JUDGMENT:- Heard Shri P. P. Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner and Shri Padiyar, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent no.1. 2. Rule. Heard forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel. Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent no.1, waives service. 3. The short point for consideration in the above Writ Petition is whether an Order dated 17.02.2009, passed by the Director of Urban Development is appealable before the Administrative Tribunal in Municipal Appeal no. 1 of 2009. 4. Briefly, the facts of the case as stated by the Petitioner is that he is the owner in possession and in occupation of his structure/gada for the last over 40 years which is situated at Borda road in a private property with the permission of said owner. It is further his case that he has obtained a licence for the sale of kerosene in the suit gada since the year 1975 which is still valid with all respects. It is further his case that in the year 1986, the Respondent no. 1 issued notice on 29.08.1986 for demolishing such structure or such gada admeasuring length of 4.80 metres with width of 4.50 metres on the ground that he had extended its original size. It is further his case that he had filed a suit against Margao Municipal Council, which was not contested by the Municipality but an endorsement was made to the effect that the Municipality would withdraw the notice dated 29.08.1986 It is further his case that Respondent no. 1 also granted him a new licence under no. 11/4/93-ADMN/G-273 on 25.08.2006 to run the business of selling cigarettes, biddies, chocolates, etc., which was valid upto 31.03.2008. It is further his contention that the Respondent no. 1 by letter dated 02.12.2008, asked the Petitioner to produce the NOC from the Deputy Director of Fire and Emergency Services. As the reply filed by the Petitioner was not satisfactory, the Respondent no. 1 by its Order dated 31.12.2008, directed the Petitioner to stop the sale of kerosene on the gada and remove the extensions/projections and maintain the original size within a specific period. The said Order was challenged by preferring an Appeal under Section 184 of the Goa Municipalities Act, 1968, before the Administrative Tribunal which was returned as having no jurisdiction. An Appeal was thereafter preferred before the Director of Municipal Administration which was dismissed on 17.02.2009 as not maintainable. The said Order was challenged by preferring an Appeal under Section 184 of the Goa Municipalities Act, 1968, before the Administrative Tribunal which was returned as having no jurisdiction. An Appeal was thereafter preferred before the Director of Municipal Administration which was dismissed on 17.02.2009 as not maintainable. Thereafter, an Appeal was preferred before the Administrative Tribunal which also came to be rejected by the impugned Order. 5. Shri P. P. Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, has pointed out that in terms of Section 293 of the Municipalities Act, (for short "the Act"), in cases in which an Order passed by the Chief officer is unlawful, an Appeal is competent before the said authorities. Learned Counsel further pointed out that the authorities below have relied upon the Judgment of the Apex Court to come to the conclusion that the Appeal was not maintainable which was out of the context and not applicable to the facts of the present case. Learned Counsel has taken me through the provisions of Section 293 of the Act and pointed out that on plain reading of the said provisions, an Order which according to the Petitioner is unlawful, can be challenged before such authorities. The learned Counsel in support of his submissions has relied upon the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 2005(2) ALL MR 769, in the case of Syed Kasim Syed Rustam vs. Addl. Commissioner, Amravati Division, Amravati & Ors., wherein in similar circumstances, this Court has come to the conclusion that such Appeal was maintainable, Learned Counsel further pointed out that the impugned Order passed by the Chief Officer is without considering the material on record as, according to him, there was sufficient evidence produced by the Petitioner to the effect that activity in the disputed premises was lawful. 6. Shri Padiyar, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent no. 1, disputes that the activities which have been carried out by the Petitioner are lawful. Learned Counsel further pointed out that the Chief Officer was justified to pass the impugned Order. Learned Counsel further pointed out that in terms of Section 293 of the said Act, the Appeals preferred by the Petitioner are not maintainable. 7. I have considered the submissions of the learned Counsel. I have also gone through the records. Learned Counsel further pointed out that the Chief Officer was justified to pass the impugned Order. Learned Counsel further pointed out that in terms of Section 293 of the said Act, the Appeals preferred by the Petitioner are not maintainable. 7. I have considered the submissions of the learned Counsel. I have also gone through the records. Section 293 of the Act reads thus: "Powers to suspend execution or orders and resolutions of Council on certain grounds.- (1) [If on the receipt of an application of any person or on his own motion, the Director is of opinion that], the execution of any order or resolution of a Council, or the doing of anything which is about to be done or is being done by or on behalf of a Council, is causing or is likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public or is against public interest or to lead to a breach of the peace or is unlawful, he may by order in writing under his signature suspend the execution or prohibit the doing thereof. [(2) Any person aggrieved by the above said order of the Director, may within a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the order of the Director by him, appeal to the Administrative Tribunal and the order passed by the Administrative Tribunal shall be final: Provided that no order shall be passed under sub-section (1) by the Director or under subsection (2) by Administrative Tribunal in appeal against any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.]" 8. On plain reading of the said provisions, in specific situations which are in the alternative, an appeal can be filed before a competent authority. In the present case, the authorities below were not justified to hold that the situations therein included a situation where an order is unlawful, only in context of public interest. In the said provision each of the situations is to be read independently to ascertain whether an appeal was maintainable. The view taken by me has been supported by the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Syed Kasim Syed Rustam vs. Addl. Commissioner, Amravati Division, Amravati & Ors., wherein at Paras 13 and 14, the Division Bench has observed thus: "13. The view taken by me has been supported by the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Syed Kasim Syed Rustam vs. Addl. Commissioner, Amravati Division, Amravati & Ors., wherein at Paras 13 and 14, the Division Bench has observed thus: "13. It is, therefore, evident that the Collector, before exercising powers under section 308(1) of the Act is required to take into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case involved and after due consideration is required to form the opinion that the execution of any order or resolution of the Municipal Council is causing or is likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public or is against the public interest or results in breach of peace or is unlawful and if his opinion is in affirmative then he is entitled to suspend the execution of such resolution or can prohibit the doing thereof irrespective of the fact that resolution or order of the Municipal Council, is in respect of appointment or termination of the teacher in the Municipal Council. 14. In the present case, the petitioner is appointed on the post as Assistant Teacher in the Primary School vide resolution dated 17-9-1986 passed by the Municipal Council to which there was no prior approval or sanction accorded by the R.D.M.A. as required under section 76(1) of the Act which was also condition of appointment mentioned in the resolution itself and therefore, the appointment of the petitioner was undoubtedly illegal or unlawful and therefore, in our considered view, the Collector was competent to suspend the resolution dated 17-9-1986 passed by the Municipal Council. It is no doubt true that provisions of section 308(1) of the Act does not empower the Collector to set aside the resolution but he is entitled only to suspend the same and therefore, the Additional Commissioner was justified in modifying the order of the Collector to that extent vide order dated 29-6-1991. The order of the Additional Commissioner for the same reasons, in our view, is just and proper and sustainable in law, consequently, rendering the order of termination dated 20-7-1991 passed by the Municipal Council also sustainable in law." 9. The order of the Additional Commissioner for the same reasons, in our view, is just and proper and sustainable in law, consequently, rendering the order of termination dated 20-7-1991 passed by the Municipal Council also sustainable in law." 9. The Judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by the authorities is not applicable to the facts of the present case as the question therein was to ascertain whether the Housing Board was a local authority within the provision of the local Act. This is not the consideration in the present case and in view of the clear provisions of Section 293 of the Act, the Tribunal was not justified to come to the conclusion that the Appeals were not maintainable. Considering the view proposed to be taken by me, I have not considered the merits of the rival contentions. 10. In view of the above, I pass the following: ORDER (i) The impugned Orders dated 17.02.2009 passed by the Urban Development Authorities and the Administrative Tribunal dated 17.01.2012 are quashed and set aside. Municipal Appeal no. 1/2009, is restored to the file of the Urban Development Authority. (ii) The Authority is directed to dispose of the said Appeal in the light of the observations made herein above upon hearing the parties in herein above, in accordance with law. (iii) All contentions of the parties are left open. (iv) Rule is made absolute in the above terms. (v) Petition stands disposed of. Ordered accordingly.