Order Navin Sinha, J. I.A. No.2596/13 has been filed to condone delay of approximately 184 days in filing the appeal. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties and are satisfied that sufficient cause has been demonstrated to condone delay. The delay is condoned. 2. The appeal arises from order dated 2.8.2011 allowing C.W.J.C. No.9128/06. The learned Single Judge ordered confirmation of the respondents as substantive Executive Engineers from the date that they were appointed as In-Charge Executive Engineers while holding the substantive post of Assistant Engineers. Consequently, directions have been given to pay full remuneration for the post of Executive Engineer and to also treat it as the last pay drawn for purposes of retirement benefits. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that respondent No.1 officiated till superannuation for a period of one year and eleven months; respondent No.2 officiated for a period of four months till superannuation; respondent No.3 officiated for approximately two years till superannuation and respondent No.4 for approximately one and a half years till superannuation. No person junior to the respondents had been promoted substantively to the post of Executive Engineer causing hostile discrimination. In absence of any substantive vacancy on the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) till the date of their superannuation, the question of granting them any notional promotion does not arise. The immediate junior as also persons senior to the respondents were promoted as Executive Engineers after their superannuation by order dated 18.3.1997. 4. The respondents never raised any grievance while in service either for substantive promotion or for full salary of the higher officiating post as they were aware and conscious of the fact that there existed no vacancies for substantive promotion to them as Executive Engineers. To grant them notional promotion today will work great turmoil in the seniority list as not only will the four respondents have to be considered, but all such persons who superannuated in officiating capacity as Executive Engineers while holding the substantive post of Assistant Engineers will all have to be considered. Third party rights have accrued in favour of those already promoted and who would necessarily be affected also. 5. The respondents came to this Court earlier four to six years after superannuation in C.W.J.C. No.2744/2000. It was disposed on 18.3.2005 to consider their representations. The representation was rejected by a reasoned order on 28.2.2006. Third party rights have accrued in favour of those already promoted and who would necessarily be affected also. 5. The respondents came to this Court earlier four to six years after superannuation in C.W.J.C. No.2744/2000. It was disposed on 18.3.2005 to consider their representations. The representation was rejected by a reasoned order on 28.2.2006. It specifically states that no vacancies were available to consider the respondents as roster clearance had been denied by the Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department with regard to the four respondents. They were however held entitled to 20% officiating allowance under Rule-103 of the Bihar Service Code. In absence of available vacancies the question for payment of full salary of the officiating post does not arise. 6. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents submitted that this Court in C.W.J.C. No.2744/2000 granted them the liberty to represent for their grievances with regard to grant of notional promotion and consequential monetary benefits. The authorities failed to prepare the final gradation list in time and which has prejudiced the respondents. Even if they had no right to be promoted, they certainly had a right to be considered in time for promotion while in service. Their cases were considered by the Departmental Promotion Committee in June, 1993 and recommended in anticipation of regular promotion. It is wrong for the appellants to contend that there existed no vacancies. 7. The learned Single Judge noticed the contention of the appellants that there was no vacancy but concluded that if there was no vacancy the question of giving officiating charge did not arise. Non-confirmation of officiating Superintending Engineers and likewise of Executive Engineers was creating an imbroglio leading to failure by the State to fill up substantive vacancies despite availability of candidates resorting to stop-gap arrangements indicating lethargy on the part of the State. It was avoidance of obligations for higher payments with regard to more onerous duties which would otherwise ensue in case of regular promotion. If the State did not finalize the gradation list, the respondents could not be denied the benefit of promotion. 8. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. 9. The respondents superannuated on 31.8.1995, 30.4.1994, 31.1.1996 and 31.1.1996 respectively. Juniors and seniors were considered for promotion and orders for promotion passed in March, 1997. It is not denied that no junior was promoted as Executive Engineer while the respondents were in service. 8. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. 9. The respondents superannuated on 31.8.1995, 30.4.1994, 31.1.1996 and 31.1.1996 respectively. Juniors and seniors were considered for promotion and orders for promotion passed in March, 1997. It is not denied that no junior was promoted as Executive Engineer while the respondents were in service. The respondents did not raise any claim for substantive promotion while in service even though some of them superannuated more than one and a half to two years after being given officiating charge. They also did not consider it necessary to approach the Court immediately after promotions were given in March, 1997. C.W.J.C. No.2744/2000 was filed by them four to six years after superannuation. No relief was granted, except to represent. The respondents represented leading to an order dated 28.2.2006 which was then made a fresh cause of action leading to the present appeal. No person has a right to promotion. The right is only to be considered for promotion. If the right to be considered for promotion entails a timely consideration, we see no reason not to hold that even a claim to be considered for promotion has to be raised in due time and not belatedly at convenience. In our opinion, the institution of a writ petition in the year 2000 was itself a highly belated claim even to be considered for promotion. The innocuous order to represent and the representation to be considered was made a fresh cause of action reviving what stood extinguished four to six years after superannuation. 10. Delay is an aspect which has always been considered vital in service matters. As far back as (1975) 1 SCC 152 dealing with the delayed claim for promotion and discrimination it was observed:- “(2) …It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article-226 nor is it that there can never be a case where Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article-226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petition even could, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal working…..”. 11. The aspect of such belated claims merit no consideration was noticed in (2010) 14 SCC 389 (Union of India v. A. Durajraj) observing as follows:- “13. It is well settled that anyone who feels aggrieved by non-promotion or non-selection should approach the court/tribunal as early as possible. If a person having a justifiable grievance allows the matter to become stale and approaches the court/tribunal belatedly, grant of any relief on the basis of such belated application would lead to serious administrative complications to the employer and difficulties to the other employees as it will upset the settled position regarding seniority and promotions which has been granted to others over the years. Further, where a claim is raised beyond a decade or two from the date of cause of action, the employer will be at a great disadvantage to effectively contest or counter the claim, as the officers who dealt with the matter and/or the relevant records relating to the matter may no longer be available. Therefore, even if no period of limitation is prescribed, any belated challenge would be liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 14. This is a typical case where an employee gives a representation in a matter which is stale and old, after two decades and gets a direction of the Tribunal to consider and dispose of the same; and thereafter again approaches the Tribunal alleging that there is delay in disposal of the representation (or if there is an order rejecting the representation, then file an application to challenge the rejection, treating the date of rejection of the representation as the date of cause of action).” 12. In (2008) 10 SCC 115 (C. Jacob vs. Director of Geology and Mining & Anr.) considering the representation syndrome for revival of belated claims it has been observed: “8. Let us take the hypothetical case of an employee who is terminated from service in 1980. He does not challenge the termination. But nearly two decades later, say in the year 2000, he decides to challenge the termination. Let us take the hypothetical case of an employee who is terminated from service in 1980. He does not challenge the termination. But nearly two decades later, say in the year 2000, he decides to challenge the termination. He is aware that any such challenge would be rejected at the threshold on the ground of delay (if the application is made before tribunal) or on the ground of delay and laches (if a writ petition is filed before a High Court). Therefore, instead of challenging the termination, he gives a representation requesting that he may be taken back to service. Normally, there will be considerable delay in replying to such representations relating to old matters. Taking advantage of this position, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition before the tribunal/ High Court seeking a direction to the employer to consider and dispose of his representation. The tribunals/High Courts routinely allow or dispose of such applications/petitions (many a time even without notice to the other side), without examining the matter on merits, with a direction to consider and dispose of the representation. 9. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly, they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any “decision” on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to “consider”. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to “consider”. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored. 11. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored. 11. When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merits, being under the impression that failure to do so may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or District Teachers’ Appointment Appellate Tribunal such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of “acknowledgement of a jural relationship” to give rise to a fresh cause of action. 14. We are constrained to refer to the several facets of the issue only to emphasise the need for circumspection and care in issuing directions for “consideration”. If the representation on the face of it is stale, or does not contain particulars to show that it is regarding a live claim, courts should desist from directing “consideration” of such claims.” 13. In our opinion, counsel for the appellants has rightly contended that if the respondents are to be so belatedly considered for retrospective promotions all such persons who were holding officiating charge and superannuated in that capacity are also required to be considered in accordance with seniority. It would bring a complete turmoil today in the gradation list including for those who have been promoted in 1997 and are sanguine. If the respondents were of the opinion that they had been recommended for promotion in 1993 but were wrongly being denied the benefit, nothing prevented them from approaching the Court for enforcement of that decision and not wait till filing of a writ application in the year 2000 long after superannuation. 14. We therefore find it difficult to uphold the order under appeal to the extent that it confirms the respondents as substantive Executive Engineers from the date of officiation upholding the contentions of the State of a stale claim which would bring in its wake magnitude problems with regard to the gradation list. 15. 14. We therefore find it difficult to uphold the order under appeal to the extent that it confirms the respondents as substantive Executive Engineers from the date of officiation upholding the contentions of the State of a stale claim which would bring in its wake magnitude problems with regard to the gradation list. 15. That leaves the only question for grant of full salary for the period of officiation. Respondent No.2 has officiated hardly for a period of four months. We see no reason why keeping in mind the short duration of officiation he is entitled to anything beyond the officiating allowance of 20% which, if it has not been paid, must be paid to him. Insofar as respondent Nos.1, 3 and 4 are concerned, we are of the opinion that their officiation for a period of one and a half years to two years cannot fall in the category of a stop-gap arrangement leaving them with officiating allowance only. We concur with the observations of the learned Single Judge in this regard placing reliance on 2008 (3) P.L.J.R. 144 (D.B.) (Prafulla Ranjan Shrivastave vs. State of Bihar). The payment of full salary for long officiation on the higher post is based on more onerous duties and responsibilities. In our opinion, it has nothing to do with non-availability of posts for regular promotion. It does not affect any third party rights. Respondent Nos. 1, 3 and 4 are therefore held entitled to full salary for duties discharged as Executive Engineers in officiating capacity till the date of superannuation. This shall not be treated as substantive promotion to the post entitling them to retirement benefits on the pay-scale of an Executive Engineer. 16. The contention on behalf of the State that if salary for the higher post was to be given, it would open a flood gate of litigation by similar persons who may have been officiating on the post of Executive Engineer is best answered from (2007) 9 SCC 625 (Coal India Limited vs. Saroj Kumar Mishra) observing as follows:- “19. The floodgate argument also does not appeal to us. The same appears to be an argument of desperation. Only because there is a possibility of floodgate litigation, a valuable right of a citizen cannot be permitted to be taken away. This Court is bound to determine the respective rights of the parties.” 17. The floodgate argument also does not appeal to us. The same appears to be an argument of desperation. Only because there is a possibility of floodgate litigation, a valuable right of a citizen cannot be permitted to be taken away. This Court is bound to determine the respective rights of the parties.” 17. Additionally those who move the Court for relief and those who do not form separate class. Relief based on parity can well be denied in such cases. The latter part of the order, less any officiating allowance paid, must be complied with within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 18. The appeal is allowed in part.