with the impugned order if it accepts the respondents' plea that the impugned order does not fall within the ambit of this Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227, the learned ASG could give no effective reply. Nonetheless, the learned ASG insists that the impugned order is a final order and three being a statutory appeal provided against such an order, the High Court's jurisdiction, under Articles 226 as well as 227, stands ousted. The conflicting submissions, which have been made on behalf of the respondents, give an impression that the respondents are, perhaps, of the view that the impugned order is based on non-existent fact and, is, therefore, illegal, but they are also of the view that since the impugned order is a final order, this Court, at least, does not have the jurisdiction either under Article 226 or under Article 227 to interfere with the final order, because statutory provisions for appeal against a final order exist in the AFT Act. 27. Heavily relying upon the decision rendered by a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, in Surendra Bahadur Singh vs. Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow & Ors., decided on 10.02.2012, the learned ASG submits that having taken into account the decisions, in Joby Varghese Vs. Armed Forces Tribunal, (2010) 4 KLT 611 and Colonel A.D. Nargolkar Vs. 27. Heavily relying upon the decision rendered by a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, in Surendra Bahadur Singh vs. Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow & Ors., decided on 10.02.2012, the learned ASG submits that having taken into account the decisions, in Joby Varghese Vs. Armed Forces Tribunal, (2010) 4 KLT 611 and Colonel A.D. Nargolkar Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (2011) 179 DLT 447 rendered by the Kerala High Court and the Delhi High Court respectively, the Allahabad High Court has held that as against the final order passed by an Armed Forces Tribunal, the High Court cannot invoke its jurisdiction either under Article 226 or 227. In support of this submission, the learned ASG has taken us through the object of the AFT Act and the history leading to the enactment of the said piece of legislation. 28. Referring to the provisions of Sub-Clause (d) of Clause (2) of Article-323A and Sub-Clause (d) of Clause (3) of Article 323B of the Constitution of India, the learned ASG has also submitted that Sub-Clause (d) of Clause (2) of Article 323A empower the Parliament to exclude jurisdiction of all Courts, except jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Articles 136 and 32, with respect to disputes or complaints, which relate to Administrative Tribunals' power of adjudication in respect of disputes and complaints arising out of recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any Corporation owned or controlled by the Government. Similarly, Sub-Clause (d) of Clause (3) of Article 323B, according to the learned ASG, empowers the appropriate legislature to exclude, by law, the jurisdiction of all Courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 and 32, in respect of all or any of the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunals constituted by such a legislature by virtue of the provisions embodied in Article 323B. 29. In the present case, the learned AFT, according to the learned ASG, is a Tribunal, which exercises judicial powers of adjudication and in respect of adjudication, which such a Tribunal makes, no writ, either under Article 226 or 227, can be issued. 30. 29. In the present case, the learned AFT, according to the learned ASG, is a Tribunal, which exercises judicial powers of adjudication and in respect of adjudication, which such a Tribunal makes, no writ, either under Article 226 or 227, can be issued. 30. In the light of the rival submissions made before us, let us, first, determine as to whether the appeal, which has been provided against a final order passed by an Armed Forces Tribunal, is an appeal 'as of right', or when the appeal is subject to the leave of the Tribunal and, in case of refusal to grant leave by the Tribunal, subject to the leave to be granted by the Supreme Court. For this purpose, we reproduce Sections 30 and 31: "Section 30. Appeal to Supreme Court (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 31, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court against the final decision or order of the Tribunal (other than an order passed u/s 19): Provided that such appeal is preferred within a period of ninety days of the said decision or order: Provided further that there shall be no appeal against an interlocutory order of the Tribunal. (2) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court as of right from any order or decision of the Tribunal in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt: Provided that an appeal under this subsection shall be filed in the Supreme Court within sixty days from the date of the order appealed against. (3) Pending any appeal under sub-section (2) the Supreme Court may order that- (a) the execution of the punishment or the order appealed against be suspended, or (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail: Provided that where an appellant satisfies the Tribunal that he intends to prefer an appeal, the Tribunal may also exercise any of the powers conferred under clause (a) or clause (b), as the case may be. Section 31. Leave to appeal (1) An appeal to the Supreme Court shall lie with the leave of the Tribunal; and such leave shall not be granted unless it is certified by the Tribunal that a point of law of general public importance is involved in the decision, or it appears to the Supreme Court that the point is one which ought to be considered by that Court. (2) An application to the Tribunal for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court shall be made within a period of thirty days beginning with the date of the decision of the Tribunal and an application to the Supreme Court for leave shall be made within a period of thirty days beginning with the date on which the application for leave is refused by the Tribunal. (3) An appeal shall be treated as pending until any application for leave to appeal is disposed of and if leave to appeal is granted, until the appeal is disposed of; and an application for leave to appeal shall be treated as disposed of at the expiration of the time within which it might have been made, but it is not made within that time." 31. From a combined reading of Sections 30 and 31, it becomes abundantly clear that while Sub-Section (2) of Section 30 makes provisions for appeal 'as of right' to the Supreme Court from any order or decision of an Armed Forces Tribunal punishing for 'contempt', the appeal, which has been provided by Section 30(1) to the Supreme Court against the final decision or order of the Tribunal, has been made subject to the leave, which may be granted by the Tribunal by certifying that a point of law of general public importance is involved in the decision and, if no such leave is granted by the Tribunal or no such certificate is obtained from the Tribunal, the leave to appeal may be granted by the Supreme Court if it appears to the Supreme Court that the point of law is one, which ought to be considered by the Supreme Court. 32. There are, thus, two distinct classes of appeals, which have been provided against the decisions or orders of an Armed Forces Tribunal. That is to say, while the decision made, or the order given, by the Armed Forces Tribunal, in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for 'contempt', is appealable 'as of right' to the Supreme Court, a final order, whereby no one is punished for 'contempt', is not appealable 'as of right', but subject to granting of leave as contemplated or envisaged by Section 31. What is, then, the difference between these two kinds of appeals? 33. What is, then, the difference between these two kinds of appeals? 33. In order to understand the distinction between the two classes of appeals, as mentioned above, namely, an appeal, which has been provided 'as of right' vis-a-vis an appeal, which is subject to the granting of leave, one needs to note that when an appeal is provided 'as of right', i.e., without obtaining leave, the appeal stands instituted, when the appeal, in such a case, is preferred; but when an appeal requires 'leave' or when a leave for appeal is required to be applied, then, until the leave is granted, there is, in such a situation, really no appeal. Hence, the disposal of the SLP or of any petition for leave to appeal does not subsume the order from which the appeal arose, for, with the rejection of the petition for leave, no appeal survived. 34. Article 136 of the Constitution of India deals with 'special leave to appeal', which may be granted by the Supreme Court. When 'special leave to appeal' is dismissed by the Supreme Court with, or without a speaking order, the order from which the appeal arose does not merge into such an order, for, as already indicated hereinabove, with the dismissal of the 'special leave petition', no appeal survives and no appeal can be said to have been considered. In fact, when the 'special leave to appeal' is declined, there is no appeal. Hence, question of the merger of the order into the order declining to grant 'special leave to appeal' does not arise at all. One may, in this regard, refer to Punjab State Electricity Board, Patiala and another Vs. Ashok Kumar Sehgal and others, AIR 1990 P&H 117 , wherein it has been observed thus: "Article 136(1) of the Constitution provides that notwithstanding anything in Chapter IV, the Supreme Court may in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any Court or tribunal in the territory of India. If the Supreme Court, in its discretion, refuses to grant Special Leave to appeal, then there is no appeal. The doctrine of merger or fusing the judgment of the lower Court in that of the appellate Court does not apply to such a situation. If the Supreme Court, in its discretion, refuses to grant Special Leave to appeal, then there is no appeal. The doctrine of merger or fusing the judgment of the lower Court in that of the appellate Court does not apply to such a situation. Thus, in our view, we can proceed with these matters despite the SLP in Kuldip Singh's case having been dismissed." (Emphasis is added) 35. The above aspect of the law has been succinctly and authoritatively laid down by the Apex Court, in Kunhayammed and Others Vs. State of Kerala and Another, AIR 2000 SC 2587 in the following words:- "The logic, underlying the doctrine of merger, is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. When tribunal or authority was subjected to remedy available under the law before superior forum, then, though the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior Court has disposed of the lis before it either way whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed. It is the decree or order of the superior Court, tribunal or authority, which is the final binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the Court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or submitted application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and content or subject-matter of challenge which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view. 43.........To sum up, our conclusions are:- (i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a Court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the sub-ordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law. (ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. First stage is up to the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and SLP is converted into an appeal. (ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. First stage is up to the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and SLP is converted into an appeal. (iii) Doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability or merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing modified or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against, while exercising it appellate jurisdiction, and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can, therefore, be applied to the former and not to the latter. (iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case, it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e. gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then, the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court, which would bind the parties thereto and also the Court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the apex Court of the country. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court, which would bind the parties thereto and also the Court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the Court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting SLP or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties, (vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation. (vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before Supreme Court the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Order 47 of the C.P.C." (Emphasis is added) 36. What emerges from the law laid down, in Kunhayammed (supra), is that where an appeal 'as of right' is provided against an order passed by a Court and the appeal is preferred, then, the decision of the lower Court/forum merges into the decision of the appellate Court and it is the latter's decision, which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eyes of law. The position of the special leave applications is, somewhat, different. The jurisdiction conferred, in a case seeking leave to appeal, by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage is up to the disposal of the prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and the SLP is converted into an appeal. 37. The doctrine of merger is, however, not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of the doctrine of merger. 37. The doctrine of merger is, however, not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of the doctrine of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment, decree or order appealed against only when it exercises appellate jurisdiction (i.e. after the leave to appeal is granted) and not while it exercises the discretionary jurisdiction on the question as to whether the petition for special leave to appeal shall be granted or not. The doctrine of merger, therefore, in such cases, comes into play if the special leave to appeal is granted and not when the question as to whether the leave would be granted or not is considered and decided. 37a. An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case, it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. What such an order implies is that the Supreme Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e. when reasons are assigned for refusing the grant of leave, then, the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law, contained in such an order, is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated, in the order, are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court, which would bind the parties thereto and also the Court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country; but it does not mean that the order of the Court, tribunal or authority below, has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting special leave petition. Once leave to appeal has been granted and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been invoked, the order, passed in appeal, would attract the doctrine of merger. 38. We may, however, hasten to add and clarify that though on the refusal to grant special leave to appeal under Article 136, the order of the High Court does not merge into the order of the Supreme Court, the order of the Supreme Court remains binding on the subordinate Courts, for, the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the matter and that is why, when a SLP is dismissed under Article 136, the order, which is sought to get opened in appeal, cannot be reviewed by the selfsame Court. This position of law is clear from the following observations of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra and another Vs. Prabhakar Bhikaji Ingle, AIR 1996 SC 3069 too, which read as follows: "3. It is contended for the respondent that the dismissal of the SLP does not preclude the Tribunal from reviewing the order since the dismissal was a non-speaking order. We fail to appreciate the contention of the respondent. It is true that this Court has held that the dismissal of SLP without a speaking order does not constitute res judicata. The principle of res judicata is founded on public policy that the parties cannot be permitted to have the controversy directly or substantially in issue between the same parties or those claiming under the parties in the subsequent suit in the same proceedings in the subsequent stages cannot be raised once over. It is a sound principle of public policy to prevent vexation. 4. But in this case, when the self-same main order was confirmed by this Court, the question arises whether the Tribunal, has had power under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC or any other appropriate provision under the Tribunal act to review the orders passed by it and confirmed by this Court by refusing to grant leave. We find that the exercise of the review power is deleterious to the judicial discipline. Once this Court has confirmed the order passed by the Tribunal, that becomes final. Therefore, the Tribunal cannot have any power to review the previous order which stands merged with the order passed by this Court." (Emphasis is added) 39. We find that the exercise of the review power is deleterious to the judicial discipline. Once this Court has confirmed the order passed by the Tribunal, that becomes final. Therefore, the Tribunal cannot have any power to review the previous order which stands merged with the order passed by this Court." (Emphasis is added) 39. In the present case, there is, as already discussed above, two kinds of appeal provided under the AFT Act, namely, (i) appeal 'as of right' and (ii) appeal subject to grant of leave. In the case of an appeal, which is subject to grant of leave the appeal does not come into existence until the time leave is granted. As against this, an appeal 'as of right' is an appeal, which does not require any leave and the appeal stands instituted, when the appeal is preferred. Logically, therefore, in the present case, when no appeal, 'as of right', has been provided against the final order of an Armed Forces Tribunal, Mr. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, is correct in saying that as against final order of an Armed Forces Tribunal, there is no definite right of appeal. 40. Should, therefore, this Court hold that the discretionary provision of appeal, which has been made by the AFT Act, is completely barred from scrutiny by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 or both these constitutional provisions? 41. The question, posed above, will, in effect, mean that Articles 226 and 227 shall be treated as non est so far as a final order made by an Armed Forces Tribunal is concerned. Is such an interpretation possible to be attributed to the scheme of the AFT Act? This question, in turn, brings us to the more fundamental question, which the respondents have raised, and the question is this: whether the power of judicial review and superintendence, conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution, form part of the basic structure of the Constitution or not? If so, what are the parameters of these powers? 42. Our quest for an answer to the above questions makes us revert to the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra). If so, what are the parameters of these powers? 42. Our quest for an answer to the above questions makes us revert to the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra). While considering L. Chandra Kumar (supra), what needs to be noticed is that having taken into account the various authorities, which threw light on the question as to whether the power of judicial review forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution or not, the Court expressed, in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), thus: "78. The legitimacy of the power of Courts within constitutional democracies to review legislative action has been questioned since the time it was first conceived. The Constitution of India, being alive to such criticism, as, while conferring such power upon the higher judiciary, incorporated important safeguards. An analysis of the manner in which the framers of our constitution incorporated provisions relating to the judiciary would indicate that they were very greatly concerned with securing the independence of the judiciary. These attempts were directed at ensuring that the judiciary would be capable of effectively discharging its wide powers of judicial review. While the constitution confers the power to strike down laws upon the High Courts and the Supreme Court, it also contains elaborate provisions dealing with the tenure, salaries, allowances, retirement age of Judges as well as the mechanism for selecting Judges to the superior Courts. The inclusion of such elaborate provisions appears to have been occasioned by the belief that, armed by such provisions, the superior Courts would be insulated from any executive or legislative attempts to interfere with the making of their decisions. The Judges of the superior Courts have been entrusted with the task of upholding the Constitution and to this end, have been conferred the power to interpret it. It is they who have to ensure that the balance of power envisaged by the constitution is maintained and that the legislature and the executive do not in the discharge of their functions, transgress constitutional limitations. It is equally their duty to oversee that the judicial decisions rendered by those who man the subordinate Courts and tribunals do not fall foul of strict standards of legal correctness and judicial independence. The constitutional safeguards, which ensure the independence of the Judges of the superior judiciary, are not available to the Judges of the subordinate judiciary or to those two man tribunals created by ordinary legislations. The constitutional safeguards, which ensure the independence of the Judges of the superior judiciary, are not available to the Judges of the subordinate judiciary or to those two man tribunals created by ordinary legislations. Consequently, Judges of the latter category can never be considered full and effective substitutes for the superior judiciary in discharging the function of constitutional interpretation. We, therefore, hold that the power of Judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226 and in this Court under Article 32 of the constitution is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded. 79. We also hold that the power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all Courts and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions is also part of the basic structure of the constitution. This is because a situation where the High Courts are divested of all other judicial functions apart from that of constitutional interpretation is equally to be avoided. *** *** *** *** *** *** 90. We may first address the issue of exclusion of the power of judicial review of the High Courts. We have already held that in respect of the power of judicial review, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 cannot wholly be excluded. It has been contended before us that the Tribunals should not be allowed to adjudicate upon matters where the vires of legislations is questioned, and that they should restrict themselves to handling matters where constitutional issue are not raised. We cannot bring ourselves to agree to his proposition as that may result in splitting up proceedings and may cause avoidable delay. If such a view were to be adopted, it would be open for litigants to raise constitutional issues, many of which may be quite frivolous, to directly approach the High Courts and thus subvert the jurisdiction of the Tribunals. Moreover, even in these special branches of law, some areas do involve the consideration of constitutional questions on a regular basis; for instance, in service law matters, a large majority of cases involve an interpretation of Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the constitution. Moreover, even in these special branches of law, some areas do involve the consideration of constitutional questions on a regular basis; for instance, in service law matters, a large majority of cases involve an interpretation of Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the constitution. To hold that the Tribunals have no power to handle matters involving constitutional issues would not serve the purpose for which they were constituted. On the other hand, to hold that all such decisions will be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls will serve two purposes. While saving the power of judicial review of legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, it will ensure that frivolous claims are filtered out through the process of adjudication in the Tribunal. The High Court will also have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits, which will be of use to it in finally deciding the matter." (Emphasis is added) 43. In the face of the decision, which, eventually, the Constitution Bench, in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), has arrived at, one can no longer have any doubt that the power of judicial review under Article 226 and the power of superintendence under Article 227 form part of the basic structure of the Constitution and the Parliament, while having the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368, cannot take away or abridge the power so conferred on the High Court under Articles 226/227. When no constitutional amendment restricting the power of judicial review and/or superintendence under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution is possible, the question of a statute, such as, the AFT Act, limiting, restricting and/or abolishing and/or setting at naught the power of judicial review conferred on the High Court under Article 226 and/or the power of superintendence vested in the High Court by Article 227 cannot arise at all, though the exercise of such powers cannot be arbitrary and must be exercised within the contours of the settled principles, which the Courts have evolved. 44. 44. Having held that the powers of judicial review conferred on the High Court under Article 226 and of supervision under Article 227 form part of basic structure of the Constitution, we, now, turn to the question as to whether the existence of an alternate remedy is an absolute bar to the exercise of the powers so conferred on the High Court. 45. While dealing with the above aspect of the matter, it is imperative to note that the proposition of law is well settled that where a particular statute provides a self-contained machinery for determination of questions arising under the enactment, the statutory remedies provided therein must be availed of and recourse should not be, ordinarily, allowed to be taken to Writ jurisdiction. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J., in Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. vs. Hawkesfor, (1859) 6 CBNS 336 at p. 356. The rule, so laid down by Willes, J, was approved by the House of Lords, in Neville vs. London Express Newspaper Ltd., (1919, AC 368) and was reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago vs. Gordon Grnt & Co. (1935 AC 532) and AIR 1940 105 (Privy Council). 46. While considering the above proposition, it is equally important to bear in mind that the principle treating the existence of alternate remedy as a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 and/or 227 has been a rule of self-imposed restriction, a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, had placed a bar on the High Court's jurisdiction to entertain certain petitions if any other remedy for redress was provided by or under any other law, the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978, has removed this restriction. The fall out of the removal of the bar, which the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, had placed, as indicated hereinbefore, further strengthens the principle that there is no rule of law wholly barring exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 merely because there exists an alternate remedy; though the fact remains that to the exercise of powers under Articles 226 and 227, existence of alternate remedy has been treated by the Courts as a self-imposed restriction, but of a limited nature. 47. In Thansingh Nathmal and Others Vs. 47. In Thansingh Nathmal and Others Vs. A. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes, (1964) 6 SCR 654 the Court, while considering the scope of Article 226 in a case, wherein alternative remedy existed, observed as under: "The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restriction.... But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary, it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain well imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy of relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by the statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226 where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. The High Court does not, therefore, act as a Court of Appeal against the decision of a Court or Tribunal to correct errors of facts and does not, by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226, trench upon an alternative remedy provided by a statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the matter provided by a statute, the High Court, normally, will not permit by entertaining under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created by the statute to be bypassed and leave the party applying to it to seek resort to that machinery so set up." (Emphasis is supplied) 48. From the observations, made in Thansingh Nathmal (supra), it becomes clear that Article 226 is couched in wide terms and though the exercise of jurisdiction thereunder is not subject to any restriction, the very amplitude of such a vast jurisdiction demands that ordinarily, this Jurisdiction shall be exercised subject to certain well-recognised limitations. Consequently, when an alternative remedy, in the form of appeal is provided, the Court will not, ordinarily, entertain a writ petition under Article 226 and the only exception, in this regard, is when the alternative remedy is equally efficacious. 49. Consequently, when an alternative remedy, in the form of appeal is provided, the Court will not, ordinarily, entertain a writ petition under Article 226 and the only exception, in this regard, is when the alternative remedy is equally efficacious. 49. In the case at hand, when the provisions, with regard to appeal as against the final order, show that against the final order, there is no remedy of appeal 'as of right', one cannot regard the provisions, embodied in Section 30 read with Section 31 of the AFT Act, as an equally efficacious remedy. Logically extended, this will mean that to the exercise of jurisdiction, at least, under Article 226, Section 30 read with Section 31 cannot be regarded as a complete bar against a final order passed by an Armed Forces Tribunal. The conclusion, which we have so reached, is supported by a bare reading of the AFT Act, inasmuch as Section 14, which confers jurisdiction, power and authority on an Armed Forces Tribunal, in certain matters, expressly recognizes that a High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as 227 in relation to all service matters, which an Armed Forces Tribunal is competent to adjudicate upon and decide. A bare reading of Section 14 will clear this position inasmuch as Section 14 of the AFT Act reads: "Section 14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority in service matters (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority, exercisable immediately before that day by all Courts (except the Supreme Court or a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to all service matters. (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a person aggrieved by an order pertaining to any service matter may make an application to the Tribunal in such form and accompanied by such documents or other evidence and on payment of such fee as may be prescribed. (3) On receipt of an application relating to service matters, the Tribunal shall, if satisfied after due inquiry, as it may deem necessary, that it is fit for adjudication by it, admit such application; but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may dismiss the application after recording its reasons in writing. (3) On receipt of an application relating to service matters, the Tribunal shall, if satisfied after due inquiry, as it may deem necessary, that it is fit for adjudication by it, admit such application; but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may dismiss the application after recording its reasons in writing. (4) For the purpose of adjudicating an application, the Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (5 of 1908) while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) subject to the provisions of Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, (1 of 1872) requisitioning any public record or document or copy of such record or document from any office; (e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents; (f) reviewing its decisions; (g) dismissing an application for default or deciding it exparte; (h) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it exparte; and (i) any other matter which may be prescribed by the Central Government. (5) The Tribunal shall decide both questions of law and facts that may be raised before it." 50. In other words, when the AFT Act, in explicit terms, states that the AFT Act does not exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and 227, there can be no bar in invoking High Court's jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 against a final order of an Armed Forces Tribunal; more so, if the facts of a given case so warrant. However, as far as Article 227 is concerned, we express no opinion, at this stage, that High Court can invoke, in an appropriate case, its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. 51. Moreover, there is no rule with regard to certiorari as there is with regard to mandamus that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. The rule, requiring exhaustion of statutory remedies before the grant of writ had nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the Court - it was a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. The rule, requiring exhaustion of statutory remedies before the grant of writ had nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the Court - it was a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Despite the existence of an alternative remedy, it is within the jurisdiction and discretion of a High Court to grant relief under Article 226.(See The Collector of Monghyr and Others Vs. Keshav Prasad Goenka and Others, AIR 1962 SC 1694 , Zila Parishad Moradabad Vs. Nundan Sugar Mills, Amroha, AIR 1968 SC 98 , Collector of Customs and Excise, Cochin and Others Vs. A.S. Bava, AIR 1968 SC 13 , Union of India (UOI) Vs. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882 , N.T. Veluswami Thevar Vs. G. Raja Nainar and Others, AIR 1959 SC 422 , and M.G. Abrol Vs. Shantilal Chhotalal and Co.,). 52. In ABL International Ltd. and Another Vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and Others, (2004) 3 SCC 553 the Supreme Court had held as follows:- "28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the gourd of alternative remedy, the Court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. This plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not, normally, be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons) for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction". (Emphasis is added) 53. In Seth Chand Ratan Vs. Pandit Durga Prasad (D) by Lrs. and Others, (2003) 5 SCC 399 the Supreme Court had also held as follows:- "13........... (Emphasis is added) 53. In Seth Chand Ratan Vs. Pandit Durga Prasad (D) by Lrs. and Others, (2003) 5 SCC 399 the Supreme Court had also held as follows:- "13........... When a right or liability is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before seeking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is, no doubt, a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and the Court may, in exceptional cases, issue a discretionary writ of certiorari. Where there is complete lack of jurisdiction for the officer or authority or tribunal to take action or there has been a contravention of fundamental rights or there has been a violation of rules of natural justice or where the Tribunal acted under a provision of law, which is ultra vires, then, notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy, the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction to grant relief. When the party had statutory remedy of assailing the order passed by the District Court by filing an appeal to the High Court itself, he could not bypass the said remedy and take recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Such a course of action may enable a litigant to defeat the provisions of the statute which may provide for certain conditions for filing the appeal, like limitation, payment of Court Fee or deposit of some amount or fulfillment of some other conditions for entertaining the appeal." (Emphasis is supplied) 54. In short, Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent the statutory procedures. Of course, in case of infringement of fundamental rights or where the authority or the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction or violates the principles of natural justice or acts arbitrarily or acts under a statute, which is ultra vires, the bar of alternative remedy does not apply. The reason is that such an order has to be treated as void or non est. In other words, failure to exercise jurisdiction by a Tribunal may make such an order open to challenge under Article 226 and, in an appropriate case, under Article 227, particularly, when no appeal 'as of right' is made available against the order of the Tribunal. In other words, failure to exercise jurisdiction by a Tribunal may make such an order open to challenge under Article 226 and, in an appropriate case, under Article 227, particularly, when no appeal 'as of right' is made available against the order of the Tribunal. Within the ambit of this list, one may also include an order, which is passed by a Tribunal on wholly non-existent facts or on wholly misconceived and misconstrued provisions of law, particularly, when there is no appeal made available to an aggrieved person 'as of right'. 55. In K.Venkatachalam Vs. A Swamickan and Another, AIR 1999 SC 1723 election of an MLA was challenged by way of a writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution, on the ground that the said MLA was not an elector in the electoral roll in the constituency and, as such, lacked the basic qualification of being an MLA from the said constituency. The returned candidate opposed the writ petition on the ground of an alternative remedy of filing an election petition being available u/s 81 of the Representation of People Act, 1951, and bar contained in Article 329(b) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court repelled the contention of the alternative remedy and held that Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in the widest possible terms and unless there is a clear bar to jurisdiction of the High Court, its powers, under Article 226 of the Constitution, can be exercised, when there is any act, which is against any provision of law or violative of constitutional provisions and when recourse cannot be had to the provisions of the Act for the appropriate relief. In this case, the Supreme Court observed, "Consider the case, where the person elected is not a citizen of India. Would the Court allow a foreign citizen to sit and vote in the Legislative Assembly and not exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution?" It was, thus, held that the High Court had rightly exercised its jurisdiction in entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and declared that the appellant was not entitled to sit in Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly with consequent restraint order on him from functioning as a Member of the Legislative Assembly. 56. 56. The law, laid down in K. Venkatchalam (supra), clearly shows that exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 is couched in widest possible terms and, unless there is a clear bar on the jurisdiction of the High Court, it can invoke its power under Article 226 if any act is against any provisions of law or in violation of the constitutional provisions or when recourse cannot be had to the provisions of the Act for appropriate relief. In the case at hand, if it is found that the learned AFT has passed the impugned order against the provisions of law or if it is shown that the actions of the respondents/authorities concerned are in violation of the constitutional guarantees, which a member of the Armed Forces enjoys, because of the provisions of Article 33 of the Constitution of India, the writ petition would be amenable to the High Court's extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 57. Jeevan Reddy, J., in his majority judgment, on behalf of a Constitution Bench of nine Judges of the Supreme Court, in the Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (1997) 5 SCC 536 held that where a refund of tax/duty is claimed on the ground that it has been collected from the petitioner/plaintiff by misinterpreting or misapplying any of the rules, regulations or notifications, such a claim has necessarily to be preferred under and in accordance with the provisions of the respective enactments before the authorities specified thereunder and within the period of limitation prescribed therein. No suit is maintainable in that behalf. While the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 and of the Supreme Court under Article 32 cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of the said enactments, they will certainly have due regard to the legislative intent evidenced by the provisions of the said Acts and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the Act. The writ petition will be considered and disposed of in the light of the respective statutory provisions. This is for the reason that the power under Article 226 has to be exercised to effectuate the rule of law and not for abrogating it. Even while acting in exercise of the said constitutional power, the High Court cannot ignore the law nor can it override it. This is for the reason that the power under Article 226 has to be exercised to effectuate the rule of law and not for abrogating it. Even while acting in exercise of the said constitutional power, the High Court cannot ignore the law nor can it override it. The power under Article 226 is conceived to serve the ends of law and not to transgress them. 58. Within the permissible limits of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, as indicated by majority in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. (supra), it can be safely held that having regard to the scheme of an enactment, when the High Court finds that there is no appeal provided 'as of right' against an order, particularly, when the order is by misapplying or misconstruing the law or is based on non-existent facts or when the action of the State or its authorities are arbitrary or discriminatory, there can be no limitation in invoking by a High Court its jurisdiction under Article 226. In the case at hand, when no appeal 'as of right' has been provided against a final order of a Tribunal and when Section 14 itself saves High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as 227, the respondents cannot heard to say that this Court's jurisdiction, under Articles 226 and 227, stands barred, because of a truncated and uncertain provisions for appeal provided against a final order of a Tribunal. This apart, the writ petitioner has put to challenge, in the present case, the actions taken by the respondents/authorities concerned as discriminatory and arbitrary. In such a situation, the High Court cannot refuse to examine the allegations made by the petitioner, for, if the allegations are found to be true or if the Tribunal's impugned order is found to be based on facts, which were non-existent, or based on an interpretation of law, which interpretation is wholly misconstrued, the High Court cannot refuse to examine such issues in exercise of its power under Article 226 or, in an appropriate case, by invoking its power under Article 227. 59. In A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay Vs. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani and Another, AIR 1961 SC 1506 a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court observed thus: "8. 59. In A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay Vs. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani and Another, AIR 1961 SC 1506 a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court observed thus: "8. The only point, therefore, requiring to be considered is whether the High Court should have rejected the writ petition of the respondent in limine because he had not exhausted all the statutory remedies open to him for having his grievance redressed. The contention of the learned Solicitor-General was that the existence of alternative remedy was a bar to the entertainment of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution unless (1) there was a complete lack of jurisdiction in the officer or authority to take the action impugned or (2) where the order prejudicial to the writ petitioner has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and could, therefore, be treated as void or non est. In all other cases, he submitted, Courts should not entertain petitions under Article 226, or in any event not grant any relief to such petitioners. 9. We see considerable force in the argument of the learned Solicitor-General. We must, however, point out that the Rule that the party, who applies for the issue of a high prerogative writ should, before he approaches the Court, have exhausted other remedies open to him under the law is not one, which bars the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the petition or to deal with it, but is rather a rule which Courts have laid down for the exercise of their discretion. The law on this matter has been enunciated in several decisions of this Court but it is sufficient to refer to two cases: In Union of India v. T.R. Varma Venkararama Ayyar, AIR 1957 SC 882 speaking for the Court said: "It is well settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It is true that the existence of another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ; but, as observed by this Court in 'Rashid Ahmed vs. Municipal Board, Kairana' the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of grating writs vide also K.S. Rashid and son vs. Income Tax Investigation Commission and where such a remedy exists it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a writ petition under Article 226, unless there are good grounds therefore." There is no difference between the above and the formulation by Das, C.J. in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh where he observed; It must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute. The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior Court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior Courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior Court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any But this rule is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of a certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. After referring to a few cases in which the existence of an alternative remedy had been held not to bar the issue of a prerogative writ, the learned Chief Justice added; It has also been held that a litigant who has lost his right of appeal or has failed to perfect an appeal by no fault of his own may in a proper case obtain a review by certiorari. In the result this Court held that the existence of other legal remedies was not per se a bar to the issue of a writ of certiorari and that the Court was not bound to relegate the petitioner to the other legal remedies available to him. 10. The passages in the judgments of this Court we have extracted would indicate (1) that the two exceptions which the learned Solicitor General formulated to the normal rule as to the effect of the existence of an adequate alternative remedy were by no means exhaustive and (2) that even beyond them a discretion vested in the High Court to have entertained the petition and granted the petitioner relief notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. We need only add that the broad lines of the general principles on which the Court should act having been clearly laid down their application to the facts of each particular case must necessarily be dependent on a variety of individual facts which must govern the proper exercise of the discretion of the Court, and that in a matter which is thus pre-eminently one of discretion, it is not possible or even if it were, it would not be desirable to lay down inflexible rules which should be applied with rigidity in every case which comes up before the Court." (Emphasis is supplied) 60. What is, thus, clear is that in A.V. Venkateswaran (supra), it was submitted by the learned Solicitor General that unless there was a complete lack of jurisdiction or where the order, impugned in the writ petition, had been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, existence of alternative remedy would bar entertainment of a writ petition under Article 226. Reacting to this submission, the Apex Court held that notwithstanding these two fundamental limitations, which the Writ Courts have imposed on themselves, a discretion vests in the High Courts to entertain Writ petition and grant the relief even if there exists an alternative remedy and since exercise of writ jurisdiction of the High Court is a matter of discretion, it would be undesirable to lay down inflexible rules, which can be applied with rigidity in every case, which comes before the Court, for, the exercise of jurisdiction may depend on a variety of individual facts, which would govern proper exercise of discretion of the Court. 61. 61. The case of A.V. Venkateswaran (supra), therefore, is an authority for the proposition that there is no inflexible rule wholly barring the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and, in an appropriate case, under Article 227 even in respect of issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari if the facts of a given case so warrant. 62. Laying down the position of law on the subject as to when, in the face of existence of the right of appeal or revision, a High Court may interfere in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, the Constitution Bench, in The State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Mohammad Nooh, laid down as follows: "On the authorities referred to above, it appears to us that there may conceivably be cases--and the instant case is in point - where the error, irregularity or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior Court or tribunal of first instance is so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision. If an inferior Court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior Court's sense of fair play, the superior Court may, we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the Court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior Court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned. This would be so all the more if the tribunals holding the original trial and the tribunals hearing the appeal or revision were merely departmental tribunals composed of persons belonging to the departmental hierarchy without adequate legal training and background and whose glaring lapses occasionally come to our notice. The superior Court will ordinarily decline to interfere by issuing certiorari and all we say is that in a proper case of the kind mentioned above it has the power to do so and may and should exercise it. The superior Court will ordinarily decline to interfere by issuing certiorari and all we say is that in a proper case of the kind mentioned above it has the power to do so and may and should exercise it. We say no more than that." (Emphasis is added) 63. From the decision in Mohd. Nooh (supra), there can be no escape from the conclusion that a writ in the nature of certiorari can be issued, when a Tribunal conducts itself in a manner contrary to all accepted rules or when it adopts a procedure, which offends the superior Court's sense of fair play. 64. In tune with the decision in Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, reported in (1998) 8 SCC 7, the Supreme Court has held, in Harbanslal Sahnia and Another Vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and Others, (2003) 2 SCC 107 that notwithstanding the existence of alternative remedy, the High Court may, in an appropriate case, still exercise its writ jurisdiction in, at least, 3 contingencies, namely, (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of the principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an enactment is challenged. 65. One may, at this stage, also refer to Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others, which Mr. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, has relied upon, wherein the Supreme Court has observed and held as under: "14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for "any other purpose". 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field." 66. In Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and Others, AIR 2003 SC 3044 , which even the learned ASG has relied upon, the Supreme Court, while laying down the parameters of powers under Articles 226 and/or 227, considered a large number of authorities on the question as to when the powers under Article 226 and/or 227 can be exercised. Dealing with this aspect of the matter, the Court observed as follows: "10. Article 226 of the Constitution of India preserves to the High Court the power to issue writ of certiorari amongst others. The principles on which the writ of certiorari is issued are well settled. It would suffice for our purpose to quote from the seven-judge Bench decision of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and Others, AIR 1955 SC 233 . The four propositions laid down therein were summarized by the Constitution Bench in The Custodian of Evacuee Property, Bangalore Vs. Khan Saheb Abdul Shukoor, etc., AIR 1961 SC 1087 as under: (AIR p. 1094, para. 15) The High Court was not justified in looking into the order of 02.12.1952, as an appellate Court, though it would be justified in scrutinizing that order as if it was brought before it under Article 226 of the Constitution for issue of a writ of certiorari. 15) The High Court was not justified in looking into the order of 02.12.1952, as an appellate Court, though it would be justified in scrutinizing that order as if it was brought before it under Article 226 of the Constitution for issue of a writ of certiorari. The limit of the jurisdiction of the High Court in issuing writs of certiorari was considered by this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 and the following four propositions were laid down- 1. Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction: 2. Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice: 3. The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous: 4. An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari if it is a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not mere wrong decision. **** **** **** **** 12. In the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, the High Court proceeds on an assumption that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has the jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly. The High Court would not, therefore, for the purpose of certiorari assign to itself the role of an appellate Court and step into reappreciating or evaluating the evidence and substitute its own findings in place of those arrived at by the inferior Court." (Emphasis is supplied) 67. From the decision in Surya Dev Rai (supra), which even the learned ASG has referred to, while citing the decision in Surendra Bahadur Singh (supra), it becomes abundantly clear that certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction. From the decision in Surya Dev Rai (supra), which even the learned ASG has referred to, while citing the decision in Surendra Bahadur Singh (supra), it becomes abundantly clear that certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction. The errors of jurisdiction will include within its fold not merely the exercise of jurisdiction, but also when an inferior Court or Tribunal omits to exercise jurisdiction, where jurisdiction ought to have been exercised. This, in turn, will mean that when a Tribunal passes an order refusing to exercise jurisdiction by incorrectly interpreting the law, a writ, in the nature of certiorari, can be issued. In fact, an error, apparent on the face of the record, is one of the recognized grounds for interference with an order passed by a Tribunal. 68. While considering the case of Surya Dev Rai (supra), it may be noted that Surya Dev Rai (supra) also took note of the decisions in Nagendra Nath Bora and Another Vs. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam and Others, AIR 1958 SC 398 , and T.C. Basappa Vs. T. Nagappa and Another, AIR 1954 SC 440 . 69. The fall out of the observations of the Supreme Court, in Surya Dev Rai (supra), particularly, with regard to what has been laid down by a seven Judge Bench, in Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and Others, AIR 1955 SC 233 is that there are, at least, four circumstances in which a writ of certiorari may be issued by the High Court, the four circumstances being as follows: "1. Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction: 2. Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, for, when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard or violates the principles of natural justice: 3. The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous: 4. The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous: 4. An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari if it is a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error, which can be corrected by certiorari but not mere wrong decision." (Emphasis is supplied) 70. From the decision, in Surya Dev Rai (supra), it also becomes abundantly clear that when the error is manifest, such as, when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law, it is permissible to issue a writ of certiorari or when a Tribunal is found to have not proceeded in accordance with essential requirements of the law, which it was meant to administer. 71. In fact, in the State, through Special Cell, New Delhi Vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afshan Guru and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 641 the Supreme Court had culled down the principles governing the exercise of powers under Article 227. Taking into account what had been culled down as the parameters of the powers of the High Court under Article 227 in Navjot Sandhu (supra), the Supreme Court, in Surya Dev Rai (supra), observed thus: "The principles deducible, well settled as they are, have been well summed up the stated by a two-Judge Bench of this Court recently in State, through Special Cell, New Delhi Vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afshan Guru and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 641 . This Court held: i. The jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature; ii. The supervisory jurisdiction is wide and can be used to meet the ends of justice, also to interfere even with an interlocutory order; iii. The power must be exercised sparingly, only to keep subordinate Courts and tribunals within the bound of their authority to see that they obey the law. The power is not available to be exercised to correct mere errors (whether on the facts or laws) and also cannot be exercised "as the cloak of an appeal in disguise". The power must be exercised sparingly, only to keep subordinate Courts and tribunals within the bound of their authority to see that they obey the law. The power is not available to be exercised to correct mere errors (whether on the facts or laws) and also cannot be exercised "as the cloak of an appeal in disguise". (Emphasis is supplied) 72. What is, however, of immense importance to note is that the Court has clarified, in Surya Dev Rai (supra), that while exercising certiorari jurisdiction, the High Court proceeds on the assumption that the Court, which has the jurisdiction over a subject matter, has jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly and that the High Court would not, therefore, assign to itself, while exercising the power of certiorari, the role of an appellate Court and step into appreciating or evaluating the evidence and/or substitute its own findings in the place of those arrived at by the inferior Court. In short, while acting on the certiorari jurisdiction, though the High Court cannot convert itself into an appellate Court, it remains free to exercise the powers of issuing writ of certiorari if the conditions precedent for exercise of such a power, as discussed above, exists. As to when the High Court can interfere under Articles 226 and/or 227 is summed up, in Surya Dev Rai (supra), in the following words: "Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder: (1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with from 01.07.2002 in Section 115 of the CPC cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory order; passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (2) Interlocutory order; passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction -- by assuming jurisdiction where mere exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction -- by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction, which it does have or the jurisdiction though available, is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of Certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceeding such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonable and the subordinate Court has chosen to taken one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence of correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Courts in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order of proceedings of the subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate Court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate Court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case". (Emphasis is added) 73. (Emphasis is added) 73. What is, now, worth pointing is that the remedy of certiorari jurisdiction is available not against the decision, but against the decision-making process. In the decision-making process, if the Court or the Tribunal or, for that matter, any other authority deciding the case ignores the vital piece of evidence and thereby arrives at an erroneous conclusion or misconstrues the provisions of an enactment, there is no impediment in taking resort to Constitutional powers under Articles 226 and/or 227. This position of law can be clearly gathered from the observations made in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. P.V. Hanumantha Rao (D) thr. Lrs. and Another, (2003) 10 SCC 121 which run as follows: "True it is that remedy of the writ petition available in the High Court is not against the "decision-making process". In the "decision-making process", if the Court, tribunal or authority, deciding the case, has ignored vital evidence and thereby arrived at erroneous conclusion or has misconstrued the provisions of the relevant Act or misunderstood the scope of its jurisdiction, the constitutional power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 can be invoked to set right such errors and prevent gross injustice to the party complaining. In the case of Surya Dev Rai. (supra), while examining the nature and ambit of power of the High Court to issue writs under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, the above-stated legal position has been recognized by observing thus: (SCC p. 696, para. 39). 39. Though we have tried to lay down broad principles and working rules, the fact remains that the parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution cannot be tied down in a strait jacket formula or rigid rules.... At the end, we may sum up by saying that the power is there but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the dictates of judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience and practical wisdom of the Judge. This Court has recognized the right of the High Court to interfere with orders of subordinate Courts and tribunals where (1) there is an error manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear misreading or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (2) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby". (Emphasis is supplied) 74. (Emphasis is supplied) 74. The language used in Article 32 and 226 of our Constitution is, if we may borrow the words of the decision in T.C. Basappa Vs. T. Nagappa and Another, AIR 1954 SC 440 very wide and the powers of the Supreme Court as well as of the High Courts extend to issuing of orders, writs or directions including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition and certiorari as may be considered necessary for enforcement, of the fundamental rights and, in the case of the High Courts, for other purposes as well and, further, that the High Courts can make an order or issue a writ in the nature of 'certiorari', in all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner, as discussed above, so long as the High Court keep to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting of such writs. 75. That Article 226 is couched in such comprehensive phraseology that it confers on the High Court the power to undo injustice, wherever it is found, is clearly emphasized in Dwarka Nath Vs. Income Tax Officer, Special Circle D-ward, Kanpur and Another, AIR 1966 SC 81 . However, the exercise of this power, as we have already pointed out above, cannot be arbitrary and is governed by the self-imposed limitations evolved by the Courts themselves. 76. The authorities cited above clearly show that the power of the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 cannot be restricted by a statute. The restraint of not interfering with an order, which is adhered to by the High Courts, is really a self-imposed restriction and this restriction will not stand in the way of exercise of writ jurisdiction if the grounds for exercise of such powers exist. The restraint of not interfering with an order, which is adhered to by the High Courts, is really a self-imposed restriction and this restriction will not stand in the way of exercise of writ jurisdiction if the grounds for exercise of such powers exist. In other words, notwithstanding the relief provided, within the scheme of an enactment, against an order passed by a Court or Tribunal, the High Court can still exercise jurisdiction of issuing writ of certiorari under Articles 226 and/or 227, when the Tribunal or the Court, subordinate to the High Court, is found to have acted without jurisdiction i.e. by assuming jurisdiction, where no such jurisdiction exists, or refuses to exercise jurisdiction, where the jurisdiction exists, or acts beyond its jurisdiction or acts in flagrant disregard of law or rule governing its function or in violation of the principles of natural justice occasioning thereby failure of justice or when its order is based on clear misreading or utter disregard of the provisions of law or when it acts under a statute, which is ultra vires. Though a mere erroneous decision is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and/or 227, yet when an error is apparent on the face of the proceedings, such as, when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby, the power to issue writ of certiorari may be exercised, though this power should be resorted to sparingly and only in appropriate cases, where the judicial consciousness of the High Court dictates it to so act, lest a gross violation of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 77. We may, at this stage, pause here to point out that in Director General, Border Security Force and Others Vs. Iboton Singh (Kh), (2007) 1 GLT 903 which Mr. Goswami has relied upon, a Division Bench of this Court, speaking through one of us (Ansari, J.), concluded thus: "16. We may also point out that the power of judicial review aims at ensuring that public bodies and adjudicatory authorities exercise powers within their own parameters. Not only that an erroneous exercise of power may, in a given case, be amenable to the power of judicial review, but even refusal or failure by such an authority may make the High Court interfere in exercise of its power of judicial review. Not only that an erroneous exercise of power may, in a given case, be amenable to the power of judicial review, but even refusal or failure by such an authority may make the High Court interfere in exercise of its power of judicial review. The High Courts, under Article 226, are obliged to ensure that the adjudicatory authorities exercise the powers vested in them in the manner prescribed by law and that such exercise of power is within their limits; it is equally important for the High Court to ensure that the power, which belongs to an adjudicatory authority, is not left without being exercised and/or when it is exercised, such exercise is in conformity with the power conferred on it by the legislature. The judicial review is basically one of the facets and an adjunct of 'parliamentary sovereignty' so as to ensure that the will of the legislature is acidulously observed by the concerned authority." (Emphasis is supplied) 78. Though we have indicated above the broad principles and the parameters in respect of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227, it needs to be borne in mind that exercise of jurisdiction, under Article 226 as well as 227, depends on a variety of factors and there can be no straight-jacket formula or rigid rules. 79. The AFT Act has been enacted to provide for adjudication or trial by Armed Forces Tribunal of disputes and complaints with respect to appointment, enrollment and conditions of service in respect of persons subject to the Army Act, 1950, Navy Act, 1957 and the Air Force Act, 1950, and also to provide for appeals arising out of orders, findings or sentences of court martial held under the said Acts and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 80. The scheme of the AFT Act clearly demonstrates jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Armed Forces Tribunal. All the service matters, which are not included within the expression service matters, as defined by Section 3(0), may be adjudicated upon by the Armed Forces Tribunal by virtue of power u/s 14. A matter, which is not included within the expression 'service matters', a person can clearly approach a High Court under Article 226, subject, of course, to the limitations, which govern the exercise of power under Article 226. 81. A matter, which is not included within the expression 'service matters', a person can clearly approach a High Court under Article 226, subject, of course, to the limitations, which govern the exercise of power under Article 226. 81. A conjoint reading of Section 30 and 31 clearly demonstrates that whereas an appeal lies 'as of right' from any order of the Armed Forces Tribunal in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for 'contempt', the appeal against final order of the Armed Forces Tribunal lies to the Supreme Court subject to the granting of leave either by the Armed Forces Tribunal itself or by the Supreme Court. In the circumstances as have been indicated above. 82. In the backdrop of the above discussion as regards High Court's exercise of power under Articles 226 and 227 and the scheme of the AFT Act, we, now, turn to the case of Joby Varghese Vs. Armed Forces Tribunal, (2010) 4 KLT 611 . 83. In Joby Varghese (supra), Kerala High Court had the occasion to examine the scheme of the AFT Act and came to the conclusion that the right to appeal is available against an order of the Armed Forces Tribunal if the order pertains to the jurisdiction of Armed Forces Tribunal to punish for contempt and, hence, no writ petition, in such a case, would lie, but there being no appeal 'as of right' against a final order, which may be passed by an Armed Forces Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the High Court, under Article 226, can be exercised as against a final order, passed by an Armed Forces Tribunal. 84. In Colonel A.D. Nargolkar Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (2011) 179 DLT 447 a Division Bench of Delhi High Court has considered the scheme of the AFT Act and while summarizing the position of law on the subject under discussion, held that Armed Forces Tribunal is manned by personnel appointed by executive in consultation with the Chief Justice of India, such a Tribunal cannot be said to be truly a judicial review forum as a substitute to High Courts, which are constitutional Courts, and the power of judicial review, being basic structure of the Constitution, is unaffected by the AFT Act. Further, Article 227(4) of the Constitution, according to the decision, in A.D. Nargolkar (Colonel) (supra), takes away only the administrative supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court over Armed Forces Tribunal and does not impact judicial supervisory jurisdiction over such Tribunal. 85. We, at this stage, for reasons of propriety, do not express any opinion with regard to the conclusion reached by the Delhi High Court, in A.D. Nargolkar (Colonel) (supra), that Article 227(4) of the Constitution takes away only the administrative supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court over Armed Forces Tribunal and does not impact judicial supervisory jurisdiction over such Tribunal, for, we notice that Article 227 contains supervisory jurisdiction, both judicial as well as administrative. While conferring the power of superintendence on the High Courts over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, Clause (4) of Article 227 states that nothing in this Article shall be deemed to confer, on a High Court, powers of superintendence over any Court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. When the Constitution has prima facie taken away the High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227, it needs to be examined if the Parliament can confer supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 on the High Court over any Tribunal, constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces? If the answer to this question is found to be in the negative, the resultant effect would be that the High Court cannot, in the present case, have any supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, though its power to issue writ of certiorari, in an appropriate case, under Article 227(b), cannot said to be barred. 86. Considering the fact that, in the present case, we are concerned, primarily, with the scope and ambit of our jurisdiction under Article 226, we consciously refrain from expressing any definite opinion with regard to the question as to whether, notwithstanding Clause (4) of Article 227, the power of superintendence, vested in the High Court under Article 227(1), can be invoked in respect of the orders/directions, which may be passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal. 87. 87. Having considered the scheme of the AFT Act and also having taken into account the decisions, in Joby Varghese (supra) and A.D. Nargolkar (Colonel) (supra), the Allahabad High Court has held and concluded, in Surendra Bahadur Singh vs. Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow, (decided on 10.02.2012), that within the scheme of the AFT Act, writ jurisdiction, under Article 226, can be exercised, where (a) it pertains to challenge against the constitutional validity of any of the provisions of the AFT Act, 2007, (b) in matters relating to Armed Forces excepted from the jurisdiction of the AFT u/s 3(0) of the AFT Act, 2007, and (c) in the matters of interlocutory orders passed by the AFT. 88. The Allahabad High Court, in Surendra Bahadur Singh (supra), has laid down that in the following matters, no writ would lie: (a) in contempt matters, where statutory appeal is provided to the Supreme Court u/s 30(2) of the AFT Act, 2007, (b) against final orders of the AFT inasmuch as an appeal, in such a case, lies to Supreme Court u/s 31(1) of the AFT Act, 2007, (c) under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 89. We have not been able to persuade ourselves to agree with the decision, in Surendra Bahadur Singh (supra), that as against final orders of the Armed Forces Tribunal, exercise of power, under Article 226, is barred, because there is an appeal provided, though not 'as of right', to the Supreme Court. With great respect, we take the view that as against final orders of the Armed Forces Tribunal, exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 is not barred, for, there is no appeal provided against the final order of the Armed Forces Tribunal 'as of right' to the Supreme Court unlike an order passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal punishing for 'contempt'. 90. Let us, now, turn to the scheme of the Air Force Rules, 1969, with regard to investigation and trial. In this regard, what needs to be noted is that it is Chapter V of the Air Force Rules, 1960, which makes provisions for investigation of charges and trial by a Court Martial. 91. While considering Chapter V, what is of great significance to note is that Chapter V relates to investigation of charges and remand for trial. In this regard, what needs to be noted is that it is Chapter V of the Air Force Rules, 1960, which makes provisions for investigation of charges and trial by a Court Martial. 91. While considering Chapter V, what is of great significance to note is that Chapter V relates to investigation of charges and remand for trial. The word 'charges', appearing in Chapter V, means tentative charges, which, in turn, means accusations and not 'charges', which are formally framed by the Criminal Courts of ordinary jurisdiction. These tentative charges are, thus, accusations and it is the Commanding Officer, who has to decide whether or not the accusations, so made, are to be proceeded with or not. 92. What is of utmost importance to note, while considering the provisions contained in Chapter V of the Air Force Rules, 1969, is that Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 24 empowers, and, at the same time, makes it a duty of the Commanding Officer to hear every 'charge' against a person subject to the Air Force Act in the presence of the accused with liberty given to the accused to cross-examine the witnesses produced against him and also to call such witnesses as he may require and he may make such statement as may be necessary for his defence. 93. If, upon hearing of the 'charges' under Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 24, the Commanding Officer is of the opinion that the 'evidence' does not show that an offence under the Act has been committed, he must dismiss the 'charges'. The Commanding Officer may also dismiss the charge if he is satisfied that the 'charges' ought not to be proceeded with. If, however, the Commanding Officer is of the opinion that the 'charges' ought to be proceeded with, he shall, within a reasonable time, (a) dispose of the case summarily or (b) he may refer the case to the superior air force authority for sanction u/s 83 or (c) adjourn the case for the purpose of having the 'evidence' reduced to writing. 94. When the Commanding Officer adjourns the case, in terms of Clause (c) of Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 24, for the purpose of having the 'evidence' reduced to writing, a Summary of Evidence, is recorded in terms of Rule 24. 94. When the Commanding Officer adjourns the case, in terms of Clause (c) of Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 24, for the purpose of having the 'evidence' reduced to writing, a Summary of Evidence, is recorded in terms of Rule 24. At the stage of Summary of Evidence, as Rule 24 conceives, 'evidence' given by the witnesses is recorded with liberty given to the accused to cross-examine the witnesses. The accused also has the right to make a statement in his defence and may even examine witnesses in defence of his case. The 'evidence', so collected, and the statements, so recorded, under Rule 25, is called Summary of Evidence. Rule 25 requires that the Commanding Officer shall consider the Summary of Evidence and remand the accused for trial by a Court Martial or refer the case to the appropriate superior air force authority for sanction u/s 83 or disposal u/s 86 or, if he thinks it desirable, re-hear the case and dispose it of summarily. 95. When, however, the accused is remanded for trial, he is served with a charge-sheet, which has to be signed by the Commanding Officer in terms of Rule 37 and it is Rule 43, which empowers the convening authority to convene a Court Martial. Where the Commanding Officer is not the officer competent to convene a Court Martial, the competent military authority can convene Court Martial if he is satisfied that the 'charges' to be tried by the Court Martial are 'offences' within the meaning of the Army Act and that the 'evidence' justifies a trial on those 'charges' and if he is not so satisfied, he may order release of the accused or may even refer the case to the superior authority. 96. What is, now, imperative to note is that until the time a convening order is made by a competent military authority, the accused is not put to trial by a Court Martial. More importantly, though Rules 24, 25 and 26 use the expression 'evidence', the word evidenced not really evidence as is understood u/s 3 of the Evidence Act and the expression 'charge', which appears in Rule 24, 25 and 26, is not really a formal 'charge', which a Criminal Court frames. The expression 'charge', as already indicated, means an accusation, which may be under enquiry or investigation. The expression 'charge', as already indicated, means an accusation, which may be under enquiry or investigation. Though called as Summary of Evidence, none of the materials collected under Rule 24 is 'evidence' stricto senso and Summary of Evidence stands on the same footing as do the previous statement of a witness and can be used for the purpose of contradicting a witness or impeaching the credibility of a witness in terms of Section 145 of the Evidence Act. 97. Thus, the scheme of the Air Force Rules, 1969, if carefully read, clearly reflect that when an accusation made against a person, subject to the Air Force Act, is investigated in terms of Rule 24 or 25, the accusation is called 'charge' and Summary of Evidence is merely a collection of the statements of the witnesses recorded during investigation with, however, liberty given to the accused to examine the witnesses and, hence, Summary of Evidence is not, legally speaking, 'evidence' as conceived u/s 3 of the Evidence Act. 98. In the case of Courts of ordinary criminal jurisdiction, a person may appear or may be brought before the Court on accusations of his having committed an offence either on completion of investigation or on completion of enquiry. When an accused is brought before a Criminal Court with an accusation, there is no formal charge. Where, however, an accused is brought before a Court Martial, charge(s), on which the accused is to be tried, are charge(s) already framed by the Commanding Officer. 99. In a Court Martial, unlike an ordinary Criminal Court, it is not the Court, which frames charges. Though in both the cases, i.e., in a trial by a Court Martial as also in a trial by an ordinary Criminal Court, the accused is asked if he pleads guilty to the charge or not. 100. From the discussions, held above, it becomes clear that recording of the Summary of Evidence is a stage or part of the investigation procedure and after recording of Summary of Evidence, Court Martial may or may not be convened depending upon the contingencies, which have been indicated in Chapter V. 101. The learned Tribunal, therefore, prima facie refused to exercise jurisdiction on non-existent fact. 102. Coupled with the above, there are allegations made by the petitioner against the respondents, particularly, respondent Nos. The learned Tribunal, therefore, prima facie refused to exercise jurisdiction on non-existent fact. 102. Coupled with the above, there are allegations made by the petitioner against the respondents, particularly, respondent Nos. 4 and 5 that they have treated the petitioner with discrimination and have victimized him and that initiation of the proceeding against the petitioner by way of recording of Summary of Evidence is mala fide and contrary to law contained in that behalf. 103. When an accusation of discrimination or victimization is made, the High Court has, indeed, the power under Article 226 to examine such issues. The power of the High Court cannot, therefore, be in dispute. The question, however, remains if the High Court, in a given case, such as, the present one, shall or shall not interfere? The answer to this question would depend on the merit of the respective cases of the parties concerned. Suffice it to hold, at this stage, that there is no legal impediment in entertaining the present writ petition under Article 226. 104. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, let Rule be issued calling upon the respondents to show cause, if any, as to why a writ shall not be issued as prayed for and/or why such further or other orders shall not be passed as to this Court may deem fit and proper. 105. No formal notices need be issued to the respondents as they have entered their appearance through their engaged counsel. 106. Considering the fact that the proceedings initiated against the petitioner needs to be, as rightly pointed out by the learned ASG, concluded at the earliest provided that the same is sustainable in law, we make the Rule returnable for hearing on 04.03.2013. Before parting with this order, we make it clear that whatever we have observed hereinabove with regard to the case of the petitioner, the same are our tentative views for the purpose of determining if this Court has the jurisdiction or not. None of our views shall be taken as a view on the merit of the case of the petitioner vis-a-vis the case of the respondents.