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2013 DIGILAW 1320 (MAD)

R. Thiyagarajan v. Secretary to the Government (Commercial Taxes)

2013-03-12

P.R.SHIVAKUMAR

body2013
JUDGMENT 1. The arguments advanced on both sides were heard. 2. The present writ petition has been filed against the order of the 1st respondent as the Appellate Authority under the Tamil Nadu Chit Funds Act, 1982 confirming the award passed by the second respondent as arbitrator in A.R.C.No.108/2000. The petitioner is said to be one of the guarantors for one Purushothaman, who has been projected as the prized subscriber of the chit, who later on, committed default in payment of the subscription for the subsequent months. The third respondent is the Chit Fund, which conducted the chit in question. The case was referred for arbitration to the second respondent based on the contention that the said Purushothaman (prized subscriber) failed to make payment of the subsequent installments after executing a promissory note for the said purpose. 3. According to the Chit Fund, the petitioner and two other persons stood as sureties for the prized subscriber Purushothaman. The alleged third surety Raja did not contest the arbitration proceedings. The petitioner herein and one Nagarajan appeared before the Arbitrator and contended that they had nothing to do with chit transaction and they did not sign any document as guarantors for Purushothaman. The second respondent, at the conclusion of the arbitral proceedings, passed an award on 05.04.2004 sustaining the claim of the third respondent herein. The said award was passed holding the said Purushothaman and the other persons projected as sureties liable to pay a sum of Rs.95,415/- (Rs.80,000/- towards principal and Rs.15,415/-towards interest) together with a subsequent interest at the rate of 12% per annum and also a sum of Rs.1,610/-towards cost. The said award passed by the second respondent was challenged by the petitioner by filing an appeal before the first respondent under section 70 of the Chit Funds Act. The first respondent passed an order dated 01.12.2006 confirming the award passed by the second respondent and dismissing the appeal. The said order is challenged in the present writ petition. 4. Mr. The first respondent passed an order dated 01.12.2006 confirming the award passed by the second respondent and dismissing the appeal. The said order is challenged in the present writ petition. 4. Mr. P. Raja, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the arbitrator, after reproducing the respective contentions of the parties, without adverting to the evidence adduced by the parties regarding the rival contentions, simply held that the opposite parties to the ARC were liable to pay the amount claimed by the third respondent herein; that such a conclusion was arrived at stating that the claim statement and other documents (without specifying what were the documents considered) were considered to arrive at such a conclusion and that the said order, though made in so many words, could not be termed a speaking order. 5. It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that when a statutory appeal is provided, the authority (the Arbitrator/second respondent herein) is expected in law to give reasons for his conclusion so that the same can be decided in appeal and that the finding recorded by the arbitrator can be nothing more than the ipse dixit of the arbitrator without supported by sufficient materials. It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of the Appellate Authority is even worse than the order of the Arbitrator in so far as the Appellate Authority, namely the first respondent, has made an attempt to justify the award of the Arbitrator by stating that the Arbitrator had compared the signatures of the appellant found in the disputed document with the signatures found in the admitted documents, which observation does not find a place anywhere in the award of the Arbitrator. Pointing out the said fact, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the order of the Appellate Authority shows pre-determination to confirm the award of the Arbitrator and it also does have traces of bias. 6. This court, after going through the entire award and the order of the Appellate Authority, is satisfied that the Order of the Appellate Authority shows pre-determination and somewhat biased in so far as the order refers to the comparison of the signature of the petitioner found in the disputed document with the signatures found in the admitted documents. 6. This court, after going through the entire award and the order of the Appellate Authority, is satisfied that the Order of the Appellate Authority shows pre-determination and somewhat biased in so far as the order refers to the comparison of the signature of the petitioner found in the disputed document with the signatures found in the admitted documents. The relevant passage found in the order of the Appellate Authority is extracted here under: "The counsel for the respondent has submitted that the prized subscriber and his sureties avoid the repayment of the amount legally due to the chit fund. The Registrar of Chits after carefully considering the statement of the respective parties and other available material records passed an award dated 5.4.04. The appellant and other sureties have been working in decent places and therefore the contentions raised in the memorandum of appeal are afterthought one to defeat the rights of this respondent. Neither the appellant nor his co-sureties ever disputed the execution of the documents in a manner known to law before appropriate forum. The subject matter was pending before the Registrar for more than 4 years and significantly all the parties to the transaction were represented by the same counsel before the Registrar. Hence the contention of the appellant is not only frivolous but devoid of any merits." It will be seen, from the last two sentences of the paragraph extracted above, that the Appellate Authority was carried away by the fact that the appellant and the other opposite parties in the ARC were represented by one and the same advocate. The same proved to be the basis of bias. Hence this court does have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the order of the Appellate Authority is vitiated. For all the reasons stated above, this court comes to the conclusion that the Writ Petition is bound to be allowed setting aside the order of the Appellate Authority confirming the award of the second respondent. The award of the arbitrator is liable to be set aside, as the same does not state the reasons for the conclusion arrived at. For all the reasons stated above, this court comes to the conclusion that the Writ Petition is bound to be allowed setting aside the order of the Appellate Authority confirming the award of the second respondent. The award of the arbitrator is liable to be set aside, as the same does not state the reasons for the conclusion arrived at. Hence this court deems it appropriate to set aside the award passed by the 2nd respondent, which was confirmed by the order of the first respondent and direct the 2nd respondent (Arbitrator) to take up the ARC for fresh disposal and dispose the same after affording opportunity to all the parties. 7. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The order of the appellate authority confirming the award of the arbitrator is set aside. The Award of the Arbitration is also set aside and the matter is remitted back to the 2nd respondent (Arbitrator) for fresh disposal after affording opportunity to all the parties, within six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No cost. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.