ORAL ORDER 1. The petitioner’s husband died on 29.06.2004, for which incident Kinjer P.S. Case No. 35 of 2004 was instituted under sections 435, 427/34 of the Indian Penal Code, read with section 27 of the Arms Act and section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. What had happened was that undisputedly extremists/terrorists made indiscriminate firing and torched a Marshal jeep bearing registration no. BR25-2274. Petitioner’s husband was at the place of occurrence and tried to extinguish the fire, but Petrol Tank of the jeep exploded. Petitioner’s husband suffered extensive third degree burn injury and died later. 2. Under the Policy of the Government dated 09.08.2000, petitioner claimed compassionate appointment. The policy provided that any person, who was victim of terrorist or extremist action, his family members would get certain benefits from the State. The benefits included payment of ex-gratia to the family members and in the event of death compassionate appointment to a dependent family member. 3. It is regrettable that though this is a benevolent step taken by the welfare State, the executive Government takes upon itself to become hyper technical in the matter denying genuine and legitimate expectations of the people. The Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Arwal, who was to decide, held that the husband of the petitioner was not killed in direct extremists action, but as a consequence thereof and, thus, the benevolent grants and compassionate appointment as per Government policy were not available to the petitioner. This decision, whether right or wrong, ought to have been taken immediately in the year 2004 itself but belying all hopes it got delayed and it was ultimately rejected in 2008. Being aggrieved by the said decision disentitling the petitioner totally, she filed a writ petition before this Court being C.W.J.C. No. 2954 of 2008, which was heard and disposed of by judgment and order dated 30.04.2010 (Annexure 6 to this writ petition). This Court held that the State had taken a myopic view forgetting the true intention of the scheme and the policy. This Court further held that State is not permitted to take technical pleas to reject the legitimate expectations of the people. State is estopped from raising such pleas. Noticing that the matter had already got delayed, it was then remanded to the Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Arwal, for fresh consideration in accordance with that judgment. 4. This Court further held that State is not permitted to take technical pleas to reject the legitimate expectations of the people. State is estopped from raising such pleas. Noticing that the matter had already got delayed, it was then remanded to the Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Arwal, for fresh consideration in accordance with that judgment. 4. It may be noted that the judgment of this Court was dated 30.04.2010, but State did not bring to the notice of this Court that on 17.02.2010 State had revised its policy in this regard, otherwise, this Court would have dealt with that policy and its implication in the said writ petition itself, saving the petitioner from further harassment and wasting the time of the executive and this Court all over again. The policy, which came on 17.02.2010, is part of Annexure 9 and this policy has been challenged by a separate interlocutory application in this writ petition. The change, that has been brought about in this policy is that this policy, has done away with the provision of offering compassionate appointment and it has enhanced the ex-gratia payment. Paragraph 5 of the said policy has gone step further and said that except for compassionate appointment, the old policy would continue to operate and apply so far as incidents prior to this policy dated 17.02.2010 came into effect. The effect is that for incidents that took place prior to this policy and where people had become entitled for compassionate appointments and compassionate appointments were not made, they would become disentitled to the same. The reasonableness of this part has been challenged before this Court in this writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Vivek Prasad submits that a right given by a policy cannot be termed to be discretionary in any manner. That being so, if the conditions of policy are satisfied, then a person cannot be denied the benefit of the policy on any other reason. In other words, the right gets crystallized. 6. In the facts, it could be seen that the petitioner sought implementation of the policy and grant of benefits thereunder soon after the incident. However, not because of her fault but on pure legal technicalities, they were being sought to be defeated and denied. This Court in the earlier writ petition intra party clearly held that denial was unjust and unreasonable. However, not because of her fault but on pure legal technicalities, they were being sought to be defeated and denied. This Court in the earlier writ petition intra party clearly held that denial was unjust and unreasonable. As such the right of the petitioner had become crystallized but State now seeks to deny that right on the ground that policy has got changed and her crystallized rights are taken away. That is unreasonable because petitioner had nothing to do with it. It was the delay on the part of the State and State cannot take benefit of its own default. 7. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, states that State is free to revise its policy and having done so, no grievance can be made. There cannot be challenge to the policy of the State. It was then submitted that in two judgments of this Court such benefits have been denied. They are the case of Nand Dulari Kumari @ Nand Dulari Devi vrs. District Magistrate, Arwal being C.W.J.C. No. 7719 of 2005 disposed of on 02.04.2007 and the case of Kavindra Kumar vrs. The State of Bihar and others being C.W.J.C. No. 11098 of 2005, disposed of on 17.04.2007. These two judgments are Annexure `B? and Annexure „C?, respectively, to the State?s counter affidavit. It is, accordingly, submitted on behalf of the State that the policy having changed, the petitioner is, at best, entitled to enhanced ex-gratia payment and not compassionate appointment. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State, in my view, the writ petition must succeed. To the question first in respect of the two judgments of this Court, as noticed above, being the cases of Nand Dulari Kumari @ Nand Dulari Devi (supra) and Kavindra Kumar (supra), suffice to say that these two cases have absolutely no application to the facts of the present case. In the first case, the right to compassionate appointment was refused on two grounds; firstly the policy of the State clearly provided that a person, who is killed, in extremists action, will not get benefit of the policy, if he is an accused in a criminal case. On the facts of the first case, State had denied petitioner the benefit of the policy because petitioner?s husband, who was killed, was an accused in major criminal cases. On the facts of the first case, State had denied petitioner the benefit of the policy because petitioner?s husband, who was killed, was an accused in major criminal cases. It was then urged on behalf of that petitioner that others had been given this benefit ignoring this disqualification. Court held that if others were given benefit wrongly that would not enure to the benefit of the petitioner. In my view, the reason is simple because the Court can only enforce lawful right and lawful duty and not something that was wrongly done. Thus, this case is clearly distinguishable. 9. Learned counsel for the State relies on the observation made in the said order by this Court that compassionate appointment requires regular payment of salary and incurs financial benefits, but, unfortunately, that was not the ground taken by this Court to deny the benefit. All I can say is when State took a decision of offering compassionate appointment, I am sure State knew what it was doing because once a person is appointed either on regular basis or on compassionate appointment, financial and legal consequences naturally flow and it is not something out of extra ordinary. Thus, it cannot be said that though compassionate appointment was provided, it was not contemplated. 10. The second case relied by the State is that of Kavindra Kumar (supra). Again the facts are totally distinguishable. There the brother of the deceased claimed compassionate appointment and the same was rejected by the Court holding that under the policy the brother of the deceased was not entitled to such an appointment. This case has also absolutely no bearing to the facts of the present case. Learned counsel for the State also submits that both these cases have been affirmed by the Division Bench in intra court appeal. It matters little. 11. All I can refer here is the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa vrs. Sudhanshu Sekhar Mistra, since reported in A.I.R. 1968 SC 647 and in particular what is stated in paragraph 13 thereof, is as follows :- “A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic this is what Earl of- Halsbury. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic this is what Earl of- Halsbury. LC said in Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 AC 495.” "Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood, (1898) AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.'' 12. Next learned counsel for the State submits that as policy has in course of time been changed, the petitioner has lost her right. I may rely on two judgments; first the case of All India Groundnut Syndicate vrs. I.T. Commissioner, Bombay, since reported in A.I.R. 1954 Bombay, Page 232 and what Chief Justice Chhagla had to say in regard to such a situation is as follows :- “But the most surprising contention is put forward by the Department that because their own officer failed to discharge his statutory duty, the assessee is deprived of his right which the law has given to him under sub-section (2) of S. 24. In other words, the Department wants to benefit from and wants to take advantage of its own default. It is an elementary principle of law that no person- we take it that the Income-tax Department is included in that definition-can put forward his own default in defence to a right asserted by the other party. In other words, the Department wants to benefit from and wants to take advantage of its own default. It is an elementary principle of law that no person- we take it that the Income-tax Department is included in that definition-can put forward his own default in defence to a right asserted by the other party. A person cannot say that the party claiming the right is deprived of that right because “I have committed a default and the right is lost because of that default.” 13. The other would be the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilizers Limited vrs. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and others, since reported in A.I.R. 1992 S.C. Page 152. In that case, a sales tax exemption was granted by the Government for a period of five years. The assessee applied for the same. Not because of its fault, but because of inter departmental communications, the benefit could not be granted and policy period expired. The assessee was then told that as the policy period has expired, the benefit cannot be granted. Upon matter reaching Apex Court, the Apex Court rejected the stand of the State and directed grant of benefit. While doing so, this is what the Apex Court held as follows :- “22……There is no dispute that appellant had satisfied these conditions. Yet the permission was withheld not for any valid and substantial reason but owing to certain extraneous things concerning some inter-departmental issues. Appellant had nothing to do with those issues. Appellant is now told, “We are sorry. We should have given you the permission. But now that the period is over, nothing can be done.” The answer to this is in the words of Lord Denning: “Now I know that a public authority cannot be estopped from doing its public duty, but I do think it can be estopped from relying on a technicality and this is a technicality” (see Wells v. Minister of Housing and Local Government, (1967) 1 WLR 1000 at p.1007). 23. Francis Bennion in his statutory interpretation, (1984 edn.) says at page 683: “Unnecessary technicality: Modern courts seek to cut down technicalities attendant upon a statutory procedure where these cannot be shown to be necessary to the fulfillment of the purposes of the legislations.” 14. 23. Francis Bennion in his statutory interpretation, (1984 edn.) says at page 683: “Unnecessary technicality: Modern courts seek to cut down technicalities attendant upon a statutory procedure where these cannot be shown to be necessary to the fulfillment of the purposes of the legislations.” 14. In this connection, I may also refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of L. Hriday Narain vrs. Income-Tax Officer, Bareilly, since reported in A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 33. In that case an income tax assessee had sought rectification of mistake in terms of section 35 of the Income Tax Act then prevalent, but the Income-Tax Officer refused to exercise his discretion in the matter and permit rectification. The assessee challenged the same before the High Court. The High Court, holding that the power was discretionary and as such Income Tax Officer could not be compelled to exercise the discretion and that there was an alternative remedy, dismissed the writ petition. In appeal, the Apex Court reversed the decision of the High Court on both the counts observing as follows :- “12. …If a statute invests a public Officer with authority to do an act in a specified set of circumstances, it is imperative upon him to exercise his authority in a manner appropriate to the case when a party interested and having a right to apply moves in that behalf and circumstances for exercise of authority are shown to exist. Even if the words used in the statute are prima facie enabling, the Courts will readily infer a duty to exercise power which is invested in aid of enforcement of a right-public or private - of a citizen. 15. The High Court was, in our judgment, in error in assuming that exercise of the power was discretionary and the Income-tax Officer could, even if the conditions for its exercise were shown to exist, decline to exercise the power.” 15. Thus, in my view, the policy of the State Government dated 17.02.2010, which disentitles a person from compassionate appointment with a paltry enhancement of ex-gratia cannot be held to be reasonable in its application to matters, which were delayed for no fault of the claimant. Let it be noted that consequences are drastic. A compassionate appointment provides security for life of the beneficiary. Every month he or she receives salary. He or she becomes entitled to retiral dues. Let it be noted that consequences are drastic. A compassionate appointment provides security for life of the beneficiary. Every month he or she receives salary. He or she becomes entitled to retiral dues. The dependents become entitled to death-cum-retiral dues. In the present case, the petitioner became a widow at the age of 23. She has her full life before her. What is now done is her right to receive compassionate appointment, which was wrongly denied to her, is now being replaced by mere an ex-gratia payment of Rs. 1 lac. The two cannot be just equivalent to each other. It is more confiscatory in nature where life long benefit is taken away and replaced by ex-gratia payment of a paltry amount. 16. State then has urged that there being a policy decision and change therein, the policies of the Government cannot be challenged. I am afraid, this statement is too wide to be accepted. It is true that generally and normally the Courts do not interfere in policy of the Government or in policy matter, but it is equally true that if the policy is found violating any of the Part III rights arbitrarily or in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, the Courts not only have a right but a duty to interfere with such policy and right of the Court is not restricted in any manner in this regard. 17. Paragraph 5 of the policy taking away a crystallized right and substituting it by a mere paltry amount of ex-gratia payment cannot be held just and fair but has to be held arbitrary and unreasonable. To that extent, the policy cannot be enforced. Of course, the policy would be applicable in full force in respect of incidents after the policy where compassionate appointment cannot now be claimed. It may be noted here that the facts aforesaid demonstrate that all along State has taken every possible steps to oppose and deny the grant of relief, which was legitimately due to the petitioner. 18. The net result is that this writ petition has to be allowed. Let a mandamus issue to the State to immediately within one month from today give compassionate appointment to the petitioner. 18. The net result is that this writ petition has to be allowed. Let a mandamus issue to the State to immediately within one month from today give compassionate appointment to the petitioner. In view of the long drawn harassment perpetuated by the State, not intended by the Policy, I deem it a fit case in which an exemplary cost of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) be awarded against the State payable to the writ petitioner forthwith and compliance reported to this Court.