M. Sirajulla khan v. Karnataka State Board of Wakfs
2013-11-14
A.S.BOPANNA
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
Order 1. The petitioners are before this Court assailing the letter dated 19.06.2013 impugned at Annexure-G to the petition. They are also seeking that respondents No 1 and 2 be directed to conduct the election to the institution as per the available list of members as at Annexure-K to the petition. 2. The brief facts are that the petitioners claim to be life members of the Muslim Orphanage which is a Wakf Institution. The said Orphanage is guided by the scheme of management (Constitution of the Orphanage) which is the bye-law for governing its affairs. After the expiry of term of its earlier elected executive committee, the first respondent by the order dated 13.10.2010 invoking Section 65(1) of the Wakf Act, 1995, has assumed direct management of the institution and the affairs were being discharged by the Administrator who had been appointed by the said order. Subsequently, the Administrator was replaced. When elections were to be held to elect the Executive Committee by appointment of an Election Officer as ordered by this Court in W.P.No.3425/2013 and W.P.No.5806/2013 disposed of on 30.05.2013, the issue relating to the membership list that was to be operated for the said election has become the bone of contention. 3. In that regard, the Administrator by his communication dated 11.06.2013 addressed to the first respondent had broached this issue. The first respondent by its reply dated 19.06.2013 impugned at Annexure-G herein has permitted the Administrator to enroll members to the Muslim Orphanage with further instructions in that regard. The petitioners claiming to be aggrieved by the said communication are before this Court assailing such action whereby the Administrator is permitted to enroll the members which according to them is contrary to law and also is against the procedure as contemplated under Clause 7 of the Constitution of the Orphanage which regulates the procedure for enrollment of a member. It is in that regard contended that only the elected Executive Committee can enroll members and it is beyond the competence of an Administrator. Since according to the petitioners the list as at Annexure-K is the membership list which existed earlier to appointment of Administrator, the election should be held in terms of the same is the contention of the petitioners. 4.
Since according to the petitioners the list as at Annexure-K is the membership list which existed earlier to appointment of Administrator, the election should be held in terms of the same is the contention of the petitioners. 4. The private respondents herein who also claim to have interest in the Muslim Orphanage and who desire that the fresh members also be enrolled and the election be held in terms of the membership list that would be drawn thereafter have got themselves impleaded to these petitions. Apart from questioning the locus of the petitioners to challenge the impugned communication, it is contended that the list of members as relied on by the petitioners cannot be considered to be authentic. Though Clause 7 of the Constitution of the Orphanage is referred to, it is contended that since the Orphanage is under the direct management of the first respondent, the powers of the Executive Committee can be exercised by the Board through the Administrator. Respondents No. 3, 4 and 5 and other persons had submitted applications dated 20.07.2013 to the Executive Officer for enrollment as members, but the second respondent has not considered the same, The fourth respondent contends to be a life member but ever since his enrolment as a life member on 10.06.2009, he has not received any notice or intimation of the General Body Meeting. It is averred that the earlier Executive Committee was elected on 23.06.2007 and its term of three years expired on 22.06.2010, as such the vacancy in the management arose on 23.06.2010. Accordingly, the first respondent assumed direct management on 13.10.2010. Since the said order is not under challenge, the petitioners cannot make out any grievance at this juncture. It is only at the stage when the election was to be held after enrollment of members as permitted by the first respondent, the petitioners are before this Court and being ex-executive committee members they have vested interest in seeking to operate only the existing list of members. It is therefore contended that the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. 5. Heard Sri Padmanabha Mahale, learned senior counsel along with Sri Naveed Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms. S.R.Anuradha, learned counsel for respondents Mo. 1 and 2, Sri Mohmood Patel, learned counsel for respondents No. 3 to 6 and perused the petition papers. 6.
It is therefore contended that the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. 5. Heard Sri Padmanabha Mahale, learned senior counsel along with Sri Naveed Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms. S.R.Anuradha, learned counsel for respondents Mo. 1 and 2, Sri Mohmood Patel, learned counsel for respondents No. 3 to 6 and perused the petition papers. 6. Though the petitioners as well as the private respondents have referred to certain factual aspects of the matter making allegations against each other, those aspects need not be adverted to in detail. That is due to the fact that what is assailed in the instant petitions is the communication dated 19.06.2013 (Annexure-G) whereby the Administrator/ Election Officer has been permitted by the first respondent to enroll members to the Muslim Orphanage before holding the election. The legality of such permission being accorded to the Administrator/ Election Officer by the first respondent is to be considered. 7. The issue therefore is as to (i) Whether an Administrator/ Election Officer is entitled to in law to enroll members to a Wakf Institution in the absence of consideration of such application by the Executive Committee of the Institution? (ii) Whether the position would be any different when an Administrator/Election Officer is appointed by the Board on assuming direct management in exercise of power under Section 65 (1) of the Wakf Act unlike in the case of supersession? 8. On the legal aspect relating to the said proposition, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Shantharaj and Another -vs- M.L. Nagaraj and Others reported in (1997) 6 SCC 37 ; in the case of Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Kerala -vs- T.A. Kuttappan and Others reported in AIR 2000 SC 2378 and on the decision of a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of Maharudrappa Sirse -vs- State of Karnataka and Others reported in 1999 (4) Kar.L.J. 346 (DB). 9. In the above cited decisions, the provisions contained in the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959, Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960, had arisen for consideration.
9. In the above cited decisions, the provisions contained in the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959, Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960, had arisen for consideration. While examining the provisions contained therein, the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court is that when the elected governing body/ committee of management is superseded and an Administrator is in-charge of the affairs of the Society and when the election to form a new governing body is to be held, the Administrator/ Election Officer or Special Officer has no power to enroll new members and conduct the election by including them, but would have to conduct the election with the members as on the existing Rolls. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents, more particularly the learned counsel for the first respondent seeks to distinguish the above cited decisions by referring to the text of the discussion made by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of K. Shantharaj -vs- M.L. Nagaraj and Others (ILR 1997 Kar 2797) which was thereafter upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision cited supra by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners. In that context, it is contended that the Hon'ble Division Bench has referred to the different nature of power to be exercised under Sections 30 and 30A of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act and the decision rendered therein is in the context of the limited power of the Administrator appointed under Section 30 of that Act after supersession of the elected committee. It is contended that a distinction has been made about the wider powers of the Special Officer under Section 30A of that Act. In that view, it is contended that the said decisions would be applicable only to a circumstance when the elected Executive Committee is superseded and an Administrator is appointed. In such situation, only the functions of the Committee can be performed but the powers of the Committee cannot be exercised, whereas in other cases, the powers of the Committee can be exercised which included enrolment of members. It is therefore contended that if the existing Committee was superseded under Section 67 of the Wakf Act and Administrator was appointed, he could not have exercised the powers of the Committee.
It is therefore contended that if the existing Committee was superseded under Section 67 of the Wakf Act and Administrator was appointed, he could not have exercised the powers of the Committee. In the instant case, the term of the Committee had expired on 22.06.2010 and since new Committee had not been constituted, the Board assumed direct management of the Wakf Institution and an Administrator was appointed by the order dated 13.10.2010. Such direct management would entitle exercise of all powers, more particularly keeping in view Section 32(2)(0) of the Wakf Act, Hence, when the Wakf institution was under the direct management, permission accorded by the Board through the impugned communication dated 19.06.2013 to enroll the member is justified and does not call for interference, is the contention. 11. Having noticed the rival contentions, the attempt made by the learned counsel for the first respondent-Board to draw a distinction between the power under Section 30 and 30A of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act and import the same for the present consideration is a futile one as I am unable to persuade myself to accept such contention. That is due to the reason that even though the Hon'ble Division Bench in the case of K. Shantharaj (supra) had drawn such distinction, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while upholding the decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench has once again extracted both the said provisions in Section 30 and 30A of that Act in para-4 of its order and concluded in para-5 as follows: ''5. It would be clear from the language of these provisions that the Administrator or Special Officer, subject to control of any of the functions of the society and in the interest of the society can take such action as is necessary for proper functioning of the society as per law. He should conduct elections as is enjoined thereunder. In other words, he is to conduct election with the members as on the rolls and by necessary implication, he is not vested with power to enroll new members of the society. (emphasis supplied) In fact the above position has been re-emphasised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of T.A. Kuttappan (supra) after referring to the decision in K. Shantharafs case, which would indicate that the power of Special Officer under Section 30A is not different from that of an Administrator to draw a distinction on that aspect. 12.
(emphasis supplied) In fact the above position has been re-emphasised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of T.A. Kuttappan (supra) after referring to the decision in K. Shantharafs case, which would indicate that the power of Special Officer under Section 30A is not different from that of an Administrator to draw a distinction on that aspect. 12. Though the above distinction sought to be made is not available to the respondents, the further consideration is as to whether the power exercised tinder Section 65 (1) of the Wakf Act would provide the right either to the Board or the Administrator appointed by it in exercise of that provision to enable the enrolment of new members since it is stated to be direct management. Insofar as the provision contained in the Constitution of the Orphanage relating to enrolment of members, there is no dispute. Clause 7(4) provides that the applicant shall be admitted to the membership of the orphanage only after the approval of the Executive Committee, while Sub-clause (5) to Clause 7 provides that the Executive Committee may reject any application seeking membership for sound and valid reasons. In that light, in order to examine as to whether even such power would vest with the Board or the Administrator in absolute terms on assumption of direct management under Section 65(1), it would be appropriate to extract the provision contained in Section 65 of Wakf Act "65. Assumption of direct management of certain wakfs by the Board.-(1) where no suitable person is available for appointment as a mutawalli of a wakf, or where the Board is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that the filling up of the vacancy in the office of a mutawalli is prejudicial to the interests of the wakf, the Board may, by notification in the official Gazette, assume direct management of the Wakf for such period or periods, not exceeding five years in the aggregate, as may be specified in the notification.
(2) xxxxxxxx (3) As soon as possible after the close of every financial year, the Board shall send to the State Government a detailed report in regard to every wakf under its direct management, giving therein- (a) x x x x x x x (b) x x x x x x x (c) the period during which the wakf has been under the direct management of the Board and explaining the reasons as to why it has not been possible to entrust the management of the wakf to the mutawalli or any committee of management during the year; (d) XX. XX'A XX (4) The State Government shall examine the report submitted to it under sub-section (3), and after such examination issue such directions or instructions to the Board as it may think fit and the Board shall comply with such directions or instructions on receipt thereof." 13. The perusal of the provision would indicate that direct management is assumed in the circumstance stated therein and it is subject to a time frame and also a duty is cast on the Board to explain to the Government as to why it has not been possible to entrust the management to the mutawalli or any Committee of management. Therefore, though direct management is assumed by the Board, it is only an interim arrangement pending appointment of mutawalli or Committee. Hence, merely because such power is assumed after the elected Committee serving its full term, it is not of much relevance. What is also to be noticed is that the Board vide Section 18 of the Wakf Act has the power of appointing Committees. Such Committee can be constituted under Section 18 after assumption of direct management as held in the case of Managing Committee, Masjid-E-Idgah, Mysore and Another -vs- State of Karnataka and Others (1997 (4) Kar L.J. 599A). Instead of appointing a Committee, on assuming direct management, the Board by its order dated 13.10.2010 has appointed the Administrator. The order reads as hereunder: "Order No.KTW/CMC/2/BNU/2007-08 dated 13.10.2010 In view of the facts narrated in the preamble to this order and in exercise of the powers conferred Under Section 65 (1) of the Wakf Act, 1995, it is hereby decided by the Administrator, Karnataka State Board of Wakfs, Bangalore, for the assumption of direct management of the Wakf Institution viz., Muslim Orphanage, Bangalore, with immediate effect.
Janab Mohammed Salahuddin, KAS., Managing Director, Karnataka Minority Development Corporation, Bangalore, is appointed as Administrator on behalf of the Karnataka State Board of Wakfs to discharge the duties of the Managing Committee of the Muslim Orphanage, Bangalore, for a period of six months or until further orders, whichever is earlier." (emphasis supplied) 14, The order would indicate that the Administrator has been appointed only to discharge the duties of the Managing Committee of the Muslim Orphanage, Bangalore, and not to exercise the powers of the Board. Though it states that the Administrator shall act as per the directions issued by the Board from time to time, the power of enrolment of members could not be exercised in such a casual manner by issue of communication as has been presently done. It would have been a different issue if the Board on assuming direct management had appointed a committee under Section 18 of the Wakf Act for the purpose of delegation of its powers of Management in favour of such Committee, which becomes a mutawalli as held in the case of Masjid-E-Idyah (supra). On the other hand, when only an Administrator is appointed, he cannot enroll members even if he is authorised by the Board. 15. In addition, in the present facts, what is also to be noticed is that when the elections had not been held to constitute the managing committee, the petitioners herein were before this Court in an earlier petition in W.P.Nos.3425 and 5806/2013 (GM-WAKF). This Court disposed of the said petitions by its order dated 30.05.2013 directing the Board to appoint another Election Officer and to complete the election process within three months from the date of his appointment. Pursuant thereto, the election process was commenced and it is thereafter on 19.06.2013, the impugned communication was issued permitting the Administrator to enroll members. The position as it existed should have been continued arid the election should have been concluded. What is also to be noticed in the instant case is that as on 13.10.2010 when the Administrator was appointed, the first respondent itself was under the management of the Administrator. 16.
The position as it existed should have been continued arid the election should have been concluded. What is also to be noticed in the instant case is that as on 13.10.2010 when the Administrator was appointed, the first respondent itself was under the management of the Administrator. 16. If all the above aspects are kept in perspective, I am of the opinion that merely because the direct management of the Wakf had been assumed under Section 65 (!) of the Wakf Act, the communication dated 19.06.2013 permitting the Administrator to enroll members to the Muslim Orphanage is not justified. The election was therefore to be conducted as per the existing list of members. However, the validity and correctness of the list relied on by the petitioners as at Annexure-K shall not be understood to have been certified by this Court. It is for the Administrator to have relied on the appropriate list, the correctness or validity of the same would be open for consideration in the appropriate proceedings, if the election is questioned on the ground of incorrect members list being operated. In that view, it would be open for the Election Officer to declare the results of the elections which was held in terms of the order dated 11.09.2013. 17. In the result, I pass the following : ORDER i) W.F.Nos.31170-31171/2013 (GM-WAKF) are allowed in the above terms. ii) The impugned communication dated 19.06.2013 (Annexure-G) stands quashed. iii) The result of the election held shall be declared and the Executive Committee shall be constituted. iv) Parties to bear theirown costs.