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2013 DIGILAW 131 (BOM)

Rockwood Hotels & Resorts Limited v. Starwood Asia Pacific Hotels and Resorts Pvt. Limited

2013-01-17

R.D.DHANUKA

body2013
Judgment : 1. By this petition filed under section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, the petitioner seeks stay of the, implementation and or operation of the termination notice dated 17th December, 2012, issued by the respondent to the petitioner purporting to terminate hotel agreements and seeks injunction restraining the respondents from assigning in any manner acting on the basis or in furtherance of or taking any steps pursuant to the purported termination and termination notice dated 17th December, 2012. 2. Dr. Tulzapurkar, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents raises a preliminary objection in respect of the maintainability of this petition in this court. Both the parties through their respective learned senior counsel addressed this court on the issue of jurisdiction. 3. Some of the relevant facts for the purpose of deciding the issue jurisdiction of this court are set out as under: (a) The Petitioner is carrying on business and has its registered office at Mumbai. The respondent is a company incorporated under the laws of Singapore and has its registered branch office in India at Haryana. The respondent carries on business of operating hotels under brand “Shereton” in India and elsewhere and amongst other properties, it is operating hotels under the operating service agreement dated 25th June, 2010 executed between the parties as amended by the first amendment to the operating service agreement. Both the parties simultaneously entered into centralized service agreement dated 25th June, 2010 and the system Licence and Technical Assistance Agreement dated 25th June, 2010. Vide its letter dated 17th December, 2012, the respondent issued notice to the petitioner that the operating service agreement and allied agreements shall be terminated with effect from 11.59 PM on 17th January, 2013. The Petitioner vide its letter dated 14th January, 2013 replied to the said notice issued by the respondent and denied the allegations made in the notice issued by the petitioner. The Petitioners therefore filed the present proceedings for seeking interim measures under section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. 4. Dr. The Petitioner vide its letter dated 14th January, 2013 replied to the said notice issued by the respondent and denied the allegations made in the notice issued by the petitioner. The Petitioners therefore filed the present proceedings for seeking interim measures under section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. 4. Dr. Tulzapurkar, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents submits that both the parties have agreed under the operating service agreement dated 25th June, 2010 that all the controversies, disputes or claims between them shall be resolved in connection with the said agreement by submitting to the final and binding arbitration which shall be administered by Singapore International Arbitration Centre (hereinafter referred to as SIAC) in accordance with its arbitration rules for the time being in force. The learned senior counsel placed reliance on clauses 17.1.1 to 17.1.2 of the said agreement which are set out as under: “17.1.1 : Arbitration Required : The Parties agree for themselves and each of their respective Parent Companies, Equity Owners and Guarantors, and each of their respective Affiliates, and each of the shareholders, trustees, beneficiaries, directors, officers, employees or agents of any of the foregoing, that any and all controversies, disputes, or claims arising from or relating to or in connection with this agreement (including any question regarding its existence, validity or termination or the performance or non-performance of any obligations set forth herein or the relationship of the Parties hereunder) shall be subject to, and resolved in accordance with, this Article 17. (For the purpose of this Article 17, the term “Party” shall refer to each of the Persons referenced in this Section 17.1.1.). 17.1.2 : Arbitration Proceedings : Any and all controversies, disputes or claims between the Parties arising from or relating to or in connection with this Agreement shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration upon demand by a Party by providing written notice to the other party (“Arbitration Notice”). The arbitration shall be administered by the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC”) in accordance with its arbitration rules for the time being in force (the “Arbitration Rules”) (if the SIAC no longer exists, the Parties shall agree on a substitute arbitration administrator within 30 days of the Arbitration Notice, failing which the arbitration shall proceed as an ad-hoc arbitration). The arbitration shall be administered by the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC”) in accordance with its arbitration rules for the time being in force (the “Arbitration Rules”) (if the SIAC no longer exists, the Parties shall agree on a substitute arbitration administrator within 30 days of the Arbitration Notice, failing which the arbitration shall proceed as an ad-hoc arbitration). A panel of three arbitrators shall be selected (the “Arbitral Tribunal”) where each party shall nominate one arbitrator and the two party nominated arbitrators shall mutually agree and appoint the thir arbitrator, who shall be the Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal. Each of the three arbitrators shall have at least 10 years full time experience in the area of expertise on which the dispute is based (e.g. for matters involving contract interpretation and/or application of legal principles, expertise in the particular area of law; for operational matters, expertise in the hospitality industry and Operation of hotels in the same class as the Hotel; for accounting matters, expertise in hotel accounting for hotels in the same class as the Hotel). The seat of arbitration shall be Singapore. The arbitral proceedings are to be conducted in the English language and shall be conducted in Singapore and shall commence within 6 months after the notice of arbitration is provided from one Party to the other. In addition to and not in derogation of the powers conferred by any applicable law or of the Arbitration Rules, the arbitrators shall have the right to award any relief that they deem proper and consistent with the terms of this Agreement, including compensatory damages (with interest on unpaid amounts from date due), specific performance, injunctive relief, legal fees and costs. The awards and decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be conclusive and biding on all Parties, and not subject to appeal and judgment upon the award may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction. 5. Dr. Tulzapurkar, invited my attention to the arbitration rules of Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) Rules which have come into force on 1st July, 2010. The said rules provide that it shall apply to any arbitration which has commenced on or after 1st July, 2010 unless the parties have agreed otherwise. The learned counsel also invited my attention to Para 6 of the Petition which reads as under: “6. The said rules provide that it shall apply to any arbitration which has commenced on or after 1st July, 2010 unless the parties have agreed otherwise. The learned counsel also invited my attention to Para 6 of the Petition which reads as under: “6. It is in these circumstances that the Petitioner intends to refer the aforesaid disputes and differences which have arisen between the parties to arbitration under Section 17.1 of the said Agreement, if the Respondent does not withdraw the Termination Notice within a reasonable time. The petitioner states that it intends to claim inter alia some or all of the following reliefs in the intended arbitration. a) a declaration that the purported termination of the Hotel Agreements by the Respondent vide the Termination Notice dated 17th December, 2012 is bad in fact and in law. b) injunctions against the Respondent restraining it from in any manner acting upon the purported termination or exercising any of the rights of termination as provided under the Hotel agreements or preventing and/or obstructing the Petitioner from exercising its rights under the said Agreements; and c) continued and/or specific performance of the Hotel Agreements; and d) an order directing the respondent to pay damages for losses suffered by the Petitioner on account of the actions of the Respondent and deficiency in services on the part of the Respondent.” 6. The learned senior counsel submits that in view of the agreement arrived at between the parties, that all the controversies disputes or claims between the parties shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration which shall be administered by SIAC in accordance with its arbitration rules and in view of the statement made by the petitioner in Para 6 of the petition that petitioner intends to claim some of the reliefs set out therein in the intended arbitration and in view of SIAC rules providing remedy for interim and emergent reliefs, this petition filed under section 9 in this court is not maintainable, this court having no territorial jurisdiction to entertain such petition. It is submitted that Part I of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 does not apply. It is submitted that by virtue of agreement under clause 17.1.1 and 17.1.2 the arbitration proceedings would be administered only by Singapore International Arbitration Centre before the arbitrators who shall have seat of arbitration at Singapore. It is submitted that Part I of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 does not apply. It is submitted that by virtue of agreement under clause 17.1.1 and 17.1.2 the arbitration proceedings would be administered only by Singapore International Arbitration Centre before the arbitrators who shall have seat of arbitration at Singapore. The learned senior counsel submits that the notice of termination was issued by the respondents as far back as on 17th December, 2004 effective from 11.59 PM on 17th January, 2013, the petitioner replied to said notice on 14th January, 2013 and filed the present proceedings in this court on 14th January, 2013. If the petitioner was desirous to apply for reliefs urgently, the petitioner could have approached the forum under SIAC Rules for the same even prior to the constitution of the tribunal. 7. Dr Tulzapurkar, the learned senior counsel placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of Yograj Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Ssang Yong Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. (AIR 2011 SUPREME COURT 3517) and more particularly paragraphs 31 to 38 which read thus : “31. In order to appreciate the controversy that has arisen regarding the applicability of the provisions of Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to the proceedings being conducted by the Arbitrator in Singapore in accordance with the SIAC Rules, it would be necessary to look at the arbitration clause contained in the agreement entered into between the parties on 13th August, 2006. Clause 27 of the Agreement provides for arbitration and reads as follows: 27. Arbitration. 27.1 All disputes, differences arising out of or in connection with the Agreement shall be referred to arbitration. The arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in English in Singapore in accordance with the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) Rules as in force at the time of signing of this Agreement. The arbitration shall be final and binding. 27.2 The arbitration shall take place in Singapore and be conducted in English language. 27.3 None of the Party shall be entitled to suspend the performance of the Agreement merely by reason of a dispute and/or a dispute referred to arbitration. 32. Clause 28 of the Agreement describes the governing law and provides as follows: This agreement shall be subject to the laws of India. 27.3 None of the Party shall be entitled to suspend the performance of the Agreement merely by reason of a dispute and/or a dispute referred to arbitration. 32. Clause 28 of the Agreement describes the governing law and provides as follows: This agreement shall be subject to the laws of India. During the period of arbitration, the performance of this agreement shall be carried on without interruption and in accordance with its terms and provisions. 33. As will be seen from Clause 27.1, the arbitration proceedings are to be conducted in Singapore in accordance with the SIAC Rules as in force at the time of signing of the agreement. There is, therefore, no ambiguity that the procedural law with regard to the arbitration proceedings, is the SIAC Rules. 34. Clause 27.2 makes it clear that the seat of arbitration would be Singapore. 35. What we are, therefore, left with to consider is the question as to what would be the law on the basis whereof the arbitral proceedings were to be decided. In our view, Clause 28 of the Agreement provides the answer. As indicated hereinabove, Clause 28 indicates that the governing law of the agreement would be the law of India, i.e., the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The learned Counsel for the parties have quite correctly spelt out the distinction between the "proper law" of the contract and the "curial law" to determine the law which is to govern the arbitration itself. While the proper law is the law which governs the agreement itself, in the absence of any other stipulation in the arbitration clause as to which law would apply in respect of the arbitral proceedings, it is now well-settled that it is the law governing the contract which would also be the law applicable to the Arbitral Tribunal itself. Clause 27.1 makes it quite clear that the Curial law which regulates the procedure to be adopted in conducting the arbitration would be the SIAC Rules. There is, therefore, no ambiguity that the SIAC Rules would be the Curial law of the arbitration proceedings. It also happens that the parties had agreed to make Singapore the seat of arbitration. Clause 27.1 indicates that the arbitration proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the SIAC Rules. There is, therefore, no ambiguity that the SIAC Rules would be the Curial law of the arbitration proceedings. It also happens that the parties had agreed to make Singapore the seat of arbitration. Clause 27.1 indicates that the arbitration proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the SIAC Rules. The immediate question which, therefore, arises is whether in such a case the provisions of Section 2 (2), which indicates that Part I of the above Act would apply, where the place of arbitration is in India, would be a bar to the invocation of the provisions of Sections 34 and 37 of the Act, as far as the present arbitral proceedings, which are being conducted in Singapore, are concerned. 36. In Bhatia International (supra), wherein while considering the applicability of Part I of the 1996 Act to arbitral proceedings where the seat of arbitration was in India, this Court was of the view that Part I of the Act did not automatically exclude all foreign arbitral proceedings or awards, unless the parties specifically agreed to exclude the same. 37. As has been pointed out by the learned Single Judge in the order impugned, the decision in the aforesaid case would not have any application to the facts of this case, inasmuch as, the parties have categorically agreed that the arbitration proceedings, if any, would be governed by the SIAC Rules as the Curial law, which included Rule 32, which categorically provides as follows: Where the seat of arbitration is Singapore, the law of the arbitration under these Rules shall be the International Arbitration Act (Cap. 143A, 2002 Ed, Statutes of the Republic of Singapore) or its modification or reenactment thereof. 38. Having agreed to the above, it was no longer available to the Appellant to contend that the "proper law" of the agreement would apply to the arbitration proceedings. The decision in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A. (2002) 4 SCC 105 , which was applied subsequently in the case of Venture Global Engg. 38. Having agreed to the above, it was no longer available to the Appellant to contend that the "proper law" of the agreement would apply to the arbitration proceedings. The decision in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A. (2002) 4 SCC 105 , which was applied subsequently in the case of Venture Global Engg. v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd. (2008) 4 SCC 190 and Citation Infowares Ltd. v. Equinox Corporation (2009) 7 SCC 220 , would have no application once the parties agreed by virtue of Clause 27.1 of the Agreement that the arbitration proceedings would be conducted in Singapore, i.e., the seat of arbitration would be in Singapore, in accordance with the Singapore International Arbitration Centre Rules as in force at the time of signing of the Agreement. As noticed hereinabove, Rule 32 of the SIAC Rules provides that the law of arbitration would be the International Arbitration Act, 2002, where the seat of arbitration is in Singapore. Although, it was pointed out on behalf of the Appellant that in Rule 1.1 it had been stated that if any of the SIAC Rules was in conflict with the mandatory provision of the applicable law of the arbitration, from which the parties could not derogate, the said mandatory provision would prevail, such is not the case as far as the present proceedings are concerned. In the instant case, Section 2(2) of the 1996 Act, in fact, indicates that Part I would apply only in cases where the seat of arbitration is in India. This Court in Bhatia International (supra), while considering the said provision, held that in certain situations the provision of Part I of the aforesaid Act would apply even when the seat of arbitration was not in India. In the instant case, once the parties had specifically agreed that the arbitration proceedings would be conducted in accordance with the SIAC Rules, which includes Rule 32, the decision in Bhatia International and the subsequent decisions on the same lines, would no longer apply in the instant case where the parties had willingly agreed to be governed by the SIAC Rules.” 8. The learned senior counsel submits that clause in question before the Supreme Court in the case of Yograj Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) and the arbitration agreement recorded in clause 17.1.1 and 17.1.2 in the instant case are identical. The learned senior counsel submits that clause in question before the Supreme Court in the case of Yograj Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) and the arbitration agreement recorded in clause 17.1.1 and 17.1.2 in the instant case are identical. The learned counsel submits that after interpreting the arbitration agreement, the Supreme Court held that curial law which regulates the procedure to be adopted in conducting the arbitration would be the SIAC Rules. After considering the fact that both the parties have decided for seat of arbitration at Singapore, the Supreme Court held that Part I would apply only for the cases where seat of arbitration is in India. The Supreme Court held that once the parties have specifically agreed that the arbitration proceedings would be conducted in accordance with SIAC Rules which includes rule 32 which provides that the seat of arbitration was Singapore, the decision in the case of Bhatia International Vs. Bulk Trading S.A.( (2002) 4 SCC 105 )and the subsequent decisions on the same line would no longer apply in the instant case where the parties had willingly agreed to be governed by the SIAC Rules. Under Clause 28 of the agreement in question before the Supreme Court in the case of Yograj Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) it was provided that the said agreement shall be subject to laws of India and during the period of arbitration, performance of that agreement shall be carried on without interruption and in accordance with its terms and provisions. Considering that clause, the Supreme Court held that Clause 28 indicates that the governing law of the agreement shall be law of India i.e. Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. It is held that while the proper law is the law which governs the agreement itself in the absence of any other stipulation in the arbitration clause as to which law would apply in respect of the arbitral proceedings, The Supreme Court interpreted clause 27.1 which provided that the disputes will be governed by and conducted in English in Singapore in accordance with Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) Rules. 9. 9. The learned counsel then submits that as both the parties have agreed expressly that the disputes shall be resolved in accordance with SIAC Rules and the seat of arbitration shall be at Singapore, by virtue of said provision, the parties have excluded applicability of Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and thus this proceedings are not maintainable in this court and are without jurisdiction. 10. The learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the petitioner responded to this submission made by Dr. Tulzapurkar and placed reliance on clause 17.1.3 of the agreement which reads thus: “17.1.3 : Arbitration Not Required for Certain Disputes : Notwithstanding anything to the contrary to this Article 17, the Parties shall have the right to pursue litigation or other legal proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction (a) with respect to any claims relating to the preservation or protection of service Provider's Proprietary Rights, (b) for any interim, provisional or conservatory measures, such as preliminary injunctive relief and temporary restraining order against conduct or threatened conduct which might cause irreparable harm to a Party, and © to enforce any arbitral award or court judgment rendered in favour of a Party. Any dispute regarding the validity of any arbitral award, shall be determined in accordance with the laws of Singapore, and shall be governed exclusively by the courts of Singapore.” 11. The learned Advocate General placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhatia International (supra) and more particularly paragraphs 33 and 34 which read thus : “33. Faced with this situation Mr. Sen submits that, in this case the parties had agreed that the arbitration be as per the rules of ICC. He submits that thus by necessary implication Section 9 would not apply. In our view in such cases the question would be whether Section 9 gets excluded by the ICC Rules of Arbitration. Article 23 of ICC Rules reads as follows: "Conservatory and Interim Measures 1. Unless the parties have otherwise agreed, as soon as the file has been transmitted to it, the Arbitral Tribunal may, at the request of a party, order any interim or conservatory measure it deems appropriate. The Arbitral Tribunal may make the granting of any such measure subject to appropriate security being furnished by the requesting party. Unless the parties have otherwise agreed, as soon as the file has been transmitted to it, the Arbitral Tribunal may, at the request of a party, order any interim or conservatory measure it deems appropriate. The Arbitral Tribunal may make the granting of any such measure subject to appropriate security being furnished by the requesting party. Any such measure shall take the form of an order, giving reasons, or of an Award, as the Arbitral Tribunal considers appropriate. 2. Before the file is transmitted to the Arbitral Tribunal, and in appropriate circumstances even thereafter, the parties may apply to any competent judicial authority for interim or conservatory measures. The application of a party to a judicial authority for such measures or for the implementation of any such measures ordered by an Arbitral Tribunal shall not be deemed to be an infringement or a waiver of the arbitration agreement and shall not affect the relevant powers reserved to the Arbitral Tribunal. Any such application and any measures taken by the judicial authority must be notified without delay to the Secretariat. The Secretariat shall inform the Arbitral Tribunal thereof." 34. Thus Article 23 of the ICC rules permits parties to apply to a competent judicial authority for interim and conservatory measures. Therefore, in such cases an application can be made under Section 9 of the said Act.” 12. The learned Advocate General placed reliance upon the judgment of Kerala High Court in the case of Paragraph Steels Pvt. Ltd. Vs. European Metal Recycling Ltd and Anr.(AIR 2006 Kerala 303)and more particularly paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 which read thus : “5. We find it unnecessary to express any final opinion on the various contentions raised since the disputes have to be finally resolved through arbitration as provided under Ext. Al contract. We may however refer to the essential facts for examining the various issues raised before us by the parties. Petitioner is a company incorporated under the laws of United Kingdom and carries on the business of export of steel scrap and other metals. Respondent is a private limited company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. Petitioner has entered into sale contract bearing No 3283/05 dated 21.9.2005 with the first respondent for sale of 27,000 metric tons shredded steel scrap at a price which was fixed as per Ext. Al contract. Respondent is a private limited company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. Petitioner has entered into sale contract bearing No 3283/05 dated 21.9.2005 with the first respondent for sale of 27,000 metric tons shredded steel scrap at a price which was fixed as per Ext. Al contract. Time for delivery has also been stated in the contract, so also the terms of payment. The contract has used the expression "we have sold" and the quantity mentioned is 27,000 metric tons of stredded steel scrap. Price is also fixed as US $ 285.75 PMT C.I.F.F.O, Cochin. Provision for arbitration is also provided in the contract, which reads as follows: All disputes, controversy, which may arise between buyer/seller under this contract, should be settled under the Rules of Indian Law. The rules of arbitration shall follow those laid down by the International Chamber of Commerce whose arbitration procedures and arbitrators both parties accept. This method is to be adopted only after all reasonable efforts to settle amicably have failed. The place of arbitration shall be London. Ext. Al contract has fixed the quantity, price, description etc. and also the factum of sale. Terms of payment specified in Ext. Al is that payment by irrevocable letter of credit to be operative at the hands of the seller latest by 7.5.2005. Ext.A2 would indicate that first respondent company had written a letter to the petitioner for extending the time for opening letter of credit. Ext. A3 letter dated 26.10.2005 sent by the petitioner to the first respondent would indicate that they have fixed the vessel MV George Lyres to perform the transaction. Request was also made to expedite the opening of letter of credit. Ext. A4 is another letter addressed to the first respondent informing them that they have failed to open the letter of credit even within the extended period. Further extension was also granted. Exts. A5 and A6 are true copies of fax messages sent by the solicitors of the petitioner to the first respondent requesting them to perform the contract. On going through the above documents as well as Ext. Al contract, we are in agreement with the court below that first respondent has failed to perform the terms of the contract though we are not expressing any final opinion on the matter since the matter has to be finally adjudicated by an Arbitral Tribunal. 6. On going through the above documents as well as Ext. Al contract, we are in agreement with the court below that first respondent has failed to perform the terms of the contract though we are not expressing any final opinion on the matter since the matter has to be finally adjudicated by an Arbitral Tribunal. 6. We may now examine as to whether petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is maintainable. For easy reference, we may quote Section 9. 9. Interim measures, etc. by Court A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with " Section 36, apply to a court: (i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or a person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or (ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely: (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorising any samples to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence. (d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient; and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it. True ICC Rules of Arbitration also give conservatory and interim measures. Rule 23 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration, which is relevant for the purpose of this case, is extracted below for easy reference. Article 23. Conservatory and Interim Measures. 1. True ICC Rules of Arbitration also give conservatory and interim measures. Rule 23 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration, which is relevant for the purpose of this case, is extracted below for easy reference. Article 23. Conservatory and Interim Measures. 1. Unless the parties have otherwise agreed, as soon as the file has been transmitted to it, the Arbitral Tribunal may make the granting of any such measure subject to appropriate security being furnished by the requesting party. Any such measure shall take the form of an order, giving reasons, or of an Award, as the Arbitral Tribunal considers appropriate. 2. Before the file is transmitted to the Arbitral Tribunal, and in appropriate circumstances even thereafter, the parties may apply to any competent judicial authority for interim or conservatory measures. The application of a party to a judicial authority for such measures or for the implementation of any such measures ordered by an Arbitral Tribunal shall not be deemed to be an infringement or a waiver of the arbitration agreement and shall not affect the relevant powers reserved to the Arbitral Tribunal. Any such application and any measures taken by the judicial authority must be notified without delay to the Secretariat. The Secretariat shall inform the Arbitral Tribunal thereof. 7. Article 4 of the ICC Rules deals with request for arbitration. Article 5 relates to answer to request: counterclaims. Article 6 relates to effect of the Arbitration Agreement and Article 7 relates to general provisions before the Arbitral Tribunal. Articles 13 to 23 refer to arbitral proceedings. Article 13 states that the Secretariat shall transmit the file to the Arbitral Tribunal as soon as it has been constituted and Article 23 states that as soon as the file has been transmitted to it, the Arbitral Tribunal may at the request of a party, order any interim or conservatory measure it deems appropriate. Sub-clause (2) of Article 23 states that before the file is transmitted to the Arbitral Tribunal and in appropriate circumstances even thereafter, the parties may apply to any competent judicial authority for interim or conservatory measures. Sub-clause (2) of Article 23 states that before the file is transmitted to the Arbitral Tribunal and in appropriate circumstances even thereafter, the parties may apply to any competent judicial authority for interim or conservatory measures. Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Article 23(2) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration, in our view, would enable a party to invoke the provisions of Section 9 as an interim measure till application is moved before the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the ICC Rules of Arbitration.” 13. The learned Advocate General placed reliance upon the judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Altreya Limited Vs. Dans Energy Pvt. Ltd. Delivered on 23rd December, 2011 in O.M.P. 819 of 2011 and I.A. 19638 of 2011 and more particularly paragraph Nos. 9, 10, 26.4 and 28 which read thus: “9. Clause 13.1 concerned the ‘Governing Law’ which reads as under: “13.1 This Agreement and all questions of its interpretation shall be construed in accordance with the laws of England, without regard to its principles of conflicts of laws.” 10. Clause 14 deal with ‘Dispute Resolution/Arbitration’ which reads as under: “14.1 Arbitration Procedure – Any dispute controversy, claims or disagreement of any kind whatsoever between or among the Parties in connection with or arising out of this Agreement or the breach, termination or invalidity or the execution or interpretation hereof (‘Dispute’) shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration. The arbitration proceedings shall be governed by the Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation of the International Chamber of Commerce by a panel of three arbitrators to be designated as per the said Rules. The parties commit to honour the arbitration award as soon as issued. This Agreement and the OMP No. 819/2011 Page 6 of 25 rights and obligations of the Parties shall remain in full force and effect pending the award in such arbitration proceeding, which award, if appropriate, shall determine whether and when any termination shall become effective. 14.2 Venue of Arbitration: The seat of the arbitration shall be Singapore or such other place as mutually agreed upon among the Parties. 14.3 14.3 Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal It is agreed that any dispute shall be referred to a panel of three Arbitrators as per the aforementioned rules (the ‘Tribunal’). 14.2 Venue of Arbitration: The seat of the arbitration shall be Singapore or such other place as mutually agreed upon among the Parties. 14.3 14.3 Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal It is agreed that any dispute shall be referred to a panel of three Arbitrators as per the aforementioned rules (the ‘Tribunal’). 14.4 The award shall be issued no later than the one hundred-eightieth (180th) day following the appointment of arbitrator or the last of them. The award shall be in writing, shall given reasons for the decisions reached by the Tribunal and shall be signed and dated by the arbitrator(s) and a copy of the award shall be contemporaneously delivered to each of the Parties. The Party against which an award assesses a monetary obligation or enters an injunctive or mandatory order shall pay that obligation or comply with that order on or before the thirtieth (30th) calendar day following the receipt of the final, signed award or by such other date as the award may provide. 14.5 Language of Arbitration The arbitration shall be conducted and the award rendered solely in the English language. 14.6 Award The award rendered by the Arbitrator shall be in writing and shall set out the reasons for his decision. The award shall include interest, which shall run from the date of any breach or violation of an Agreement, which shall be determined by the Tribunal in its Award. Interest shall continue to run from the date of award until the award is paid in full at the interest rates. 14.7 Confidentiality Except to the extent necessary for proceedings relating to enforcement of the arbitration agreement, the award or other, related rights of the Parties, the fact of the arbitration, the arbitration proceeding itself, all evidence, memorials or other documents exchanged or used in the arbitration and the arbitrators’ award shall be maintained in confidence by the Parties to the fullest extent permitted by Applicable Law and except as permitted by Clause 12 (Confidentiality) and save as required in order to enforce the arbitration agreement and/or any award made pursuant to this Agreement. 14.8 Injunctive Relief Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, the Parties shall have the right to approach any Court or competent jurisdiction at any point of time for suitable interim relief, including injunction. 14.9 Survival The provisions contained in this Clause 14 shall survive the termination of this Agreement.” 26.4. 14.8 Injunctive Relief Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, the Parties shall have the right to approach any Court or competent jurisdiction at any point of time for suitable interim relief, including injunction. 14.9 Survival The provisions contained in this Clause 14 shall survive the termination of this Agreement.” 26.4. As far as the decision in Yograj Infrastructure Limited is concerned, the question did not concern the applicability or interpretation of the ICC Rules. On the other hand, this was a case of clear exclusion of Indian laws by making explicit the applicability of the SIAC Rules. Again the agreement in that case contained no clause similar to Clause 14.8 of the Investment Agreement. 28. Turning to the present case, it is seen that the governing law in terms of Clause 13.1 is the law of England. The venue of the arbitration is Singapore. Under Clause 14.1 the arbitration proceedings are to be governed by the ICC Rules. The situation is, therefore, similar to that in Bhatia International where the governing law was the Swiss law, the seat of the arbitration was Paris and the ICC Rules governed the arbitration proceedings. There is no implied exclusion of Indian law inasmuch as Clause 14.8 states that “the parties shall have the right to approach any court or competent jurisdiction at any point of time for suitable interim relief, including injunction.” Consequently, this Court finds no difficulty in holding that in terms of ruling in Bhatia International the present petition under Section 9 of the Act would be maintainable. The objection raised by the Respondents as regards the maintainability of the petition is hereby rejected.” 14. The learned Advocate General also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Venture Global Engineering Vs. Satyam Computer Services Ltd. and another ((2008) 4 Supreme Court Cases 190)which has been subsequently followed by the Supreme Court and this High Court. The learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of this court in the case of Liverpool & London Steamship Protection and Indemnity Association Ltd. Vs. Arabian Tankers Co. Satyam Computer Services Ltd. and another ((2008) 4 Supreme Court Cases 190)which has been subsequently followed by the Supreme Court and this High Court. The learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of this court in the case of Liverpool & London Steamship Protection and Indemnity Association Ltd. Vs. Arabian Tankers Co. LLC & Ors.( 2003(3) Arb.L.R. 537 (Bombay)) in support of the plea that though in clause 17.1.1 and 17.1.2 the disputes between the parties would be governed and administered by SIAC Rules, under clause 17.1.3 this court would have jurisdiction to entertain the relief for interim measures under section 9 of the Act. The learned Advocate General submits that if there would not have been agreement as recorded under clause 17.1.3 permitting the party to apply for interim measures, in any court of competent jurisdiction, the objection of the respondent would have merits. It is submitted that the petitioner has already obtained leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent and this court being the court of competent jurisdiction, the present proceedings are rightly filed in this court having jurisdiction to grant interim measures. The learned Advocate General submits that by virtue of clause under 17.1.3 by express agreement, the parties have agreed that for the purpose of interim measures, the provisions of Part I would be applicable. It is submitted that thus parties would be governed by the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhatia International (supra). It is submitted that under clause 17.1.3 remedy of the petitioner to apply for interim measures is provided. The learned Advocate General made an attempt to distinguish the judgment of this court (R.D. Dhanuka,J.) delivered on 6th November, 2012 in the case of BG Strategic Advisors, LLC Vs. Arshiya International Ltd. in Arbitration Petition No. 740 of 2012. Para 18 of the said judgment is relevant which reads thus: “18. It is not in dispute that the parties by agreement have agreed that the agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of Florida without giving effect to that State’s principles of conflict of law. The parties have also agreed that the dispute will be submitted to binding arbitration which shall be administered by the National Arbitration Forum and initiated and conducted in accordance with the Forum’s Code of Procedure. The parties have also agreed that the dispute will be submitted to binding arbitration which shall be administered by the National Arbitration Forum and initiated and conducted in accordance with the Forum’s Code of Procedure. It has also been agreed that the arbitration will occur in West Palm Beach, Florida and arbitrator shall apply Florida substantive law andFederal substantive law where state law is preempted, the Federal Arbitration Act will also apply. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner has already invoked arbitration clause and filed statement of claim before National Forum of Arbitration at Florida in accordance with the agreement arrived at between the parties. In my view, there is no merit in the submission of learned senior counsel Mr. Chitale appearing on behalf of the petitioner that there is no express agreement between the parties excluding any of the provision of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 or that the said agreement does not contain any such provision excluding provision of Part I. On perusal of the judgment in case of Bhatia International (supra), which has been followed by the Supreme Court in several other judgments, it is clear that exclusion of all or any provisions contained in Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 can be express or implied. In view of the law declared in the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Bharat Alluminium Co. (supra) made applicable prospectively to all arbitration agreements executed after pronouncement of the said judgment, this case would be governed by the law laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Bhatia International (supra). In my view, considering the agreement entered into between the parties, it is clear that both the parties have agreed to follow the laws of Florida. The perusal of the agreement makes it clear that both parties had intended to exclude the provisions of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996. In my view, it is not necessary for parties to refer specific provisions of the Arbitration Act in the agreement which they want to exclude and make it inapplicable. Such exclusion can be implied from the provisions of the agreement between the parties. In my view, the parties having agreed that laws of Florida would apply, it is implied that the provisions of Part I will not apply. Such exclusion can be implied from the provisions of the agreement between the parties. In my view, the parties having agreed that laws of Florida would apply, it is implied that the provisions of Part I will not apply. In my view, the proceeding filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is thus not maintainable.” 15. In rejoinder Dr. Tulzapurkar submits that the clause under consideration of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhatia International (supra), Venture Global Engineering (supra), Paragaon Steels Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Liverpool & London Steamship (supra), are totally different. Dr. Tulzapurkar submits that clause considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Yograj Infrastructure (supra) are identical to clause 17.1.1 and 17.1.2 of the contract arrived at between the parties. Dr. Tulzapurkar submits that clause 17.1.3 gives option to the parties to approach any court of competent jurisdiction provided remedy of arbitration provided under clause 17.1.1 and 17.1.2 is not exercised by that party. However a party cannot invoke clause 17.1.1 and 17.1.2 for resolution of dispute and for interim measures under clause 17.1.3. It is submitted that clause 17.1.3 cannot be invoked for seeking interim reliefs in arbitration. It is submitted that interim relief is in aid of final relief which the petitioner could seek only under SIAC Rules by filing proceedings under those rules before the arbitrator appointed under those rules. 16. In my view as both the parties have agreed under clause 17.1.1 and 17.1.2 that the controversies, disputes or claims shall be administered by SIAC in accordance with the arbitration rules and the seat of arbitration shall be at Singapore, and thus Part I of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 is excluded expressly or in any event by implication. The Supreme Court in the case of Yograj Infrastructure (supra) has already dealt with the similar clause and has held that there is distinction between proper law of the contract and curial law to determine the law which has to govern the arbitration itself. It is held that while proper law is a law which governs the agreement itself in the absence of any other stipulation in the arbitration clause as to which law would apply in respect of the arbitration proceedings but it is law governing the contract which would also be the law applicable to the arbitration tribunal itself. It is held that while proper law is a law which governs the agreement itself in the absence of any other stipulation in the arbitration clause as to which law would apply in respect of the arbitration proceedings but it is law governing the contract which would also be the law applicable to the arbitration tribunal itself. Considering the identical clause, the Supreme Court took a view that curial law which regulates the procedure to be adopted in conducting the arbitration would the SIAC Rules and such rules would be curial law of the arbitration proceedings. Considering the identical clause, the Supreme Court took a view that the Judgment of Bhatia International (supra) would have no application to the parties in view of the agreement that arbitration proceedings would be conducted in Singapore in accordance with SIAC Rules. In my view, clauses considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Yograj Infrastructure (supra) are identical to the clauses in the question and in my view, this case is squarely covered by the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Yograj Infrastructure (supra). 17. On conjoint reading of clause 17.1.1, 17.1.2 and 17.1.3, it is clear that the remedy provided to the party under section 17.1.3 is by way of an option to approach the court of competent jurisdiction if a party does not exercise option to resolve dispute through arbitration under clause 17.1.1 and 17.1.2. In my view a party cannot be permitted to adopt remedy of resolution of dispute by arbitration for claiming substantive relief and to adopt alternate procedure for seeking interim relief which procedure is available by way of option for adjudication of dispute before court of competent jurisdiction. It is not in dispute that the petitioner intended to seek relief by adopting arbitration proceedings as is apparent from Paragraph 6 of the petition and since the said proceedings are to be governed by SIAC Rules and since Part I does not apply, section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 also therefore, cannot be resorted to. In my view, even for seeking interim relief by any of the parties hereto, the parties would be governed by SIAC Rules. 18. In my view, even for seeking interim relief by any of the parties hereto, the parties would be governed by SIAC Rules. 18. The next submission of the learned Advocate General is that this court shall grant ad interim relief for a short period to enable the petitioner to apply for interim relief under the provisions of SIAC rules for interim measures. Dr. Tulzapurkar, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent strongly opposes to this prayer being granted by this court. I am of the view that since this court has no jurisdiction to entertain, try and dispose of this petition, even request for ad interim order thus cannot be considered. If the petitioner desires to seek any urgent interim relief, in my view, there is adequate provisions under SIAC Rules for consideration of such urgent reliefs. I am thus, not inclined to accept this request made by the learned Advocate General. I, therefore, pass the following order: 19. Petition is rejected. There shall be no order as to costs.