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2013 DIGILAW 1306 (MP)

Satnam Singh v. Hukum Singh

2013-10-29

PRAKASH SHRIVASTAVA

body2013
JUDGMENT 1. This appeal under section 100 of the C.P.C. is at the instance of the defendants No.1 and 2 in the suit challenging the judgment of the First Appellate Court dated 18.2.1980, by which Civil Appeal No. 3A/1975 filed by the respondents No. 1 to 5 (plaintiffs) was allowed and the Civil Suit No. 24A/1970 was decreed. The trial Court by the judgment dated 11.1.1975 had dismissed C.S. No. 24A/1970. 2. The respondents No.1 to 5 (plaintiffs) had filed the suit for declaration and permanent injunction pleading that Kunwarji and Bhuri Wd/o Heera were owner of the land admeasuring 50 Bigah 1 Biswa situated at village Ahirkheda. Bhuri had gone in ‘Natra’ during the lifetime of Kunwarji, therefore, her rights on the land had come to an end and Kunwarji remained the sole owner of the land. In 1933 Kunwarji had sold a part of the land in his ownership admeasuring 31 Bigah 11 Biswa (suit land) to the respondents No. 6 and 7 Narayan and Ghisalal for consideration of Rs.5,00/- and in the record the name of the respondent No. 7 Ghisalal was entered and possession of the suit land was handed over to him. In 1937-38 Ghisalal had sold the suit land to Bhagwan Singh (plaintiffs-respondents No. 1 to 5 are the legal heirs of Bhagwan Singh). The sale by Ghisalal in favour of Bhagwan Singh was oral sale and in pursuant thereto, Bhagwan Singh and thereafter his legal representatives respondents No. 1 to 5 had continued in possession of the suit land. It was further pleaded that the sole legal heir of Kunwarji was his daughter Nandi Bai and after her death, her son Narayan (respondent No. 6) had become the legal heir. It was further pleaded that Hari Singh had got his name mutated illegally and surreptitiously whereas Tehsildar of the Jagir had no power to pass mutation order dated 17/3/1948. The remaining land of Kunwarji admeasuring 19 Bigah was inherited by Narayan. It was further pleaded that Hari Singh had got his name mutated illegally and surreptitiously whereas Tehsildar of the Jagir had no power to pass mutation order dated 17/3/1948. The remaining land of Kunwarji admeasuring 19 Bigah was inherited by Narayan. Defendant Hari Singh had initiated proceedings for possession under section 250 of the Land Revenue Code claiming possession of suit land, which were dismissed by the Tehsildar by order dated 23.3.1964 and the appeal was dismissed by the S.D.O. by order dated 31.7.1968, and Hari Singh had thereafter executed a bogus sale deed dated 10.4.1970 in favour of the appellants whereas Hari Singh was neither owner nor he was in possession of the suit land. Since the appellants had tried to interfere in the possession of the respondents No. 1 to 5, therefore, they had filed the present suit. 3. The appellants by filing the written statement had denied the plaint averment. They had denied the sale by Kunwarji in favour of Ghisalal and Bhagwan Singh. It was pleaded that Kunwarji had died in 1946 and in 1948 the suit properties were mutated in the name of Hari Singh. It was further pleaded that Hari Singh was son of Kunwarji’s brother’s son Ram Singh. The possession of Ghisalal on the suit land was denied. It was further denied that Bhagwan Singh had received any title on the basis of the sale deed executed by Ghisalal. It was further pleaded that Bhagwan Singh on 27.8.1958 had filed an application for rights of Pakka Krishak in respect of the suit land disclosing himself to be sub-tenant and that the plaintiffs had not raised earlier any plea of adverse possession. 4. The trial Court by the judgment dated 11.1.1975 had dismissed the suit on reaching to the conclusion that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that Kunwarji had sold the suit land to Narayan and Ghisalal in 1933, and Ghisalal had sold the suit land to Bhagwan Singh and given him the possession of the suit land. It was further found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that they had perfected their title by way of adverse possession. The trial Court also found that Hari Singh, defendant No. 3, was the heir of Kunwarji and that appellant No.1 is not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. 5. It was further found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that they had perfected their title by way of adverse possession. The trial Court also found that Hari Singh, defendant No. 3, was the heir of Kunwarji and that appellant No.1 is not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. 5. The first appellate Court by the judgment dated 18.2.1980 has reversed the findings recorded by the trial Court and has decreed the suit. The first appellate Court has found that the suit properties were undisputedly in the name of Kunwarji. It was held that the onus was on the appellant, who had purchased the suit property from Hari Singh, to prove that Hari Singh was legal heir of Kunwarji but in this regard the appellant had not produced any cogent evidence. The first appellate Court has found that it was not proved that Hari Singh was son of the nephew of Kunwarji and has held that Hari Singh was not the legal heir of Kunwarji. It was also found by the first appellate Court that the suit land was sold by Kunwarji to Ghisalal and in 1937-38 Ghisalal had sold the suit land to Bhagwan Singh, and thereafter Bhagwan Singh had continued in possession of the suit land. The first appellate Court alternatively also found that the plaintiffs had perfected their title by way of adverse possession, since they had continued in possession of the suit land for more than 12 years. The first appellate court accordingly decreed the suit by declaring the plaintiffs owner of the suit land and restraining the defendants from interfering in possession of the plaintiffs. 6. This Court had earlier allowed the second appeal by setting aside the judgment of the first appellate Court and restoring the judgment of the trial Court by the judgment dated 26.9.2001. The Civil Appeal No. 2937/2003 was allowed by the Supreme Court making observations in respect of the question which arise in the appeal and claim and counter claim of the parties and remanding the matter back to this Court to frame the substantial question of law that may arise in the case, and hear the parties and answer the same. The Civil Appeal No. 2937/2003 was allowed by the Supreme Court making observations in respect of the question which arise in the appeal and claim and counter claim of the parties and remanding the matter back to this Court to frame the substantial question of law that may arise in the case, and hear the parties and answer the same. This Court thereafter on 2.5.2013 had framed following substantial questions of law :- (1) Whether the first appellate Court has erred in law to prove the alleged oral two sales; first in favour of Gheesalal and another in favour of Bhagwan Singh for consideration of Rs. 500/- without having any registered instrument and as such the plaintiff confers valid title on the basis of such sales, whereupon the suit filed by the legal heirs of Bhagwan Singh has rightly been decreed? (2) Whether the finding recorded by the first Appellate Court about acquisition of title on the basis of adverse possession in pursuance of oral sale of the suit land stands vitiated for want of requisite pleadings? (3) Whether lower appellate Court committed an error to hold that Harisingh is not the legal heir of Kunwarji reversing the well considered finding of the trial Court, however such finding is perverse? (4) Whether the learned first appellate Court has erred in law in holding that by means of the long possession of the first respondent Hukumsingh and his predecessors, they have acquired title to the suit lands? (5) Whether the learned first appellate Court has failed to notice the established principle of law that in a suit based upon title, the plaintiff must success on the basis of his own strength and cannot take advantage of any weakness in the defendant’s title? The above questions are answered as under :- Question No.1 :- 7. The first appellate Court has accepted the plea of the plaintiffs that Kunwarji had sold the suit land to Ghisalal for consideration of Rs. 500/- and a document in writing was prepared by Mangilal, in which PW 2 Sardar Singh and PW 6 Ghasiram had signed as witness. The first appellate Court on that basis has recorded the finding of fact that Kunwarji had sold the suit land to Ghisalal in the year 1935. 500/- and a document in writing was prepared by Mangilal, in which PW 2 Sardar Singh and PW 6 Ghasiram had signed as witness. The first appellate Court on that basis has recorded the finding of fact that Kunwarji had sold the suit land to Ghisalal in the year 1935. Ghisalal thereafter had cultivated the land and had sold the suit land in the year 1937-38 by way of oral sale to Bhagwan Singh for consideration of Rs. 500/-. Both the sales; first by Kunwarji in favour of Ghisalal and second by Ghisalal in favour of Bhagwan Singh, were for consideration of Rs. 500/-. In terms of section 54 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 the sale of suit land which was admittedly of the value of more than Rs. 100/-, could have been made only by a registered instrument. Since the aforesaid two sale transactions were made without executing the registered sale deed, therefore, no title had passed to Ghisalal and Bhagwan Singh on the basis of the unregistered and oral sale made in their favour. Though on the basis of the evidence on record, it has been proved before the first appellate Court that the suit property was sold in favour of Ghisalal and then Bhagwan Singh, but the sale was not a valid sale having been done in contravention of the provisions contained in section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and such a sale would not confer valid title to the respondents plaintiffs, therefore, the first appellate Court was not right in law in holding the plaintiffs to be the title holders on the basis of above sales. Question No.2 & 4 :- 8. Counsel for the appellants has submitted that the plea of adverse possession has not been raised in the plaint and necessary ingredients of adverse possession have not been proved, whereas the counsel for the respondents No. 1 to 5 has submitted that all the material facts were pleaded in the plaint and since the plaintiffs had continued in possession of the suit land on the basis of the invalid sale deed, therefore, their possession was adverse to the appellants and they had perfected their title by way of adverse possession. It has also been submitted that the finding of adverse possession is a finding of fact. 9. It has also been submitted that the finding of adverse possession is a finding of fact. 9. So far as the submission of counsel for the respondents No. 1 to 5 that the finding relating to adverse possession is a finding of fact is concerned, such a submission can not be accepted because the question of adverse possession is not a pure question of fact or of law but a blended question of fact and law, and the person who is claiming the adverse possession is required to establish the necessary ingredients of adverse possession, failing which the finding of adverse possession cannot be upheld. [See: Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India and others, (2004) 10 SCC 779 and Hemaji Waghji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan and others, AIR 2009 SC 103 ]. The reliance of counsel for the respondents on the Single Bench Judgment of this Court in the matter of Ratanlal v. Kishanlal and others reported in 2012 RN 133 is of no help to the respondents, since in that judgment in paragraph 15 observations have been made about the general findings recorded by the courts below being pure findings of fact, but it has not been laid down in so many words in that judgment that the finding of adverse possession is a finding of fact. 10. It is the settled position in law that a party claiming adverse possession, must prove that his possession is “nec vi, nec clam, nec precario” i.e. peaceful, open and continuous. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that the possession is adverse to the true owner. Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusive possession to the actual owner is important. A person claiming adverse possession is required to establish: (a) the date he came in possession, (b) nature of his possession, (c) If the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) period of his continuous possession and (e) that his possession was open and undisturbed. [See: Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India and others, 2004 (10) SCC 779 ]. [See: Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India and others, 2004 (10) SCC 779 ]. He is also required to show at least when the possession became adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. [See: S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254 ]. The possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the former’s hostile action. [See: T. Anjanappa and others v. Somalingappa and another, (2006) 7 SCC 570 ]. Adverse possession right is not a substantive right but a result of the waiving (wilful) or omission (negligent or otherwise) of right to defend or care for the integrity of property on the part of the owner of the land. Adverse possession statutes, like other statutes of limitation, rest on a public policy, that does not promote litigation and aims at the repose of conditions that the parties have suffered to remain unquestioned long enough to indicate their acquiescence. [See: P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and others v. Revamma and others, AIR 2007 SC 1753 ]. 11. In the present case an objection has been raised by the appellants that the respondents-plaintiffs have not clearly pleaded adverse possession. By a catena of judgments it has been settled that the plea relating to the adverse possession must be made and proved. [See: S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254 ]. Since the person claiming adverse possession tries to defeat the right of the true owner, therefore, he has to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. [See: Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India and others, (2004) 10 SCC 779 ]. In the present case a perusal of the plaint reveals that the respondents-plaintiffs though had not used the word “adverse possession” but had pleaded all the necessary facts making out the plea of adverse possession. The trial Court had also framed the Issue No. 3 relating to acquisition of title by the plaintiffs by way of adverse possession. Both the parties had led evidence on this issue and thereafter the findings have been recorded by the two Courts below on this issue after appreciating the evidence placed on record. The trial Court had also framed the Issue No. 3 relating to acquisition of title by the plaintiffs by way of adverse possession. Both the parties had led evidence on this issue and thereafter the findings have been recorded by the two Courts below on this issue after appreciating the evidence placed on record. Even otherwise if a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. [See: Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735 ]. In view of this the submission of counsel for the appellants that the plea of adverse possession can not be raised for want of clear pleading in the plaint, is rejected. 12. The counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs has submitted that since the respondents have been found to be in continuous possession of the suit land since 1937-38 on the basis of the invalid sale deed, therefore, their possession was open and hostile denying the title of the lawful owner, hence they have perfected their title by way of adverse possession. 13. In the matter of Bondar Singh and others v. Nihal Singh reported in 2003 RN 241 = AIR 2003 SC 1905 in a case where the plaintiffs had raised the plea that they were in possession of the suit land by virtue of unregistered unstamped sale deed executed in favour of their predecessors in title and the defendants had alleged the plaintiffs to be the trespassers and the possession of the plaintiff was established, the Supreme Court has found that the plaintiffs were in hostile and continuous possession and had perfected their title by way of adverse possession. This Court also in the matter of Mangilal v. Sundar Bai reported in 1993 RN 94 referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Soni Lalji Jetha (deceased) through his LRS v. Soni Kalidas Devchand and others reported in AIR 1967 SC 978 , in the matter of Padma Vithoba Chakkayya v. Mohd. This Court also in the matter of Mangilal v. Sundar Bai reported in 1993 RN 94 referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Soni Lalji Jetha (deceased) through his LRS v. Soni Kalidas Devchand and others reported in AIR 1967 SC 978 , in the matter of Padma Vithoba Chakkayya v. Mohd. Multani and another reported in AIR 1963 SC 70 and of this Court in the matter of Sukhibai and others v. Limye and others reported in 1987 JLJ 159 has held that continuous possession of the transferee for more than the statutory period on the basis of unregistered sale deed which is voidable, is adverse to real owner and title accrues on the basis of such possession. The Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Hotam Singh and others v. Sewaram and others reported in 2004 (2) JLJ 274 = 2004(3) MPLJ 72 , has held that if the sale is void, the suit for possession must be brought within 12 years of dispossession and when a party claims to be in possession under an invalid document, then also his possession is adverse to the true owner. 14. In the present case, it has been found by the first appellate Court that the Bhagwan Singh, the predecessor of the plaintiffs-respondents no.1 to 5, was placed in possession of the suit land in the year 1937-38 on the basis of the oral sale deed. The earlier sale in the year 1935 by Kunwarji, who was undisputedly the lawful owner of the suit property, to Ghisalal was also contrary to section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. Bhagwan Singh and Ghisalal in the mutation proceedings had filed the application on 20.3.1958 showing that they were in possession of the suit land for last several years on the basis of the sale, therefore, all the facts were within the knowledge of defendant Hari Singh yet he had not filed any suit for possession, and Bhagwan Singh and the respondents-plaintiffs claiming through him had continued in possession of the suit land denying the title of Hari Singh. Thus the respondents plaintiffs had continued in possession of the suit land on the basis of the invalid sale denying the title of the appellants and the respondent Hari Singh, therefore, in terms of the above judgments the respondents No.1 to 5 (plaintiffs) had perfected their title by way of adverse possession. 15. Counsel for the appellants has referred to the documents Ex.D/11, D/4, D/17 & D/14 had has submitted that in these documents Bhagwan Singh had claimed himself to be sub-tenant, therefore, he was stopped from claiming adverse possession. Bhagwan Singh has not been found to be sub-tenant by any competent court. The plea of sub-tenancy if raised by Bhagwan Singh in different set of proceedings in different circumstances, that would not affect his right in the present proceedings. Even otherwise, it is found that the appellants and defendant Hari Singh had also raised the conflicting plea claiming the respondents-plaintiffs as encroacher. The Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Bhawarlal v. Mathura Prasad reported in 1961 JLJ 1489 = AIR 1962 MP 141 has taken the view that a party can show that either the admission by him was made under a mistake or under different circumstances, and unless there has been a prejudice to the opposite party on account of the admission having been acted upon or on account of any representation made by the admitting party, it would not bind the party unless it amounted to an estoppel. Further where each party makes admission detrimental to itself, the mutual admissions cancel each other, with the result that the question for consideration may have to be decided on the material on record irrespective of such alleged admissions. In view of this, on the basis of Ex.D/4, D/14 & D11 it can not be held that the respondents-plaintiffs were in permissive possession of the suit land or were in possession as sub-tenant ignoring the other material evidence on record, on the basis of which the first appellate Court has found that the appellants were placed in possession of the suit land on the basis of unregistered/oral sale. 16. The respondents-plaintiffs in the present case have established the date on which they had come in possession, the nature of their possession and the fact that their possession based upon sale was known to the other party. 16. The respondents-plaintiffs in the present case have established the date on which they had come in possession, the nature of their possession and the fact that their possession based upon sale was known to the other party. They have established their continuous possession from 1937-38 and that their possession was open and undisturbed. Thus, the necessary facts which were required to be proved by the respondents-plaintiffs for establishing their plea of adverse possession in terms of the judgments of the Supreme Court noted above, have been proved in the matter. 17. Hence the finding recorded by the first appellate Court about acquisition of title on the basis of adverse possession in pursuance of the oral sale of the suit land is not vitiated for want of requisite pleadings. So far as the finding of the first appellate court in respect of acquisition of title to the suit land by respondent No.1 Hukum Singh and his predecessors only on the basis of long possession is concerned, it is not disputed by the counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs that mere long possession will not establish adverse possession, but in view of the above analysis since this Court has found that the respondents No. 1 to 5 (plaintiffs) had perfected their title by adverse possession being it continuous and hostile possession on the basis of the invalid sale, therefore, the finding of the first appellate Court about perfection of title by way of adverse possession is upheld though for the different reasons which have been assigned above. Questions No. 2 and 4 are answered accordingly. Question No.3 :- 18. This question relates to the claim of the appellants that Hari Singh was the legal heir of Kunwarji. The trial Court had found that Hari Singh was the legal heir of Kunwarji, whereas the first appellate Court has reversed the said finding of fact by holding that the appellants could not prove that Hari Singh was the legal heir of Kunwarji. 19. The first appellate Court which is the final fact finding Court, has reversed the finding of the trial Court in this regard after elaborately dealing with the evidence led by the parties on this issue. 19. The first appellate Court which is the final fact finding Court, has reversed the finding of the trial Court in this regard after elaborately dealing with the evidence led by the parties on this issue. Though the appellants and the original defendant Hari Singh have claimed that Hari Singh was son of Ram Singh, who was son of Kunwarji’s brother, meaning thereby it was claimed that Hari Singh was grand son of the brother of Kunwarji but the appellants have failed to plead or disclose by way of evidence the name of the brother of Kunwarji whose grand son was Hari Singh. The first appellate Court has rightly noted that the appellants had not disclosed whose son was Ram Singh. Since the appellants were claiming that Hari Singh was legal heir of Kunwarji, therefore, the onus to prove this fact has rightly been placed by the first appellate Court to the appellants. The first appellate Court while recording the finding in this regard, has considered the evidence of the plaintiffs’ witnesses PW 1 Ghisalal, PW 2 Sardar Singh, PW 3 Onkar Singh, PW 5 Umrao Singh, PW 8 Amar Singh, PW 9 Shankar Singh as also the evidence of the appellant Satnam Singh and the pleadings in this regard and also examined the documentary evidence such as Ex. P/26, D/10, D/13, D/22, D/23, D/24, D/21, D/1, D/2, D/20, D/11, D/15 to D/19, D/27 & D/ 28. The oral and documentary evidence which was considered by the trial Court while recording a finding that Hari Singh was the legal heir of Kunwrji, has duly been considered by the first appellate Court while reversing the said finding and coming to the conclusion that Hari Singh was not the legal heir of Kunwarji. 20. The oral and documentary evidence which was considered by the trial Court while recording a finding that Hari Singh was the legal heir of Kunwrji, has duly been considered by the first appellate Court while reversing the said finding and coming to the conclusion that Hari Singh was not the legal heir of Kunwarji. 20. The Supreme Court in the matter of V. Ramchandra Ayyar and another v. Ramalingam Chettiar and another reported in AIR 1963 SC 302 has held that in second appeal High Court can interfere if there is a substantial error or defect in procedure provided by the code or by any other law for the time being in force which may produce error or defect in the decision of the case upon merits, but even if the appreciation of evidence by the lower appellate Court is patently erroneous and the finding of fact recorded in consequence is grossly erroneous, that cannot be said to introduce a substantial error or defect in the procedure but if in dealing with the question of fact the lower appellate Court has placed onus on a wrong party and its finding of fact is the result, substantially, of this wrong approach, that may be regarded as defect in procedure or if in dealing with the question of fact the lower appellate Court discards evidence on the ground that it is inadmissible and the High Court is satisfied that the evidence was admissible, that may introduce an error or defect in procedure, or if the lower appellate Court fails to consider an issue which has been tried and found upon by the trial Court and proceeds to reverse the trial Court’s decision without the consideration of such issue, that may be regarded as an error or defect in procedure; or if the lower appellate court allows a new point of fact to be raised for the first time before it, or permits a party to adopt a new plea of fact, or makes out a new case for a party, that may, in some cases, be said to amount to a defect or error in procedure, but the High Court can not interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court, however erroneous the said conclusions may appear to be to the High Court. The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurdev Kaur and others v. Kaki and others reported in AIR 2006 SC 1975 has reiterated that the legislative intention behind the amended Section 100 of the CPC is clear that legislature never wanted second appeal to become “third trial of facts” or “one more dice in the gamble”. 21. In the present case, counsel for the appellants has failed to point out any cogent ground which would permit this Court in the limited exercise of the second appellate jurisdiction in terms of the above judgments to interfere in the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court in regard to the proof of legal heirship of Hari Singh. Counsel for the appellants has submitted that the first appellate Court has not considered Ex.P/ 4 to P/7 and P/9 & P/10 while considering this issue, but a perusal of these exhibits reveal that they are the Khasra entries for different periods from 1958 to 1970 recording the name of Hari Singh in the revenue record. But from these Khasra entries it can not be inferred that Hari Singh was legal heir of Kunwarji, specially when Hari Singh is neither son or grand-son of Kunwarji and Hari Singh has failed to disclose the name of the person through whom he is claiming his relation with Kunwarji. 22. Alternatively it has also been submitted by counsel for the respondents No. 1 to 5 that Dhar State Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1941 applies and if Kunwarji had died prior to 1950, Kunwarji’s daughter Nandi Bai was alive and she would inherit the suit property and if Kunwarji had died after 15.8.1950, Madhya Bharat Tenancy Act, 1950 would apply and Kunwarji’s daughter Nandi Bai or Nandi Bai’s son Narayan would inherit the suit property and, therefore, Hari Singh can not be held to be the legal heir of Kunwarji. 23. In view of the above analysis, it is held that the finding of the lower appellate Court that Hari Singh is not the legal heir of Kunwarji, needs no interference by this Court and the lower appellate Court has not committed any error in reversing the finding of the trial Court in this regard and the finding of the lower appellate court is not perverse. The question No. 3 is answered accordingly. Question No.5 :- 24. The question No. 3 is answered accordingly. Question No.5 :- 24. Learned counsel for both the parties have not disputed to the settled position in law that the plaintiff must succeed on the basis of his own stand and can not take the advantage of any weakness in the defendant’s title. Since in the present case the first appellate court by appreciating the evidence led by both the parties has recorded the positive inding that Hari Singh was not the legal heir of Kunwarji and Ghisalal-respondent No.7 had purchased the suit land from Kunwarji in the year 1933 and Bhagwan Singh through whom the respondents No. 1 to 5 are claiming, had purchased the suit land from Ghisalal in the year 1937-38 and thereafter they had continued in possession of the suit land continuously denying the title of Hari Singh or the appellants, therefore, they have perfected their title by way of adverse possession. This Court has also upheld the finding of the adverse possession on the ground that the possession on the basis of the invalid sale was adverse to the appellants. Since the first appellate Court has not decreed the suit on the basis of the weakness of the defendants title but has decreed the suit finding the plea of the respondents No. 1 to 5 to be proved, therefore, the first appellate Court has not committed any error of ignoring the established principle of law that in a suit based upon title, the plaintiff must succeed on the basis of his own stand and can not take advantage of the weakness of the defendant’s title. The question no.5 is answered accordingly. 25. Counsel for the parties have not made any submission before this Court to frame any other additional question of law and this Court has decided the questions of law which are formulated in the appeal. 26. In view of the aforesaid analysis, I do not find any merit in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed.