JUDGMENT 1. This second appeal is filed by the defendant, inveighing the judgement and decree dated 18.8.2011 passed by the learned District Judge, Tiruvarur, in A.S.No.6 of 2008, confirming the judgement and decree dated 10.4.2007 passed by the Subordinate Judge, Mannarkudi, in O.S.No.26 of 2006, which is one for recovery of money. 2. The parties, for the sake of convenience, are referred to here under according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. Compendiously and concisely the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this second appeal would run thus: (a) The deceased respondent herein-Kunchithapatham, as plaintiff, filed the suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.1,22,400/- (rupees one lakh twenty two thousand four hundred) based on the suit promissory note, as against the defendant/appellant herein. (b) The appellant/defendant filed the written statement denying the signature in the pro-note itself. (c) Whereupon issues were framed. Up went the trial, during which, the plaintiff-Kunchithapatham examined himself as P.W.1 along with P.W.2 and P.W.3 and Ex.A1 was marked on his side. On the defendant's side no one was examined and no document was marked. (d) Ultimately, the trial Court decreed the suit, as against which, the appeal was filed for nothing but to be dismissed by the first appellate Court, confirming the judgement and decree of the trial Court. 4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgements and decrees of both the Courts below, this second appeal has been filed by the defendant on various grounds and also suggesting the following substantial questions of law: "(A) Whether the Courts below are right in placing burden of proof on the appellant to disprove his signatures in Ex.A1 Promissory Note, when the deceased plaintiff himself has not established his case that the signature in Ex.A1 is that of the appellant? (B) In view of the limitation prescribed under Schedule-I of the Limitation Act, aren't the suit filed by the deceased plaintiff based on Ex.A1 Promissory Note dated 11.11.1999 is barred by limitation and if so, whether the courts below are right in entertaining the same? (C) Whether the Courts below was justified in holding that the appellant has not proved his case of disputing the signatures in the document, especially, when no opportunity was given to the appellant to disprove his signature in Ex.A1, by taking out an application for expert opinion for comparison of signatures? (C) Whether the Courts below was justified in holding that the appellant has not proved his case of disputing the signatures in the document, especially, when no opportunity was given to the appellant to disprove his signature in Ex.A1, by taking out an application for expert opinion for comparison of signatures? (D) Whether the courts below are justified in holding that the deceased plaintiff has financial capacity to lend money to the appellant without production of any material evidence by the deceased plaintiff except the oral evidence of P.W.2? (E) In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and the materials on record, whether the reasons recorded by the Courts below for granting the relief prayed the deceased plaintiff are fair, just, proper and sustainable under law?" 5. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant, inviting the attention of this Court to various portions of the typed set of papers as well as the judgements of both the Courts below, would pyramid his arguments, which could succinctly and precisely be set out thus: (i) The appellant/defendant filed the application for taking the assistance of a handwriting expert to verify the purported signature of himself in the suit pro-note, but the trial Court dismissed the said application, as against which, C.R.P. was filed, but that also was dismissed. (ii) Before the first appellate Court also application was filed for taking the assistance of a handwriting expert and the appellate Court also dismissed the said application. (iii) The Courts below have not given due opportunity for the defendant to rebut the evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiff. (iv) Both the Courts below jointly placed reliance on the evidence of the alleged scribe as well as the attesting witnesses of the pro-note and held as though the pro-note was a genuine one. (v) The defendant was not in the habit of signing in English at all ever since 1998, whereas in the suit pro-note, English signature is found and this fact also was not taken note of by the Courts below. As such, the learned counsel would pray for the dismissal of the suit, after setting aside the judgements of both the fora below. 6. As such, the learned counsel would pray for the dismissal of the suit, after setting aside the judgements of both the fora below. 6. A mere running of the eye over the typed set of papers as well as the judgements of both the fora below would evince and evidence, portray and convey that the defendant did not examine himself as a witness. The gist and kernel of the defence is that the plaintiff's son was conducting an unauthorised chit and in that, the defendant was a subscriber and in that connection he executed a pro-notes; however from that, the son of the plaintiff took a cue to forge the signature of the defendant and caused the present suit to be filed with the help of such forged pro-note. 7. These are all facts which are within the exclusive knowledge of the defendant, which he ought to have deposed on oath, as per Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. 8. At this juncture, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following judgements of the Honourable Apex Court: (i) AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1341 (Iswar Bhai C. Patel v. Harihar Behera and another), certain excerpts from it would run thus: "29. Applying the principles stated above to the instant case, it would be found that in the instant case also the appellant had abstained from the witness-box and had not made any statement on oath in support of his pleading set out in the written statement. An adverse inference has, therefore, to be drawn against him. Since it was specifically stated by Respondent 2 in his statement on oath that it was at the instance of the appellant that he had issued the cheque on the account of Respondent 1 in Central Bank of India Ltd., Sambalpur Branch and the appellant, admittedly, had encashed that cheque, an inference has to be drawn against the appellant that what he stated in the written statement was not correct. In these circumstances, the High Court was fully justified in decreeing the suit of Respondent 1 in its entirety and passing a decree against the appellant also." (ii) AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1441 (Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao and another),certain excerpts from it would run thus: "15. In these circumstances, the High Court was fully justified in decreeing the suit of Respondent 1 in its entirety and passing a decree against the appellant also." (ii) AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1441 (Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao and another),certain excerpts from it would run thus: "15. It was Defendant 1 who contended that the sale deed executed by Defendant 2 in favour of the plaintiff was fictitious and the whole transaction was a bogus transaction as only Rs.500 were paid as sale consideration to Defendant 2. He further claimed that payment of Rs.4500 to Defendant 2 at his home before the registration of the deed was wholly incorrect. This plea was not supported by Defendant 1 as he did not enter the witness-box. He did not state the facts pleaded in the written statement on oath in the trial court and avoided the witness-box so that he may not be cross-examined. This, by itself, is enough to reject the claim that the transaction of sale between Defendant 2 and the plaintiff was a bogus transaction. 17. Where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness-box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct as has been held in a series of decisions passed by various High Courts and the Privy Council beginning from the decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh v. Gurdial Singh. This was followed by the Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal Singh and the Bombay High Court in Martand Pandharinath Chaudhari v. Radhabai Krishnarao Deshmukh. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulla Kharagjit Carpenter v. Narsingh Nandkishore Rawat also followed the Privy Council decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh case. The Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. Virendra Nath held that if a party abstains from entering the witness-box, it would give rise to an adverse inference against him. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Bhishan Chand drew a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872 against a party who did not enter the witness-box." 9. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Bhishan Chand drew a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872 against a party who did not enter the witness-box." 9. A mere running of the eye over those precedents would exemplify and demonstrate that a party, in whose knowledge there are certain facts, should necessarily examine himself and his failure to examine himself by shunning the witness box would certainly be fatal to his case. In all cases blindly the expert's assistance need not be resorted to. 10. Here, the trial Court adverting to the depositions of P.Ws.2 and 3 concerning the execution of the promissory note by the defendant, believed the version of the plaintiff-P.W.1. Since there are no material contradictions among the depositions of P.Ws.1 to 3, the trial Court gave a finding on fact that the pro-note was a genuine one. 11. The first appellate Court also considering the pro et contra confirmed the judgement of the trial Court. In such a case, I am of the considered view that in second appeal no interference with the finding of fact is warranted. 12. In this connection, I would like to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2012(8) SCC 148 [Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and another]; an excerpt from it would run thus: "59. Section 100 CPC provides for a second appeal only on the substantial question of law. Generally, a second appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. In SBI v. S.N. Goyal (2008) 8 SCC 92 , this Court explained the terms "substantial question of law" and observed as under: (SCC p.103, para 13) "13......The word "substantial" prefixed to 'question of law' does not refer to the stakes involved in the case, nor intended to refer only to questions of law of general importance, but refers to impact or effect of the question of law on the decision in the lis between the parties. 'Substantial questions of law' means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties ......any question of law which affects the final decision in a case is a substantial question of law as between the parties. 'Substantial questions of law' means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties ......any question of law which affects the final decision in a case is a substantial question of law as between the parties. A question of law which arises incidentally or collaterally, having no bearing on the final outcome, will not be a substantial question of law......There cannot, therefore, be a straitjacket definition as to when a substantial question of law arises in a case." (emphasis added) 13. In the same precedent, the following decisions are found referred to: (1) AIR 1962 SC 3314 [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mgf. Co. Ltd.] (2) (2011) 1 SCC 673 [Vijay Kumar Talwar v. CIT] (3) AIR 1947 PC 19 [Bibhabati Devi v. Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy] (4) (1949) 17 ITR 269 (Nag) [Suwalal Chhogalal v. CIT] (5) AIR 1957 SC 852 [Oriental Investment Co. Ltd. v. CIT] (6) AIR 192 SC 1604 [Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh] (7) (1996) 5 SCC 353 [Parativa Devi v. T.V.Krishnan] (8) (1998) 6 SCC 423 [Satya Gupta v. Brijesh Kumar] (9) AIR 2000 SC 534 [Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co.] (10) AIR 2000 SC 1261 [Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd.] (11) (2010) 11 SCC 483 [Bharatha Matha v. R.Vijaya Renganathan] (12) (2010) 12 SCC 740 [Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali] (13) (2002) 3 SCC 634 [Jai Singh v. Shakuntala] (14) (2008) 12 SCC 796 [Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh] 14. A perusal of the above precedents would connote and denote, exemplify and demonstrate that unless there is any substantial question of law is involved, the question of upsetting the findings of the courts below would not arise. 15. Keeping this in mind, if the judgments of both the fora below and the records are perused, it is crystal clear that the findings of both the courts below do not warrant any interference. 16. In the result, this second appeal is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is dismissed.