Hon'ble , J.—This appeal under section 374(2) Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the accused appellants challenging the judgment dated 19th October, 2005 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Chhabra District Baran in Sessions Case No.34/2005, whereby they have been convicted and sentenced as under: Under Section 302/149 IPC - Life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.100/- each, in default of payment of fine to further undergo1 month S.I. Under Section 148 IPC - 2 years S.I. and a fine of Rs.100/- each, in default of payment of fine to further undergo 1 month S.I. Under Section 323/149 IPC - 1 year S.I. and a fine of Rs.100/- each, in default of payment of fine to further undergo 1 month S.I. 2. The instant criminal case was initiated on a report (Ex.P-1) lodged by one Madan Lal (PW-1) at police station Atru District Baran on 1.7.1992. It was alleged in the report that while he along with Bhagwati, Kalu Lal, Kailash Bai, Ramesh and Prakash Chand were collecting 'pharda', accused Ashok Pratap Singh came in a jeep along with 4-5 persons whose names were not known to him. Besides, a tractor belonging to Ashok Pratap Singh was being driven by Pramod, who was accompanied by Manoj and Jai Pratap, had also reached there. Manoj and Jai Pratap and one Choti @ Guddu were having fire arms. Ashok Pratap Singh was also armed with a single barrel gun and Kishore Gurjar was having a stick in his hand. Similarly, accused Chintaram Meena was having a stick. Soon after reaching the field, accused Ashok Pratap Singh abused the complainant and objected with regard to the use of the agricultural field. Thereafter, when the complainant and his companions were about to run, Ashok Pratap Singh used the fire arm which resulted in injury to Bhagwati Prasad. Consequently, hue and cry was raised and Kalulal, Kailashi Bai, Ramesh and Prakash Chand came to the complainant. In order to prevent the accused, Ramesh and Prakash started pelting stones on them. Thereafter, Ashok Pratap Singh fired with a gun on Kalulal. Similarly, Jai Pratap also fired with a gun at Kalu and Manoj fired at Ramesh. Prakash Chand sustained fire arm injury at the hands of Guddu. Kishan Lal and Chintaram had inflicted injuries to Kailashi Bai with lathi. Pramod had driven over the tractor on Kalulal. Thereafter, Ashok Pratap Singh fired with a gun on Kalulal. Similarly, Jai Pratap also fired with a gun at Kalu and Manoj fired at Ramesh. Prakash Chand sustained fire arm injury at the hands of Guddu. Kishan Lal and Chintaram had inflicted injuries to Kailashi Bai with lathi. Pramod had driven over the tractor on Kalulal. On hearing the hue and cry, the persons from the neighbouring fields, namely Amrit Lal Meena and others had come to rescue the complainant party. Thereafter, the assailants ran away with the tractor. Kalulal had died on the spot and was lying in the field. In the report, the witnesses, namely; Ramesh, Prakash Chand, Kailashi Bai, Bhagwati etc. were named. 3. On the aforesaid report, an FIR no.138/1992 came to be registered at police station Atru for the offences under sections 447, 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 323 and 324 IPC. Thereafter, the investigation commenced, during which the injured were got medically examined and the statements of the witnesses were recorded. The accused persons were then arrested. Naksha Mauka of the place of incident was prepared. Similarly, panchayat-nama, memos of seizure of blood stained mud, clothes, supardigi etc. were prepared. From the place of occurrence, fire arm used by the assailants i.e. one Topidar gun was recovered. On completion of investigation, challan came to be filed against accused Kishan, Jagannath, Ramcharan, Manoj Pratap Singh, Chintaram, Jai Pratap Singh @ Jai mama Jai Prakash Singh, Rajkumar Singh @ Kallu, Govind Prasad, Pramod Pratap Singh, Guddu @ Choti @ Krishna Kumar Singh and Sattar for the offences under sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 323 and 324 IPC. The learned Magistrate had thereafter committed the case to the court of Sessions, which came to be transferred to the court of Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Chhabra District Baran. 4. The trial commenced with framing of charge against the aforesaid accused persons for the offences under sections 147, 148, 302, 302/149, 307/149 and 323/149 IPC. The accused denied the charges and claimed for trial. The prosecution, in support of its case, had produced 35 witnesses and had also filed 66 documents which were collected during the course of investigation and the same were exhibited by the trial court. The statements of accused were then recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein they had stated that the prosecution case is a false one. The prosecution, in support of its case, had produced 35 witnesses and had also filed 66 documents which were collected during the course of investigation and the same were exhibited by the trial court. The statements of accused were then recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein they had stated that the prosecution case is a false one. In support of their case, the accused had produced one witness, namely; Dr. C.M.Agrawal (DW-1) and filed five documents. Learned trial court, on conclusion of the trial, passed the judgment on 19.10.2005 whereby out of a total of eleven persons, it had acquitted three persons, namely Jagannath, Ramcharan and Rajkumar Singh @ Kalu; four accused persons had died during the course of trial and four persons were convicted for the offences as afore-mentioned and were sentenced accordingly. Hence, the present appeal has been filed by the accused appellants before this court assailing the judgment passed by the learned trial court. 5. Learned counsel for the accused appellants has submitted that the instant case is one where the accused persons have not committed any offence as they had exercised their right of private defence to property and person. In this regard he has read before the court the statement of Patwari halka and other prosecution witnesses who have categorically stated that the land in question had stood transferred in favour of the accused party and at the relevant time they were in possession of the same. He has further submitted that in respect of the same incident, a cross case had also been registered from the side of the accused, inter-alia, for the offences under section 302 IPC as one of their member, namely Ashok Pratap Singh had died. It has also been submitted that in the cross case (145/2003), learned trial court had proceeded against the members of the complainant party, namely Chotu, Bhagwati, Amrit Lal, Ramesh and Prakash Chand. It is to be noted that in the said case Madan Lal (informant of the present case) was also an accused. He died during the course of trial. Learned counsel for the accused appellants has submitted that even otherwise, in this case the prosecution has totally failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. It is to be noted that in the said case Madan Lal (informant of the present case) was also an accused. He died during the course of trial. Learned counsel for the accused appellants has submitted that even otherwise, in this case the prosecution has totally failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. He has invited the attention of this court to various documents on record including the statements of the prosecution witnesses as well as the memos prepared during the course of investigation so as to show that the prosecution has failed to connect the accused with commission of crime with regard to the weapons used by them. Learned counsel had drawn the attention of this court to the fact that amongst the prosecution witnesses, except two, namely Madan Lal (PW-1) and Kailashi Bai (wife of the deceased) (PW-2), none of the witnesses have not supported the prosecution case and they had to be declared hostile. Likewise, learned counsel for the defence has drawn the attention of the court towards the recoveries made by the investigating agency, particularly in respect of the weapons of offence alleged to have been used by the accused persons. Therefore, it has been submitted by the counsel for the appellants that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused persons and the injuries sustained by the complainant party at the hands of the accused were in exercise of their right of private defence, as they had tried to disturb the possession of the accused from the land in question. In such view of the matter, the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial court is not sustainable in law and the accused appellants deserves to be acquitted of all the charges lavelled against them. 6. On the other hand, the learned public prosecutor has supported the judgment passed by the learned trial court and has submitted that it is in accordance to the evidence on record that the learned trial court has rightly held the accused guilty for the commission of the crime and accordingly sentenced them. 6. On the other hand, the learned public prosecutor has supported the judgment passed by the learned trial court and has submitted that it is in accordance to the evidence on record that the learned trial court has rightly held the accused guilty for the commission of the crime and accordingly sentenced them. She has further submitted that on taking into consideration the evidence of the prosecution, in its totality, it is revealed that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the fact about the incident, the accused persons having inflicted injuries on the complainant party as a result of which one of their members, namely Kalulal had died and other persons of the complainant party had also sustained injuries in the incident. The very fact that there had been a cross case, it is more than clear that the accused were present at the time of incident and had also participated in the same, as a result of which they had also sustained injuries. Therefore, it has been submitted that the learned trial court has rightly convicted and sentenced the accused appellants for the offences alleged and the appeal filed against the same deserves to be rejected. 7. We have carefully considered the facts and circumstances of the case and have perused the material on record of the trial court. The incident had taken place, in the present case, on 1.7.1992 where both the parties gave beatings to each other, resulting in injuries to their members. Cross cases were registered between the parties, challans came to be filed and trial commenced against both of them. One person each had died from the accused as well as complainant side. Therefore, trial was faced by the parties for the offences, inter-alia, under section 302 IPC. 8. In so far as the place of incident is concerned, it is revealed from the record that the same belongs to the accused and they were in possession of the same. One person each had died from the accused as well as complainant side. Therefore, trial was faced by the parties for the offences, inter-alia, under section 302 IPC. 8. In so far as the place of incident is concerned, it is revealed from the record that the same belongs to the accused and they were in possession of the same. The most important witness in this regard is the patwari halka Shri Ram Gopal (PW-16) who has categorically stated as under: ;g lgh gS fd izn'kZ ih-4 dk Hkkx , ls ch [kljk uEcj 240 ,oa [kljk uEcj 827 dh ;g Hkwfe jktLo fjdkMZ ds vuqlkj fnukad 7-9-89 dks dkywyky }kjk jes'k mQZ fparkjke N=iqjk dks cspku dh FkhA ;g ckr lgh gS fd c;ku izn'kZ Mh-4 dk Hkkx lh ls ch eSaus iqfyl dks lgh fy[kk;k FkkA tks bl izdkj gS fd fjdkMZ ds eqrkfcd fparkjke gh bl ij dkfct gSA tks ekSds ds vuqlkj lgh FkkA Further more, the star witness of the prosecution Smt. Kailashi Bai wife of Kalu (deceased) (PW-2) had also stated before the trial court as follows: ^^fQj dgk fd v'kksd izrki ds fxjoh j[kh FkhA ;g ckr lgh gS fd ml [ksr ij ljlksa dh Qly v'kksd izrki flag us gh cksbZ FkhA** The informant Madan (PW-1) had stated before the trial court that - ^^;g ckr xyr gS fd fpUrkjke us ml tehu ij ljlksa cksbZ gks cfYd v'kksd izrki flag o eukst izrki flag us cksbZ FkhA** The prosecution witness Ramkishan (PW-19) had deposed that: ^^vkt ls 13-14 lky ifgys eSaus o ckcwyky eh.kk us 45]000@& :i;s esa 15 ch?kk tehu Hks:yky ls [kjhnh FkhA ftl tehu dks eSaus dk'r dh Fkh] rFkk 6000@& :i;s equkQs dk'r ds fy, Nhrjyky eqyfte dks nh FkhA equkQk ij tehu Nhrjyky dks nh] mldh fy[kki<+h ugha dhA bl tehu ckcr~ enuyky tkfr eh.kk us >xMk fd;k FkkA** Madan Lal (PW-1) is the informant in the present case. Babulal Meena (PW-27) has corroborated the aforesaid statement of Ramkishan by deposing before the trial court as under: ^^12-13 lky igys esjh tehu v'kksd fpUrkjke dks tqrkbZ Fkh ftldk [kljk ua- ;kn ugha gSA tehu 15 ch?kk Fkh tks rhu gtkj :i;s ch?kk esa tqrkbZ FkhA eSaus 45 gtkj :i;s tehu c;ukek [kjhnk Fkk ftldks fpUrkjke eh.kk dks 6 gtkj okf"kZd equkQs esa Bsds ij ns j[kk Fkk ftldh fy[kk i<+h ikap :i;s ds LVkEi isij ij dh FkhA Hks:yky ls eSaus tehu [kjhnh FkhA vc Hks:yky eh.kk ej pqdk gS] Hks:yky dks dksbZ dke ugha djrk gSA enuyky eh.kk Hks:ykyk dk Hkkatk FkkA enuyky tehu dks tcjnLrh gkaduk pkgrk FkkA** Another prosecution witness Hari Mohan Sharma (PW-32) had stated during trial as follows: ^^;g ckr lgh gS fd fooknxzLr Hkwfe ij tks dkfct dk'r Fkk v'kksd dkfct dk'r FkkA** Therefore, it is well established from the prosecution evidence itself that it was the accused party who was in possession of the agricultural field, where the incident took place, on the day of incident. This leads us to hold that it was the complainant party who had come to the field of the accused persons and the injuries sustained by the appellants side goes to show that the same was inflicted by the informant and his companions. As mentioned earlier, one of the persons of the accused party, namely; Ashok Pratap Singh had succumbed to his injuries and died. Consequently, a criminal case was lodged against the complainant, by the accused persons for the offence, inter-alia, under section 302 IPC which was registered by Bajrang Singh (PW-34) SHO Atru District Baran and the investigating agency having found primafacie case against them, filed a challan by Ram Laxman Sharma (PW-30) which was followed by regular trial against them. In such a situation, it would be just to infer that it was the complainant party who was the aggressors, entered the agricultural field of the accused persons and gave them beating which is proved by the medical evidence on record and from the statement of the medical jurist Dr. Mahesh Soni who has proved the injury reports of the accused appellants. 9. Mahesh Soni who has proved the injury reports of the accused appellants. 9. The inevitable conclusion of the aforesaid circumstances is that when the members of the complainant party had entered the field of the accused persons, armed with various weapons and gave beating to them, certainly a right accrued in favour of the accused appellants for exercising of right of private defence of property and person. This fact is further corroborated by the medical evidence on record by which it is established that many accused persons have sustained injuries and one of their member, namely; Ashok Pratap Singh had succumbed to his injuries and died. The principle of law in this regard is well settled since long. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Amjad Khan vs. State- AIR 1952 SC 165 , had laid down as under: “It was impossible for him to know whether his shop would or would not suffer the same fate if he waited, and on the findings it was reasonable for him to apprehend death or grievous hurt to himself and his family once they broke in, for he would then have had the right to protect and indeed would have been bound to do what he could to protect his family. The threat to break in was implicit in the conduct of the mob and with it the threat to kill or cause grievous hurt to the inmates; ... The circumstances in which he was placed were amply sufficient to give him a right of private defence of the body even to the extent of causing death. These things cannot be weighed in too fine a set of scales or, as some learned Judges have expressed it, in golden scales.” Thereafter, the principle was reiterated in the case of Jai Dev vs. State of Punjab- AIR 1963 SC 612 , where it was observed as follows: “This, however, does not mean that a person suddenly called upon to face an assault must run away and thus protect himself. He is entitled to resist the attack and defend himself. The same is the position if he has to meet an attack on his property. In other words, where an individual citizen or his property is faced with a danger and immediate aid from the State machinery is not readily available, the individual citizen is entitled to protect himself and his property.... The same is the position if he has to meet an attack on his property. In other words, where an individual citizen or his property is faced with a danger and immediate aid from the State machinery is not readily available, the individual citizen is entitled to protect himself and his property.... There can be no doubt that in judging the conduct of a person who proves that he had a right of private defence, allowance has necessarily to be made for his feeling at the relevant time. He is faced with an assault which causes a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt and that inevitably creates in his mind some excitement and confusion. At such a moment, the uppermost feeling in his mind would be to ward off the danger and to save himself or his property, and so, he would naturally be anxious to strike a decisive blow in exercise of his right.” In the case of Puran Singh and others vs. The State of Punjab- (1975)4 SCC 518 , it was held, in para 19, that: “19. ...... It is not the law that a person when called upon to face an assault must run away to the police station and not protect himself or when his property has been the subject-matter of trespass and mischief he should allow the aggressor to take possession of the property while he should run to the public authorities. Where there is an element of invasion or aggression on the property by a person who has no right to possession, then there is obviously no room to have recourse to the public authorities and the accused has the undoubted right to resist the attack and use even force if necessary. The right of private defence of property or person, where there is real apprehension that the aggressor might cause death or grievous hurt to the victim, could extend to the causing of death also, and it is not necessary that death or grievous hurt should actually be caused before the right could be exercised. A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the right of private defence into operation.” 10. A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the right of private defence into operation.” 10. This takes us to another important aspect of the matter that despite of the fact that the injuries were sustained by the accused party in the incident but there was no explanation what-so-ever from the side of the prosecution with regard to it. The prosecution witness Smt. Kailash wife of Kalu (deceased) (PW-2) had stated before the trial court that her husband was having a Paraniya (sharp edged weapon) with him. This further casts a shadow of doubt on the prosecution case that the accused persons had attacked the complainant party and they have committed the alleged crime. The non-explanation of injuries on the person of the accused by the prosecution is definitely a matter of great relevance to create doubt on the prosecution case. This question was considered elaborately by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohar Rai vs. State of Bihar- AIR 1968 SC 1281 , wherein it was observed as under: “The trial court as well as the High Court wholly ignored the significance of the injuries found on the appellants. Mohar Rai had sustained as many as 13 injuries and Bharath Rai 14. We get it from the evidence of PW 15 that he noticed injuries on the person of Mohar Rai when he was produced before him immediately after the occurrence. Therefore the version of the appellants that they sustained injuries at the time of the occurrence is highly probabilised. Under these circumstances the prosecution had a duty to explain those injuries.... In our judgment the failure of the prosecution to offer any explanation in that regard shows that evidence of the prosecution witnesses relating to the incident is not true or at any rate not wholly true. Further those injuries probabilise the plea taken by the appellants. It was clearly pointed out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that where the prosecution fails to explain the injuries on the accused, two results follow: (1) that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is untrue; and (2) that the injuries probabilise the plea taken by the accused. Further those injuries probabilise the plea taken by the appellants. It was clearly pointed out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that where the prosecution fails to explain the injuries on the accused, two results follow: (1) that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is untrue; and (2) that the injuries probabilise the plea taken by the accused. Subsequently, in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Bai Fatima- (1975)2 SCC 7 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed, in para 17, as follows: “In a situation like this, when the prosecution fails to explain the injuries on the person of an accused, depending on the facts of each case, any of the three results may follow: (1) That the accused had inflicted the injuries on the members of the prosecution party in exercise of the right of self-defence. (2) It makes the prosecution version of the occurrence doubtful and the charge against the accused cannot be held to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. (3) It does not affect the prosecution case at all.” Similarly, in the case of Puran Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held, in para 20, as follows: “In the first place as the prosecution has deliberately suppressed the very material part of the origin of occurrence, we do not know as to how the occurrence started. Secondly when two persons on the side of the accused were injured by gunfire it was not possible for the appellants to weigh their blows in golden scales in order to assault the prosecution party. As held by us this was a case where the appellants were fully entitled to the exercise of the right of self-defence of their property and person both because their persons had been attacked and their property had been trespassed upon and damaged. It is manifest that after the two persons on the side of the accused received gunshot injuries as found by the High Court and by us, the accused party would have undoubtedly a reasonable apprehension that either death or grievous hurt could be caused to the appellants or one of them. This being the position they were fully justified in causing the death of the deceased persons in the exercise of their right of private defence of person. This being the position they were fully justified in causing the death of the deceased persons in the exercise of their right of private defence of person. Such an apprehension could not be said to be hypersensitive or based on no ground and it will be idle to contend that the accused should have waited until one of their party members would have died or received serious injuries before acting on the spur of moment, nor can one expect a person who is attacked by an aggressor to modulate his blows in accordance with the injuries he receives. In these circumstances, therefore, it cannot be said that the accused had in any event exceeded their right of private defence.” In a later judgment of Laxmi Singh vs. State of Bihar- (1976) 4 SCC 394 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the principle and laid down as under: “...... It seems to us that in a murder case, the non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of the occurrence or in the course of altercation is a very important circumstance from which the court can draw the following inferences: (1) that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and the origin of the occurrence and has thus not presented the true version; (2) that the witnesses who have denied the presence of the injuries on the person of the accused are lying on a most material point and therefore their evidence is unreliable; (3) that in case there is a defence version which explains the injuries on the person of the accused it is rendered probable so as to throw doubt on the prosecution case. The omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries on the person of the accused assumes much greater importance where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses or where the defence gives a version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution one.” 11. Besides, when we look into the question as to whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, we are of the view, after having considered the evidence on record produced by the prosecution, that they have failed to do so. On consideration of the prosecution evidence, starting from the first information report and also the statements of their witnesses, it is revealed that the version has been changed. On consideration of the prosecution evidence, starting from the first information report and also the statements of their witnesses, it is revealed that the version has been changed. The prosecution witnesses have a different story to tell in the statements before the learned trial court than the one which was initially given in the first information report by Madan Lal (PW-1). It is note worthy that most of the prosecution witnesses have not supported the prosecution case and they have been declared hostile, so much so that even the injured witnesses Pappu @ Bhagwati Prasad (PW-3), Prakash Chand (PW-4), Ramesh Chand (PW-5) and Amritlal (PW-6) have not supported them. After the said injured witnesses having been declared hostile, primarily only two witnesses, namely; Madan Lal (PW-1) and Smt. Kailash (wife of the deceased) (PW-2) remains in support of the prosecution case. A close scrutiny of the testimony of the said witnesses further goes to show that there are material inconsistencies. As mentioned above, it has been specifically stated by Ram Kishan (PW-19) that it was Madan Lal (PW-1) who had picked up the quarrel. Therefore, statement of Madan Lal is totally different from the thrust of the prosecution case and as such it is not trust worthy. Consequently, Smt. Kailash, wife of the deceased, is the only prosecu-tion witness which remains for consideration. It would suffice to say that she is not an independent witness, but a close relative i.e. wife of the deceased. 12. The prosecution has also failed to produce evidence so as to connect the accused with the commission of the crime so much so that many of the accused are alleged to have been armed with guns, but a perusal of the prosecution evidence on record in respect of weapon of offence goes to show that it is not worth the name. The prosecution witness Bijjoram (PW-18) has very categorically deposed that five guns were found in a potla during investigation in another case. Similarly, prosecution witness Prabhulal (PW-21) has also stated about the guns which are said to have been recovered at the instance of the accused appellants, were found together in an open place. The weapons are said to have been recovered (Ex.P-22 to P-28) on 14.7.1994 on the basis of a joint information given by all the accused under section 27 of the Evidence Act. The weapons are said to have been recovered (Ex.P-22 to P-28) on 14.7.1994 on the basis of a joint information given by all the accused under section 27 of the Evidence Act. The arrest of the accused except Kishan was made in the month of July 1994 but recovery of the weapon of offence 'topidar' was made on 10.7.1997. Above all, motbir of recovery of gun Mahendra Kumar (PW-25) has very specifically stated that no weapon was recovered from the accused persons. Therefore, there is a serious lacuna in the prosecution case, in absence of weapon of offence, to connect the accused persons with the commission of crime. 13. In view of the aforesaid circumstances and the reasons given, the evidence on record produced by the prosecution crystallizes the point that the case against the accused appellants have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. As a matter of fact, the prosecution has not come with true version which is reflected from the first information report as well as the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and also for the reason that the circumstances of the case reveal that the accused appellants had acted in exercise of their right of private defence. Further more, the prosecution evidence is prima-facie falsified as there is no explanation at all in respect of injuries sustained on the person of the accused. The prosecution has failed to bring evidence on record so as to prove the ingredients of the offence with which the accused appellants have been charged and also to connect with the commission of the crime. Accordingly, this court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial court has erred in holding the accused appellants guilty of the alleged offences. The accused appellants are entitled to be exonerated from all the allegations levelled by the prosecution. Thus, they deserve to be acquitted of all the charges. 13. Consequently, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The accused appellants are acquitted of all the charges levelled against them. Accused Kishan Lal and Chintaram Meena are on bail. They need not surrender and their bail bonds stand discharged. Accused Manoj Pratap Singh and Jai Pratap Singh are in Central Jail, Kota, they be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.