JUDGMENT : M. C. GARG, J.: - This common order shall dispose of the aforesaid two writ appeals one writ appeal by appellant Sushil Kumar Kasliwal and another W.A. No. 306/2012 filed by one Deepak Kasliwal. Both these writ appeals are directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court delivered in W.P. No. 676/2012, whereby the learned Single Judge has set aside the order passed by the Registrar Public Trust, Indore dated 31-12-2012 and has given the following directions : - "Resultantly, the impugned order dated 13-12-2012 is hereby set aside. The matter is remanded to the Registrar, Public Trust for deciding it afresh on merits. The Registrar, while hearing the matter afresh, shall notice all the trustees including the petitioners. The Registrar, Public Trust, shall grant all relevant documents to the petitioners and shall also permit the petitioners to file a reply in the matter. The writ petition stands allowed. No order as to costs." 2. The appellants are the new trustees of Seth Trilokchand Kalyanmalji Digambar Jain Parmarthik Sansthayen (Trust) which is Trust registered under the Public Trust Act. The writ petitioners who are now respondents in W.A. No. 273/2012 were acting trustees of the public trust and in fact were removed from the trusteeship vide resolution passed by the Board of Trustees in a meeting held on 6-11-2011. In the said meeting, while Shri Ashok Kumar Kasliwal and Dileep Kumar Kasliwal were removed from the Board of trustees, Shri Sushil Kumar Kasliwal, Veer Kumar Jain and Deepak Kasliwal were inducted as new trustees. The new trustees then filed an application before the Registrar Public Trust in Form-6 to bring on record the changes so brought in the trusteeship of the Public Trust with a prayer to record these entries in the record of the Registrar of Public Trust under the provisions of M. P. Public Trust Act. The Registrar Public Trust, who is the second respondent in these writ appeals after holding an enquiry under section 9, sub-clause (2) of the Public Trust Act recorded the changes brought in the trusteeship of the Public Trust by deleting the name of the writ petitioners and taking on record the names of respondents No. 3 and 4 of the writ petition who are the appellants in the writ appeal subject-matter of this order. 3. 3. Against the decision of the Registrar Public Trust, the removed trustees i.e. Ashok Kumar Kasliwal and Dileep Kumar Kasliwal (hereinafter referred to as writ petitioners) along with the Public Trust filed the writ petition registered as W.P. No. 676/2012 assailing the order of the Registrar, Public Trust. They were aggrieved of the changes in the trusteeship of the aforesaid Trust vide resolution passed on 6-11-2011 (which is alleged to be unauthorised). The petitioners No. 1 and 2 were removed from the trusteeship of the Trust while respondents No. 3 and 4 i.e. Deepak Kasliwal and Ravi Gangwal were inducted new trustees. It was the submission of the writ petitioners that this was done by the registrar at their back without giving them any notice of hearing and without holding a proper enquiry as is contemplated by section 9(2) of the M. P. Public Trust Act. 4. It is a matter of record that the proposal brought by the appellant of W.A. No. 273/2012 was registered by the second respondent as No. 11-B/l 13/11-12. The intimation was also put up in the notice board of Tehsildar on 22-11-2012. However, no information was given to the petitioners about such changes brought in the trusteeship. Infact, according to the writ petitioners they had no notice of the meeting held on 6-11-2011 which meeting was held at their back. It was thus their submissions that on the basis of information given by the writ appellants and the statement of respondent No. 6 recorded before the Registrar of Trust on 12-12-2011 again at the back of the petitioners, the changes could not have been made in the trusteeship of the Trust which was accepted by respondent No. 2 so as to induct respondents No. 3 and 4 as trustees in place of the writ petitioners. It was alleged that the action of the Registrar was without jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions of section 9 of the M. P. Public Trust Act which are reproduced hereunder :- 9. Change. - (1) where any change occurs in any of the entries recorded in the register, the working trustee shall, within ninety days from the date of the occurrence of such change or where any change is desired in such entries in the interest of the administration of the such public trust, report in the prescribed manner such change or proposed change to the Registrar. (2) If, on receipt of such report and after making such enquiry as the Registrar may consider necessary, the Registrar is satisfied that a change has occurred or is necessary in any of the entries recorded in the register in regard to a particular public trust, he shall record a finding with the reason therefor and subject to the provisions contained in subsection (3) amend the entries in the said register in accordance with such finding. (3) The provisions of section 8 shall apply to any finding under this section as they apply to a finding under section 6. 5. According to the writ petitioners provisions contained under section 9(2) of the Public Trust Act required the Registrar to make an enquiry which according to them had to be in accordance with the principles of natural justice and after being satisfied about the genuineness of the meeting held on 6-11-2011 which has not been done. It is submitted that the writ petitioners who were affected by the impugned changes were not given notice about the proposed changes. Infact, they should have been given notice and should have been heard during the enquiry as contemplated under section 9(2) of the Public Trust Act but which was not done therefore, the said action on the part of the Registrar was illegal and require interference by the Writ Court as stated above. 6. The learned Single Judge accepted the submission of the writ petitioners that the change of trustees was accepted by Registrar without hearing the petitioners and without issuing any notice to them and therefore, the enquiry which was held by the Registrar was not in accordance with law. The learned Single Judge therefore had given the directions as noticed in para 1 of the order. 7. It is this order of the learned Single Judge which has been assailed in both the writ appeals by the newly brought trustees as per the changes brought in the trusteeship of the Public Trust as aforesaid. 8. The writ appeals have been contested by the writ petitioners who were removed from the trusteeship of the Public Trust. While contesting the writ appeal they had reiterated the submissions made in the writ petition. 8. The writ appeals have been contested by the writ petitioners who were removed from the trusteeship of the Public Trust. While contesting the writ appeal they had reiterated the submissions made in the writ petition. Whereas as per the learned counsel appearing for the appellants in both the writ appeals, the jurisdiction of the Registrar for the purpose of accepting the changes in the trusteeship as per the application submitted before the Registrar under Form No. 6 though require holding of enquiry, Registrar was not required to hold judicial enquiry. It is also submitted that there was equal efficacious alternative remedy available to any person who was aggrieved of any such order regarding changes was entitled to file a civil suit in accordance with section 8 of the Act by filing a civil suit. It is therefore submitted that once alternative remedy was available, the trustees who were removed by way of resolution in the meeting of the trustees of the Public Trust and which resolution was brought on record in Form No. 6 to the notice of the Registrar, if at all, were not satisfied by the order passed by the Registrar should have filed a civil suit. They were not entitled to file a writ petition. It is therefore submitted that the writ petition filed before the learned Single Judge was not maintainable. 9. According to the appellants, the impugned order is not sustainable for the simple reason that as per section 8 of the M. P. Public Trust Act, alternative efficacious remedy by filing a Civil Suit was available to the writ petitioners and by way of remedy, they were entitled to challenge the order of the Registrar. Insofar as holding of inquiry under section 9 of the Act, it is submitted that such inquiry was not required to be a judicial inquiry. It is a matter of record that public notice about the changes to be brought in the trustee deed in the name of trustees was put up on the notice board which fact is not even denied by the writ petitioners and thereafter, statement of respondent No. 6 was also recorded. Thus after holding such inquiry, Registrar was satisfied that the changes were brought. Now, if the writ petitioners were not happy with it, they were fully entitled to file a Civil Suit. Thus after holding such inquiry, Registrar was satisfied that the changes were brought. Now, if the writ petitioners were not happy with it, they were fully entitled to file a Civil Suit. However instead of doing that, they have filed writ petition, which was not maintainable. 10. To support their contention, the appellants have relied upon the judgments delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Harbanslal Sahnia and another vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and others, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 107 and Indradevanand vs. State of M. P. and others, reported in 7976 JLJ 823 which is the judgment delivered under the Public Trust Act by a Division Bench of this Court. In this case while referring to filing of the civil suit, the Court has discussed about the alternative efficacious remedy for filing of suit under section 8 of the Act. Relevant observations made in paragraph No. 6 are reproduced hereunder. 6. From a perusal of the various provisions of the Act we have no hesitation in holding that the cause of action for a civil suit contemplated under section 8 is the finding recorded by the Registrar on completion of the inquiry provided for under section 5. The cause of action being the recording of the finding by the Registrar, notwithstanding the entries being made in the register under section 7(1) and the publishing of the same on the notice board of his office, a civil suit shall lie by any working trustee or person having interest in the trust property aggrieved by any finding of the Registrar under section 6, the stress is not on the limitation. The period of limitation prescribed under section 8 is six months from the date of the notice published under section 7(1), where no entry or entries have been made in the register in accordance with the findings recorded by the Registrar under section 6, the person or trustee aggrieved by such finding has cause of action to file a suit. The right to file a suit under section 8 does not depend upon the registrar's making the entries in the register or their publishing on the notice board in accordance with section 7. The right to file a suit under section 8 does not depend upon the registrar's making the entries in the register or their publishing on the notice board in accordance with section 7. The legislature has rightly thought it fit and proper in their discretion to make the cause of action to file a suit by an aggrieved party not to depend upon the unilateral act of the registrar in causing the entry made under section 7(1). It is an independent cause of action which had accrued to the party under section 8(1). There may be cases, as in the present one, where the entries have not been made by the Registrar for some reason or other in the register in accordance with his findings recorded under section 6 and no publication on the notice board of his office of the entries made by the Registrar, still the petitioner must be held to have a right to file a civil suit under section 8 if he is aggrieved by any findings of the Registrar recorded under section 6. 11. However according to the removed trustees first of all even as per section 9 of the Act, the Registrar was required to hold an inquiry about changes, which were sought to be brought on record by following the principles of natural justice i.e. by giving a notice of hearing to the petitioners who were sought to be removed by issuing a notice to them and to hear them before accepting the changes which has not been done in this case. It is also submitted that merely because section 8 of the Act provided for filing of a suit against the proposed changes, filing of a writ petition was very much maintainable in the facts and circumstances of this case. 12. In relation to the judgment delivered in the case of Indradevanand vs. State of M. P. (supra), it has been submitted that findings which can be challenged by way of suit are findings of the Registrar which are recorded after holding inquiry of registration of the trust. 12. In relation to the judgment delivered in the case of Indradevanand vs. State of M. P. (supra), it has been submitted that findings which can be challenged by way of suit are findings of the Registrar which are recorded after holding inquiry of registration of the trust. In this case, the issue which was before the Registrar was as to whether appropriate resolutions were passed or not, so as to bring the changes, and as such, the Registrar was obliged to issue notice about the proposed changes to the writ petitioners and then pass appropriate order after hearing them, which has not been done. It is submitted that the remedy available under section 8 was still available to the writ petitioners even if changes would have been accepted by the Registrar after holding an enquiry in accordance with law after giving notice to the writ petitioners and after hearing them. It is submitted that the remedy by way of civil suit do not bar the remedy by filing writ petitions as has been done. 13. In this regard, it is also submitted that even if there is efficacious remedy available by filing Civil Suit, remedy by way of writ jurisdiction is not excluded. Reference has been made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Harbanslal Sahnia and another vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and others (supra). Relevant portion of the judgment are reproduced hereunder : 7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observed that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies; (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged (See Whirlpool Corpn. vs. Registrar of Trade Marks). The present case attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. vs. Registrar of Trade Marks). The present case attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners' dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings. 14. To the same effect, there are also judgments delivered in the case of Committee of Management and another vs. Vice Chancellor and others, reported in AIR 2009 SC 1159 and Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks Mumbai and others, reported in AIR 1999 SC 22 . 15. In the light of the law and the peculiar facts of this case, which clearly establishes that while accepting changes in the light of the resolution dated 6th of November, 2011, at the instance of appellants, the enquiry as contemplated under section 9(2) of the M. P. Public Trust Act has not been done by the second respondent in accordance with law inasmuch as no notice was served upon the writ petitioners who were certainly affected by the proposed changes and sought to be removed from the trusteeship, issue notice to them and hearing them was very much required if one follows the principles of natural justice which was not done. 16. Considering all the facts, we find no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Consequently, both the writ appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.