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2013 DIGILAW 1300 (PAT)

Md. Asim v. Ram Khelawan Yadav

2013-11-14

MUNGESHWAR SAHOO

body2013
JUDGMENT Mungeshwar Sahoo, J. 1. The defendants-appellants-appellants have filed this Second Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 03.04.1991 passed by learned 1st Additional District Judge, Saharsa in Title Appeal No.8 of 1981 whereby the learned Lower Appellate Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree dated 25.04.1981 passed by learned Munsif, Saharsa in Title Suit No.1 of 1979. 2. The plaintiffs-respondents filed the aforesaid suit praying for declaration of title and confirmation of possession over the disputed land i.e. the suit land and also for specific performance of contract by directing the defendant no.1 to hand over registration receipt (chirkut) of sale deed dated 16.08.1978 or the sale deed to the plaintiffs and to receive the consideration money of the same by the plaintiffs. 3. The plaintiffs claimed the aforesaid relief alleging that the defendant no.1 agreed to sell his land in favour of the plaintiffs by 3 registered sale deeds for Rs.7,000, Rs.4,000 and Rs.4,000 total Rs.15,000. It was agreed between the parties that title will pass on the registration of the sale deed and thereafter the plaintiffs will pay the consideration amount to the defendant no.1. The defendant no.1 executed 3 sale deeds accordingly for Rs.7,000 for land measuring 1 bigha and odd, Rs.4,000, second sale deed for 1 bigha and odd and also third sale deed for Rs.4,000 for 1 bigha 4 kathas 3 dhurs. The subject matter of the present suit giving rise to this second appeal is with respect to this third sale deed being dated 16.08.1978 for 1 bigha 4 kathas 3 dhurs. The plaintiffs alleged that after execution of the sale deed, the defendants avoided to receive the consideration amount. However, subsequently, the plaintiffs gave Rs.7,000 out of Rs.15,000 and the defendants handed over one chirkut but did not hand over the other chirkut of two sale deeds. The plaintiffs then learnt that subsequently the defendant no.1 has transferred the property in favour of the defendants-purchasers. The plaintiffs were always ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, therefore, the aforesaid relief was claimed. 4. The defendants-appellants filed contesting written statement who are purchasers from the defendant no.1. According to the defendants, the payment of consideration money was the condition precedent for passing the title. The plaintiffs were always ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, therefore, the aforesaid relief was claimed. 4. The defendants-appellants filed contesting written statement who are purchasers from the defendant no.1. According to the defendants, the payment of consideration money was the condition precedent for passing the title. The parties agreed that the title will pass after payment of consideration amount, therefore, it was recited in the sale deed but after the execution and registration of the sale deed, the plaintiffs did not pay a single farthing to the defendant no.1. Therefore, the defendant no.1 cancelled 3 sale deeds and transferred the property to the purchasers including the present appellants. Since after purchase, the defendants are in possession of the property. 5. The trial court on the basis of oral evidences and documentary evidences produced by the parties held that passing of consideration amount is not the condition precedent and the title passed on the registration of the sale deed, therefore, the plaintiffs have got right, title and, therefore, decreed the plaintiff’s suit. The defendants were directed to receive the consideration amount and hand over the chirkut or the original sale deed to the plaintiffs. 6. The defendants-purchasers filed title appeal before the Lower Appellate Court. The Lower Appellate Court confirmed the finding of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. 7. On 13.11.1992, the following six substantial questions of law were formulated at the time of admission of this second appeal: I. Whether findings of the courts below that transfer of title to the vendee was not dependent on the payment of consideration is legal and in terms of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act? II. Whether title passes on payment of consideration or on mere execution and registration of sale deed? III. Whether in view of clear recital in the sale deed Ext.1 dated 16.8.78 the intention of the vendor was that title would pass only on payment of consideration and whether the Courts below have made error of record in interpreting the sale deed in question? IV. Whether the Courts below has committed serious illegality in not considering other evidence as well as deposition of the vendor that no consideration had passed and he was compelled to cancel the sale deed dated 16.8.78 under registered document? IV. Whether the Courts below has committed serious illegality in not considering other evidence as well as deposition of the vendor that no consideration had passed and he was compelled to cancel the sale deed dated 16.8.78 under registered document? V. Whether in view of the fact that the courts below have rejected the story of panchayati as propounded by the plaintiffs, the finding of the courts below that the intention of the vendee was to execute the sale deed and give possession to the plaintiff is sustainable in law when vendee says that neither consideration was paid to him nor he gave possession? VI. Whether in view of the rulings reported in 1982 BBCJ 104 Ramjee Yadav Vrs. Ramchandra Prasad, A.I.R. 1989 Pat 50 Ramchandra Singh Vrs. Sub Divisional Officer, Hajipur, A.I.R. 1985 Patna 94 Ganesh Prasad Vrs. Deo Nandan Raut and A.I.R. 1978 Pat 97 Baldeo Singh Vrs. Dwarika Singh & others, the finding that title would pass even without consideration is legal and valid? 8. The learned counsel, Mr. Mathur appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that both the courts below have wrongly decided that payment of consideration was not the condition precedent for passing of title and title passed on registration of the sale deed. These findings of both the courts below are contrary to the intention of the parties and recital made in the sale deed in question. According to the learned counsel, there are various decisions of this court and other courts such as, A.I.R. 1978 Patna 97(Baldeo Singh and others v. Dwarika Singh and others), A.I.R. 1989 Patna 50(Ram Chandra Singh and others etc. v. Sub-divisional Officer, Hajipur and others), 2003 AIHC 378 Jharkhand (Ramesh Prasad & Ors. vs. Kashi Sao @ Kashi Prasad & Anr.), 1979 BBCJ 179 (Kamaldhari Rai vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.), A.I.R. 1950 Patna 288 (Motilal Sahu v. Ugrah Narain Sahu & Others) and A.I.R. 1953 Patna 330 (Girish Narain Singh & Anr. v. Akhtar Hussain & Ors.). On the strength of these decisions, the learned counsel submitted that the findings recorded by both the courts below are perverse findings because there is no evidence to the effect that in fact, there was agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant no.1 that title will pass only on registration of the sale deed. 9. v. Akhtar Hussain & Ors.). On the strength of these decisions, the learned counsel submitted that the findings recorded by both the courts below are perverse findings because there is no evidence to the effect that in fact, there was agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant no.1 that title will pass only on registration of the sale deed. 9. The learned counsel further submitted that the trial court categorically recorded a finding that the possession of the land was not delivered to the plaintiffs. Admittedly, the registration receipt and the sale deed were also not handed over to the plaintiffs. It is admitted by the plaintiffs that consideration amount was also not paid to the defendants by the plaintiffs and, therefore, the finding recorded by the courts below are illegal and unsustainable in the eye of law. The learned counsel in support of his contention placed the recital in this sale deed dated 16.08.1978. According to the learned counsel, it is specifically recited in the sale deed that only after payment of the consideration amount, chirkut will be handed over and then the plaintiff will be entitled to take possession of the land. This document is registered document, therefore, any oral evidence contrary to the terms and conditions mentioned in this registration, sale deed is inadmissible in evidence under Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act but both the courts below without considering this aspect of the matter, have wrongly held that title passed only on the registration of the sale deed. On these grounds, the learned counsel submitted that the substantial question of law formulated at the time of admission be answered in favour of the appellants and the plaintiff’s suit for declaration of title and/or specific performance be dismissed. 10. The learned counsel further submitted that there is no finding recorded by both the courts below that the plaintiffs paid Rs.7,000 or not and likewise, the courts below have not recorded any categorical finding that the plaintiffs were always ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and are still ready to perform. Only on mere registration of the sale deed, the plaintiff’s suit has been decreed. 11. Only on mere registration of the sale deed, the plaintiff’s suit has been decreed. 11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents submitted that the parties agreed that title will pass on mere registration of the sale deed because in the panchayati, the defendant no.1 who is Bhagina of plaintiffs expressed his desire that he is not desiring to keep the Nanihal property and, therefore, he wants that the property be sold. The plaintiffs agreed to purchase and it was agreed between them that the consideration amount will be paid later on. Accordingly, the sale deeds were executed. Subsequently, the plaintiffs also paid Rs.7,000 out of the total consideration of Rs.15,000. Considering all these aspects of the matter, the courts below have recorded clear finding that the title passed to the plaintiffs. The learned counsel admitted the fact that in fact, chirkut was not given by the defendant no.1 to the plaintiffs and likewise, the sale deed was also not given to the plaintiffs by the defendant no.1 and this could be detected by the plaintiffs subsequently that with ulterior motive, the defendants withheld the same and subsequently he sold the property to the present purchasers-appellants. The learned counsel submitted that it has been decided by various courts that even on mere registration of the sale deed, title will pass to the purchasers. The learned counsel relied upon A.I.R. 1973 Patna 386 (Shiva Narayan Sah and others v. Baidya Nath Prasad Tiwary and others) and A.I.R. 1965 Patna 29 (Dhuri Sah, v. Kishun Prasad Sah and others). On these grounds, the learned counsel submitted that the substantial questions of law formulated be answered against the appellants and the second appeal be dismissed with cost. 12. It is admitted fact that the defendant no.1 is the Bhagina i.e. cousin sister’s son of the plaintiff no.8. The suit property is the Nanihal property of defendant no.1. From perusal of the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court, it appears that there were litigation between defendant no.1 and the plaintiffs with respect to the suit property i.e. the property of the Nana (maternal grandfather of the defendant no.1). It further appears that it is admitted fact that the sale deed was executed by the defendant no.1 in favour of the plaintiffs on 16.08.1978. It further appears that it is admitted fact that the sale deed was executed by the defendant no.1 in favour of the plaintiffs on 16.08.1978. It is also admitted fact that the chirkut was not handed over by the defendant no.1 to the plaintiffs. The original sale deed was also not handed over by the defendant no.1 to the plaintiffs. The trial court categorically recorded the finding that the plaintiffs are not in possession of the suit property. So far this finding is concerned, it has not been reversed by the Lower Appellate Court. From perusal of the judgments of both the courts below, it further appears that the courts below have not at all considered the case of the plaintiffs regarding payment of Rs.7,000 to the defendant no.1 because it is the specific case of the contesting defendants that the plaintiffs never paid a single farthing, as agreed. No doubt, the defendant no.1 did not file written statement but he has been examined as D.W.2 on behalf of the appellants who has categorically stated that no amount of consideration was paid by the plaintiffs. As stated above, there is no finding as to whether the plaintiffs paid the alleged Rs.7,000 i.e. part consideration or not. 13. From perusal of the judgment of the courts below, it appears that the trial court has quoted the recital portion of the sale deed in paragraph 9. From perusal of the said recital, it is clear and unambiguous that the title will pass only after payment of consideration amount. It is recited that on payment of consideration amount, chirkut will be given to the plaintiffs and thereafter he will be entitled for possession of the land. From perusal of the pleading of the parties, it appears that the pleading of the plaintiffs is contrary to this recital in the registered sale deed. In the plaint, the plaintiffs categorically stated that there was agreement between the parties that title will pass on mere registration of the sale deed. 14. In the case of Ramkishorelal and another v. Kamalnarayan, A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 890, five Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that “the golden rule of construction, it has been said, is to ascertain the intention of the parties to the instrument after considering all the words, in their ordinary, natural sense. 14. In the case of Ramkishorelal and another v. Kamalnarayan, A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 890, five Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that “the golden rule of construction, it has been said, is to ascertain the intention of the parties to the instrument after considering all the words, in their ordinary, natural sense. To ascertain this intention the Court has to consider the relevant portion of the document as a whole and also to take into account the circumstances under which the particular words were used. Very often the status and the training of the parties using the words have to be taken into consideration. It has to be borne in mind that very many words are used in more than one sense and that sense differs in different circumstances. Again, even where a particular word has to a trained conveyancer a clear and definite significance and one can be sure about the sense in which such conveyancer would use it, it may not be reasonable and proper to give the same strict interpretation of the word when used by one who is not so equally skilled in the art of convincing. Sometimes it happens in the case of documents as regards disposition of properties, whether they are testamentary or non-testamentary instruments, that there is a clear conflict between what is said in one part of the document and in another. A familiar instance of this is where in an earlier part of the document some property is given absolutely to one person but later on, other directions about the same property are given which conflict with and take away from the absolute title given in the earlier portion. It is well settled that in case of such a conflict the earlier disposition of absolute title should prevail and the later directions of disposition should be disregarded as unsuccessful attempts to restrict the title already given. It is clear, however, that an attempt should always be made to read the two parts of the document harmoniously, if possible; it is only when this is not possible, e.g. where an absolute title is given in clear and unambiguous terms and the later provisions trench on the same, that the later provisions have to be held to be void.” 15. As quoted in the judgment of the trial court at paragraph 9, it is specific recital that chirkut and sale deed will be given to the plaintiffs only after payment of the consideration amount. In such circumstances, the contrary pleading and evidence adduced by the plaintiffs which are oral in nature is inadmissible at all in view of the provision contained in Section 91/92 of the Evidence Act. Section 92 provides that “when the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contracting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms.” 16. From perusal of the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the respondents, it appears that it is now settled principles of law that the intention of the parties has to be gathered from the contents of the document itself. If the terms and conditions mentioned in the document are ambiguous then the court is required to see the circumstances to ascertain the intention of the parties. This aspect of the matter has now already been settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Janak Dulari Devi and another v. Kapildeo Rai and another, (2011) 6 Supreme Court Cases 555. This aspect of the matter has now already been settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Janak Dulari Devi and another v. Kapildeo Rai and another, (2011) 6 Supreme Court Cases 555. The Hon’ble Supreme Court considering the earlier decision i.e. (2009) 4 Supreme Court Cases 193 Kaliaperumal vs. Rajagopal and another) held that “as per practice of takhubzul badlain prevalent in Bihar (that is, title to the property passing to the purchaser only when there is exchange of equivalents), where a sale deed recites that the entire sale consideration has been paid and possession has been delivered, but the registration receipt is retained by the vendor and possession of the property is also retained by the vendor, as the agreed consideration (either full or a part) is not received, irrespective of the recitals in the sale deed, the title would not pass to the purchaser, till payment of the entire consideration to the vendor and the registration receipt is obtained by the purchaser in exchange.” In the present case, it is admitted fact that neither possession has been delivered nor amount of consideration has been paid nor the original sale deed has been given to the plaintiffs nor the registration receipt was handed over to the plaintiffs by the defendants. The D.W.2, the vendor of the appellants clearly stated that he has handed over the receipt and the original sale deed to the purchaser i.e. the present appellant. In view of the above settled proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, now it is not necessary to discuss all the citations relied upon by the parties one by one because as stated above, in those decisions, it has been settled that intentions of the parties has to be seen. If it is the intention that title will pass on mere registration then title will pass but it is not the absolute rule. The important is the intention of the parties and the recitals in deed. 17. So far passing of decree for specific performance is concerned, as has been stated above, there is no finding recorded by both the courts below that the plaintiffs ever paid any consideration amount to the defendant no.1. There is no pleading that Rs.7,000 was paid to the defendants for which sale deed. 17. So far passing of decree for specific performance is concerned, as has been stated above, there is no finding recorded by both the courts below that the plaintiffs ever paid any consideration amount to the defendant no.1. There is no pleading that Rs.7,000 was paid to the defendants for which sale deed. Moreover, both the courts below have not decided this question but have declared the title of the plaintiffs. The trial court at paragraph 11 held that the payment of the consideration money was not condition precedent for passing the title to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs have acquired valid title to the suit land on 16.08.1978 and Exhibit C does not nullify the effect of already contemplated sale deed dated 16.08.1978. The trial court also held that the defendant no.1 is entitled for the consideration amount of Rs.4,000 only with respect to the suit property because it may be mentioned here that this suit giving rise to this second appeal relates to only one sale deed for Rs.4,000. 18. The substantial questions of law formulated at the time of admission are all interlinked and it depends on this question which has been settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Now, therefore, the substantial questions of law formulated at the time of admission have already been answered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court i.e. the binding precedent. In my opinion, it needs no further decision by this court. The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is binding as such, in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the appellants. 19. In the result, this second appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of both the courts below are set aside. The plaintiff’s suit is dismissed with cost of Rs.10,000 to be paid by the plaintiffs-respondents to the defendants-appellants within two months from today failing which the appellants are entitled to recover the same from the respondents through the process of the Court.